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Abstract 
 
This research argues for recognition of the importance of cultural industries and cultural 
diversity and their special treatment by competition law.  It uses the record industry as a 
tool to demonstrate how independent music labels contribute to diversity in a record 
business dominated by four major players.  Whilst some scholars have advocated the 
inclusion of cultural issues under competition law, no concrete suggestions have been 
made as to how exactly to do that and no study has been made to determine what pitfalls 
may lay in doing so.  This thesis deals with the lacuna by adopting a number of 
approaches and shows why cultural industries require special protection by competition 
law. The aforesaid is the unique feature of this thesis, which should help bridge the 
existing gap between theory and practice. 
 
In order to address the research question, a three-stranded methodological approach is 
utilised.  Firstly, the historical analysis demonstrates the different competitive dynamics 
of the record industry since its inception, and it shows that musical diversity generally 
increased when the industry concentration was low.  Secondly, the legal analysis 
focuses on the EU merger test and Article 81 of the EC Treaty; the US approach is also 
analysed for comparative purposes.  Legal analysis examines how competition law has 
dealt with the regulation of competitive dynamics in the record industry, drawing 
analysis from a number of mergers and acquisitions, most notably the merger wrangling 
between Sony and BMG lasting for 5 years overall.  Thirdly, qualitative interviews 
probe into why independent labels are important and what effect the recent mergers had 
on the independent sector. 
 
The main finding of this study is that cultural diversity can be incorporated into the EU 
merger test as well as Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty as a non-competition concern and 
therefore should be taken into account by decision-makers.
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“Life is not so idiotically mathematical that 
only the big eat the small; it is just as common 
for a bee to kill a lion or at least to drive it 
mad”. 
 
August Strindberg1 
 
“Music, of all the liberal arts, has the greatest 
influence over the passions, and it is that to 
which the legislator ought to give the greatest 
encouragement”. 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This study focuses upon whether or not cultural industries3 deserve special treatment by 
competition law and if so, to what extent competition law has thus far managed to 
protect cultural diversity?  The research seeks to demonstrate that competition law 
should treat cultural industries as a special case because the law has so far failed in 
preventing high concentration within them, in turn leading to the reduction of cultural 
diversity, which in terms of this study embraces the diversity of both products and 
producers.4  The record industry is used as a vehicle to demonstrate and prove the 
argument.  
 
The work is based on the most up-to-date opinions of scholars and leading figures 
within the record industry.  Its uniqueness and originality lie in the fact that I5 argue in 
favour of the incorporation of non-price and non-economic considerations into the new 
merger test and Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty to protect the diversity of producers, and 
thus, cultural diversity.  Also challenged are some of the perceived stigmas and 
stereotypes of major and independent labels.  For example, the ideas of majors caring 
only about their profits and independents caring only about music and artists are 
examined; such clichés are put to the test.  The backdrop to this study is that 
                                                
1 August Strindberg, Miss Julie, translated by Michael Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 57. 
2 Also cited in Tryon Edwards, A Dictionary of Thoughts (Warwick: Read Books, 2008), 367. 
3 For the definition of cultural industries see Section 1.1. 
4 For the detailed analysis of cultural diversity see Section 1.7. 
5 Although it is more normal to use the third person, as this study comes from the ethnographic tradition, 
the first person approach to writing was adopted where necessary. 
 11 
competition law’s effect on cultural industries has been previously under-researched; 
this work seeks to remedy the situation and contribute to both the academic debate and 
the application of competition law in practice. 
 
This introduction presents an overview of the research problem, an indication as to why 
the problem was worth exploring and what contribution the proposed study will make to 
theory and practice.  Additionally the context for the thesis as a whole is set. 
 
The rationale for the research question and the study was to evaluate the impact of 
competition law on cultural industries and diversity, with the synopsis of the arguments 
being that culture and cultural products should not be treated by law in the same way as 
for example, chemical, commodities or car industries; and that competition law has 
failed in protecting cultural industries exactly for this very reason; because it applies the 
same legal tests (price competition) when regulating cultural industries.  The study 
illustrates that it is actually non-price or non-economics based competition that is more 
important and relevant than price competition when assessing the concentration levels 
within cultural industries.   
 
Before going into further explanation of the research, I would like to explain what 
inspired me to carry out this work.  Back in 2003, one of my favourite bands, Simply 
Red, released their new album on their own label after leaving a major label, East/West 
(an imprint of Warner Records).  That was one of the first successful examples in the 
digital age of an established artist leaving a major record company to start his own risky 
venture, and understandably it generated vast media interest.  This prompted my initial 
interest and I questioned why an established artist or band would ever want to leave 
such a ‘safe harbour’ like a major record company?  Being a big fan of modern 
mainstream culture, I also appreciate that there is a lot more great art out there that 
audiences do not have a chance to hear or see.  For example, the big seven Hollywood 
studios dominate 90 percent of European screens.6  Therefore, the usually high quality 
independent films tend not to be played on European mainstream TV and cinema 
screens.7  Obviously, there is always an exception,8 but it is not to society’s benefit that 
                                                
6 Christophe Germann, “Content Industries and Cultural Diversity: The Case of Motion Pictures,” in 
Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination, ed. Bernd Hamm and 
Russell Smandych (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2005), 93. 
7 This should be seen in contrast to the US, where less than 3 percent of foreign films are shown in 
cinemas and on TV.  id., at p. 93. 
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such things happen to be the exceptions rather than the rules.  Hence, my other main 
query with respect to music was why do both radio and television broadcast a limited 
number of artists and what effect does this limitation have on cultural diversity?  That 
question had to be considered in the light of a huge wave of mergers and acquisitions in 
the record industry during 2004 – 2008 alone.  
 
I embarked on this research in 2004, and I like to think that it crystallised into a study 
that contributes to both theory and practice.  In 2005 I started working in the record 
industry as a researcher, and afterwards as an artist manager.  The experience expanded 
my horizons and eased my access to leading music industry experts.   
 
Ironically, these events evolved around 2004 when the two out of the then five major 
record companies, Sony and BMG, merged their businesses with the blessing of the 
European Competition Commission (hereinafter, the Commission), generating an outcry 
from the independent label sector.  What I could not predict was that this very merger 
would be used in the study as an example to help me answer the research question.  At 
the time, independents showed their teeth by successfully opposing the merger at the 
Court of First Instance (hereinafter, the CFI) at the European level in 2006, but 
SonyBMG could not give up without a fight, which culminated in the second approval 
of the merger by the Commission in 2007.  In 2008, as I was approaching the 
submission date, Sony acquired a 50 percent stake in BMG.  The described wrangling 
allows one to appreciate the uncertainty I faced when carrying out this research.  
Serendipitously, help came with the investigation of this very merger by the European 
Parliament, which wanted to look into the effect of the merger on small businesses in 
the cultural sector and diversity of cultural products.  The European Parliament, 
showing particular interest in cultural diversity and the merger between Sony and BMG 
timely coincided with my research, and gave it a much wider perspective.  
 
Despite the fact that there has been a lot of media coverage of the Sony/BMG merger, it 
became evident that no sustained work had been carried out on whether competition law 
should be used as an instrument to regulate cultural industries.  There has been a vast 
amount of research conducted concerning the connection between the concentration of 
                                                
8 For example the Curzon Cinema in London, that specialises in non-mainstream movies. 
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cultural industries and its effect on diversity levels, but that is a different research 
question.   
 
It is important to note that this work is not intended to be a ‘bashing big business’ 
treatise.  Indeed, some even argue that big corporations are integral to the existence of 
popular music,9 although today the Internet and new technologies do exert a 
democratising influence.  All in all for better competitive dynamics, big business should 
be able to co-exist with small business.  However, this study argues that the market 
share and power of four record companies, Universal, Warner, EMI and Sony (currently 
75 percent of the market share worldwide) have to be balanced in the interests of 
cultural diversity and consequently, the public. 
 
As the nature of this research presents both legal and sociological insights, the study 
begins with Chapter 1, Orientation and Context, which introduces the antecedents of 
academic opinions on cultural industries, the value of cultural diversity, and the legal 
underpinnings of the study.  Chapter 1 explains what cultural industries are, by 
combining related insights from the production and consumption of culture.  Also 
illustrated is that the consumption patterns in the modern record industry are more 
complicated than presumed without a thorough, in-depth study.  The review in addition 
shows that in many industries, especially cultural industries, innovation and diversity 
are prominent features of the competitive process and are closely related to 
concentration levels.  Hence, it was necessary to investigate the connection between 
market structure and diversity.  The majority of the research carried out by other 
scholars indicates that high concentration within cultural industries, the record industry 
in this particular case, is inversely correlated with levels of diversity, i.e. the higher the 
concentration, the lower the diversity.  
 
Chapter 2, Methodology, gives both a theoretical background presentation and the 
method utilised and follows the introduction to the main issues described in Chapter 1.  
The three-stranded approach to the research is described: historical study, legal study, 
and interviews.  
 
                                                
9 Jon Stratton, “Capitalism and Romantic Ideology in the Record Business.” Popular Music 3 (1983): 
143. 
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As this research is focused on the record industry, Chapter 3, History of Competitive 
Dynamics and Growth in the Record Industry, takes the reader through the various 
competitive dynamics pertinent to the industry, both backing up the research provided 
in Chapter 1 and proving that in practice, music diversity diminished when industry 
concentration was high.  This historical background is a unique study because the 
description illustrates the different evolutionary stages of the record industry that were 
tied in with corresponding competitive dynamics, i.e. oligopolistic and competitive 
market structures.  Also underlined are the crucial differences between big and small 
businesses in the record industry.  The position taken is that the majority of independent 
labels are qualitatively different from major record companies.  Later, this very 
argument is used to show that the diversity of products and producers need to be 
protected by competition law.  Finally, Chapter 3 also highlights the importance of 
small and medium-sized businesses in the record industry, elucidating why competition 
law should protect the diversity of producers. 
 
Since the crux of this study is the high concentration apparent in the record industry, it 
was deemed necessary to investigate what was and still is, the main reason for majors to 
merge with each other and acquire independents.  Whilst competition law is a major 
part of the thesis, the central underpinning of the record industry is intellectual property.  
As such there is a synergy between competition law and the idea of protecting diversity 
in relation to intellectual property.  To fully understand the competition aspects of the 
record industry, it is first necessary to deal with intellectual property as far as the record 
industry is concerned.  It is important to note that the record industry is based on 
copyright creation, acquisition, and rights transfers.  These elements are dealt with in 
Chapter 4, The Rationale behind Mergers and Acquisitions and Resultant Anti-
competitive Behaviour, which firstly analyses the role of copyright in the consolidation 
process and the way that both majors and independents approach the extension of 
copyrights in sound recordings.  The chapter also highlights the polarised aims of the 
competition and copyright legal regimes, with the former seeking to prevent 
monopolies, whilst the latter actually granting monopoly rights.  Following the analysis 
of copyright’s role in giving majors market power, other reasons for mergers and 
acquisitions in the record industry are provided.  
 
The fact that four major record companies with a market share of 75 percent dominate 
the recorded industry market is not a problem in terms of competition law (it is 
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problematic though in terms of diversity).  Rather it is the fact that majors might abuse 
this market power that warrants an investigation.  In this respect it is important to 
illustrate examples of anti-competitive behaviour that major record companies have 
exercised in the past and still do exercise at present.   
 
Following on, the legal safeguards in protecting cultural diversity are analysed in 
Chapter 5, Past and Existing Jurisprudence in Merger Regulation, which firstly 
considers the account of the past merger test.10  Every single merger decision in terms 
of the record industry in the EU to date has been based on that test.  Furthermore, the 
new merger test is analysed to hypothesise its capability to deal with cultural industries 
in the future.  As major and numerous independent labels span across the United States 
too, for the sake of comparison, the US merger test was also assessed to investigate if it 
was better suited to deal with cultural issues.  The chapter proceeds to critically analyse 
the merger between Sony and BMG allowed by the Commission in 2004 as well as its 
annulment by the Court of First Instance in 2006 and its second approval by the 
Commission in 2007.  The analyses of these rulings contain the first strand of criticism 
as to the way the Commission applied the past merger test (the second strand of 
criticism is contained in the Conclusion).  These unique analyses are, in addition, used 
as a necessary base to explain in Conclusion why the Commission should take on board 
non-price or non-economic considerations when dealing with cultural industries.  To 
date, investigation of the above case law has been very sparse and this thesis will add 
considerably to the pool of knowledge in the area. 
 
Having assessed the jurisprudence under the merger regulation, Chapter 6, Articles 81 
& 82 of the EC Treaty and Other Legal Tools Accommodating the Diversity of Products 
and Producers, proceeds to investigate to what extent those avenues could protect 
cultural diversity, small businesses, and consumers.  Article 82 is only briefly assessed 
because it was effectively made more or less defunct by the new merger regulation.11  
                                                
10 The submission of the thesis took place before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on the 1st 
December 2009.  Most of the substantive provisions of the EC Treaty remain unchanged. However, it 
made some changes to both the terminology and the numbering of key provisions.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
replaced all references to ‘European Community’ by ‘European Union’.  The EC Treaty has been 
renamed as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the TFEU).  The European Court of 
Justice is now known as the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of First Instance has 
been renamed as the General Court.  Article 81 of the TFEU was re-numbered to now be Article 101, 
whilst Article 82 was re-numbered to now be Article 102.  
11 The new merger regulation introduced the collective dominance test, which arguably replaced the 
dominance test under Article 82 (collective dominance test is analysed in Chapter 5).  
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Article 81, however, is analysed in far greater detail exploring, by analogy, the book 
price-fixing system in terms of whether or not such non-economic considerations as 
cultural issues could and should be taken on board under Article 81 when dealing with 
cultural industries. 
 
Finally, the Conclusion contains the findings supporting the assumption that 
competition law fails in preventing the high consolidation of cultural industries.  
Following on, the Conclusion sums up the criticism related to the existing merger 
regulation test itself.  This line of criticism is backed up by the second approval of the 
Commission of the Sony/BMG merger in 2007 and its investigations by the European 
Parliament and its Culture Committee in late 2007 and 2008.  The study concludes that 
it is incorrect for both the Commission and the CFI to apply the existing merger test that 
only takes into account price-based competition, which is to a greater degree irrelevant 
to the record industry in the digital age.  The analyses contained in all the previous 
chapters support the finding of this study, namely that competition law, i.e. its merger 
test and Article 81 of the EC Treaty, should take on board non-price competition and 
non-economic considerations when dealing with cultural industries as those are more 
relevant to the industry.  Following that, possible ways to modify and improve the 
existing merger test and Article 81 are discussed.  Finally, some concluding remarks 
suggesting other, informed ways to diminish the high concentration of cultural 
industries, are provided.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Orientation and Context  
 
 
Before looking into the theoretical issues, it is necessary to consider some of the 
guiding threads, i.e. the academic work around cultural industries, diversity, and 
regulation.  Clarifying the relationship between the study and previous work conducted 
on the topic will also help to further demonstrate why the proposed study is both 
important and timely.  Explained in this chapter is how the study is distinctive and 
different from previous research by unpacking the main concepts that penetrate the 
work; namely cultural industries, cultural products, cultural production and 
consumption, diversity, globalisation and regulation.  Also explained is why cultural 
industries are of a specific nature and deserve special treatment by competition law.  
The review is conducted within the context of contemporary debates and places 
historical work in its context. 
 
1.1. Cultural Industries: Definition and Significance 
 
As a starting point, the meaning of culture, along with its importance and place, should 
be defined.  Etymology indicates that the word ‘culture’ refers to the cultivation of the 
soil; 12 ‘cultura’ has its roots in Latin ‘colere’ – to cultivate.  From the fourteenth 
century until the present day the meaning of culture has spread to other areas, including 
the development of human subjectivity and the intellect.13  Evidently, the concept of 
culture is associated not only with intellect but also with numerous manifestations of 
individual endeavours.  As Raymond Williams noted “the modern history of the 
concept of culture is in fact a history of the search for such a concept”.14  Particularly 
today, culture may mean beliefs, dress, religion, manners, and other attitudes to life, e.g. 
gun culture.  However, in terms of this thesis ‘culture’ signifies the arts: music, art, 
books, films etc.  Defining culture in this sense can be problematic but not impossible.  
For example, Simon During defined culture “...not as a thing or even a system but a set 
of transactions out of which music, poems and films are produced, to be experienced 
and given meaning and value in different ways”,15 whilst Matthew Arnold gave his 
                                                
12 David Throsby, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), 3.  
13 id., at p. 3. 
14 Raymond Williams, Culture (London: Fontana, 1981), 206. 
15 Simon During, Cultural Studies: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2005), 6. 
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wide view of culture as “the best that has been thought and said in the world”.16  
Therefore, to this day culture (arts) is strongly connected with the cultivation of the 
mind and has a great impact on society.   
 
Having considered the meaning of culture in terms of this thesis, the next step is to find 
out what is meant by another notion - ‘cultural industries’.  Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School first coined the term ‘culture industries’, which 
presents the foundation of this study, in 1947.   For the purpose of this study however, 
the more modern version of the term, cultural industries, is used instead.17  The 
backdrop to cultural industries is that businesses, be they big or small, connect a cultural 
product with its consumer, hoping to make a profit.  This shift in cultural production 
from an almost ‘cottage industry’ stage to an industrial stage is in itself problematic and 
is referred to as the commodification18 of cultural forms such as film, radio, books and 
music.  Indeed, the term ‘cultural industries’ already arguably contains a contradictory 
relationship between creative forces and industrial production.  The industrialisation of 
culture can be described as a process by which “... massive market interests have come 
to dominate an area of life which, until recently, was dominated by individuals 
themselves”.19  In addition to industrialisation, two other problem areas pertaining to 
cultural industries are: firstly, the high concentration of market power in a handful of 
players and secondly, their globalisation as the cultural sector for the past century has 
constantly been absorbed into large industrial conglomerates.  Consequently, in order to 
survive, large cultural firms have to adapt to business logic, with the most prominent 
one being the economies of scale.  These economies lead to the standardisation of 
cultural products; thus financial gain becomes the “raison d’etre” of cultural industries.  
The duality of cultural practice in the modern age is expressed in that “culture is itself a 
discourse of capitalist practice”.20  This explains why the relationship between popular 
culture and commerce is so problematic21 and is one of the themes that run throughout 
this study.   
                                                
16  Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 7. 
17 In the UK the government’s preferred term is ‘creative’ industries.  See for example, Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport, “UK Creative Industries Mapping Document.” (1998). 
18 This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
19 Anthony Briggs, “Fisher Memorial Lecture.” University of Adelaide, 1960.  Also cited in Nicholas 
Garnham, “Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass-communication.” Media, Culture and Society 1 
(1979): 145-146. 
20 Stratton, supra, n. 9, at p. 145. 
21 See for example, Francesca Martin, “Get in Tune with Pop Culture if You Want to Survive, BBC2’s 
Culture Show Told,” The Guardian, February 14, 2007. 
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In producing their theory of cultural industries, Adorno and Horkheimer borrowed from 
Freud, the deep-rooted psychological and socio-economic conflict (in that individuals 
will oppose social demands that appear to be repressive) and from Marx, the idea of 
capital.22  Being the first to highlight the interplay between culture and capital as 
important and problematic, they emphasised the transformation of culture by both the 
technology and the ideology of capitalism, specifically the ever-increasing desire of 
profit making was transferred “naked onto cultural forms”.23  The record industry too 
was no exception to this philosophy with records being produced by major record 
companies with the sole aim of making a profit.  Even in his later works, Adorno kept 
insisting, “the venerable profit motives of culture have overgrown the whole culture like 
a fungus”.24   
 
The point that Adorno and Horkheimer emphasised was that a previously independent 
sphere such as culture, became industrialised and instrumental in the hands of highly 
concentrated cultural industries indicating the book, film and record industries.  Thus 
culture, previously “a source of edification, the building of human potential, turned into 
a machinery of control, whose main goal was the expenditure of resources in the 
interests of the financial profitability of corporate oligopolies”.25  This view highlights 
the danger that culture, previously associated with the cultivation of the mind, became 
objective like other products.  The relationship between cultivation of the human mind 
and financial gain has become the central theme in the critique of cultural industries: in 
chasing mass markets, diversity suffers.26   
 
Having said that, not all scholars have been unanimous in their negative assessment of 
cultural industries.  It seems that Throsby was one of the few cultural theorists who 
believed that the term ‘cultural industries’ should have not “... implied any ideological 
or pejorative judgment, or any economic motive on the industry participants”.27   
 
                                                
22 Deborah Cook, The Culture Industry Revisited: Theodor W. Adorno on Mass Culture (London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 1. 
23 Theodor W. Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered.” New German Critique 6 (1975): 13. 
24 Theodor W. Adorno, “Theory of Pseudo-Culture.” Telos 95 (Spring 1959): 27. 
25 Scott Lash and Celia Lury, Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2007), 2. 
26 Paul DiMaggio, “Can Culture Survive the Marketplace?” The Journal of Arts Management and Law 
13, no.1 (1983): 84. 
27 Throsby, supra, n. 12, at p. 111.  
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Going back to Adorno, he expressed great concern at the way culture was produced and 
he was not alone in this view.  Other scholars echoed Adorno’s concerns; most notable 
of those was F.R. Leavis whose predicament was that he saw culture in crisis.28  
However, his idea of “civilisation and culture coming to be antithetical terms”29 seems 
too radical.  Another scholar, Antonio Gramsci, inspired by Marx’s ideas, also linked 
economic production with cultural theories.  In his article Americanism and Fordism,30 
he compared the methods of mass production in cultural industries with the conveyer 
type methods used in car manufacturing by the Ford Motor Company.  Gramsci argued 
that it was the system of mass production employed by Ford that led to the 
transformation of a culture, resulting in its commodification.  However, the modern 
view of cultural production has shifted towards post-Fordism, i.e. after the 1970s, 
cultural corporations began outsourcing ideas as well as staff from other craft-based 
enterprises (further discussed in Chapter 3).31  That aforesaid scenario prompted the 
point of view espoused by academics that any analysis of culture would only be 
pertinent if the study was carried out considering the parallels of those who manufacture 
cultural products.32   
 
Since then, a different way of looking at culture within a broader economic sense has 
emerged.  For example, Jean Baudrillard33 located culture in a shifting universe of 
tangible and intangible social and economic phenomena.  The world of economics, 
according to Baudrillard, inseparably combined culture and capital.  The view, to a 
degree, finds support in this thesis. 
 
                                                
28 Frank Raymond Leavis, Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture (Cambridge: The Minority Press, 
1930), 4. 
29 id., at p. 26. 
30 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), 277 - 
318; Kenneth Thompson, “Regulation, De-regulation and Re-regulation,” in Media and Cultural 
Regulation, ed. Kenneth Thompson (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 15. 
31 David Hesmondhalgh, “Flexibility, post-Fordism and the Music Industries.” Media, Culture & Society 
18 (1996). 
32 See Keith Negus, “Cultural Production and the Corporation: Musical Genres and the Strategic 
Management of Creativity in the US Recording Industry.” Media, Culture and Society 20 (1998): 359; 
Douglas Gomery, The Hollywood Studio System (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); David Bordwell 
and Janet Staiger, “Technology, Style and Mode of Production,” in The Classical Hollywood Cinema: 
Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960, ed. David Bordwell et al. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1985), 474; James Robbins, “Organization as Strategy: Restructuring Production in Film Industry.” 
Strategic Management Journal 14 (1993): 103.    
33 Jean Baudrillard, “The System of Objects,” in Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 13; Jean Baudrillard, “The Consumer Society,” in Selected Writings, ed. Mark 
Poster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 32. 
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One of the arguments that dominate this study is that cultural industries are different 
and therefore, should be treated differently by the competition legislation and 
authorities, from say, the automobile, textile, and oil industries.  The argument then asks 
the question of what makes those industries so different?  Indeed their importance is 
that they provide education, enlightenment, cultivation of self-determination and 
individuality, as well as value formation.  Both the importance of cultural industries and 
their special status was re-emphasised by F.R. Leavis in his seminal work, Mass 
Civilisation and Minority Culture:  
 
“If the worst effects of mass-production and standardisation were represented by 
Woolworth’s there would be no need to despair.  But there are effects that touch the life 
of the community more seriously….  When we consider, for instance, the processes of 
mass-production and standardisation in the form represented by the Press, it becomes 
obviously of sinister significance that they should be accompanied by a process of 
levelling down”.34 
 
Therefore, the protection of cultural industries, namely the diversity of their products 
and producers, represents a legitimate task.  The next issue concerning the above is that 
of understanding the nature of cultural industry products.  The explanation below 
should be borne in mind during the later discussion on the complexity and dual nature 
of cultural products (see Chapter 6). 
 
1.2. Cultural Products 
 
As demonstrated above, the basis of cultural industries is that of culture becoming an 
industrialised economic activity as the result of mass production and standardisation of 
cultural products.  Indeed, in ancient and medieval times as well as during the early 
stages of capitalism, the output of culture was referred to as art, music, paintings, and 
literature.  In modern times, the preferred descriptions for all of those activities are 
cultural products, goods or even services.  In this respect, the situation does beg the 
question of what are cultural products and what makes them so different from pure 
industrial products?  Article 4 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation’s (hereinafter, UNESCO) Convention on Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions35 defines cultural products as those that “embody or convey cultural 
                                                
34 Leavis, supra, n. 28, at pp. 7 – 8. 
35 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, October 20, 
2005. 
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expressions, irrespective of the commercial value they may have”.  This study argues 
that cultural products (films, TV programmes, music, books etc.) are different from 
commodity products in that “they serve a cultural function as opposed to a material 
one”.36  Fiske provided a good example of this by comparing jeans with music: in the 
case of jeans, their main function is to be utilitarian and fashionable, music however 
appeals to more personal emotions.37  Therefore, the main difference lies in the 
emphasis one makes on either money or spiritual and emotional values and meanings.  
Hirsch echoed Fiske by arguing that cultural products have “a non-material nature, 
directed at mass consumption, serving an aesthetic rather than a clearly utilitarian 
purpose”.38  David Throsby suggested that cultural products are the ones that possess 
the following characteristics:39 
 
• They should carry a creative element in their production. 
• They should embody a symbolic meaning when consumed. 
• They should possess some form of intellectual property, for example copyrights. 
 
Therefore, cultural products should be valued for their ‘originality and uniqueness’40: 
“every book must have an author, every score a composer, every film a writer, director 
and cast of actors, unlike cans of peaches, lines of cars and shirts on a shop rack where 
the direct producers of these commodities are entirely unknown to their purchasers”.41  
Cultural products are important as they provide so-called ‘social cement’ and are 
responsible for critical faculties and value development.  Arguably, cultural products 
should not solely be for entertainment as they bear an ideological meaning too.  They 
cannot be qualified as “a pure content neutral merchandise, but must also be considered 
as a vehicle to carry ideas, ideologies, opinions and values”.42   
 
However, there are a number of problematic areas in respect to cultural products.  
Whilst the products can communicate values and emotions directly across many 
listeners, viewers and readers, there exists a diametrically opposed force; 
                                                
36 John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture (Routledge: London, 1989), 11, 26-27. 
37 id., at p. 11. 
38 Paul Hirsch, “Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organisation – Set Analysis of Cultural Industry 
Systems.”  The American Journal of Sociology 77, no. 4 (1972): 641.  
39 Throsby, supra, n. 12, at p. 4. 
40 Bill Ryan, Making Capital from Culture: The Corporate Form of Capitalist Cultural Production 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 28. 
41 id., at p. 45. 
42 Germann, supra, n. 6, at p. 94. 
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commodification, which both restricts and controls the circulation of cultural products.43  
The following study will demonstrate, that there is a vast amount of music being 
recorded and released every day but only a minute proportion of it is being heard.  
Another problem with cultural products is that there is a lack of consensus as to the 
measurement of their quality and diversity44 (this is discussed below).  This uncertainty 
in measurement actually stems from the terms ‘culture’ because it is a qualitative 
concept that does not provide precise definitions.  To many, culture means different 
things.  However, even though some may say that it is difficult to define the word 
‘culture’, in this research it is argued that culture may be divided into separate 
constituent parts and music, for example, is one of them.  Similarly, the record industry 
does represent a definable part of cultural industries and can easily qualify as a purveyor 
of these products. 
 
Another important feature of cultural products worthy of mention in this study is that 
they are not separable from the act of producing.  This fact is the backbone to the thesis 
because the numerous record labels are the agents of production; they are not the artists 
themselves.  It would be incomplete to consider only the artists as part of the cultural 
show, leaving out the producers.  This is a conceptual issue because in this study record 
labels are argued to be associated with the protection of cultural diversity.  It is not 
exactly uncontroversial to consider the record companies as part of the cultural diversity 
issue as there are many other agents in the record making chain, e.g. sound engineers 
and accountants.  However, these other agents do not have a say as to the shape, the 
nature and the product itself like the record labels.   
 
This section has explained the nature of cultural products and has indicated the link 
between cultural products and the act of production.  The next section will explore the 
link between culture and economics and show how strongly they are connected in the 
modern age but that culture should, nevertheless be protected for its cultural, not its 
economic value. 
 
                                                
43 Michael Featherstone, Consumer Culture & Postmodernism (London: Sage, 1991), 17. 
44 Joe Lampel et al, “Balancing Act: Learning from Organising Practices in Cultural Industries”. 
Organization Science 11, no. 3 (2000): 268. 
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1.3. The (Im)perfect Markets of Cultural Industries 
 
Unsurprisingly, the record industry generates many debates concerning commercialism.  
The potential for making profits within the industry is huge and as Garnham observed, 
under capitalism, economics determine everything.45  The prevalent academic opinions 
find the economy to be in some way at odds with culture but the reality is that it is 
vitally important, especially in this industry, that both the economic and the cultural 
analyses are considered and thus analysed together.  For example, there has always been 
an attempt to connect cultural industries with the economy and their importance for the 
Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter, GDP) or Gross Value Added (hereinafter, 
GVA).46  The position is evident in the DCMS’ Mapping Document, which states, “the 
creative industries occupy an increasingly important place within the national economy; 
however their importance is not yet widely recognised”47 (the economic importance of 
the record industry is discussed further in Chapter 3).  
 
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, on the one hand the term ‘cultural 
industries’ carries with it a quantitative dimension in terms of profit making and other 
economic benefits, e.g. generating employment opportunities.48  On the other hand, the 
term contains a qualitative category - culture.  The idea of art or culture becoming 
industrialised is difficult to reconcile; the fact that such industrialisation does exist 
focuses attention on the way cultural products are produced and disseminated.49  
 
The juxtaposition between art and capital in cultural industries has always been a heated 
topic amongst scholars.  For example, Garnham insisted that cultural industries’ 
industrialisation being a direct result of capitalism, should be acknowledged.  In proving 
his point, he borrowed Marx’s notion of base and superstructure claiming that “the 
cultural superstructure was dependent upon and determined by the base”50 and the 
former had collapsed into the economic base: “under monopoly capitalism the 
                                                
45 Garnham, supra, n. 19, at p. 125. 
46 Cultural industries make a contribution of about 8 percent of GDP to the UK’s economy.  Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport, “New Proposals to Boost the Creative Economy.” (2006); Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport, “Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee 
Report into New Media and the Creative Industries.” (2006), at p. 1; and Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport, “Creative Industries Economic Estimates Statistical Bulletin.” (2009): 1 – 15. 
47 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, supra, n. 17. 
48 Throsby, supra, n. 12, at p. 111. 
49 id. 
50 Garnham, supra, n. 19, at p. 126. 
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superstructure becomes precisely industrialised”.51  However, some disagree with such 
an approach.  For example, Kenneth Thompson argued that culture enjoyed “some 
relative autonomy”52 from economic forces.  DiMaggio also pointed out that “...we need 
not worry about the survival of culture, because culture always survives.  What we 
really are concerned about is the sort of culture that will survive”.53  Overall though, it 
is not disputed that economic factors have played a significant role in the production of 
culture for the past 50 years.  
 
The brief analysis above demonstrates the fraught relationship between culture and 
economics in the modern age.  The opinion of Ruth Towse is of particular interest in 
this respect: cultural industries should be protected for their cultural not their economic 
potential.54  Towse rightly saw no point in making certain areas of cultural industries 
protected solely because of their economic might.55  This view will be addressed again 
in the concluding remarks of the thesis. 
 
The investigation into the production patterns of cultural industries and their economic 
power has outlined the pessimistic conclusions reached by cultural elitists as to how 
corporations exercise their power over consumers.  However, what should not be 
forgotten is the human factor.56  Therefore, the following section investigates the 
consumption patterns in cultural industries.  
 
1.4. Always Mass Consumption? 
 
Having reviewed the literature in relation to consumption patterns, it is obvious that 
there is a dualism in the notion of mass-culture consumption.  Whilst one small camp 
(cultural optimists)57 believes that if a consumer wants to find something non-
                                                
51 id., at p. 130. 
52 Thompson, supra, n. 30, at pp. 11, 29. 
53 DiMaggio, supra, n. 26, at p. 65. 
54 Ruth Towse, “Cultural Economics, Copyright and the Cultural Industries” (2000), 107.  Conference 
paper for “the Long Run” at Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
55 id. 
56 Keith Negus, Music Genres and Corporate Cultures (London, Routledge, 1999), 15 - 17.  
57 The cultural optimists are represented by scholars such as Tyler Cowen and Herbert Gans.  For more 
details see Herbert J. Gans, Popular Culture and High Culture (York: Basic Books, 1999) and Tyler 
Cowen, In Praise of Commercial Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).  
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mainstream, he or she will always find it; the others (cultural pessimists)58 insist that the 
general public will always accept and only buy what is on offer from an oligopolistic 
cultural industry.  
 
It would be incorrect to brand modern culture as good or bad.  Cultural appreciation is 
indeed subjective.  Interestingly, as a counter argument to the cultural pessimists’ idea 
that large corporations are anathema to real culture, they are confronted with the   
rock’n’roll phenomenon of the mid 1950s.  Even though some cultural optimists 
provide over-glorified opinions on the state of modern culture, they are right in that not 
all modern culture released by multi-national corporations is bad.  The argument can be 
supported by the fact that, for instance, the Beatles and Barbra Streisand have moved 
into a different league of popular culture.59  More importantly, as this study emphasises, 
modern culture is not just about pop or rock music released by big corporations.  There 
is much more to modern culture, e.g. alternative and high-quality music released by 
numerous independent labels, proving the point that consumers are not ‘dummies’.  
This topic generates heated debates as to whether or not cultural industries indeed 
absorb every single consumer.60  Some opined that only an educated minority of 
consumers could soak up culture: “it is upon a very small minority that the discerning 
appreciation of art and literature depends; it is… only a few who are capable of 
unprompted, first-hand judgment”.61  In other words, not everybody can understand the 
philosophy of Kafka and listen to Shostakovich.  Another point of view, albeit extreme, 
that is often suggested is that the consumption patterns are limited to the fact that 
consumers are ‘cultural dupes’, or as Marcuse called them, ‘one-dimensional men’.62  
Dwight Macdonald echoes those concerns by noting that:  
 
“Mass culture is imposed from above.  It is fabricated by technicians hired by 
businessmen; its audience are passive consumers, their participation limited to the choice 
between buying and not buying.  The Lords of kitsch, in short, exploit the cultural needs 
of the masses in order to make a profit and/or to maintain their class rule”.63 
 
                                                
58 The cultural pessimists are represented by Adorno, Horkheimer, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Jacques Ellul, 
Russel Kirk, Irving Howe, Bernard Rosenberg, Herbet Marcuse and Dwight Macdonald. The speculative 
estimate affords concluding that the number of cultural pessimists is larger than the number of cultural 
optimists.  For more details see Herbert Marcuse, One- Dimensional Man (London: Sphere, 1968), 92. 
59 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (New York: Dell, 1966), 26. 
60 See for example, Cowen, supra, n. 57. 
61 Leavis, supra, n. 28, at pp. 3, 4. 
62 Marcuse, supra, n. 58. 
63 Dwight Macdonald, “A Theory of Mass Culture,” in Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, 
ed. John Storey (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall, 1998), 23. 
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The ‘industrialisation of the mind’64 does have a huge impact on human consciousness.  
The way people take and use music is not an uncomplicated process though, to suppose 
that musical appetites just pander to the machinations of producers is too 
unsophisticated.65  Not all consumers acquire cultural products from supermarkets, top 
bookselling chains, or the four largest record companies.  Storey is a proponent of the 
fact that consumers are not gullible dummies that are being force-fed by the cultural 
industries: “culture is not something ready-made which we consume, culture is what we 
make in the varied practices of consumption”.66  Richard Hoggart, whose extract is 
particularly relevant to this study, supports Storey’s thoughts: 
 
“Songs which do not meet the requirements (of working-class people) are not likely to be 
taken up, no matter how much Tin Pan Alley plugs them…  People do not have to sing or 
listen to these songs, and many do not, and those who do, often make the songs better 
than they really are…  People often read them in their own way.”67 
 
It is possible to agree with the view of F.R. Leavis that although only a minority of 
people go out of their way to enjoy various cultural activities, one could not make the 
assumption that there is not a cultivated and intelligent populace.  It would be wrong to 
insist that: “the cultural industries have a Pavlovian hold on their audience and can 
persuade it to accept any emotion or idea they wish”.68  The paradox of cultural 
industries is that profit-motivated companies produce cultural products,69 but it is the 
consumers who make the ultimate choice on whether or not to buy a particular cultural 
item: 
 
 “To deny the passivity of consumption is not to deny that sometimes consumption is 
passive; to deny that the consumers of popular culture are cultural dupes is not to deny 
that the culture industries seek to manipulate.  But it is to deny that popular culture is 
little more than a degraded landscape of commercial and ideological manipulation, 
imposed from above in order to make profit and secure social control”.70     
 
Storey is not the only one who rejects the notion of ‘one-dimensional man’.  Angela 
McRobbie opined that: “the people are too difficult in their diversity, too unpredictable 
                                                
64 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, The Consciousness Industry (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974). 
65 For more details see Alan Swingewood, The Myth of Mass Culture (London: Macmillan, 1977). 
66 John Storey, Inventing Popular Culture: From Folklore to Globalisation (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003), 59. 
67 Richard Hoggart, The Use of Literacy (Harmonsworth: Penguin, 1990), 231. 
68 Gans, supra, n. 57, at p.74. 
69 Fiske, supra, n. 36, at p. 23. 
70 Storey, supra, n. 66, at pp. 52-53.   
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in their tastes, too likely to stray from the path of class politics,”71 with Paul Wills 
reinforcing the view that “people find on the market incentives and possibilities not 
simply for their own confinement but also for their own development and growth”.72 
 
Thus, it is important to identify the differences between how much power cultural 
industries have and how much influence they have on consumer behaviour.  Despite 
these differences often being linked, they are not the same.  As explained by Fiske: 
 
“The people are not the helpless subjects of an irresistible ideological system, but 
neither are they free-willed, biologically determined individuals; they are a shifting set 
of social allegiances formed by social agents within a social terrain that is theirs only by 
virtue of their constant refusal to cede it to the imperialism of the powerful.  Any space 
won by the weak is hard won and hard kept, but it is won and it is kept”.73 
 
The mere existence of independent record labels (in contrast to the big four record 
companies), which predominantly release alternative and eclectic music and have done 
so for nearly a century, supports the finding that consumers cannot be simplistically 
branded as cultural dupes.  This is particularly so in the age of digital technology and 
globalisation.    
 
1.5. Globalisation and Glocalisation  
 
Central to this study is the tension between cultural homogeneity and cultural 
heterogeneity.  Whilst Adorno and Horkheimner described the concept of cultural 
industries based on the situation in the 1940s, modern day scholars74 contend that there 
has been a shift from cultural industries to global cultural industries.  Particularly within 
the last three decades, economic forces have evolved into another category, 
globalisation - a very complex category, which can be defined as “the relentless global 
flow of capital, commodities, and communications”75 across territories.  In the view of 
some authors, globalisation became synonymous with homogenisation of global 
                                                
71 Angela McRobbie, “Looking Back at New Times and its Critics,” in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in 
Cultural Studies, ed. David Morley and Chen Kuan-Hsing (London: Routledge, 1996), 252. 
72 Paul Wills, Common Culture (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990), 27. 
73 Fiske, supra, n. 36, at p. 46. 
74 Lash and Lury, supra, n. 25, at p. 6. 
75 Storey, supra, n. 66, at p.107.  For more see Terry Flew, Understanding Global Media (New York: 
Palgrave, 2007). 
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culture.76  Visiting high streets and cities worldwide and finding the same shops and 
food chains, epitomises this aspect of globalisation.  The same situation is witnessed in 
relation to cultural industries with the most cited offenders being Mickey Mouse and 
Dallas.  The more recent examples include the same formats of entertainment shows 
that are being adapted to the local tastes of almost every single country, be it Pop Idol, It 
Takes Two or Strictly Come Dancing.  In terms of the record industry, globalisation has 
generated a situation in which four major record companies control about 75 percent of 
the market share whilst being responsible for only 20 percent of the new music releases 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4) with the resulting saturation of the same music 
products worldwide.  Major labels achieve such saturation because there are no barriers 
for them in a globalised world: they are faceless global companies that move around 
freely.  Rudimentary observation informs that the music that is played on most radio 
stations across the globe is predominantly of American and English origin.  As far as 
that goes, cultural pessimists could say that F.R. Leavis’ forecast of “a standardised 
civilisation rapidly enveloping the whole world”77 has come true.  Undisputedly, 
globalisation had provided cultural industries with a fundamentally different mode of 
operation and power.  Although industrialised, culture in 1945 for Adorno and 
Horkheimer, was still basically a superstructure; commodification is arguably what they 
defined as industrialisation.78  By contrast, Lash and Lury made the argument that the 
(cultural) superstructure is diminished due to capitalisation and globalisation and is 
dissolving into the material base.79  To put the argument in another way, culture 
becomes material once it is in the base.  
 
Having said that, one of the complexities of globalisation can be illustrated by the 
scenario of differing production modes being subsumed but also allowing and indeed 
supporting differences by “involving the ebb and flow of both homogenising and 
heterogenising forces and the meeting and mingling of the local and global in new 
forms of hybrid cultures”.80  Other scholars also suggest that cultural globalisation 
should not be confused with cultural homogenisation81 and globalisation simply 
                                                
76 Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh, “Homogenization of Global Culture,” in Homogenization of 
Global Culture. The Case against Global Economy, ed. Richard Barnet (San Fransisco: Sierra Club 
Books, 1996), 71. 
77 Leavis, supra, n. 28, at p. 30. 
78 Lash and Lury, supra, n. 25, at p. 7. 
79 id. 
80 Storey, supra, n. 66, at p. 112. 
81 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” in Global Culture: 
Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, ed. Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1994), 307. 
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signifies a new borderless world.  For example, in relation to the record industry, the 
Internet, in particular, plays a positive role in delivering heterogeneous music to 
consumers, proving that globalisation is thus not only about global culture 
homogenisation.  Indeed, the positive side of globalisation can be seen in the fact that 
rare genres of music from other continents can be delivered to consumers within 
seconds.  In this respect, “globalisation offers the possibility of cultural mixing on a 
scale never known before”82 and must be regarded as being positive in its fusing of 
different cultures.  Even such a cultural pessimist as Jean Baudrillard noted that 
globalisation has not completely won the game when he mentioned that: “heterogeneous 
forces ...  are rising everywhere”.83  Another upside of globalisation is that there is now 
a resistance, which has been termed as ‘glocalisation’ (the latter signifies the local being 
championed on a global scale), and this has been the domain of the independent labels.  
Therefore, in terms of this study, independent music labels represent such 
heterogeneous forces.  The following discourse into the Long Tail continues the 
analysis of consumption patterns and explains how these small heterogeneous forces 
contribute to diversity. 
 
1.6. The Long Tail 
 
Chris Anderson was perhaps the first one who pointed out how consumer behaviour has 
changed since the year of 2000 as a result of the digital revolution.  In his seminal book, 
The Long Tail, he stated that the vast majority of products (cultural or otherwise) were 
not available in stores; interestingly in his view, by necessity “the economics of 
traditional, hit-driven retail, limit choice”.84  It seems that in the record industry there is 
a gap between what is consumed and what is available, i.e. as stated earlier, 20 percent 
of the released material by the majors, account for 80 percent of total sales.85  To give a 
concrete example: only 1 percent of music albums are available in high street music 
retailers, such as Virgin, HMV in the UK or Wal-Mart in the United States.86  Of more 
than 200,000 films produced for commercial release, only 3,000 are available at 
                                                
82 Storey, supra, n. 66, at p. 117. 
83 Jean Baudrillard, “La Violence du Mondial,” in Power Inferno, ed. Jean Baudrillard (Paris: Galilee, 
2002), 64.  
84 Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business Is Selling Less of More (New York: 
Hyperion, 2006), 26. 
85 For the opposite view on the unimportance of the Long Tail see Andrew Keen, The Cult of the 
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86 Anderson, supra, n. 84, at p. 26. 
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Blockbuster.87  In recent years even big music retailers such as Wal-Mart have been 
cutting the amount of shelf-space for CDs,88 begging the question of where do the rest 
of the music and films go?  The answer lies in the digital on-line world.  For 
comparison, whilst Wal-Mart carries about 4,500 unique CD titles, Amazon lists about 
800,000 of them.89   
 
Anderson provided a telling example of a digital music service, Rhapsody, with a 
catalogue of 1.5 million songs.90  In contrast, high-street music retailers store about 
60,000 songs.  The strength of the on-line phenomenon can be illustrated by the fact 
that each one of Rhapsody’s tracks is streamed every month.91  What is demonstrated is 
that some people spend their leisure time trying to find the music they want to hear.  
This phenomenon is called the Long Tail and Anderson professed that “for the record 
industry it looks like the end of the blockbuster era (the Short Head)”:  
      
“You can find everything out here in the Long Tail.  There’s the back catalogue, 
older albums still fondly remembered by long-time fans or rediscovered by new ones.  
There are live tracks, B-sides, remixes, even (gasp) covers.  There are niches by the 
thousands, genres within genres within genres … There are foreign bands, once 
priced out of reach on a shelf in the import aisle, and obscure bands on even more 
obscure labels – many of which don’t have the distribution clout to get into Tower at 
all.  Oh sure, there is also a lot of crap here in the Long Tail.  But then again, there is 
an awful lot of crap hiding between the radio tracks on hit albums, too”.92 
 
For Netflix, Amazon and Rhapsody, between 25–50 percent of sales are generated from 
products not available from traditional (not on-line) outlets and these products represent 
the fastest growing area of their businesses.93  
 
“…most of us want more than just hits.  Everyone’s taste departs from the 
mainstream somewhere…  Unfortunately, in recent decades, such alternatives have 
been relegated to the fringes by pumped-up marketing vehicles built to order by 
industries that desperately needed them”.94 
 
                                                
87 id. 
88 The Economist, “From Major to Minor,” January 10, 2008.  
89 Anderson, supra, n. 84, at pp. 20, 90. 
90 These are the numbers for 2006 when the Long Tail was published. 
91 Anderson, supra, n. 84, at p. 22. 
92 id. 
93 id., at p. 24. 
94 id., at p.18. 
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The Long Tail puts forward the argument that in the largesse of the digital world, all is 
there and available.  However, in an economy that relies on hits, there is paucity95 for 
the world of cultural diversity.  These days, neither the existence nor the size of the 
Long Tail is disputed.  However, what are disputed are consumer behaviour and the 
profitability of the Long Tail.  In his research, Chris Anderson provided convincing 
data.  However, the data for 2008 does not present a winning case for the Long Tail. 96  
According to a recent study carried out by the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society 
- Performing Rights Society (hereinafter, MCPS-PRS), 80 percent of the recordings 
online sold no copies at all.97  To date, there is no unanimous opinion on this matter 
with some, attempting not to exaggerate the consumers’ power in making their choices.  
Having said that, irrespective of how active consumers are in searching for new cultural 
products, the existence of the Long Tail proves an abundance of diverse cultural 
products. 
 
1.7. Cultural Diversity: Definition, Measurement and Its Relation to 
Concentration  
 
The discussion of cultural industries, globalisation and consumer behaviour would not 
be complete without highlighting the importance of cultural diversity and how, if at all, 
it is affected by the high concentration of cultural industries.  As the study uses the 
record industry as a tool to demonstrate that cultural industries deserve special treatment 
by competition law, this section considers the notion of diversity and why it is 
important for the record industry and public interest overall. 
 
Perhaps the biggest hurdle to negotiate is the definition of ‘diversity’, which is an 
elusive concept, just like the notion of ‘culture’ itself because both concepts are 
qualitative.  Diversity is indeed difficult to define, let alone measure but it is possible to 
                                                
95 id. 
96 Helienne Lindvall, “Behind the Music: Is the Long Tail a Myth?” The Guardian, January 8, 2009. 
97 The following researches have challenged Anderson’s Long Tail theory: Patrick Foster, “Long Tail 
Theory Contradicted as Study Reveals 10m Digital Music Tracks Unsold,” The Times, December 22, 
2008; Sean Michaels, “Most Music Didn't Sell a Single Copy in 2008,” The Guardian, December 23, 
2008; Andrew Orlowski, “Chopping the Long Tail Down to Size,” The Register, November 7, 2008; Jim 
Milliot, “How Fat is The Long Tail?,” Publishers Weekly, September 15, 2008.  However, Anderson 
disputed the outcomes of the PRS-MCPS research.  See Eliot Van Buskirk, “eMusic Says Data Supports 
Long Tail Theory,” Wired, January 15, 2009. 
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do so if both the definition and measure of diversity are related to market structure.98  
Various attempts have been made to look at diversity from the cultural industries 
concentration point of view.  Those attempts are examined below.   
 
The issues of culture and diversity have recently received much attention on numerous 
levels.  In 1991, the Treaty of Maastricht incorporated Article 151 (4) into the EC 
Treaty,99 which states the need to protect cultural diversity within the European 
Community (further examined in greater detail in Chapter 6).  On another high level, 
UNESCO, the most influential organisation dealing with culture and diversity, adopted 
the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity and Cultural 
Expressions.100  The Convention re-emphasised the importance of diversity by 
affirming that cultural diversity is “a defining characteristic of humanity”.101  The 
Convention defines cultural diversity “... as the manifold ways in which the cultures of 
groups and societies find expression.  These expressions are passed on within and 
among groups and societies”.102  Although the UNESCO definition of diversity is rather 
vague, the Convention claims that cultural products are different from other goods and 
deserve special treatment protecting them from standardised mass consumption.103  In 
other words, cultural diversity represents a variety and an exchange of cultural 
experiences.  As the record industry is used as a case study for cultural industries, for 
the purposes of this study, diversity means diversity of both products (music) and 
producers (record companies).  This study assumes that producers are not identical, 
therefore the diversity of producers is intertwined with the diversity of products, and the 
protection of producers will lead to a broader spectrum of musical diversity. 
 
Since the 1950s economists have proposed that the growth of diversity and innovation 
was related to the market and its structures.104  Therefore, within this study which 
focuses on the record industry and its relationship with competition law, the first logical 
                                                
98 Peter J. Alexander and Brendan M. Cunningham, “Diversity in Broadcast Television: An Empirical 
Study of Local News in the United States.” International Journal of Media Management 6, no. 3&4 
(2004): 183.    
99 The Treaty establishing European Community, 25 March 1957. 
100 See supra, n. 35. 
101 id., para 1 of the Recital. 
102 id., Article 4. 
103 To the moment of submission, the United States still has not signed this Convention. 
104 Richard Peterson and David Berger, “Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music.” 
American Sociological Review 40 (1975): 159. 
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step is to find out whether or not consolidation has affected diversity in the record 
industry: are levels of concentration connected with levels of diversity? 
 
Before going into a discussion of diversity, a brief explanation of market structures has 
to be provided.  Apart from the competitive or monopolistic markets, there are several 
other market structures.  Out of those, an oligopolistic market structure seems to be the 
most relevant in terms of this study, implying that there are a few firms which release 
similar but not identical products.105  Examples of oligopolies include the oil and car 
manufacturing businesses as well as the record industry.  Each firm has sway over what 
it produces but the products are close substitutes, as are cigarettes, CDs, and computer 
games.  It is believed that these firms have very little intention to innovate, because they 
have little to gain from investing heavily into risky new products.  The consequence is 
that creativity is being restricted or controlled.106  Oligopoly theory makes the 
assumption that small companies are responsible for introducing diversity to the 
marketplace, as oligopolists would be wary of championing high or even medium-risk 
products.  The voids that are left by oligopolists are filled by smaller enterprises.  
However, the major drawback of all these theories is that they are based on the 
economics of competition and they do not take into account producer diversity as well 
as product diversity.  Producer diversity is excluded because competition economics are 
based on simplistic mathematical models allowing a producer to make only one product.  
The above explains why competition law does not deal with vague concepts like 
cultural diversity (discussed below in this section).   
 
Measuring diversity and its relation to highly consolidated industries is an important 
issue because this study, unlike any others seeking to investigate the problem of 
diversity and concentration, deals with law.  The first attempt to investigate the causal 
link between market structure and diversity has been made by industrial organisation 
economists,107 examining in detail the relationship existing between innovation and 
                                                
105 Gunnar Niels, “Collective Dominance: More than just Oligopolistic Interdependence.” European 
Competition Law Journal 5 (2001): 168.  For a good explanation from the industrial economics point of 
view see Frederic Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand 
McNally College Publishing Company, 1980).   
106 Paul DiMaggio, “Market Structure, The Creative Process, and Popular Culture: Toward an 
Organisational Reinterpretation of Mass-Culture Theory.” Journal of Popular Culture 11, no. 2 (1977): 
441. 
107 Industrial organisation is the field of economics that studies the strategic behavior of firms, the 
structure of markets and their interactions.  A Dictionary of Geography, 2004, s.v. ‘industrial 
organisation’.  The industrial economists were the first ones to approach the market concentration via a 
division of majors and independents.  
 35 
diversity levels on the one hand and the size of the firm on the other.  Following that, 
Joseph Schumpeter initiated the academic debate in his work Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, where he argued that because big firms had more wealth, they could afford 
to develop new products and also that they had the appetite to do so because their 
market power allowed profits to be made from such innovations.108 Schumpeter’s view 
seems correct but only in respect to high technology, chemical and oil industries, not 
cultural industries.109  Hence, not everybody agreed with the Schumpeterian view,110 
with the majority of scholars stressing that it was the small firms who were the real 
innovators.111  Such views are bolstered by the fact that large firms are indeed reluctant 
to introduce risky products to the market due to both bureaucracy and conservative 
attitudes and prefer to stick to the model of ‘if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it’.  As Chapter 3, 
which examines the history of competition in the record industry will demonstrate, the 
above is particularly true with regards to major companies in the record industry with 
their initial reluctance to release blues, jazz, rhythm & blues, rock & roll and almost any 
other new genre.   
 
One of the important caveats in terms of this study is that lawyers like to see clear-cut 
concepts and that is precisely why it was crucially important to find out whether there 
was a criterion that could measure diversity in the record industry.  To date there have 
been numerous empirical studies testing the relationship between market concentration 
and product homogeneity in the record industry and other cultural industries.  A 
pervasive problem with the reviewed researches on the relationship of market structure 
to diversity is that some of them differ in their conclusions, which is somewhat limiting.  
However, all of them emphasised the undeniable impact of oligopolistic market control 
                                                
108 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, Harper, 1942), 59 - 165.  
109 See for example the opinion of Wesley Cohen and Richard Levin, “Empirical Studies of Innovation 
and Market Structure,” in Handbook of Industrial Organisation, Volume II, ed. by Richard Schmalensee 
and Robert Willig (Amsterdam, North-Holland: 1989), 1059. 
110 Franklin M. Fisher and Peter Temin, “Returns to Scale in Research and Development: What Does the 
Schumpeterian Hypothesis Imply?” Journal of Political Economy 81 (January/February 1973): 56-70; 
Kenneth Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in Essays in the 
Theory of Risk-Bearing, ed. by Kenneth Arrow (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), 145; Frederic 
Sherer, Market Structure (Amsterdam: The New Palgrave, 1987); Edwin Mansfield, “Technological 
Change and Market Structure: An Empirical Study.” American Economic Review 73 (1983): 205 – 209 
and Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1968).  
111 This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  For more information see Charlie Gillett, The Sound of 
the City (New York, Pantheon: 1983); John Ryan, The Production of Culture in the Music Industry: The 
ASCAP-BMI Controversy (Lantham, University Press of America: 1985); Walter Adams and James 
Brock, The Bigness Complex (Stanford: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2004); and Frederic Scherer 
and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (Boston, Houghton Mifflin: 
1990). 
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on diversity.  Overall, there are three schools of thought about the influence of 
concentration on diversity.  One camp believes that a high level of concentration in the 
record industry diminishes diversity112 through to the opposite,113 whilst the minority of 
scholars are of the opinion that a market structure midway between monopoly and 
perfect competition is best for promoting innovation.114  Even though all these 
researches do not provide a clear-cut answer, the predominant outcome is that levels of 
diversity diminish with higher concentration and the smaller labels fill these ‘diversity’ 
vacuums.  
 
A pioneering attempt to measure diversity in the record industry and to determine how 
diversity correlated with the changing levels of concentration in the major record 
companies was made by Peterson and Berger in the 1970s.  They analysed the 
relationship between diversity and market concentration in the American record 
industry from 1948-1973 in their seminal paper, Cycles of Symbol Production.115  The 
work assumed that innovation and diversity were indeed products of competition.116  
Concentration levels were measured using two tests: one on the then top four and one 
on the then top eight major record companies; diversity was measured as the top 10 hits 
during 52 weeks.  Peterson and Berger found evidence for the inverse relationship 
between concentration and diversity, i.e. higher concentration equalled less diversity, 
According to their research, 80 percent of the songs examined fitted into “a 
                                                
112 Michael Black and Douglas Greer, “Concentration and Non-price Competition in the Recording 
Industry.” Review of Industrial Organisation 3 (1986): 13 – 37; Bruce Owen and Michael Spence, 
“Television Programming, Monopolistic Competition, and Welfare.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 91, no. 1 (1977): 103 – 126; Shu-Fang Lin and Daniel McDonald, “The Effect of New 
Networks on U.S. Television Diversity.” The Journal of Media Economics 17, no. 2 (2004): 105 – 121; 
Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: Beacon Press, 1997); Barry Litman, “The Television 
Networks, Competition, and Programme Diversity.” Journal of Broadcasting 23 (1979): 393 – 409; 
Hyuhn-Suhck Bae, “Product Differentiation in Cable Programming: The Case in the Cable National All-
News Networks.” Journal of Media Economics 12 (1999): 265 – 277; and Ryan, id. 
113 Paul Lopes, “Innovation and Diversity in the Popular Music Industry, 1969 – 1990.” American 
Sociological Review 57 (1992): 56 – 71; and Robert Burnett, “The Implications of Ownership Changes on 
Concentration and Diversity in the Programme Industry.” Communication Research 19 (1992): 749 – 
769. 
114 The outcome depends on the parameter and the industry used.  For example, Berry and Waldfogel 
found evidence that the increased concentration of radio stations reduced the entry barriers without 
reducing the diversity.  See Steven Berry and Joel Waldfogel, “Do Mergers Increase Product Variety? 
Evidence from Radio Broadcasting.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 2001): 1009 – 1025.  
Such finding could be contrasted with the research into the connection between diversity and 
consolidation in broadcast television carried out by Alexander and Cunningham.  They found that 
diversity of local news content was sensitive to the level of concentration.  See Alexander and 
Cunningham, supra, n. 98, at p. 183.  
115 Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104, at p. 159. 
116 Peterson and Berger also suggest that there is a clear distinction between innovation and diversity.  See 
Richard Peterson and David Berger, “Measuring Industry Concentration, Diversity, and Innovation in 
Popular Music.” American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (1996): 176.  However, for the purposes of this 
research, diversity and innovation bear the same meaning. 
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conventionalised cycle where sexual references are allegorical and social problems are 
unknown and cover records were a significant part of the charts”.117  Peterson and 
Berger’s research has generated a lot of discussion with many authors having 
subsequently used the same methodology in their research.  However, their result is not 
conclusive because their figures for 1964 to 1969 show increased concentration as well 
as increased level of diversity.  The fact that Peterson and Berger were unable to 
consistently show an inverse relationship between diversity and concentration was 
documented in their later papers.118  
 
Following the above, similar research was carried out to cover the period between 1974 
-1980.119  Rothenbuhler and Dimmick used Peterson and Berger’s method to test 
whether the record industry was exhibiting the same patterns of the oligopolistic market 
conditions of the 1948-1955 period, characterised by high concentration and low 
diversity.  Their data also showed a pattern of increasing concentration accompanied by 
a decline in diversity.  However, using Peterson and Berger’s method, Burnett120 has 
found that no inverse relationship existed between concentration and diversity.  Also, 
interestingly revealed was the view that majors and independents were cooperating, for 
instance in the case of mutually advantageous licensing and distribution deals.  Burnett 
also argued that majors’ acquisition of independent labels increased general diversity.  
Other scholars like Lopes and Ross121 supported Burnett’s findings, underlining the fact 
that high concentration was not necessarily damaging to diversity because it was often 
the case that larger companies would embrace the innovations of smaller companies and 
as a consequence, increase overall diversity.  Therefore, it was argued that even though 
record industry concentration was high, diversity levels were high too.122  
 
                                                
117 Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104, at p.163. 
118 Richard Peterson, “Cultural Studies through the Production Perspective,” in The Sociology of Culture, 
ed. by Diana Crane (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 189 and supra, n. 117, at p. 178. 
119 Eric Rothenbuhler and John Dimmik, “Popular Music: Concentration and Diversity in the Industry, 
1974-1980.” Journal of Communications 32 (1982): 143; Eric Rothenbuhler and John Dimmik, “The 
Theory of the Niche: Quantifying Competition among Media Industries.” Journal of Communication 34, 
no. 4 (1984): 103. 
120 Robert Burnett, The Global Jukebox: The International Music Industry (London: Routledge, 1996); 
Robert Burnett, “Concentration and Diversity in the International Phonogram Industry” (PhD diss.,  
University of Gothenburg, 1990). 
121 Lopes, supra, n. 113, at p. 56 and Peter Ross, “The Emergence, Development, and Mainstreaming of 
British Punk Rock Music.” Popular Music and Society 20 (1996): 133 – 161. For more on the 
competition and cooperation issue see Jonathan Gander and Alison Rieple, “Inter-organisational 
Relationships in the Worldwide Popular Recorded Music Industry.” Creativity and Innovation 
Management 11, no. 4 (2002): 248 – 254.  
122 Section 4.2 will demonstrate that such conclusion has a limitation. 
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However, Peterson and Berger’s methodology was not favoured by everyone and has 
been described as ‘flawed’,123 ‘limited’,124 and ‘unreliable’125 because their method 
measured diversity by reference to lyrics without even touching upon other aspects of a 
song, e.g. melody and genre.  Another obvious drawback is that they only used the 
Billboard hit parade data, whilst ignoring the total supply of recorded music.  As Lopes 
suggested, examining a correlation between concentration and diversity by defining 
who owns the charting material is flawed and inadequate.126  The most commercially 
successful pieces of music are not particularly indicative of existing diversity and such a 
narrow view ignores that fact.127  A more realistic enquiry should be discussed in terms 
of the musical diversity of records released especially, in a Long Tail world, e.g. 
different genres, styles, approaches, and innovative ideas.128   
 
A more precise method to investigate the connection between consolidation and 
diversity in the record industry, applied by Christianen, included the database of all the 
albums released in a particular territory.129  The rationale for using the debut albums 
released in one year was to examine the gate-keeping function of major record 
companies.  New artists have greater market access when there is a scenario of low 
concentration.  However, during periods of high concentration, fewer artists get any 
exposure.  Christianen found that independents existed in the void that majors created 
and that the relationship between diversity and concentration was inverse.  
 
Peter Alexander employed another interesting method using the application of entropy 
theory.130  The upshot of his research showed that both low and high levels of market 
                                                
123 David Hesmondhalgh, The Cultural Industries (London: Sage, 2002), 233. 
124 The quantity is not synonymous with quality, but quality is a better indicator of cultural diversity.  See 
Jeffrey Mondak, “Cultural Heterogeneity in Capitalist Society: In Defence of the Repetition on the 
Billboard Hot 100.” Popular Music and Society 13 (1989): 55. 
125 The method used by Peterson and Berger, Burnett and Lopes is unreliable because it only used the 
Billboard hit parade data, whilst ignoring the total supply of recorded music.  See Michael Christianen, 
“Cycles in Symbol Production? A New Model to Explain Concentration, Diversity and Innovation in the 
Music Industry.” Popular Music 14, no. 1 (1995): 56. 
126 Peterson and Berger noted themselves in their recent commentary that “concentration ratios were 
accurate measures of musical product ownership, but…they are no longer good measures of the 
concentration of creative control”.  Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 116, at p. 175. 
127 Mondak, supra, n. 124, at p. 55. 
128 For example, Dowd measured musical diversity based on melodic, rhythmic, and choral elements.  
Timothy J. Dowd, “Musical Diversity and the U.S. Mainstream Recording Market, 1955-1990,” (English 
version of “Diversificazione Musicale e Mercato Discografico negli Stati Uniti, 1955-1990,” Rassegna 
Italiana di Sociologia XLI (2): 223-263 (2000)), 3.  
129 Christianen, supra, n. 125, at p. 59. 
130 Entropy is a value used in mathematics to quantify information.  Peter J. Alexander, “Entropy and 
Popular Culture: Product Diversity in the Popular Music Recording Industry.” American Sociological 
Review 61 (2004): 171. 
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concentration led to decreased product diversity, whilst maximum diversity resulted 
from a moderately concentrated market structure.131  This method is similar to the one 
used by Peterson and Berger but the measure of diversity was amongst the top 40 hits 
during 1948 to 1988.  In this analysis, it was not the number of hits that counted, rather 
it was the combination of several measures: form, accent, harmonic structure, and 
melody.  However, the lyrics were not analysed.  The results showed that during the 
early years of ‘rock revolution’ (around 1955 to 1966), major hit recordings were 
relatively homogenous when compared to those of the years 1967 to 1977, i.e. when 
concentration in the industry was higher.  This contradicts the conclusion of Peterson 
and Berger.  However, for the period of 1971 to 1988, diversity decreased whilst 
concentration increased, thus implying that the relationship between concentration and 
diversity was non-linear and that product diversity was maximised when the industry 
was moderately concentrated.   
 
The above findings mean that a new approach to measure cultural diversity in the film 
industry is of particular interest.  Moreau and Peltier carried out research into film 
diversity between 1900 and 2000.132  The main result of their comprehensive research 
was that supplied diversity and consumed diversity were positively correlated, and the 
former was always higher than the latter.  Moreau and Peltier’s method included three 
determining factors of cultural diversity: variety, balance and disparity and the more 
these factors existed the greater the diversity.  They suggested that in the case of the 
film industry, these three dimensions of diversity could be presented as: the film, the 
genre, and the geographical origin.  With respect to the first dimension, each film was 
considered unique.  According to the second dimension, the genre, diversity increased 
in direct proportion to the number of genres available (comedies, dramas, cartoons etc), 
the extent to which they were equally represented and the extent to which the genres 
were clearly differentiated from each other.  The third dimension was self-explanatory: 
film diversity increased in direct proportion to the number of different geographical 
origins available.   
 
Moreau and Peltier presented an interesting interaction: the smaller the difference 
between supplied and consumed diversity the higher the degree of diversity and vice 
                                                
131 id. 
132 Francois Moreau and Stephanie Peltier, “Cultural Diversity in the Movie Industry: A Cross-National 
Study.” The Journal of Media Economics 17, no. 2 (2004). 
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versa.  Their research demonstrated that the film industry was threatened by the 
concentration of consumption on a small number of films and by low diversity actually 
on the screens.  In their conclusion Moreau and Peltier observed that it was demand that 
adapted to the supply and not the other way round.  Thus supply, can to a certain extent, 
influence what consumers demand.  
 
Following this method, diversity in the record industry could be measured using the 
dimensions appropriate for the record industry: the song, the genre, (hip hop, dance, 
punk etc.) and the geographical origin.  Such a research method appears worthwhile as 
it could take into account the amount of the albums released on both major and 
independent labels and the amount of albums actually sold.  Unfortunately, it would be 
impossible to obtain the required complete data for such research (similarly, to the 
above research regarding the film industry) and such study is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.   
 
In addition to the above, other ways for measuring diversity have been presented.   An 
interesting suggestion was made by Ross that in the digital age, examining the whole 
idea of innovation is more advantageous outside of the majors.133  An alternative way to 
measure diversity could be to measure producer diversity by analysing the number of 
existing or new labels coming to the market every year; whilst product diversity could 
be measured by the number of songs released by majors and independents as well as the 
number of songs purchased.134   
 
Even though the above studies had different research methods and conclusions, their 
significance lies in showing a correlation between high cultural industry concentration 
and lower levels of diversity.  The connection between diversity and high levels of 
concentration should not be underestimated and necessitated considering the impact of 
competition law upon such matters.  Even though Adorno’s approach to cultural 
industries was not entirely objective and could be described as elitist,135 he rightly 
connected standardisation with the high concentration of cultural industries, mostly in 
private hands (for more see Chapter 4).  Furthermore, he was not the only one to stress 
the link between consolidation and diversity.  Douglas Kellner too outlined a strong link 
                                                
133 Ross, supra, n. 121, at p. 484. 
134 Perhaps the difficulty in obtaining statistics explains why the previous researchers mostly concentrated 
on hit records only. 
135 This could be inferred from his highly negative attitude towards jazz music. 
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between capitalism and culture with the former representing the interests of “corporate 
domination and profitability”.136   
 
As mentioned earlier, the record industry is not alone in facing the problem of high 
concentration leading to less diversity.137  Other types of cultural industries experience 
similar problems, and concerns have been consequently raised.  For example, Bagdikian 
pointed out the disastrous consequences of having little competition in the American 
media sector.138  He quotes the instance of how mass advertising left only one paper 
standing in 1981 in Washington.139  He also highlighted a direct link between diversity 
of opinions and concentration in the media industry.140  His standpoint is supported by 
the fact that in competitive markets, newspapers contain more serious news and gain 
circulation more readily.  In the words of Leo Bogart: “with the best of intentions in the 
world, it is difficult for a monopoly daily to avoid complacency and 
establishmentalism”.141  Newspapers generally try to avoid overt and extreme political 
affiliations, as they need to attract the widest possible readership thus making them an 
attractive proposition to advertisers. 142 
 
Laura Miller has raised similar concerns in her investigation of major and independent 
booksellers143 (the treatment by competition law of cultural diversity in the book 
industry is discussed in Chapter 6).  She noted that book sellers in the US too have gone 
through several waves of mergers and acquisitions, with the latest one being in the mid 
1990s which led to a large number of independents being forced out of business, 
including some of the US’ most well-known stores.   
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138 Bagdikian, supra, n. 112. 
139 id., at p. 123. 
140 A new view has recently emerged, which insists that newspapers should be allowed to consolidate in 
the twenty-first century in order to survive because they are losing advertising income to Google and 
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For example, in 1991, independent booksellers’ adult book sales were responsible for 
32.5 percent of books sold whilst big chains were responsible for only 22 percent.144  
The situation had changed in 1997; the independent’s share had dropped to 17 percent 
whilst the chains’ share had grown to 25 percent.145  At that point, nearly half of the 
market was dominated by two chains: in 1997, Barnes & Noble and the Borders Group 
accounted for 43.3 percent of bookstore sales.146   
 
The above research exemplifies the prevalent opinion that cultural diversity is important 
for public interest and benefit.  It also shows that consolidation of cultural industries 
leads to a diminishing level of diversity.  However, despite the fact that the importance 
of cultural industries is highlighted in numerous government speeches and documents, 
little has been said or done about the protection of diversity.  It should not be forgotten 
that in the 1984 the US opted out of UNESCO and it took 17 years to re-join the 
organisation.  The UK likewise opted out and re-joined UNESCO in 1997.  Moreover, 
after reviewing the relevant legislation, it seems that cultural diversity is not a stated 
aim of the existing laws at all.  There is no mention of the requirement of cultural 
diversity in the UK and US copyright and competition legislation.  One of the reasons 
may be that cultural diversity is indeed a loose concept whilst lawmakers require clearly 
defined economic concepts.  However, as previously demonstrated, cultural diversity 
can be measured.  Another reason for the omission may lay in the fact that governments 
may not necessarily wish to promote cultural diversity (even though they constantly 
emphasise the importance of cultural industries) since, for example, the more money the 
record industry makes, the more money flows into the economy and the surest way to 
make a profit, is to sell what sells best and fast, i.e. homogenised cultural products.  The 
paradox of the situation is that competition law affects cultural industries, but it does 
not take cultural issues into account when multi-national mergers and acquisitions in the 
cultural sector take place.  This issue is illustrated in a number of case law arguments 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 and is important to bear in mind for the conclusion of this 
study.   
 
                                                
144 id., at p. 52. 
145 id. 
146 id. Explained by the fact that big chains depend on a steady flow of fast-selling bestsellers.  It is in a 
way a vicious circle because major publishing houses therefore produce the kinds of books they think the 
big chains will be able to sell.  
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This discourse into the diversity of cultural products is not putting forward the idea that 
standardised products are the only ones that capitalism requires.  Of course, capitalism 
requires diversity, but it has to be a controlled diversity, “a diversity that is determined 
and limited by the needs of its mode and production”.147  Copying products that have 
already been popular in the market place is an obvious strategy employed by many.  In 
this respect, Meade rightly outlined the dichotomy that exists between the requirement 
for product diversity and the advantageous economics of manufacturing a limited 
variety of products.  Such a situation is explained by the high substitutability and high 
overhead costs being the main factors in market economy.148  Thus in today’s cultural 
industries, economy of scale is a determining factor, but it can contradict the interests of 
the consumers who want diverse products.149   
 
The next section considers the need for regulation of cultural industries and explains 
why competition law should be considered as an important tool in regulating cultural 
industries.   
 
1.8. Regulation of Cultural Industries: Competition Law, De-
regulation and Self-Regulation 
 
In late 1970s Williams proclaimed that the same attention given to industrial institutions 
should be enjoyed by cultural industries, which had hitherto been under researched.150  
A decade later Girard insisted for the inclusion of cultural industries in cultural policy-
making: “policy-makers persistently ignored the place that industrial cultural products 
were gradually taking in people’s leisure time…” 151  He commented further that: 
 
“…today, not only is a debate on the subject [regulation of cultural industries] 
inevitable, it is highly desirable and should be carried out at all levels…  New trends of 
thought are required to articulate cultural policies with cultural industries…”152  
                                                
147 Fiske, supra, n. 36, at p. 29. 
148 James Meade, “The Optimal Balance Between Economies of Scale and Variety of Products: An 
Illustrative Model.” Economica (November 1974), 367. 
149 Dixit and Stiglitz arrived to a similar conclusion.  Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, “Monopolistic 
Competition and Optimum Product Diversity.” American Economic Review 67, no. 3 (1977): 297 – 308. 
150 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 136. Also cited 
in Garnham, supra, n. 19, at p. 123. 
151 Augustin Girard, “A Commentary: Policy and the Arts: The Forgotten Cultural Industries.” Journal of 
Cultural Economics, 5, no. 1 (1981); 62. 
152 id. 
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Having said that, regulation is controversial.  It becomes more problematic when 
cultural industries are at issue because contestation over the regulation of culture 
includes struggles over meanings and interpretations.  The latter represents the main 
argument of the opponents of the special treatment of culture.  Indeed, can regulation of 
cultural industries develop unless it is based on data and facts?  Is culture too vague for 
the rules of law?  Can regulation of cultural industries be dynamic enough to produce a 
status quo?  These are all legitimate concerns, and this thesis addresses them.  
 
One type of regulation is of particular interest, i.e. the regulation of anti-competitive 
behaviour in the record industry, which in turn is intertwined with high levels of 
concentration.  Hence the research contained in the thesis critically analyses how 
competition law could and should be used to protect cultural diversity.  The main issue 
is whether or not cultural elements could be taken on board when regulating competitive 
dynamics and anti-competitive behaviour of highly concentrated corporations.  
Therefore, this section looks into the need of cultural industries regulation by 
competition law.  For comparison, de-regulation and self-regulation of cultural 
industries are also briefly examined.  
 
Competition law is an economics-based law and is aimed at balancing the competitive 
dynamics in different markets as well as maximising the production of goods at 
competitive prices.  The economic character of competition law can be seen in Article 2 
of the Maastricht Treaty, which states that the ultimate objectives of the EU are: “a 
harmonious, balanced development of economic activities, … and a high degree of 
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance”.153 
 
Price theory economics are of dominant importance in competition law.  All the 
analyses, be they of mergers or acquisitions between oil industries or cultural industries 
are carried out in terms of whether a proposed merger or acquisition is bound to produce 
a price increase and/or price-fixing.  Unlike the concentration in the aviation or 
automobile industries, concentration in the record industry is worth separate attention 
because the issues raised are not of pure economic nature.154  As indicated above, on the 
one hand, the record industry is responsible for providing employment and economy 
                                                
153 The Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, February 7, 1992. 
154 See more in Peristera Kremmyda, “Comment,” in The Evolution of European Competition Law: 
Whose Regulation, Which Competition?, ed. Hanns Ullrich (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 191. 
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growth, but on the other hand, it has a cultural function, which makes “the concentration 
of ownership in this sector a problem different in nature and in importance from that 
encountered in other sectors of the economy”.155  This research argues that price 
increase, whilst being an appropriate yardstick for typical industrial firms, is of little 
relevance to the interests of cultural industries.  In contrast, the non-price issues, such as 
obtaining radio play and shelf-space are of crucial importance for the record industry, 
and ultimately its consumers.  
 
In the words of ex-Commissioner, Mario Monti: “if competitors are eliminated from a 
market not because of competition on the merits but through anti-competitive practices, 
this is to the clear detriment of consumers and innovation”.156  Thus, in the present 
globalised and oligopolistic world particularly, both the competition policy and the 
authorities should serve economies as well as public interests.  Interestingly, Mario 
Monti described competition law as “an interdisciplinary combination of at least, law, 
economics, and politics, which at times disconcertingly reveals the stamp of history, 
philosophy and perhaps geography when least expected”.157  The latter statement is of 
particular interest as this research will show how unpredictable, political and uncertain 
the application and interpretation of legal rules can be.  
 
Too often throughout the history of competition law it was political reasons that 
determined the outcome of a ruling.  In fact in the US, the fundamentals for competition 
law were political rather than economical,158 e.g. the US civil war (1865) lead to the 
vast industrialisation and growing power of oil and coal trusts.159  However, because of 
public demand and in the public interest, the competition law, namely the Sherman Act 
(1890), projected “a hatred of monopoly”160 and declared the trusts “a growing and 
intolerable evil”.161  Therefore, when necessary competition law can ‘invent’ the tool to 
protect public interests.  It is interesting to note how the financial crisis of 2008 
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157 id., at p. 6. 
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demonstrated that both the Commission162 and the national governments163 had the 
power to act quickly and interfere when public interest164 (and the economy) needed to 
be protected.  But for some reasons modern competition policy-makers are resistant to 
embrace cultural diversity and non-price elements in their analyses.  Indeed it seems 
that both the American and European competition policy-makers have used political 
considerations to protect the interests of the merged parties, and not so much the 
public.165  
 
The opinion of scholars provided in previous sections shows a consensus that cultural 
diversity represents a legitimate value166 that needs to be protected for the public 
interest.  The protection of cultural diversity becomes even more important in the light 
of the significant growth and consolidation of cultural industries since the 1980s.  
Mergers and acquisitions have become “an expression of globalisation”.167  This 
process triggered a long debate about the positive and negative effects of corporate 
mergers in the cultural sector.  Whilst high concentration is quite common for some 
industries, e.g. oil and commodities’ industries,168 for the reasons described in this 
chapter, cultural industries represent a particular concern.  According to some scholars, 
the Commission regulated cultural industries’ mergers as well as possible, in particular, 
                                                
162 For example, the Commission speedily produced a new set of rules with regard to state aid in the face 
of the economic crisis.  See Edward Fennell, “Credit Crisis: European Commission’s Dazzling Moves 
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163 For example, the waiver of merger policy for the merger between Lloyds TSB and HBOS in 2008, 
when the Secretary of State in the UK sealed the merger despite concerns by the OFT as to the potential 
lessening of competition in the banking area.  This merger was branded a ‘policy mistake’.  See John 
Vickers, “The Financial Crisis and Competition Policy: Some Economics.” Global Competition Policy 
(2008): 2, 8.  See also Charles Whiddington, “Competition Law in Hard Times.” Field Fisher 
Waterhouse (2008): 1-3.  
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for the EU if the Commission did not approve the merger.  For a good account of the events see Clifford 
Jones, supra, n. 158, at p. 35.   
166 The sufficient importance of culture to merit special treatment was also emphasised by DiMaggio, 
supra, n. 26, at pp. 65-66. 
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Intellectual Property Forum 43 (Dec 2000): 56. 
168 id., 57. 
 47 
the media mergers.169  This study shows that the Commission could have done a better 
job when regulating mergers and acquisitions in the record industry.  
 
Up to the moment of writing, the record industry is dominated by the oligopoly of four 
major record companies.  As the history of competition and growth of the record 
industry will demonstrate in Chapter 3, within the past two decades, concentration of 
the record industry has escalated, with four major record companies (Universal, Sony, 
Warner and EMI) controlling about 75 percent of the global music market, whilst 
responsible for only about 20 percent of music releases.170  Such growth was not 
organic, but largely achieved by mergers and acquisitions, which not only help majors 
amass the necessary financial capital, but also changes the structure of the industry.  
Having said that, the majors’ market share alone is not such a big concern in itself.  
What is important however is that market share equals market power, which is often 
used by the majors to exercise anti-competitive behaviour in the market place (analysed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4). 
 
Historically, it was the majors’ parent electronic or media companies, such as Sony, 
Thorn, Vivendi, and BMG that have wholly or partly owned them.  Mainly these 
corporations are massive and diversified media conglomerates with music accounting 
for only a small percentage of their overall revenue.  In many cases, these transnational 
corporations use music as a loss leader to sell consumer electronics.171  Therefore, 
majors epitomise complete vertical integration from the signing of artists and recording 
them to the marketing and distribution of their music.  This power, in turn, makes major 
record companies the gate-keepers, controlling both market access as well as the music 
that consumers are exposed to.  By also controlling the life source of the industry, 
copyrights, the larger proportion of distribution channels are consequently controlled.172  
Majors should be seen in contrast to small, medium, and large-sized independent music 
labels (indies), which tend to specialise in niche or alternative music.  Altogether, 
independent labels have about 25 percent of the market.  Chapter 3 will demonstrate 
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that it is the independents that are predominantly responsible for cultural diversity as 
they historically introduce the majority of genres into the music market.  
 
Logically, it seems strange that EU competition law to date has no clear-cut jurisdiction 
and competence for regulating cultural industries.  The law only contains a number of 
provisions, which in theory should be enough to prevent high concentration and certain 
types of anti-competitive behaviour, e.g. merger regulation and Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 correspondingly).  However, concerns have 
already been raised in terms of the failure of competition law to prevent high 
consolidation of cultural industries.173  Perhaps this is why there were demands that the 
special status of media industries should be accommodated under the EU Merger 
regulations.174  Interestingly, back in 1970s the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, 
the ECJ) already recognised that cultural industries do have a specific and separate role 
and ruled that broadcasting was a cultural industry as well as a cultural activity.175  
 
Not every scholar agrees that competition law in itself can be an adequate tool to cater 
for questions of cultural diversity.176  Regulation of cultural industries by competition 
law can be contrasted with two other trends, i.e. de-regulation and self-regulation.  The 
former category was extremely popular with media industries in the 1990s.177  In this 
respect, the media industry faced similar problems to the record industry, i.e. the 
dichotomy between pluralism (requiring ownership control and restraint) and media 
industry development (de-regulation).178  Pluralism was protected in the name of public 
interest but governments were also forced to negotiate with large companies for more 
media deregulation.179  Lobbying powers then were so powerful, that pluralism did 
indeed suffer with economic performance within the media industries being the 
justification.  Therefore, the conflict between economic prosperity and diversity is 
relevant to other types of cultural industries.  From this example it can be seen that de-
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regulation of the media industry has not provided the desired outcome in terms of 
pluralism.  The Commission’s involvement in safeguarding pluralism has been 
questioned as media concentrations have been understandably fairly unrestrained by 
governments.180  Unfortunately, back then in the 1990s the Commission noted that the 
intervention could be justified “...only on the basis of securing the proper functioning of 
the internal market and not on the basis of protection of pluralism, per se”.181  
Therefore, the Commission shut its eyes to the reality of mergers; although not 
necessarily impairing competition, they may well challenge diversity of opinion.182  
This argument is extremely relevant to mergers in the record industry. 
 
As mentioned earlier, another popular trend in cultural industries is self-regulation.183  
An attempt of self-regulation with respect to competition in the record industry, albeit 
ill-fated, was the recent decision by the Association of Independent Music (hereinafter, 
AIM) and International Music Publishers and Labels (hereinafter, Impala), trade bodies 
for independent labels in the UK and EU correspondingly, not to oppose a Warner 
takeover of EMI, two of the biggest record companies in the world.184  In February 
2007, after the Sony/BMG merger defeat at the CFI (the Sony/BMG merger is critically 
analysed in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion), Warner struck a secret deal with Impala not 
to oppose the then rumoured merger between EMI and Warner.  In return, Warner 
promised to provide the multi-million dollar funding for the newly established 
independent music labels’ licensing agency Merlin.185  This in itself could be 
unproblematic, however the main issue was that some of the Board members of AIM 
happened to also be Board members of Impala, who in turn were the Interim Board 
members of Merlin.  The support of AIM for Impala’s back–up of the Warner and EMI 
merger, came at a price as not everybody agreed with such a state of affairs.  Two of 
AIM’s members resigned claiming that the merger would be anti-competitive and that 
AIM had not disclosed a personal interest in the matter.  Those two members being Gut 
Records186 and the biggest dance music label in the world, Ministry of Sound:187   
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"It [the Warner/EMI merger] makes our lives more difficult in the retail sector, it makes 
getting racking in store more difficult, it makes getting attention in media more 
difficult, because these large companies leverage their power to get support for their 
artists."188 
 
 
This spat generated a highly acrimonious public exchange of legal letters and threats as 
well as huge media interest.189  It is obvious that Impala has placed itself in a very 
difficult position, especially so because it backed the proposed Warner/EMI merger 
only 6 months after its victory in the CFI, which annulled the Sony/BMG merger. 
   
The above does show how difficult and ineffective both de-regulation and self-
regulation of the cultural industries can be.  Therefore, this study will argue that 
competition law still has a crucial role to play in regulating cultural industries in the 
twenty-first century, albeit not in its existing form, because asking record companies to 
regulate themselves is rather like asking Dracula to look after a blood bank.  Hence this 
study will concentrate on the importance of legal regulation of cultural industries, and 
where regulation is found wanting.   
 
In terms of competition, the fact that larger scale entities absorb smaller scale entities is 
not a new phenomenon.190  However, in terms of cultural industries, the importance of 
smaller scale entities lies in the fact that they are responsible for diverse cultural 
products.  To date, very little research has been undertaken in order to show the effect 
that competition law has had on cultural industries.  This study represents a brand new 
look at cultural diversity from the competition law angle and vice versa.  Moreover, the 
legal regulation of anti-competitive behaviour in the record industry is a mainly 
unexplored area.  There is a gap in the academic debates and practice that this thesis 
seeks to mend by thorough examination of mergers and acquisitions in the record 
industry. 
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1.9. The Importance of Small Business in Cultural Industries 
  
Finally, a concluding remark should be made about an important category that runs 
throughout this study - small businesses in cultural industries.  In their work, Adorno 
and Horkheimer strongly emphasised that from the twentieth century cultural industries 
were subservient to organised capital: 
 
“Under monopoly capital all mass culture is identical….  The people at the top are no 
longer interested in concealing monopoly: as its violence becomes more open, so its 
power grows”.191 
 
Despite the fact that standardisation is a mainstay of capitalism there is also the need for 
diversity and new products to generate increasing turnover.192  The big players are not 
the only players in cultural industries.  Cultural pessimists have not considered in 
greater detail the opportunities that existed in cultural industries, e.g. the ‘vacuums’ that 
were filled by smaller companies.  Often small firms do not just flesh out vacuums but 
are instrumental in producing what is best in modern culture.  It seems true that high 
market concentration in any industry means greater standardisation.  However, speaking 
of the record industry, there always existed a symbiosis of major record companies and 
small labels with the latter discovering the majority of new talent and genres, and the 
former capturing the markets of genres that had been tested and proved popular by 
independents.193  
 
The discussion in this chapter on the state of modern culture affords concluding that 
despite the general pessimism, it is not doomed.  Even Adorno’s thoughts leave some 
hope.  He did find fault lines in the previously smooth homogeneous veneer of societies 
under late capitalism, i.e. he did find enlightenment. 194  F.R. Leavis, also a cultural 
pessimist, likewise concluded that “mass-production and standardisation have not 
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achieved their supreme triumph yet”195 and there is “the vague hope that recovery must 
come, somehow, in spite of all.”196  Indeed constant creativity provides hope.  As has 
been shown above, not all consumers are manipulated by corporations.  There are 
certain consumers who spend their time looking for unknown, eclectic, and non-
mainstream music.  Chapter 3 will illustrate that it is predominantly small music labels 
that release these types of music.     
 
Cultural pessimists also rightly highlighted the commodification of music from the 
twentieth century.  However, they neglected the important “cottage industry” aspects of 
production and work organisation within small independent labels that have always 
played a vital role in the cultural sphere.197  Therefore, it can be argued that independent 
music labels de-commodify and democratise both music and the record industry because 
they retain pre-industrial features of cultural production.  This study will demonstrate 
that independent labels are the force that at least seeks to limit the market power of the 
major record companies.  Small labels are the most likely groups to passionately care 
about diverse music and its availability as well as provide a robust argument against 
commodification, as opposed to those working to produce good results for shareholders 
and stock exchanges.198  Their specialised knowledge affords them a legitimacy that 
majors do not have.  It would be a mistake to state that all independent music labels are 
altruistic, but they certainly “run on a less single-mindedly profit-oriented system”,199 
which in turn allows them to be a lot more diverse than the four labels controlling the 
recorded music market.  New digital technology is instrumental in fostering the 
proliferation of independent labels, which in turn increases the diversity of music heard: 
 
“[With independents] we can hear a greater diversity of expression than is allowed 
through the gates of big record companies – with their narrow ideas about what kind of 
music is profitable.  For instance, if you knew hip-hop only from what you heard on the 
radio or MTV, you’d rightly come to the conclusion that it’s about nothing but bitches 
and money”.200 
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Stratton rightly highlighted that when small companies grow in size they adopt the 
structure of a big company, and profit becomes more important.  However, Chapter 3 
will discuss the fact that only a tiny percentage of independents grow in size.  By 
contrast, no major record company grew in size naturally.  They grew in size due to 
numerous mergers and acquisitions.  Even though very few independents can be 
considered as big in size, there is still a chasm between the smallest major and the 
biggest independent label,201 with the latter nevertheless being a lot more diverse than 
majors.  Even a strong critic of romantic ideology like Stratton admitted that small 
labels are “pressured to preserve the rationale that they record good music.  Were it not 
for this rationale, there would be no reason for their existence…”.202  Thus, these labels 
can be considered as the force that prevents the total industrialisation of the record 
industry, and in this study it is argued that the independent music labels, a small but 
influential force in the record industry, provide the opportunity to listen to diverse 
music.  
 
Section 1.3. demonstrated the connection between culture and economics.  Independent 
labels are no exception to that connection but they can be said to keep culture at the 
superstructure level, not letting it collapse into the base.  From the standpoint of this 
thesis, they are a source of enlightenment.  However, further chapters will demonstrate 
that independents, whilst still being niche players, seek to play a more influential and 
active role in the digital age record business.  
 
1.10. Limitation of the Study 
 
Although this study investigates the relationship between competition law and cultural 
industries, it has used the record industry as a vehicle to demonstrate that competition 
law has failed in preventing high concentration within cultural industries and that the 
latter deserved special treatment by competition law.  It would have been ideal to carry 
out similar investigations into other types of cultural industries, but it was not possible 
due to the word and time constraints.  To make up for that lack of coverage, a number 
of examples from other types of cultural industries have been provided in Chapters 1 
and 6. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
2.1. Description and Rationale 
 
This chapter outlines the methods employed in researching whether or not cultural 
industries deserve special treatment by competition law and to what extent competition 
law has managed to protect cultural diversity so far.  The following sections present the 
study’s research strategy and theoretical framework.  
 
There are a number of rationales for studying the relationship between the law and 
cultural industries.  Even though some research has been undertaken in relation to the 
nature and history of the record industry and its levels of diversity203 (see Chapters 1 
and 3), most scholars’ attention concentrated on organisational structures rather than 
any competitive dynamics in the record industry.204  This thesis seeks to fill the 
aforementioned gap by means of a mixed model, combining legal study, historical study 
and interviews, using a triangulation method in order to prove and thereby support the 
conclusions made.  
 
2.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
The chapter explains the method and research strategy for the following research 
question: whether or not the independent record sector as a cultural industry deserves 
special treatment under competition law and if so, how has competition law in the past 
protected cultural diversity, and consequently how could the law be changed in order to 
protect cultural diversity more effectively in the cultural industries, with specific focus 
on the independent record industry?  
 
In order to deal with the research question, the work was divided into three sections:  
 
                                                
203 Laurence Shore, “The Crossroads of Business and Music: A Study of the Music Industry in the US 
and Internationally” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 1983); Timothy Dowd, “Making the Mainstream 
Market: Organizational and Musical Change in the US Recording Industry” (PhD diss., Princeton 
University, 1996); Burnett (1990), supra, n. 120. 
204 David Hesmondhalgh, “Independent Record Companies and Democratisation in the Popular Music 
Industry” (PhD diss., Goldsmiths College, 1996). 
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1. Does the independent record sector as a cultural industry deserve special 
protection through competition law?  After carrying out the research, the 
answer to this question was positive and the importance of cultural 
industries, as well as the independent record industry, has been explained in 
greater depth in Chapter 1.   
 
2. As this study answered the previous question positively, therefore the 
secondary question was then considered, i.e. whether or not competition law 
had managed to protect cultural diversity so far.  The answer to this question 
was negative; this is dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6, which analyse both 
merger regulation and merger cases in the record industry as well as Article 
81 of the EC Treaty. 
 
3. After concluding the previous point, the next question to be answered was 
how competition law could be amended so that it would be more effective in 
protecting cultural industries in the future.  The answer to this question is 
provided in the Conclusion. 
 
This particular chapter is organised as follows.  Firstly, the definitions are provided so 
as to inform the reader of the key concepts.  Secondly, the definitions are followed by a 
detailed explanation of the research strategy and methods involved in this research, 
namely that of legal study, historical study and interviews.  
 
2.3. Definitions of the Main Concepts 
 
In this thesis the record industry is used as a case study for cultural industries.  Of 
course, there are other types of cultural industries, such as those involved with 
literature, films, art and media but the sole focus of this work is on the record industry.  
The record industry is defined as four major record companies (Universal, Sony, 
Warner and EMI – together the “majors”) having approximately 75 percent of the 
market share, the remainder belonging to independent music labels (“independents”).  
In this research, it is argued that independents are largely responsible for the diversity of 
music (for more on the importance of independent labels in terms of cultural diversity 
see sections Chapter 3).   
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For the purposes of this thesis, cultural diversity, as has been defined in Chapter 1, is 
the diversity of producers and diversity of products, i.e. the diversity of record labels 
and music itself.205  In this thesis, it is argued that the former is intertwined with the 
latter.    
 
Also in this thesis, competition law includes both EU merger regulation and Article 81 
of the EC Treaty.  The USA merger test is also considered for comparative analysis.   
 
In addition to the legislation, the research considered a number of cases with particular 
emphasis on the Sony/BMG merger case.  The case demonstrated that competition law 
has no specific legal rules, which can be applied in order to regulate competition in 
cultural industries.  Furthermore, the Conclusion provides ideas on how existing 
competition law could be improved to incorporate the consideration of culture and 
cultural diversity, specifically in those cultural industries, with which it directly relates.   
 
2.4. Research Strategy & Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to answer the research question of this study, a mixed model of data collection 
was used, as this is an accepted method of data collection for qualitative research.206  
The three main types of data collection comprised legal study, historical study and 
qualitative interviews.  Having provided three parts of the research question in Section 
2.2, and before explaining each method, it is appropriate to demonstrate how my 
methods helped answer those questions. 
 
In order to answer the first part of the research question, multiple methods have been 
employed.  Firstly, the notion of cultural industries had to be unpacked.  This was 
achieved by the literature review.  Secondly, to explore what the independent record 
industry sector is, both historical analysis and interviews have been carried out.  The 
history of the record industry has demonstrated that from almost its inception, small 
labels were the real innovators and risk-takers, which did increase overall musical 
diversity when concentration levels were low.  The interviews highlighted the unique 
                                                
205 For the justification of this approach see Christianen, supra, n. 125, at p. 55. 
206 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (London: Sage, 2006), 
97 – 120; and Lisa Webley, “Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research.”  In press: H.Kritzer 
& P. Cane, The Oxford Handbook to Empirical Legal Studies, Chapter 31. 
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characteristics of independent labels and emphasised their role in risk-taking.  Thirdly, 
examining whether competition law could provide a particular treatment of cultural 
industries necessitated using legal analysis as well as the interviews.  The former was 
necessary to understand what the law says at the moment and the problems that need to 
be rectified.  The legal analysis also demonstrated how both the merger and acquisitions 
cases in the record industry were dealt with by competition law.  However, legal 
analysis alone would not have been sufficient.  In order to find out about the issues that 
are not covered by competition law, interviews with industry leaders were carried out to 
explore their perceptions, which in turn gave me an insight to the background of the 
problems with the record industry’s high concentration that was not obvious purely 
from a legal analysis.    
 
Answering the second part of the research question, namely whether or not competition 
law managed to protect cultural diversity, necessitated utilising mainly legal analysis of 
the case law and the legislation.  Once again, the legal analysis provided an 
understanding of the law as it stood.  However, an analysis of competition law could not 
have given all the answers.  Therefore, a historical analysis was also needed to look into 
cultural diversity (in this case the diversity of music under different levels of 
concentration in the record industry).  
 
In order to answer the third part of the research question, as to how competition law 
could be amended so that it would be more effective in protecting cultural industries, 
legal analysis was employed to understand the limitations and benefits of competition 
law treating cultural industries in a special and particular way.  
 
As shown above, all three methods were used to complement each other. 
 
A quantitative questionnaire could have been used as an alternative method of gathering 
data.  However, my concern was that I would not have had enough responses to be able 
to analyse the data quantitatively, and therefore would not have met the requirements 
for quantitative research.  Quantitative research would have probably provided me with 
more breadth, but qualitative research has provided me with more depth and focus.  For 
example, one of the research methods described below, the interviews, allowed an open-
ended discussion that in turn provided me with an insight into an individual’s 
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experience.  Arguably, the quantitative method would have given me a narrower context 
within which to work. 
 
2.4.1. Legal Study 
 
As competition law and policy constitute a crucial part of the thesis, it was necessary to 
consult legal sources related to competition law and the record industry including 
primary data207 such as case law and relevant legislation.  The main case law cited in 
this thesis related to the merger of Sony and BMG, which included the approval of the 
merger by the Competition Commission in 2004, the disapproval of the merger by the 
Court of First Instance in 2006, and the re-approval of the merger by the Competition 
Commission in 2007.   
 
Other relevant legal sources included such secondary sources as commentaries on the 
law that explained its background as well as legal academic commentaries.  A majority 
of the information regarding competition law in this thesis was obtained from various 
publications, such as authoritative legal journals, books and official press releases from 
the European Competition Commission, the Court of First Instance and the Federal 
Trade Commission.  In addition to these publications, very valuable and innovative 
information was found in a range of authoritative legal on-line sources, which have 
been specified, where relevant, and which include sources such as the Social Science 
Research Networks. 
 
As outlined above, competition law for the purposes of this thesis was the European 
competition merger regulation (hereinafter, the ECMR), case law and a comparative 
analysis of the US merger test and case law.  Apart from merger regulation, for the sake 
of completeness, Article 81 of the EC Treaty was also considered.  In terms of merger 
regulation, the analysis of the “old EU merger test”, relating to the “strengthening of a 
dominant position”,208 was necessary because it allowed me to appraise to what extent 
the “new EU merger test”, relating to whether there is “significant impediment of 
                                                
207 In terms of the interpretation of the law. 
208 Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of December 21, 1989 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings (OJ 1989, L395) as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1310/97 of June 30, 1997 (OJ 1997, L 180). 
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effective competition”,209 could accommodate cultural diversity.  Moreover, the analysis 
of the new EU merger test (although not yet implemented in any merger cases in the 
record industry) was necessary in order to see whether it could potentially address some 
of the issues in relation to competition in the record industry, e.g. non-price or non-
economics matters.   
 
In this respect, it was interesting to compare how other jurisdictions dealt with the 
problem of high consolidation in the record industry and this study focused on the USA 
as a comparative model.  The conclusion is that the US merger test, “substantial 
lessening of competition” (hereinafter, the SLC test),210 although being an economics-
based test, is better suited to deal with the competition issues in the record industry 
because it is less stringent.  However, because a huge amount of lobbying power and 
politics were involved in the Sony/BMG merger, the US merger test also failed to stop 
the major record companies from consolidating even further.   
 
Investigating the merger regulation alone would have not provided the complete picture 
of the competition law.  Therefore, Article 81 of the EC Treaty, [which deals with 
situations] “rendering incompatible with common market all agreements between 
undertakings which may affect trade between Member States”, was also analysed even 
though it is yet to be applied to the record industry.  In this case, the record industry was 
replaced by another type of cultural industry, i.e. the book industry, which allowed me 
to draw some conclusions by analogy. 
 
Thus, within the legal analysis, four separate tests were carried out: 
 
1) Analysis of the old EU merger test, which included primary legislation and case 
law, as well as secondary commentary on the legislation and case law. 
 
2) Analysis of the new EU merger test, which likewise included primary 
legislation, as well as secondary commentary on the legislation.  This merger 
test is yet to be implemented in relation to the record industry but some forecasts 
were made in this paper as to its possible application. 
                                                
209 Article 2 (2) of Council Regulation  (EEC) No 139/2004 of January 20, 2004 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings (OJ 2004, L 24). 
210 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.  
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3) Analysis of the US merger test, which included primary legislation and case law, 
as well as secondary commentary on the legislation and case law. 
 
4) Analysis of Article 81 of the EC Treaty, which included primary legislation and 
case law (predominantly in relation to the book industry as Article 81 is yet to 
be applied in terms of cultural diversity in the record industry), as well as 
secondary commentary on the legislation and case law. 
 
In terms of the legal study, there have been a number of both practical and conceptual 
problems encountered.  One of the biggest problems with this research was that it 
coincided with the ongoing Sony/BMG merger dispute, which resulted in a great deal of 
uncertainty for me as a researcher working under a time constraint.  In 2004 the 
Commission approved the merger (the Sony/BMG merger is analysed in Chapter 5).  In 
2006 the Court of First Instance annulled the merger, whilst the second investigation by 
the Commission re-approved the merger in 2007.  The Commission issued the final 
approval on the 3 October 2007 but it was not published until the 18 June 2008.  This 
too caused a delay with finalising the arguments.  In each decision the competition 
authorities suggested new developments and approaches which I critically analysed and 
changed my conclusions correspondingly after each ruling was published.  There was 
also a positive element to this dispute – each new ruling, be it the one by the 
Commission or the Court of First Instance, added more arguments in favour of the 
special treatment of culture by competition law.  
 
A conceptual problem I faced was my not being an American lawyer, as part of the 
research required me to spend a fair amount of time understanding the nuances of the 
American competition system, i.e. what factors they take into account when reasoning 
their decisions, and learning what some of the American legal concepts meant, e.g. the 
rule of reason.  Having said that, both practical and conceptual difficulties have been 
overcome in presenting this research and the conclusions it provides.  
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2.4.2. Historical Study 
 
Historical research was the second method utilised in this study.  Whilst there are 
several good sources written about record industry history,211 the point of this study was 
to focus on different stages of record industry consolidation (such as primary and 
secondary consolidations) and to examine what factors had been driving large record 
companies towards consolidation.   
 
The historical analysis is based predominantly on secondary sources, because the 
commentators of different eras have encapsulated growth and diversity patterns at 
different stages of the record industry’s evolution.  These diverse authoritative sources 
also allowed me to construct timelines of concomitant stages of consolidation and 
competition in the record industry, and analyse how those stages correlated with 
musical diversity levels at those times.  The timeline, in turn, provided a complementary 
analysis of the connection between concentration and diversity levels discussed in 
Chapter 1.  The study also examines how such high levels of consolidation affected 
small labels as well as cultural diversity and what role independent labels played in that 
process, e.g. record industry democratisation and de-commodification in discovering 
and releasing new and non-mainstream music.  Such approaches were necessary in 
terms of data analysis, e.g. looking at the developments between majors and 
independents and the patterns of consolidation at different periods, plus the impact of 
consolidation on diversity. 
  
The historical study has covered the evolution of the record industry from the moment 
the phonograph was invented by Thomas Edison in 1877.  The description of the 
background of the record industry has been compiled in such a way as to demonstrate 
its cyclical nature and the patterns of the majors’ responses to crisis situations, which in 
turn neatly tie up with the reasons for merging, discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
Thus the methodology necessitated seeking out pieces of information from available 
authoritative secondary sources such as books, academic articles and other studies 
relevant to the research question.  A process of linking them together was undertaken in 
a manner that not only explained the past but also aided an understanding of the present.  
                                                
211 See for example Pekka Gronow and Ilpo Saunio, An International History of the Recording Industry 
(London: Cassell, 1998). 
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These items amassed the collective knowledge of particular fields within the record 
industry in considerable detail and thus became a valuable resource in supplementing 
the primary data gathered during fieldwork. 
 
2.4.3. Qualitative Interviews 
 
As mentioned above, qualitative interviews are an accepted way of collecting data for 
qualitative research and therefore were used in preparing this study.212  The interviews 
carried out were a small but important part of this research.  They provided an 
additional examination of certain tentative conceptual ideas that had emerged from the 
documentary analysis stages of the research.  Overall, the interviews could be described 
as intensive individual interviews to prove or disprove some of my hypotheses, as well 
as a way to develop a convincing argument independent of statistical testing.  
 
It should be noted that most of the written sources concerning major record companies 
and independent labels are either historical reports about their creation or about 
charismatic personalities involved in their management.213  There are a few sources, 
however, which contain a good description of the economics and structure of the record 
industry and the majors in particular.214  Since very little was written scientifically about 
the way majors and independents operated, particularly reflecting on their competitive 
dynamics and the changing patterns in the digital age, interviews with record label 
executives and other music industry figures helped me gather this information.  The 
qualitative interviews were aimed at obtaining the opinions of the experts in the field 
based on the shifting notion of independents in the digital age and how, in their opinion, 
competition law affected cultural diversity and the use of copyright.  The interviews 
were also utilised in order to provide some ideas as to whether or not the record 
industry’s high concentration was of concern to independent labels and what effect the 
recent mergers had on the independent sector.  These matters are covered in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, dealing with mergers and acquisitions. 
 
                                                
212 Kjell Rudestam and Rae Newton, Surviving Your Dissertation: A Comprehensive Guide to Content 
and Process (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 2001), 97-98, and Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), 318 – 335. 
213 Frederic Dannen, Hitmen (New York : First Vintage, 1991). 
214 Keith Negus, supra, n. 56; Marc Huygens et al., “Co-evolution of Firm Capabilities and Industry 
Competition: Investigating the Music Industry 1877 – 1997.” Organisation Studies 22, no. 6 (2001), 981. 
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As there are no statistics on how many independents there are in the UK and the USA or 
in any country for that matter, I came up with two different classifications of 
independent labels: one based on the size of labels in terms of their profits and market 
power and the second based on their business model and motivation. The ten interviews 
(the participants are discussed below in this section) carried out are considered to be 
broadly illustrative of a range of (i) different size classifications (some interviewees 
were the owners / founders of very small labels, whilst others ran extremely successful 
independent labels), (ii) different business models (some of the interviewees were 
passionate about keeping their independence whilst others were prepared to co-operate 
with majors) and, (iii) different motivations (different reasons for setting up 
independent labels by the interviewees). 
 
Since it was impossible to interview the entire population of independent labels, a form 
of stratified sampling was used instead, i.e. the key characteristics were chosen for each 
group.  Those key characteristics were utilised as a method to identify and select 
interviewees.  In keeping with the qualitative method employed in this research the 
selection was broadly representative of the key characteristics.  However, it was not 
representative in any statistically valid sense of the word.   
 
a) The Sequence of the Process 
 
The research started in October 2004.  The interviews were left to the last stage of this 
research because I wanted to carry out both legal and historical studies first in order to 
enable a more sophisticated interview process.  Two interviews were carried out in 2006 
because I wanted to find out at the time how the industry compiled its statistics, and 
why certain labels opted for the Creative Commons instead of the copyright institution.  
The rest of the interviews were carried out between June and October 2007.   
 
All interviews apart from one were conducted in London; the exception having been an 
interview conducted in Los Angeles.  Each interview varied between 45 minutes to 1 
hour, the longest interview lasting for 1 hour 20 minutes.  All the interviews were 
recorded to a minidisc (on file with the author) and then transcribed. 
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b) Process & Instrumentation  
 
Firstly, it is important to acknowledge my connections within the record industry.  
During 2005-07, I worked for the music industry business network, MusicTank, as a 
researcher and events coordinator for numerous conferences and think tanks.  In 
addition to that, since the middle of 2007 I have been an artist manager.  These 
experiences gave me an appreciation of the industry’s dynamics, how both big labels 
and small labels operated, and their business practices.  Those credentials gave me the 
status of participant observant that on the one hand helped me come up with key issues 
for the interviews and on the other hand made access to the interviewees a lot easier.  
My status afforded an approach to some of the interviewees, whereas my peers helped 
me obtain an interview with other participants.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that my status allowed me to ask knowledgeable 
questions but it did not prevent me from critiquing and analysing the responses of the 
interviewees.  It must be stressed that I had no shares in any of the companies nor did I 
or do I, have any financial interest in any enterprises.  The latter enabled me to keep my 
independence as an external observant.  Due to my status I was able to observe certain 
practices: how artists are restrained by their record contracts, organisational and cultural 
differences between major and small record companies, the ever-increasing role of the 
marketing departments at the major record companies and the lack of record contract 
transparency.  In doing so, the ethics of participant observation have been preserved.  
As a participant observer I developed empathic neutrality,215 i.e. whilst I had empathy 
with what the interviewees were saying, I at all times remained neutral towards the 
findings.  My objectivity was uncompromised as I remained critical and reflective about 
the findings throughout. 
 
There are a number of limitations that arise when employing participant observation.  
Positivists could argue that there are issues with the validity and reliability of the data, 
arguing that the findings depend on a particular researcher’s interpretation.  That indeed 
could present a weakness to the research but, as specified above, I sought to test my 
findings and impressions against other data to provide rigorous triangulation.  It is also 
important to note that because I was a participant observant in the record industry, 
                                                
215 Michael Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Method (London: Sage, 1996), 50. 
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generalising the findings in terms of other cultural industries, addressed in both Section 
1.10 and the Conclusion would be problematic. 
 
My status also provided me with knowledge of the key characteristics of independent 
labels thus helping me to analytically design the interview questions.  The questionnaire 
was a structured qualitative data collection instrument.  It helped collect important 
information about the key issues that run throughout the thesis.  The questionnaire was 
constructed in a way to firstly help understand what an independent label is, and 
secondly, whether the classic notion of an independent label caring only for the artists 
and music diversity has changed in the digital age.  The characteristics of independent 
labels had to be lined up against those of major record companies to examine if there 
are any fundamental differences between them that could impact upon musical 
diversity.  The questions were structured to cover the key characteristics of record 
company behaviour, for example, the way copyrights were handled, a company’s size, 
different business models and motivation were all investigated.  Secondly the 
questionnaire considered the competition issue.  It was interesting to find out whether 
independent labels had been worried at all about the industry’s high concentration and 
what were the main obstacles for independents in the digital age, if any.  The interviews 
were finished with an open question about record industry regulation. 
 
The interviewees were selected on the basis of meeting key characteristics and access; 
they did not receive questions in advance.  However, the interviews could be described 
as semi-structured, because where necessary there was room for additional questions 
depending on how the interviews progressed, e.g. sometimes it was necessary to play 
‘devil’s advocate’ when enquiring about the more controversial issues such as the 
‘selling out’ of a label (i.e. sale by an independent label to a major label).  Sometimes 
questions had to be varied and inconsistencies taken into consideration and clarified.216 
 
c) Participants  
 
The list of the interviewees included celebrated figures that covered the widest range of 
record industry experience.  These 10 interviewees captured the gamut from artists (3 
participants) to label executives (7 participants) and managers (2 participants) to a 
                                                
216 A technique recommended achieving a better outcome from the interviews. Bryman, supra, n. 212, at 
p.332.  
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copyright expert (1 participant), and a Creative Commons specialist (1 participant), with 
the majority of the interviewees being crossovers combining 2 roles.  The numbers are 
simply here to illustrate that the interviewees were selected based on the key 
characteristics and roles of the record industry (copyright, Creative Commons, artists, 
labels etc).  More importantly, almost all of them have worked for major and 
independent labels, thus providing invaluable comparative knowledge about both.  
 
All the participants were chosen because of their expertise within the field.  Even 
though the objective of my research was to remain open to discovery, it is important to 
note that interviewees were purposefully selected due to their knowledge and expertise 
as my intention was to interview people who were relevant to the research question.217 
 
As mentioned above, my status of participant observer allowed me to choose a diverse 
sample group.  For example, to cover the varied range of the music labels and their 
(financial) interests, this thesis took into consideration not only copyright law but also 
the relatively novel Creative Commons scheme.  On another level, it is a common 
practice for the most successful independent labels to sell their businesses to major 
record companies (reviewed in depth in Section 3.4).  However, the majority of 
independent labels do not do so, either because they are not successful enough to be of 
any interest to the majors, or for ideological reasons.  In this respect the interview with 
the Fading Ways Records’ founder, Neil Leyton, was very valuable because it provided 
a counter-balance to the sell-out stories.  The sample group is also unique because it 
represented different degrees of independent labels, resulting in different challenges and 
different opinions on high concentration within the record industry.  For example, the 
hugely successful Dramatico Records, who has Katie Melua on its roster, has different 
issues with high concentration, than for example, the small jazz label, Dune Records.  
However, interestingly, some of the answers were the same throughout many 
interviews, irrespective of a particular label’s size and level of success.     
 
For the purposes of this research the following interviews were carried out:   
 
1. Keith Jopling (06 February 2006) – then Chief Analyst of the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industries. 
                                                
217 Purposive sampling is a recommended technique for qualitative researches. ib., 333-4, and Rudestam, 
and Rae, supra, n. 212, at p. 93.  
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2. Neil Leyton (20 March 2006) – an artist, founder and owner of Fading Ways 
Records, a label using Creative Commons as opposed to copyright and 
specialising in the release of non-commercial music. 
3. Mike Batt (09 July 2007) – composer, conductor, producer, founder and owner 
of Dramatico Records (Katie Melua), Deputy Chairman of the British 
Phonographic Industry (hereinafter, the BPI). 
4. Geoff Travis (20 June 2007) – founder and owner of the Rough Trade Shop and 
Rough Trade Records. 
5. Safta Jaffery (21 June 2007) – artist and producer manager, ex-owner of Taste 
Media (discovered and developed Muse on his independent label), sold–out to 
Warner in 2005. 
6. Adjei Amaning (26 June 2007) – owner of Vanquish Records, a small 
independent rock label. 
7. Darrell Panethiere (27 June 2007) – international copyright consultant, ex-
Head of the Copyright Department in the US Congress, ex-legal advisor to IFPI 
and Warner. 
8. Keith Harris (6 September 2007) – Stevie Wonder’s manager outside of the 
US, Director of the Artist Affairs at the Public Performance Limited 
(hereinafter, the PPL). 
9. Bobby Colomby (26 September 2007) – producer and drummer with Blood, 
Sweat & Tears. 
10. Janine Irons (25 October 2007) – the CEO of Dune Records, a small 
independent label specialising in jazz releases by black artists. 
 
A few caveats regarding the notion of independent labels are worthy of mention because 
they could have presented a problem in answering the research question.  The first 
caveat was that independent labels are mainly small businesses and many of them want 
to grow to the size of the next major label.  A second caveat was that the main aspects 
of independence become immediately redundant when a major offers money to buy out 
the label.  The third important caveat was that particularly in the digital age, 
independent labels are certainly in the business of profit making as much as the majors.  
Thus, it was necessary to question the cultural importance of independent labels and 
their financial interests, as this contradiction represented one of the main problems in 
terms of why competition law should have protected the small business in cultural 
industries, because the latter too, could have been considered as competitors to the big 
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businesses that have sought to increase their financial gain.  All these issues are 
examined in far greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  Of course, there is a limitation to the 
findings because not all independent labels are pure independents (this is further 
discussed in Section 3.2.2), but there are labels to which none of those caveats are 
applicable, and therefore looking at cultural diversity from the independent labels’ point 
of view was appropriate.  Just as there is a limit on the reliability of the statistical data, 
there is a limit on how diverse some of the independents are, but as shown in this 
research, independents are undeniably more diverse than the four majors. 
 
A number of other issues should be mentioned at this point.  The record industry is a 
small cottage industry in terms of people who work in it, and despite gaining easy 
access to some of these people due to my insider status, many respondents asked for 
confidentiality when quoting controversial statements.  Thus, wherever it was felt 
during the writing up of this work that a particular statement could be considered 
controversial, confidentiality was granted for that particular quote.  In all other cases, 
the names of the interviewees are provided.   
 
It was decided to stop at 10 interviews since it was felt that theoretical saturation was 
reached essentially because some of the interviewees were providing very similar 
answers.  Besides, the status of the record industry figures interviewed meant that they 
were extremely knowledgeable about the characteristics I wanted to cover in this 
research and they provided very informative answers.218  The interview group should be 
seen in contrast to the millions of people who only have a MySpace page and who could 
have given me longer interviews; but it is doubtful whether they would provide as 
informative and reliable data as the sample selected for this thesis.  Obviously, it would 
have been possible to talk to more people, but as this methodology has demonstrated, I 
was not relying on the interviews as the only data source.  It was decided not to 
interview the CEOs of majors because due to their positions they would not be able to 
answer certain tricky questions about the reasons for merging and the exploitation of 
copyrights etc.  More to the point, as mentioned above, with one exception, all the 
interviewees have worked for both majors and independents either as lawyers, 
managers, A&R managers or artists, thus they could speak reliably about both types of 
entities.  I only used those sources of methodology that were needed for this research.  It 
                                                
218 Short interviews by their nature of not necessarily being in-depth are often insightful. Bryman, ib., at 
p. 331. 
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is important to re-emphasise that I was looking at the sector as a participant observer 
and so would only approach those who were inside rather than outside (but influential) 
of the industry.  Hence competition lawyers have been excluded from the interviews.  
Had I been involved in another research area , e.g. how competition lawyers view the 
record industry, obviously it would be necessary to interview competition lawyers, but 
this was not the  case.  Additionally, there has been an abundance of both primary and 
secondary competition law sources.   
 
At the end of the interview stage, data analysis was carried out for which thematic 
coding219 was chosen in preference to other methods of interview analysis because 
having read the relevant literature, I knew the key issues that were markers for cultural 
diversity, e.g. concentration and copyright.  After the interview stage was over, the 
interviewees’ responses were re-analysed and coded by pulling out the relevant parts, 
which related to each characteristic and those responses were used for the data analysis.  
After the data was analysed, the relevant chapters were re-written incorporating the data 
obtained during the interviews.  For example, one of the sections in this thesis, covering 
the differences between major record companies and independents, is based primarily 
(but not solely) on the data obtained from the interviews.  This was done on purpose to 
avoid the previous academic views about the idealistic nature of the independents.  
Chapter 4, which covers the relationship between copyright and competition law and 
Chapter 5 covering mergers and acquisitions in the record industry, are based primarily 
on the detailed analysis of the numerous relevant commentaries and case law, combined 
with the data obtained from the interviewees. 
 
Thus, in terms of collecting data, all three types of methods perfectly fitted together and 
complemented each other.  The crucial point is that these methods answered the 
research question.  It should be noted that the research was carried out in cycles because 
the nature of it necessitated going from one method to the other.  
 
 
 
                                                
219 The essence of thematic coding is classification (in this study, the qualification included the cultural 
diversity, concentration, copyright etc), therefore allowing easy retrieval of text relating to a particular 
issue.  For more on thematic coding see Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: 
Thematic Analysis and Code Development (London: Sage, 1998). 
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2.5. Data Analysis 
 
In order to answer the research question a triangulation method was utilised to 
corroborate evidence, an acceptable method in qualitative research.220  The method 
ensured that the same question was looked at from different viewpoints, coupled with 
continuous cross checking of the data.221 
 
2.5.1. Legal Study  
 
In order to answer the two elements of the research question, it was necessary to explain 
how far competition law has managed to protect cultural diversity.  In this particular 
case, a four-stranded approach was utilised.   
 
Firstly, the primary data sources in relation to the EU old merger test were considered.   
 
Secondly, the conclusion was supplemented with the discussion of commentary by 
leading academics on the operation of the old EU merger test and the way it was applied 
to the merger and acquisition cases in the record industry.  This allowed me to conclude 
as to the extent to which the old test protected competition and cultural diversity in the 
record industry.  A similar mode was employed in relation to the new EU merger test 
and the extent of its possible protection of competition and cultural diversity. 
 
Thirdly, since many record labels span the USA, and the latter has a different merger 
test, it was necessary to consider the extent of protection of competition and cultural 
diversity under the SLC test following the same way of operating as used when 
analysing the EU merger tests and case law.  
 
Fourthly and finally, Article 81 of the EC Treaty was examined in order to complete the 
                                                
220 Triangulation is a technique that brings together different methods and data sources in a study. 
Bryman, supra, n. 212, at p. 275. Triangulation utilises “multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, 
sources of data, and methodologies”. See Norman Denzin, The Research Act in Sociology (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1970), 310; Eugene Webb, et al., Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Measures in the Social 
Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), and Rudestam and Rae, supra, n. 212, at p. 100.  
221 David Deacon, et al., “Collision or Collusion? A Discussion and Case Study of the Unplanned 
Triangulation of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods.” International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology 1 (1998): 47.  
 
 
 71 
analysis of the European competition law.  Without investigating Article 81, the 
analysis would have been limited to merger regulation only, which would not have 
presented the full spectrum of competition law.  When analysing Article 81, a mode 
similar to the European merger regulation, was employed in order to find out the extent 
of its possible protection of competition and cultural diversity. 
 
2.5.2. Historical Study 
 
The analysis of competition law alone could not answer the research question because 
courts seem to view the record industry in a rather restricted and narrow way.  Thus, 
when considering the research question, it was necessary to carry out a historical 
analysis looking into the record industry more broadly.   
 
The focus of the historical analysis of the record industry was to look at consolidation 
because numerous studies tended to suggest that consolidation (market power) was 
analogous to a lack of diversity (as illustrated in Chapter 1).  In this instance, 
considering both primary and secondary data plus industry statistics, triangulated the 
data. 
 
2.5.3. Interviews 
 
Looking at the issue of cultural diversity and competition law from a third data source, 
the interviews, then further triangulated the data.  Whereas the historical study dealt 
with the evolution of the record industry and different competitive regimes, the 
interviews were aimed at examining the shifts and changes within the record industry, 
highlighting the tensions and differences between the majors and the independents.  The 
interviews also helped to contrast certain attributes of major record companies with 
independent labels and analyse how big business, if at all, affected the small businesses 
and what impact that has had on cultural diversity.  The interviews were also necessary 
to understand how the record industry has changed within the past decade, why 
independent labels are important, if indeed they are, and why those labels need to be 
protected by competition law.  Eventually, the interviews combined with a historical 
study allowed me to analyse as to what extent competition law managed to regulate the 
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record industry, as part of cultural industries, and look into the tensions within the law 
itself, for example the seemingly opposite purposes of copyright and competition laws.   
 
As the sample was stratified by working out key characteristics of record companies 
(size, business model, motivation, and the use of copyright), the interviewees reflected 
some differing viewpoints in the independent label sector.222  Each of these key 
characteristics was important in relation to cultural diversity.  Size showed that the 
majority of independent labels were more flexible in their approach than major record 
companies. The business model and motivation were important in terms of cultural 
diversity because they may have carried the notion of independence.  The treatment of 
copyright was equally important in terms of increasing cultural diversity because many 
artists borrow from previous musical works, and the ever-lasting attempts by the 
majors’ and now independents’ trade bodies to extend the copyright term do not 
facilitate cultural diversity.    
 
Thanks to the interviews, this thesis also provides a unique collection of data, e.g. a 
previously unknown methodology for calculating the market share data in the record 
industry, which is extremely important when considering the impact majors have on 
independents. 
 
2.6. Additional Sources 
 
In addition to the above analysis, peer review was used to challenge my conclusions and 
keep my mind open for all opinions by asking difficult and candid questions about data 
collection and data interpretation.  Peer review included the reading of some of the 
chapters by other record industry participants and the crosschecking of different issues 
with them.   
 
As a part of my research, I also attended the Winter Music Conference 2005 (Miami), 
which illustrated the role that independent labels played in releasing dance music in the 
USA.  In addition, working for two years as a researcher for the record industry 
                                                
222 These characteristics were selected because they are in themselves noted as important generally in the 
record industry and fundamentally important in relation to my area of research.  Size, business model, 
motivation and copyright are seen as defining characteristics within the sector because they denote the 
kind of artists labels signed and how they deal with them and their music. 
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network, MusicTank, allowed me to attend numerous music industry conferences and 
think tanks, such as In the City 2005 (Manchester), Music Works 2005 (Glasgow), 
Copyright conferences 2005-6 (London), London Calling 2006-07 (London) and 
numerous other panels.   
 
Other secondary sources included material from industry journals, such as Music Week 
and Billboard, and the daily media including press, radio and television.  Any project of 
this type collects an enormous range of news items, interviews and features from the 
above sources and this one has been no exception.  There is a vast amount of news 
every day about the record industry.  Being a music industry insider and researcher, I 
subscribed to the daily news bulletin, the Record of the Day, which collates significant 
stories about the music business every day from reliable and respected sources, such as 
The Guardian, The Sunday Times, The Telegraph, The Times, The Financial Times etc. 
There is also an abundance of on-line digital magazines, blogs and other Internet 
sources, which were treated with a great deal of caution; the data from which had been 
double-checked in the daily consumer media.  Therefore, only sources regarded as 
authoritative and the data offered in them, have been used for the purposes of this 
research. 
 
The resulting combination of the primary and secondary data has provided an up-to-date 
picture of the record industry in the twenty first century and its relationship with 
competition law, with all three methods facilitating the answer to the research question.  
 
Having explained the methodology, the following chapter analyses the competitive 
dynamics in the record industry, as well as the differences between major and 
independent labels. 
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Chapter 3: History of Competitive Dynamics and Growth in 
the Record Industry: Diversity of Producers  
 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate historical patterns of growth and competition in 
the record industry from 1877 to the present day, helping to illustrate its competitive 
dynamics as well as major record companies’ attempts to exercise control over the 
ownership of technology and music. The record industry’s adaption to technological 
and structural innovation has always been significant in its development.  In order to 
evaluate how competition law could regulate the industry, it is necessary to understand 
the industry’s growth processes and patterns. 
 
The structure of this chapter covers firstly the record industry’s historical development, 
whilst the following part further explains the differences between major and 
independent record companies.  The last part of the chapter looks into the importance of 
small and medium-sized record labels, elucidating why competition law should protect 
the diversity of producers 
 
3.1. Cyclical Nature and Competition Patterns of the Record Industry 
 
The history of the record industry, for purposes of this research, can usefully be broken 
down into nine time periods, characterised by different competition and growth patterns.  
The description of these periods will help to explain why the industry is what it is today, 
and with the assistance of the next chapter, should provide a full picture of how the 
industry has become so consolidated.  This analysis also builds up the foundation for 
the further analysis of how competition law allowed such high concentration within the 
record industry. 
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3.1.1. Invention of the Phonograph and the Gramophone (1877 – 1909) 
 
It was the invention of the phonograph by Thomas Edison in 1877, which gradually 
made possible the change of attitude from viewing music purely as an expression and 
art form, to music as a commodity223 and arguably, the possibility of music being 
utilised as a service.224  Back then, however, music was pre-industrial.  Edison was 
convinced that the most important application of his invention would be the 
reproduction of speech for purposes of dictation and education.  Having said that, the 
start was not a promising one - despite the phonograph being able to reproduce sound, it 
was difficult for recorded speech to be intelligible.  Moreover, the recordings could not 
be preserved.225  The poor quality of the recordings plus the lack of the means to 
preserve them, blinded people to the prospective commercial value of the phonograph.  
Edison was so frustrated by that short sightedness that he gave up on his invention.  
Luckily, the phonograph was not forgotten.  Further innovations followed and in 1885 
Charles Sumner Tainter and Chichester Bell patented the graphophone, onto which 
sound could be permanently recorded.226  
 
In 1887, ten years after Edison had created the phonograph, another American 
innovator, Emile Berliner, patented a better quality sound machine, called the 
gramophone.227  The gramophone was able to reproduce sound through a stylus moving 
horizontally over a rotating flat disc that sat on top of a turntable, which was different to 
Edison’s drums used in the phonograph.228  Berliner could also see how his invention 
had potential for commercial exploitation through its use in a domestic setting as a 
means of musical entertainment, rather than simply for business use.229  Seeing that a 
supply of high-quality recordings was a prerequisite in making his product attractive to 
the consumer market, Berliner developed a system for the efficient manufacturing of 
high-fidelity recordings by using a zinc plate as a master record.230  There then followed 
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a total separation of the recording process from the reproduction of discs, which 
allowed Berliner to make further duplicates at less cost, with easier distribution and 
higher quality.   
 
All of the above attempts to improve the phonograph did not go unnoticed by Edison 
himself and in 1888 Edison constructed his own improved machine by developing a 
spring-motor driven phonograph, which was very reminiscent of Berliner’s invention 
and sparked a huge patent war with the latter.231  At that time, the American 
businessman, Jesse Lippincott, solved the dispute by buying both patents and investing 
more than a million dollars in a company called the North American Phonograph 
Society, whose purpose was to exploit the invention commercially.232  The company 
began leasing233 phonographs to offices as dictating machines, a mistake, which led the 
North American Phonograph Society into bankruptcy.  Edison bought the patent rights 
back in 1889 and together with the Columbia Phonograph Company started selling the 
phonograph, firstly as a business aid234 and then for the first jukeboxes, fairs, and 
amusement centres. 235  This venture marked the birth of the record industry.  In 1901 
the Victor Talking Machine Company was formed, followed by the British 
Gramophone Company.  The historical background just described shows how important 
the monopoly control over patents was back then and may be seen in parallel with the 
present efforts by the majors to have a monopolistic control over copyright236 (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
3.1.2. Creation of the Record Industry - The Stage of Low Concentration 
(1910 – 1928) 
 
The historical evolution of the record industry, indeed like any other industry, has been 
home to cycles of booms and slumps which is important to take into account, when 
assessing the current situation of the record industry and its future development.  The 
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first boom time in the record industry occurred after World War I.237  Record sales 
around the world in the early 1910s were up to at least 50 million.238  By 1920, over 100 
million records were sold in the US alone.239  Even at this early stage the gramophone 
companies realised that from a commercial point of view, it would be more profitable 
for them to make both the record equipment and the records, similar to hardware and 
software synergy these days.240  In other words “a company manufacturing 
gramophones but not records was rather like making razors but not the blades”.241  This 
stage of the record industry produced a real boom and by 1929, about 50 percent of all 
US households owned a gramophone machine and in the same year, more than 150 
million records were sold in the US alone, an increase of 50 percent compared to 
1920.242   
 
This period of the record industry can be described as a ‘low concentration’ stage 
thanks to new manufacturing technologies facilitating new entries into the recorded 
music market and the expiration of patents for playback devices, which reduced the cost 
of recording.243  Record companies were still part of the electrical goods industry,244 but 
they had already begun forming their release policies; namely, concentrating on a 
limited number of famous theatre and opera singers and cover versions of the same 
songs.245  Such practices can be described as a mould for contemporary record industry 
behaviour.  This incredible expansion period in the late 1920’s came to an abrupt end 
with the onset of the Great Depression in the US.  
 
3.1.3. Recession - The Stage of High Concentration (1929 - 1939) 
 
The first record industry slump was caused by the Great Depression, coupled with a 
drastic change in people’s leisure habits,246 and the development of radio and cinemas, 
which enticed music-buying fans away.  In fact, in 1923 the situation was so poor that 
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the second largest company in the US, Columbia, nearly went bankrupt.247  On 24 
October 1929 matters became much worse, with prices crashing on the Wall Street 
Stock Exchange in New York.  Many companies, large and small, were forced out of 
business.  In 1932, sales of gramophone records had fallen from 104 million in 1927 to 
6 million248 and the number of phonograph machines manufactured had also diminished 
from 987,000 to 40,000.249  By 1933 sales were cut to a fraction of what they had been 
in the boom years of ‘gramophone fever’.250  However, this crisis produced a shift in 
music profits, from that of selling of records, to that of selling other assets.  In 1928, for 
example, Warner realised the benefits of the back catalogues by acquiring Tin Pan 
Alley,251 the first ever publisher252 in the US.  As will be shown in Chapter 4, majors to 
this day, invest hefty amounts to acquire back catalogues. 
 
When the Great Depression struck, the choice the record companies faced was to either 
merge or face bankruptcy.  During this slump period the number of independents 
declined, partly due to the prevailing economic conditions and partly due to the 
imitation by majors of genres and artists released on those small labels.253  This first 
crisis produced one salient outcome - the establishment of the record business as an 
oligopoly, i.e. the market was dominated by a small number of large or major record 
companies.  For example, in the UK, The Gramophone Company and Columbia merged 
in 1931 under the name Electrical Musical Industries (EMI), after both companies’ 
turnover had plummeted by 90 percent.254  
 
It was a new entrant to the market, Decca Records, which began to revitalise the market 
by realising the potential of the economies of scale.255  Jack Kapp and Ted Lewis 
founded Decca Records in the US in 1934.  They soon understood that in order for their 
business to become highly successful, all they needed was a high volume of sales of just 
a few artists.  They stopped investing money in gramophone manufacturing and instead 
concentrated solely on making and selling records; the diversity of music released 
declined but the quantity increased.  Other big record companies followed Decca in 
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their organisational changes.  Engineers and technical staff were no longer running 
record companies but instead, business-orientated people with strong personalities were 
in charge.  Furthermore, brand new departments were staffed with large amounts of 
marketing employees.  As a result, big record companies also started investing 
significant amounts of money advertising their stars and releases.  Decca re-assessed 
popularity as something that transcended class differences; “the secret of success was to 
offend nobody”.256   
 
As the big record companies preferred to concentrate on definite hits, less overtly 
commercial music such as jazz and rhythm and blues were out of the picture.  Such a 
situation created a partial vacuum for people who wanted to listen to different kinds of 
music.  The reason why non-mainstream music was not released by the majors was 
because at the time it was considered as ‘black’ or ‘race’ music.257  Having said that, 
already at such an early stage of the record industry evolution, there appeared small 
labels that filled the vacuum.  These small labels predominantly catered for African-
American musicians releasing ragtime, blues, jazz, and Charleston, which were snapped 
up by white performers to cover the popular black music of the era.258 
 
3.1.4. Revival in the US, Recession in the UK during the World War II – 
The Stage of Corporate Concentration (1940 – 1949) 
 
Whilst Europe was preparing for World War II, the record industry in America was 
enjoying a boom time again.  In 1938, 33 million records were sold in the United States; 
in 1941 the figure had increased to 127 million.259  By 1939, RCA-Victor, Columbia, 
and Decca accounted for 100 percent of the mainstream market.260  However, after 
1940, new players, such as Capitol, Mercury, and MGM jockeyed for position amongst 
the leaders.261  The war did not stop the American record industry euphoria and by 1945 
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the structure of the record industry was well defined: the production of music turned 
into a conveyer-type process predominantly concentrated in a handful of majors.262 
 
By contrast, the European record industry was very much struggling during the War as a 
result of the rationing of shellac.  Both Columbia’s office in London and the Deutsche 
Grammophon office in Berlin were destroyed by bombing raids.  However, Europeans 
struggled to afford records, constrained by the ongoing rationing that continued long 
after the war had ended.263  Record sales in the Unites States in 1950 were worth £37 
million, compared to only £2.5 million in England.264   
 
Post war the situation gradually improved.  The period between 1948 and 1955 could be 
described as one of corporate concentration.265  During this period four companies 
dominated the record industry, those being RCA Victor, Columbia, Decca and Capitol 
together holding a total market share of 75 percent.  Such high market concentration266 
was achieved because of the vertical integration267 of the four companies.  The then Big 
Four controlled the entire production flow from raw materials to distribution and had 
the great advantage of their marketing and corporate links with radio and movie 
companies.268  Such a solid grasp of marketing and distribution by the majors in turn 
resulted in low diversity levels.  For example, the 1947 hit songs ‘Near You’ and ‘Open 
the Door, Richard’, were initially released by independent labels.  However, both songs 
were subsequently covered by the then four major record companies, leading to a 
situation where both songs had five versions in the top ten hit parade.269  Majors thus 
successfully learned to use three tactics to increase their market share:270 to produce 
more cover versions of the songs that proved successful on independent labels, to sign 
artists away from independent companies, and to merge with each other and acquire 
independent labels.   
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Importantly, major record companies were able to transform radio from a rival to a 
collaborator.  Radio, with its nation-wide coverage, became the new outlet to promote 
new and unknown artists.  At the same time the record industry was facing a new 
‘threat’ following on from radio, that of television.  Again, the majors showed their 
initial resistance to technological novelty, although television would eventually have a 
huge impact on their development and massive increase in their profit levels.271  The 
record industry had clearly entered a period of growth, one that started in the 1950s and 
ended in the late 1970s. 
 
3.1.5. The Arrival of Independents and New Music Genres – The Stage of 
Low Concentration (1950 – 1959) 
 
A new surge of diversity occurred in the 1950s due to new production techniques 
becoming available.  Magnetic recording tape became available and allowed for further 
innovation as well as a reduction of production costs.272  Moreover, there was another 
crucial development in the record industry, namely that of a marked division into 
‘majors’ and ‘independents’.  Between 1956–1959 there was a period of stronger 
competition273 during which independent music labels arose, introducing more genres 
that the majors were not ready to release such as rhythm and blues, gospel and jazz: 
“with the exception of Buddy Holly and Bill Haley, all of the new generation of dancing 
teenagers first recorded for independent recording companies”.274   
 
The success of the independents in the US was caused by a number of factors.  In 1948 
the US Supreme Court ruled that film companies had to sell their theatre chains.  This 
meant the end of the domination of the American movie industry by the eight major 
Hollywood film companies because they had to cut down the production of musicals 
with new songs.275  Moreover, by 1951 television was becoming more popular and 
enticing people away from cinemas back to the comfort of their homes.276  All these 
events had a great impact on the record industry and happened at a time when small 
independent but highly entrepreneurial labels, such as Atlantic, Chess, Imperial, Dot 
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and Sun Records flourished and were in the position to provide real competition to the 
majors.  
 
Independent music labels had become an alternative to majors, and by encouraging 
creativity and experimenting with more varied styles and sounds they tested markets for 
the entire industry.277  It is worth noting that one of the most successful stars in the 
history of music, Elvis Presley, started on an independent music label, Sun.  Initially the 
majors had refused to sign Presley, because at that time ‘rock-n-roll’ was still regarded 
as a dangerous novelty.  Only after the then major record company RCA realised his 
commercial appeal, was Presley signed.278  However, despite the acceptance of Elvis 
Presley, the record business was still reluctant to embrace rock’n’roll as a genre.  For 
example, the Beatles’ were rejected by all major companies before Parlophone took an 
interest in them, and the Beatles’ first American single was licensed to three 
independent labels:  Swan, Tollie and Vee-Jay, as Capitol had thought it too risky to 
release the Beatles’ records in the States.279  This short - sightedness demonstrated that 
as a result of the majors’ inflexibility, there were a lot of gaps waiting to be filled by the 
independents.  Additionally, the low costs of tape recording and the mobility of its 
equipment enabled independents to produce recordings at acceptable costs.  The 
distribution patterns had also widened and apart from the traditional retailers, records 
were also sold by mail and via record clubs.280   
 
In the late 1950s, the independent record sector was responsible for a significant 
increase in the diversity of records, such as Elvis Presley, Jerry Lee Lewis, Chuck 
Berry, and Little Richard.  For the first time in history, independents could provide 
strong competition to the majors and the diversity of producers thereby increased 
musical diversity in general.  Whereas in 1955 the big four majors had owned 
approximately 75 percent of the $277 million US record market, by 1959, their share 
had tumbled to 34 percent of a growing market that had reached a value of $603 
million,281 with the independents enjoying an impressive 66 percent of the recorded 
music market.  By 1962, the independents held 75 percent of the market share.282  The 
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general demographic trends were important factors in the spectacular profits seen by the 
record industry in the 1950s, namely that of young people purchasing music after World 
War II and growing economies in both the US and the UK as well as an overall increase 
in the standard of living following the war. 
 
3.1.6. The Arrival of Beatlemania  - The Stages of Secondary 
Consolidation, Renewed Growth and Re-Concentration (1960 – 1978) 
 
The period from 1959-1963 could be described as secondary consolidation,283 and it 
saw the rise of new leading companies, such as MGM and Warner Brothers, together 
with a number of those independents holding a strong market position. 
 
By 1964, the big four majors realised that the music styles of R&B and rock’n’roll were 
not just passing fads.  The market had continued to grow and this growth could be 
attributed to the independents’ discovery of these music genres that appealed more to a 
younger generation.  Once again, similarly to when Decca arrived, the big four were 
learning from new entrants how to reorganise their traditional marketing strategies.  
They placed more emphasis on discovering and developing new talent; consequently 
A&R (Artist & Repertoire) departments were created.284  The Big Four started releasing 
acts like the Beach Boys and Bob Dylan.285 
 
The next period of renewed growth286 from 1964 – 1969 was fuelled by the British 
musical invasion, particularly of Beatlemania.  During this period record sales were 
higher as was the concentration within the industry; this situation is somewhat in 
contradiction to the norm, namely the relationship between diversity and concentration 
levels is usually an inverse one (see Chapter 1).  
 
In 1960, US record sales had reached a peak value of $600 million.287  Small cheap 
cassette recorders were being produced and expanded the customer base of recorded 
                                                
283 Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104, at p. 166. 
284 For more on A&R see Keith Negus, Producing Pop: Culture and Conflict in the Popular Music 
Industry (London: Arnold, 1992), 80-81 and Elisa Bray, “The Big Question: What are A&Rs, and Can a 
Record Company Survive without Them?”, The Independent, February 29, 2008.  
285 Huygens et al., supra, n. 214, at p. 992. 
286 Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104, at p. 167. 
287 Gronow and Saunio, supra, n. 211, at p. 96. 
 84 
music too, thereby contributing to high music sales.  The LP format introduced into the 
market by CBS-Columbia in 1948 also proved extremely popular.288  In 1967, the sales 
achieved by the American record industry were in excess of one billion dollars and just 
six years later surpassed two billion dollars.289  By 1978, global sales had reached $7 
billion.290   
 
This period of the development of the record industry from 1970-1973 can be described 
as a re-concentration.291  During this short time, the level of concentration increased by 
about one third.  Majors achieved a new level of market strength by displacing 
independents, either by acquiring them or by buying their main acts.  At the time, 
Warner Communications and Columbia each had a market share of 15 percent; Capitol 
was in third place thanks to the Beatles, with Motown and A&M being the only 
independents in the top eight record companies.  However, with those two important 
exceptions, the remainder of the companies were vertically integrated corporations.  
Having strong financial power, the majors regained control over the three key areas of 
production, distribution, and marketing.292   
 
3.1.7. Recession– The Stage of Low Concentration (1979 - 1984) 
 
The immense growth of the previous period was followed by another crisis lasting from 
1979 to 1984.  The slump could be explained by the cycles of competition, but more 
importantly, there were social and economic changes, including an increasing number 
of people over 25 and a high level of unemployment.293  The American economy was at 
its weakest point since the Depression of the 1930s as the oil crisis affected automobile 
and retail sales too.294  On the whole, consumers had less money to spend on leisure.  In 
addition to that, there was a lack of quality and diverse music.  As Lee Hartstone 
remarked: “If the best the industry can do is give us two hit LPs (Bee Gees and Rod 
Stewart), it is pretty damn weak”.295  Interestingly, it was at this time that independents 
in the UK championed a new genre, punk rock, as an antidote to the disco genre that 
                                                
288 id., at p. 98. 
289 Frith, supra, n. 223, at p. 64. 
290 Burnett (1990), supra, n. 120, at p. 6. 
291 Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104, at p. 168. 
292 id., at p. 170.  
293 Frith, supra, n. 223, at pp. 66-7. 
294 Denisoff, supra, n. 279, at p. 108. 
295 Also cited id., 109-10. 
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was championed by the majors.  Also technological advances, such as home tape 
recorders and videocassette recorders, meant that the consumers would be less liable to 
spend money on music.  Once again, the symbiotic link between technology and the 
industry is demonstrated by the latter having opposed technological development in the 
form of videocassette recorder (hereinafter, the VCR).  The VCR caused much 
controversy over the issue of copyright and profits’ loss culminating in the Sony v. 
Universal Studios decision in 1984.296  The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Sony that 
home videotaping for private use was legal, and off-air taping was not a copyright 
infringement, as Universal Studios and its allies had claimed.  Eventually, the record 
industry made the move to embrace video recorders, particularly when they started 
selling their artists’ concerts and video clips on videocassettes. 
 
3.1.8. Revival – The Stage of High Concentration (1984 - 1999) 
 
From 1983-84, the record industry started its recovery and gradually entered a new 
boom time.  Bobby Colomby explained that there were three reasons for the recovery of 
the industry: MTV, Compact Discs (hereinafter, CDs), and Michael Jackson.297  MTV 
changed the perception of music because the visual aspect of the industry arguably took 
over the musical aspect.  CDs allowed consumers to replace their existing collections on 
tapes and LPs thus generating more profit for the majors as they simply re-released their 
back catalogues,298 which was less expensive than investing money in new artists and 
content.  Akin to the time when Warner acquired Tin Pan Alley, having realised the 
importance of their back catalogues, majors turned their attention to acquiring 
independent publishing companies as well as independent labels, e.g. Chrysalis and 
Virgin.  Importantly in terms of this study, the competition authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic showed indifference, by allowing these acquisitions, disregarding the effect 
that the higher concentration of the record industry thereby had on cultural diversity 
(this is analysed in Chapters 4 and 5).  The main aim of such acquisitions was to acquire 
vast numbers of copyrights in already successful songs (this policy is discussed in 
Chapter 4).  Thus the emphasis in the record business shifted from manufacturing and 
distribution of records to the transfer and exploitation of copyrights.299  Finally, in 
                                                
296 464 U.S. 417 [1984]. 
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timely fashion, Michael Jackson released his record-breaking Thriller album, which 
single-handedly saved CBS Records (now Sony) from financial ruin.  All these events 
meant that the record industry was at its nadir.  By 1989 music sales reached $22 
billion300 and they kept growing until 2000.   
 
3.1.9. Recession - Digital Revolution: The Stage of Higher Consolidation 
(2000 - onwards) 
 
In 2000, music sales reached the mark of $36.9 billion301 and since then they have been 
on a decline.  By 2004, the global music market was worth $33 billion.302  This is still 
an impressive figure, but the record industry became increasingly unstable due to the 
onset of the digital era.303  Despite these difficult times, majors still managed to hold 
onto their market share and even slightly increase it in the digital age, as demonstrated 
below in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
300 Burnett (1990), supra, n. 120, at p. 7. 
301 International Federation of the Phonographic Industries (hereinafter, IFPI) Report, “The Recording 
Industry in Numbers”, 2001. 
302 IFPI Report, “The Recording Industry in Numbers”, 2005. 
303 Daniel Lee, “First Against the Wall in the Online Music Revolution,” The Guardian (Media Law 
Music Supplement), March 10, 2008, 2; Adam Smith, “The Music Industry: Lost in the Shuffle,” The 
Time, March 19, 2008; Andrew Leyshon et al., “On the Reproduction of the Musical Economy after the 
Internet.” Media, Culture & Society 27, no. 2 (2005): 179 – 18; Ethan Smith, “Sales of Music, Long in 
Decline, Plunge Sharply: Rise in Downloading Fails to Boost Industry,” The Wall Street Journal, March 
21, 2007; Brian Hiatt and Evan Serpick, “The Record Industry’s Decline,” The Rolling Stone, 19 June 
2007; Ed Christman, “Sony BMG Loses $49 Million Last Quarter,” The Billboard, July 29, 2008. 
Traditionally, music sales pick up in the run up to Christmas.  See Andre Paine, “Strong Q4 Sales for 
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Table 1: Major and Independent Record Companies’ Market Share 
for 2002 – 2008. 
 
 2002304 2003305 2004306 2006307 2007308 2008309 
EMI 12.3 13.5 13.4% 12.8% 11.8% 11.3% 
SonyBMG 22.2 22.1 21.5% 21.2% 18.9% 19.1% 
Universal 25.3 23.4 25.5% 25.7% 27.7% 29.0% 
Warner 11.6 12.5 11.3% 13.8% 14.5% 14.8% 
Independents 28.5 28.5 28.4% 27.5% 27.1% 25.8% 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that the market share of majors is slightly on the increase, whereas 
the independents’ share dropped just under two percent.  Most importantly, the 
independents’ market share has actually dropped in the digital age.  That lack of growth 
of the independents’ market share in the digital age, which affords very cheap 
technology for making and selling music, alerts one to think as to whether independents 
can provide an effective competition to majors in the promising digital age.  
 
Nearly every month there is new research on the market showing the decline of CD 
sales, for example, the research by the NPD group (leading provider of retail marketing 
information) pointed out that CD sales fell by 19 percent in 2007, whilst 48 percent of 
US teenagers did not purchase a single CD that year.310  Even without questioning the 
                                                
304 IFPI Report, “The Recording Industry in Numbers”, 2005. In calculating the market share, the IFPI 
considered all sales of a record company’s music products including licensed-in products.  The rationale 
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signs a licensing deal with an independent music label, the outcome is that an independent label sells its 
product to that major for a fee, with the major selling it worldwide.  It may turn out to be that a major 
might either lose or make money on the product and that is why the sales are booked to that particular 
major.  All licensing deals were counted as a majors’ market share.  The above offers an explanation as to 
why, in the digital age when independent labels are set up almost on a daily basis, their market share is 
falling, and when a major acquires an independent label, the latter also becomes a major for the IFPI 
statistics.  Interview with Keith Jopling, 06 February 2006. 
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validity of these studies, it is obvious that eventually and perhaps sooner than later, the 
CD will lose its dominance due to digital downloads.311  This trend is already more 
obvious in the US.  Even though digital downloads will eventually overtake the sale of 
the CDs, to date the revenue from downloads is not enough to compensate majors for 
the loss of CD sales.312  In an attempt to save declining income, major record companies 
pointed their finger to illegal file-sharers and illegal file-sharing websites (Peer–2–
Peer).313  The majors’ crusade against such file-sharers culminated in thousands of 
lawsuits on both sides of the Atlantic.314   
 
However, what the record companies overlooked was the ever-increasing power of 
supermarkets and Internet Service Providers (hereinafter, the ISPs) which now dictate 
conditions to the majors (see the discussion below in Chapter 4).  Likewise, mobile 
phone operators and telecoms are dwarfing the record companies in terms of their 
power and revenue.  This is coupled with the fact that the content released by the majors 
is far from being heterogeneous.315  Rosters of artists have been dramatically reduced, 
and perhaps for the first time in history of the record industry, the function of talent 
development shifted from A&R to the marketing departments.316  These factors can be 
added to the old business models the majors are still using, increasing their general 
inflexibility and fear of what results they are going to report to the shareholders.  Majors 
also paid little attention to needless expenses and huge advance payments to the 
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artists,317 which cost the big four millions of pounds every year.  Just as it seemed that 
matters could not become any worse, a number of A-list stars left the major record 
companies.318  Two of the four majors, that are unaffiliated, Warner and EMI, suffered 
the most because as opposed to Sony and Universal, they could not derive any 
protection from the parent companies.319   
 
In the digital age majors simply repeated the same mistakes they made when radio, 
television and videocassette recorders appeared in the market.320  Instead of embracing 
the opportunities offered by digital technology, they once again rejected them.  
Interestingly enough, whilst majors again fell into the trap of refusing to embrace a 
technological breakthrough, the independents were the first to realise the potential 
offered by digital technology as an inexpensive new form of recording and distribution 
to increase the diversity of musical content in the marketplace,321 i.e. the Long Tail.  
However, the ease of copying digital material with no perceived generation loss has 
made piracy much more rife than previously. 
 
In the eyes of the majors there could only ever be two responses to the market crisis, 
being that of lobbying for the legislative change to extend the copyright in sound 
recordings (discussed in Chapter 4) and higher consolidation by mergers and 
acquisitions.  Starting from the year 2002 there has been an unprecedented wave of 
mergers and acquisitions in the record industry, including the infamous merger between 
Sony and BMG (this merger is analysed both in Chapter 5 and the Conclusion), as well 
as the chain of acquisitions by Universal of a BMG publishing catalogue and a plethora 
of other labels (this is also discussed in Chapter 5).   
 
                                                
317 Dan Sabbagh, “Guy Hands Aims to Snuff Out Excesses that Cost EMI £100m a Year,” The Times, 
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Record,” The Times, December 14, 2007; Jeff Leeds, “McCartney Signs with Starbucks for his Next 
Album,” The New York Times, March 22, 2007; Katie Allen, “Material Girl Says Goodbye to Warner to 
the Tune of $120m,” The Guardian, October 12, 2007; Chris Ayres, “Power of Goodbye: Madonna Split 
May Herald Record Industry’s Death,” The Times, October 12, 2007; and The Telegraph, “Paper Pays 
£500K to Give Prince’s New Album Away,” June 30, 2007.       
319 The Economist, supra, n. 88. 
320 Dwight Garner, “When Labels Fought the Digital, and the Digital Won,” The New York Times, 
January 6, 2009. 
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At the same time, the crisis of the record industry once again spawned a spurt of 
entrepreneurism, with many artists and music industry figures setting up their own 
labels.  Thanks to the prevailing digital technology, many small labels were able to 
record and release their music (predominantly online), as the costs of recording and 
digital distribution were no longer prohibitive.322  This process has to a certain extent, 
eroded higher concentration within the record industry.  However, as will be shown in 
Chapter 4, majors are still holding a grip on such important areas as the marketing, 
promotion, and physical distribution of music, thus preventing independents from 
competing effectively.  Hence, in this study it is argued that independents cannot 
compete with majors in those areas of marketing and distribution, leading to lower 
levels of music diversity. 
 
Before going into a discussion of competition in the record industry it is necessary to 
provide a further, more detailed explanation of the role of both majors and 
independents; on what makes them different and accordingly what is their impact on 
cultural diversity.  It will also help answer the research question of why, if at all, 
competition law should protect small businesses in cultural industries.  
 
3.2. Majors and Independents 
 
“[We were] too big to be small, too small to be big.” 
           
Chris Blackwell323  
 
“Corporations cannot be involved in creative force – it 
is nonsense.” 
Pete Jenner324  
 
“If I said I found the next Sonny Rollins, do you think 
majors would care?”   
         Bobby Colomby325 
 
Whilst the historical analysis has illustrated that traditionally record companies have 
been classified into two groups: ‘majors’ and ‘independents’, this section looks at the 
main characteristics and differences between majors and independents, with the 
                                                
322 It only applies to the recordings of a low and moderate quality. 
323 Quoting Chris Blackwell (founder of Island Records) by Marc Marot at MusicTank seminar “Label 
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emphasis on the controversial issues such as profit making and selling business to 
bigger companies.  The backdrop of this section is that there have always been two 
extreme points of view about the two types of record companies.  One is that multi-
national corporations care about commerce, whilst small labels care about cultural 
diversity.  In order to avoid accepting pre-formed categories, this section initially 
analyses these preconceptions.  Bearing in mind the stature of the interviewees and their 
pertinent responses, for this particular section, I purposely preferred to concentrate 
mainly on the outcome of the interviews where appropriate rather than secondary 
sources.  This approach allows the reader to obtain a unique and up-to-date picture of 
the record industry from top music industry figures.  
 
3.2.1. Characteristics of Major Record Companies:  Evolution of the 
Record Industry Oligopoly 
 
The majors are large, international record companies, currently Universal, EMI, Sony 
and Warner, each of them having a network of owned or affiliated companies world-
wide with their own local distribution chains through which they can market repertoire 
predominantly with international potential; they dominate the record industry’s market 
output and earnings.  The majors are both horizontally and vertically integrated to 
varying degrees and undertake a wide range of activities from discovering and 
developing new recording artists and repertoire to distributing, marketing and 
promoting the records.   
 
The historical discourse demonstrated that the record industry evolved though different 
stages of oligopoly.  This section documents how the Big Four established their 
dominance through their control of creative and distribution chains. 
 
1) Universal Music Group 
 
Universal’s legacy can be traced back to 1906 when Carl Laemmle opened his first 
nickelodeon theatre in Chicago.326  Six years later, Laemmle incorporated the name 
                                                
326 The timeline of the Universal history (except the PolyGram description) is taken from Universal 
Music official website, http://new.umusic.com/History.aspx. For more on Universal Music Group history 
see Bishop, supra, n. 236, at pp. 448 – 449.  
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‘Universal’ when he formed the Universal Film Manufacturing Company in New York.  
In 1936 Universal was sold to the Standard Capital Company and ten years later it 
merged with International Pictures.  In 1952 the English label, Decca Records 
purchased a controlling interest in Universal Pictures.  Six years later, Music 
Corporation of America (hereinafter, MCA) purchased the Universal Studios Property 
and Paramount’s pre-1948 film library for its MCA TV division, incorporating 
everything under the name MCA.  However, the proposed merger of MCA-Decca-
Universal was banned for violating the US anti-trust laws.327  Still, it did not prevent 
MCA from acquiring such influential independents as ABC Records, Motown, and 
Geffen Records.  In 1991 the Japanese electronics giant, Matsushita, the parent 
company of Panasonic, acquired MCA for $6.6 billion.328  At the time, the deal made 
Matsushita the largest entertainment conglomerate in the world consisting of: Universal 
Pictures, Universal TV, MCA Home Video, MCA Records and other smaller holdings.  
The music division was an important but still very small part of MCA/Universal.  Up 
until 1998, the market share of the music group accounted only for 3.6 percent.  
 
In 1995, Seagram (the world’s largest drinks manufacturer) acquired an 80 percent 
interest in MCA.  Following that, in 1998, Seagram purchased PolyGram for $10.6 
billion and merged it with MCA to create the Universal Music Group.  As MCA was 
acquiring and being acquired, two of the world’s largest electrical engineering and 
electronics companies, Phillips and Siemens, became major players in the music 
industry. 
 
Siemens had originally founded Deutsche Grammophon in 1898 to offer a line of 
classical recordings.  In 1924 following the demand, Siemens launched a second label, 
Polydor, to release commercial pop music.329  Philips as a corporation was founded in 
1891 but entered the music business in 1950.  A decade later Philips acquired Mercury 
Records and two years later with Siemens, established a joint venture linking the 
Deutsche Grammophon and Philips under the name Phonogram.330  Finally, in 1972, 
Philips and Siemens combined Phonogram with Polydor to create PolyGram.  The latter 
bought out several labels in the United States, most notably MGM and Verve, and took 
over the United Artists record distribution system.   
                                                
327 Sanjek and Sanjek, supra, n. 261, at p. 153. 
328 Millard, supra, n. 236, at p. 344. 
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Having gone through a substantial restructuring in the 1990s within Phillips, PolyGram, 
through both vertical and horizontal integration, was able to enjoy a great deal of 
success from the 1990s onwards.331  PolyGram’s further success was owed in no small 
part to the fact of it owning one of the best rock/pop and classical catalogues in the 
world as well as being responsible for the discovery of new acts, for example those that 
fitted into the heavy metal group genre.  In the mid 1990s, PolyGram provided a 
successful portion of corporate profits but this was still not enough to prevent it from 
being acquired by Seagram.  As mentioned earlier, in 1998 Seagram purchased 
PolyGram and merged it with MCA to create Universal.  This very merger established 
Universal as the world’s largest music company.  In 2000 Universal changed ownership 
again.  At the time of writing, Vivendi and Canal+, a French media giant, own 
Universal.   
 
 
2) Sony Music Entertainment 
 
Sony traces its roots back to 1888 when Columbia was the US sales representative for 
the Edison phonograph.332  In 1938 the Columbia label was acquired by the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (hereinafter, the CBS).  Ten years later, Columbia introduced the 
Long Playing (LP) format that became the music industry standard for the next 50 
years.  In 1953, CBS launched Epic Records, which would have unprecedented success 
with the artists like Michael Jackson, Sade, Gloria Estefan, George Michael, and Cyndi 
Lauper.  During the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s, CBS Records was one of the most 
successful record companies in history.  In 1988 however, the Japanese corporation 
Sony Electronics, acquired CBS Records for $2 billion, following which its name was 
changed to Sony Music.  The following year, Columbia Pictures was added to its 
structure, continuing the corporation’s chain of acquisitions, helping the Sony 
Corporation of Japan to grow in force as a multi-media entertainment empire.  In 1991, 
the Sony Software Corporation was formed in order to oversee the record business arm 
of the ‘empire’, and was subsequently renamed Sony Music Entertainment.   
 
                                                
331 Negus, supra, 56, at p. 42. 
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In 2004 Sony merged its record music division with BMG (Bertlesmann Music Group), 
a German record company owned by Bertlesmann (the world’s largest media 
conglomerate prior to the Time-Warner merger).333  Bertlesmann Media Group’s origins 
can be traced back to 1935 when it started publishing books and, then later, magazines.  
In 1958, Bertlesmann founded its first music label Ariola Records.  In 1979 BMG also 
acquired Arista - one of the most successful independent music labels, which had 
Whitney Houston on its roster, and in 1986 it acquired Radio Corporation of America 
(hereinafter, the RCA).  The latter acquisition provided BMG with the invaluable rights 
to the Elvis Presley back catalogue.  In the 1990s BMG established a few high profile 
joint ventures with LaFace Records and Bad Boys Records.  Finally, in 2003 BMG 
acquired Zomba Records (one of the biggest independent labels in Europe).  Like other 
majors, BMG’s objectives were aimed at focussing on their established artists rather 
than signing and developing new ones.  As mentioned above, in the digital turmoil, 
BMG decided to merge its music division with Sony’s forming one company under the 
name SonyBMG (this merger represents a significant part of this study and is analysed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5), resulting in the second largest record company after 
Universal.  However, in August 2008, having gone through an unprecedented merger 
saga, BMG decided to sell 50 percent of its stake to Sony334 and to date the new 
company is titled Sony Music Entertainment International. 
 
3) Warner Music Group 
 
The Warner music group has its origins in 1923 when the Warner Brothers Studios was 
co-founded by four brothers.335  Later, when Steve Ross, president of Kinney 
Corporation, which specialised in funeral parlours, car hire and car parks,336 gained 
financial control of the holding company, he reconfigured Warner’s music department.  
This included acquiring three of America’s most successful independent labels: 
Atlantic, Electra, and Asylum, forming at the time the most powerful major record 
company in the world.  Steve Ross’ innovation was the ‘label federation’ concept, in 
which each of the labels held were still able to operate fairly independently and enjoy a 
certain level of autonomy within the larger corporate structure.337  This allowed the 
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labels to retain their individuality as was suited to their different target markets.  In the 
following decades Warner acquired London Records, Frank Sinatra’s Reprise Records, 
and established Warner Western and Maverick Records.   
 
Warner Brothers’ dual music and film production resulted in a very successful business, 
with Warner’s music division going on to become the US market leader in the late 
1960s – a considerable achievement, given Warner’s diversification into the recorded 
music market only a decade earlier.  In 1989 Warner Communications merged with 
Time Inc. making Time/Warner the largest media conglomerate in the world.  However, 
due to the immense debt and a series of poor results, a number of groups including 
Warner Music Group had to then be sold.  Currently, Warner is owned by a group of 
venture capitalists.338  Its publishing arm, Warner Chappell Music, owns one of the best 
publishing catalogues in the world, with artists like Alanis Morrisette, Madonna, and 
REM.  Warner, to date, is the only American-owned company in contrast to Sony or 
Universal. 
 
4) Electric & Musical Industries  
 
EMI was established in 1897 originally under the name of The Gramophone 
Company.339  In 1899, the company acquired the infamous Francis Barraud’s painting, 
‘His Master’s Voice’, and adopted the image and title as its trademark, which is still 
used today by HMV.  Its first major artist in 1902 was Enrico Caruso.  EMI as it is 
known today was formed in 1931 as a result of a merger between Columbia 
Gramophone and The Gramophone Company.  Before and during the Second World 
War, EMI controlled most of the European music market.  Having said that, the best 
was yet to come for EMI, when in the1960s it shaped music for generations by signing 
The Beatles.  On a business side, two decades later EMI merged with Thorn Electric 
Industries.  EMI also kept increasing its profits and turnover through a series of 
acquisitions, including the purchase of numerous music publishing catalogues and the 
four biggest independent record companies at the time: Chrysalis, Virgin, Island and 
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group, the company, who previously sold Universal to Vivendi. David D. Kirkpatrick and Andrew 
Sorkin, “Warner Music Is Sold: Edgar Bronfman Jr. Is Looking for a Hit,” International Herald Tribune, 
November 25, 2003. 
339 For more on the evolution of EMI see Peter Martland, EMI: The First 100 Years (London: Batsford, 
1997) and Bishop, supra, n. 237, at pp. 451 – 452. 
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A&M, raising their combined market share in the 1990s from 29 to 45 percent.  In 1996 
EMI de-merged from Thorn and since then has been involved in numerous talks about a 
new merger with Warner.  However, in August 2007 a private equity group, Terra 
Firma, acquired EMI.340  
 
In addition to the majors, there are a large number of independent record labels, which 
in the digital age have become more prominent and numerous.  Before moving into the 
discussion of competition law, it is necessary to analyse what makes independent labels 
so different from majors in terms of their cultural impact. 
 
3.2.2. Characteristics of Independent Music Labels 
 
 
Whilst the history of independents and their role with regards to the new musical genres 
was dealt with earlier in this chapter, this particular section discusses the nuances of 
independent labels, what makes them so different from majors, and how these 
differences impact upon cultural diversity. 
 
Independents, which are much smaller than the majors, have widely differing 
characteristics but usually specialise in a certain style of music.  Independent companies 
often sub-contract tasks that would normally be undertaken in-house by a major.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, in the post-Fordist era, the majority of firms outsource most of 
their tasks.  However, whilst majors outsource creative tasks, independents sub-contract 
non-creative tasks, for example, manufacturing and distribution of records.  Thus, they 
do not normally have the power to carry out their own distribution to wholesalers and 
retailers.  Overseas exploitation of independents’ records is normally carried out by one 
of the majors although some independents, particularly those operating in niche areas, 
may license to other independents, or sell records via local distributors, or export the 
finished product. 
 
Independence as such is an ambiguous concept, particularly in the record industry, 
because there are so many different labels that consider themselves independent but 
                                                
340 Danny Forston, “Terra Firma Seal Takeover of EMI,” The Independent, August 02, 2007; Siobhan 
Kennedy and Rhys Blakely, “Hands Clinches EMI Deal with 90% Shareholder Support,” The Times, 
August 02, 2007. 
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have licensing, distribution and financial deals with majors.  Even both EMI and 
Warner have recently referred to themselves as independent,341 perhaps meaning that 
they are unaffiliated with any other corporation.  Indeed, the definition of an 
independent label is not an easy one.  As indicated in the methodology, interviews were 
partly aimed at assessing what is the notion of independence in the record industry these 
days.  The interviewees were asked to define what independence meant to them, with 
response categories ranging from “being able to do what we want to do without 
reference to anybody else’s agenda”,342 through “long-standing life-time wish to be 
independent enough to make my own decisions about which records I make and not to 
have to be crawling cap in hand to a record company 25 year old A&R man who does 
not even know what he is talking about”.343  The notion of independence is also closely 
intertwined with the motivation for setting up music labels.  The reasons for starting 
independent labels are manifold.  Some labels are set up because the owners want to 
make money (not the classical indie notion344), others are set up because no major 
would release the music of a particular artist or of a particular genre, and others are set 
up by music altruists who want to bring the music they love to the public.  Some simply 
believe in doing things in a different way. 
 
This, in turn, begs a question of what is a true independent label and how independent 
are independent labels?  By no means, is it an easy question to answer.  The definition 
of the word ‘independent’ is “not under the control or authority of others, and not 
relying on others for financial support”.345  In terms of the record industry, some are 
adamant that a true independent label is a homegrown, self-distributed and self-
sufficient label,346 whilst others are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with 
having a distribution or a licensing deal with a major record company because 
independents cannot make it on their own due to the lack of the huge distribution 
networks that only the majors have at their disposal.347  Moreover, the process of 
acquisitions of independent labels led to the blurring of the notion of independence, as 
has been rightly noted by Dowd, “the majors allowed pseudo-independents to operate 
                                                
341 See for example, the press release “Major and Independent Record Labels Unveil Dual Disc to 
Retailers,” August 24, 2004, http://www.dualdisc.com/press-content01.html. 
342 Interview with Janine Irons, 25 October 2007. 
343 Interview with Mike Batt, 09 July 2007. 
344 A classical independent is self-sufficient and does not aim to sell out to a major. 
345 Mairi Robinson, Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (Edinburgh: Larousse, 1996). 
346 Interview with Neil Leyton, 20 March 2006. 
347 Interview with Adjei Amaning, 26 June 2007. 
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within their respective firms”.348  Perhaps Time Warner provides one of the best 
examples of this when it controlled over 75 labels in the late 1980s and 1990s.349  The 
above illustrates the fact that the definition of an independent label has changed since 
the 1950s.  In those days a label was independent if a major had not distributed it.  
Nowadays, most of the independent distribution systems are actually owned by majors 
(see the discussion below).  That explains why some commentators suggested that there 
should no longer be a division between majors and independents.350  Others however, 
are not so categorical.351  The founder of Rough Trade, Geoff Travis, suggested that an 
independent label these days is the one that is completely separate from major label 
finance,352 but at the same time emphasising that an independent label in itself is not a 
virtue.  There are independent labels that release poor quality content too.  In this sense, 
a classic independent is the one that marries its structure with the content.353 
Independents, in terms of this study, represent an economic disconnection from majors 
that give them the freedom to introduce a diversity of genres to the recorded music 
market.  Perhaps the classification of independent labels below allows the reader to see 
how hazy the notion of an independent label is. 
 
3.2.2.A. Independent Record Labels: A Wide Spectrum of Structures 
 
As indicated in the above discourse, the independent sector is far from being 
homogenous.  Depending on their market activity, size of roster, work force and sales 
profits, the labels can be divided into three categories: large, medium and small-sized 
independents.  To date, there has been no attempt to classify independent labels, partly 
because there are so many of them, and all of them are so diverse in their business 
strategies.  In addition, for the reasons described above, the notion of what an 
independent label is nowadays is more blurred.  Nevertheless, in terms of size (meaning 
sales and structures) independents can be divided into: 
                                                
348 Dowd, supra, n. 128, at p. 7. 
349 Album Network, The Yellow Pages of Rock (Burbank, CA: The Album Network, 1994).  Also cited 
id., at p. 8. Similarly to this, PolyGram in the UK had financial interest in 82 labels at the end of 1990.  
Negus, supra, n. 284, at p. 18. 
350 Negus refers to such interdependence between majors and independents as ‘webs of majors and 
minors’.  See Negus, supra, n. 56, at pp. 16 - 18 and supra, n. 284, at pp. 17 - 19.  
351 David Hesmondhalgh, “The British Dance Music Industry: A Case Study of Independent Cultural 
Production.” The British Journal of Sociology 49, no. 2 (1998): 243. 
352 Interview with Geoff Travis, 20 June 2007.  See also Chris Mugan, “A Bit of Rough and Tumble: 
Rough Trade Celebrates 30 Glorious Years,” The Independent, November 24, 2008. 
353 Interview with Geoff Travis, id. 
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1. Small-sized labels. 
2. Medium-sized labels (such as Dramatico and Domino).  
3. Large-sized labels, or a hybrid between an independent and a major (such as 
Beggars Group, Ministry of Sound, and Sanctuary as it was formerly). 
 
However, within the above classification, there could be another breakdown of 
independents.  In terms of the motivation and organisational structure,354 independents 
can also be divided into following five categories: 
 
1. ‘Classical’ indies, i.e. those that do not sell to a major, and have their 
distribution deals with independent distributors only, e.g. Jello Biafra, and labels 
like Kill Rock Stars, Fading Ways Records, Skinny Dog Records, FDM 
Records355 and extremely successful punk label, Epitaph Records.  These labels 
put creativity and independence as their priority.  Mostly, they specialise in 
indie, rock, punk, and other alternative genres.   
 
2. A label that has been set up because no major would initially release the 
material, e.g. SubPop Records (which had Nirvana and other big name grunge 
artists on its roster).  However, if the act then proves successful, some kind of 
financial, licensing or distribution deal is often agreed with a major, including 
the full acquisition. 
 
3. Simplyred.com model,356 Marillion,357 Radiohead358 – when a hugely successful 
artist with a stable fan base wants to leave a major record company to make the 
most of his/her albums’ sales and retain the ownership of their master 
recordings.359  The presence of this type of label increases in the digital age 
                                                
354 Organisational structure is very important in relation to diversity, and is often neglected by the 
economists.  Christianen, supra, n. 125, at pp. 86, 89. 
355 In the words of Kieron Concannon, manager of FDM Records: “When we set up the label, we vowed 
never to work with the majors. They have destroyed the industry with their greed and short-termism.  
This current dependence on reality TV is just another blow to an industry that probably wouldn’t be able 
to give U2 enough support to make it if they were starting up now”.  Also cited in David Sinclair, 
“Independent Music: There's a Musical Revolution Going On,” The Independent, February 3, 2006. 
356 Sathnam Sanghera, “Hucknall,” The Financial Times, March 25, 2003. 
357 Nigel Jopson, “There Is also a Third Way.” Resolution Magazine (May/June 2003): 52. 
358 Jonathan Brown, “Radiohead Album Goes Live on the Internet,” The Independent, October 11, 2007. 
359 Sinclair, supra, n. 355. See the glossary for the definition of master recordings.  
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because once the artists have a stable fan-base; it is easier for them to sell their 
records without the support of the majors.  
 
4. Dramatico model – when an entrepreneur or producer finds a person to suit his 
project and sets up a label to release that artist and make the most of the profits.  
  
5. Sanctuary model – when an independent label wants to grow, and in some way 
these labels become too big to be small (because they are considered like majors 
for small independents), and too small to be big (because they are still too small 
to compete with majors on equal terms).   
 
The most common is perhaps the second category of independent labels followed by the 
classic independents’ category.  The remaining three categories are more an exception 
to the rule; however, they are becoming more prevalent in the digital age.  At this point, 
it is important to note that the vast majority of labels, including the ideologically 
motivated ones, aim to sell their music and to make a profit.  This profit-making issue 
does not present a hurdle in answering the research question because the importance of 
competitive small businesses in an economy should not be underestimated (discussed 
below in Section 3.5). 
 
Normally, the majors provide financial resources, marketing and distribution expertise 
while the independents provide A&R expertise, thus often being the source of 
innovation in the market.  For instance, ‘punk’, ‘heavy metal’, ‘hip-hop’, ‘jazz’, 
‘rhythm and blues’, ‘glam-rock’ and ‘house’ genres were all developed by the 
independent sector and then embraced by the majors.360  As exemplified above, majors 
often move to compete in a new market sector by developing similar artists or content.  
Alternatively, they may seek to acquire an independent and retain it as a separate label 
to take advantage of its reputation in the market.  It seems valid to say that majors are 
using independents as their A&R, but it can also be argued that as independents do not 
have the money to take it to the level that majors can, they nurture and release new 
artists and genres and then use the majors as the distribution, marketing and 
promotional tool instead.  It must be noted though that the majority of the independents 
have little or no contact with majors and use independent recording studios, 
                                                
360 For more details see Gander and Rieple, supra, n. 121, at pp. 249-250. 
 101 
manufacturers, and distributors.  The distribution issue itself is not a clear-cut one.  In 
the 1970s – 80s, there was a huge wave of vertical acquisitions, i.e. when majors bought 
up almost all of the independent distributors.361  However within the past decade, there 
appeared a new wave of independent distributors, some of which are owned by majors, 
and small labels prefer to deal with them because “with major distributors we 
(independents) are just a number in the catalogue, whereas independent distributors give 
us personal treatment, we are prioritised”.362  
 
The fact that the majority of independent labels have no relation with majors can be 
explained in a number of ways.  It may be because independents’ current volume of 
sales and their growth potential are too small to interest the majors, e.g. Vanquish 
Records.  It could be the result of the choice of niche market served, e.g. Dune Records.  
Alternatively, it might be that company finances are sufficiently stable to avoid relying 
on an outside agent, e.g. Dramatico.  Some company owners may be ideologically 
opposed to the idea of affiliating to a major, e.g. Fading Ways Records.  The 
independent status of a label should not be under-estimated as it may be a statement of 
principle; or it may also serve as an aid to marketing a particular character in such a way 
as to attract artists and fans (see the example with Oasis below, page 109).  For 
example, it is difficult to imagine the Arctic Monkeys on a major’s roster.  As the recent 
news headlines demonstrated,363 there is a trend amongst artists to prefer to sign with a 
particular independent even when in receipt of offers from one or more of the majors.364  
This has been recently witnessed by the deals between independent labels and groups 
like Enter Shikari, Arctic Monkeys and Franz Ferdinand.  Even though they could 
arguably obtain terms that are more preferable with majors, they chose to sign with 
small independent labels. 
 
In this respect it is interesting to find out what makes these new successful bands and 
artists sign with relatively small labels in preference to the multi-million pound record 
deals with majors.  The discussion below takes the reader through the most salient 
differences between majors and independents including culture, resources and 
capabilities.  
 
                                                
361 Alexander, supra, n. 172, at p. 92. 
362 Interview with Neil Leyton, supra, n. 346. 
363 Chris Mugan, “Shikari: A Record Deal? No Way,” The Independent, 19 January 2007. 
364 Jude Rogers, “The Labels that Turned the Tables,” The Guardian, September 12, 2008. 
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3.3. Differences in Approaches between Majors and Independents 
 
 
“At Warners, I got the biggest shock when I 
first sat in a budget meeting with 
spreadsheets… We never had spreadsheets at 
Stiff.  We never had budgets.” 365 
 Paul Conroy 
 
“What I am looking for is to develop software 
applications that can differentiate our products 
and then use content as a sledgehammer to sell 
them.” 366 
      Sir Howard Stringer 
 
In order to understand the differences between the two types of record labels, it is 
necessary to look at their cultural significance, which in turn necessitates analysing the 
effect of the size of the labels and economies of scale on diversity.  Following that, 
looking at the innovation patterns and the cultivation of niche markets, a willingness to 
take more risks by the small business and the organisational culture also helps make the 
case for the importance of independent labels. 
 
a) Size is the most obvious difference between the two types of companies.  Majors can 
afford to have their own manufacturing and distribution facilities as well as fund very 
expensive promotional campaigns.  By contrast, the vast majority of independents 
outsource both manufacturing and distribution, plus they cannot afford a costly 
marketing campaign.  The record industry is a sunk cost industry.367  Therefore, the 
risks of not being able to recoup costs for a small company are considerable at the initial 
stages when investing in new artists.  The infamous ‘9:1 ratio’ in the record industry 
means that only 1 act out of 10 will be successful enough to pay for the 9 ‘failures’.368  
Majors, due to their size and access to finance, can cope with this situation better than 
the independents.  They can spread their risks for particular records they release, 
because although they do not know in advance whether a particular artist will sell a few 
hundred or several million copies of their record, they have enough artists on their roster 
                                                
365 Quoting Paul Conroy, ex-manager of Stiff Records who later moved to Warner, Chrysalis and Virgin. 
Also cited in Tim Cooper, “Pop: Finger on the Pulse,” The Sunday Times, September 03, 2006. 
366 Quoting Sir Howard Stringer, CEO of Sony.  Also cited in Michiyo Nakamoto and David Pilling, 
“Sony Chief Embraces ‘Sledgehammer’ Strategy,” The Financial Times, September 25, 2005.   
367 See the glossary for the definition of ‘sunk cost industry’. 
368 Alexander Belifante and Richard L. Johnson, “Competition, Pricing and Concentration in the U.S. 
Recorded Music Industry.” Journal of Cultural Economics 6 (1982): 14. 
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to ensure that they receive a reasonably predictable flow of income overall.  The small 
company, by contrast, sometimes with only one or two artists, cannot afford a ‘mistake’ 
like that369 (see the discussion below as regards innovation v. commerce).  The two 
types of companies in turn, intrinsically connect this fact to the way artists are treated.  
If an artist sells less than 300,000 copies on a major record company, he/she is likely to 
be ‘dropped’ by the label.370  This economy of scale dictates that a major will only be 
able to cover its costs upon the sale of 300,000 copies.  Any sales crossing that amount 
will go on to make the record profitable.  Such a high threshold means that majors 
normally do not allow artists to develop their careers with them if the first album has 
not sold over the required threshold.  This situation can hardly be described as 
advantageous to an artist because the latter only has one career371 and they do not have 
hit records from day one.  By contrast, independents do not need such a high threshold 
to make a profit as discussed next. 
 
b) Economics of Scale is another salient feature, which is intrinsically connected with 
the size and homogeneity of products, since the greater the economies of scale, the more 
homogenous cultural products are released in the market.372   Independents tend to be 
much more niche in the way that they market music.  Normally, an independent can 
make a profit out of a record that sells 20,000 copies and they usually operate on the 
profit sharing model.373  This should be seen, in contrast, to the major’s threshold of 
300,000 copies.  Thus the scenario can be described as one of major companies for 
major artists (superstars), as in those artists who can guarantee good profits.374  If an 
artist is on a major label, he or she must be aimed at the mass market as opposed to the 
niche market, whereas independents predominantly cater for the niche markets.   
 
                                                
369 Conal Walsh, “Size Does Matter. It’s Good to be Small,” The Observer, June 22, 2003.  
370 Interview with Keith Harris, 6 September 2007.  There maybe exceptions to this rule, however this 
figure came up in conversations with several A&R people and at numerous music industry panels.  
371 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343. 
372 The same interdependence between economy of scale and homogeneity was found in other cultural 
industries: the TV and newspapers.  See Doyle, supra, n. 178, at pp. 8, 11, 22. 
373 McLeod, supra, n. 200, at p. 527. 
374 For example SonyBMG’s Burgundy Records focuses only on the stars like Chaka Khan, Gloria 
Estefan and Donna Summer, i.e. those who have already enjoyed ‘platinum’ status in the past and can 
guarantee steady sales.  Louis Hau, “Old Stars, New Music, New Money,” Forbes, June 26, 2007; Eric 
Strobl and Clive Tucker, “The Dynamics of Chart Success in the UK Pre-Recorded Popular Music 
Industry.” Journal of Cultural Economics 24 (2000): 116.  Sanctuary Records used a similar model of 
signing established artists who have been jettisoned by major record companies, but this was an exception 
to the rule. 
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Major labels operate much more on their ‘advances’375 culture, which means that artists 
are charged for the costs and expenses of making their albums.  Throughout their 
history, majors offered artists big up-front money and big investment although this 
system is changing now because even majors cannot afford such high payments 
anymore.376  Independents could never afford such amounts so as a result they deal with 
artists differently.  In order to attract people to whom independents are paying such 
small amounts of money, one has to have some kind of partnership with that performer, 
whilst with a major label, “it is very much a master and a servant relationship; they 
expect a service from you”,377 and quite often the major selects the material for the 
album.  With a major record company, there is more of a production line effect: the 
record is released, there is a small window of opportunity, all marketing goes into that 
window of opportunity and if the record is not successful, an artist is dropped by the 
label.378  By contrast, independents normally give their artists a second chance because 
the relationship is more of a partnership between label and artist.379    
 
c) Innovation v. Commerce and the resulting tension – it has almost become a cliché 
that majors have done well for commerce, whilst independents have done well for 
innovation.  To this date, this has remained unchallenged.  Hence, the explanation 
below seeks to address this dilemma.  
 
Some music industry insiders have expressed their anger with majors’ short-term 
approach to culture, which could be described as “the next quarter results that should be 
presented to shareholders”.380  This short-term approach dismisses the fact that art needs 
a longer term to develop.381  Some echo similar concerns that a major will sign an artist 
not necessarily because of the artist’s talent: it is rather “a selection made according to a 
whole series of commercial judgments and cultural assumptions”.382  However, such 
tactics can be argued to be beneficial to independents because the latter fill the vacuum 
in the music market, but at the same time, such tactics may impact negatively on the 
                                                
375 See the glossary for the definition of ‘advance’. 
376 Sabbagh, supra, n. 317. 
377 Confidential source. 
378 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
379 Dorian Lynskey, “They Put Out Records the Way You Want Them Put Out,” The Guardian, October 
30, 2003.  
380 This point of view prevails because majors are public companies and have to account for their actions 
before shareholders. 
381 Quoting Pete Jenner, MusicTank seminar, supra, n. 323. 
382 Negus, supra, n. 56, at p. 32. 
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artists and, consequently the consumers.  As expressed by one interviewee: “every time 
I have had a big success it is when a (major) record company had given up on me, be it 
Wombles, or Bright Eyes.  These things have never been on a priority list and if you are 
not there, forget about everything”.383   
 
Contrary to that, one could advance the argument that it is actually independents who do 
not care about cultural diversity or innovation because all they care about is how not to 
make a ‘flop’ record and lose everything.  Therefore, the argument could be that 
independents in the digital age are geared more towards making hits, than not, with 
profit making being the first thing on the independents’ agenda.  As this seems to be a 
valid argument, most of the interviewees were confronted with it.  Janine Irons, an 
owner of a small independent jazz label, gave an interesting response: 
 
“That is a good argument.  In the jazz world, I can definitely say that it is not about the 
money (laughs).  It is about cultural and artistic things.  We can only release one or two 
albums a year because we only have the personnel to deal with that number of 
recordings.  We only have the money to support a release properly by limiting the 
number of the recordings that we do.  Majors may release more records but I do not 
know if they are diverse.”384 
 
And whilst Bobby Colomby noted: “big or small, it does not matter, everybody is in the 
business of making money”, he also admitted that “little labels are visionaries”.385  In 
my view, the argument as to whether independents too are in the business of profit 
making is best illustrated by the following response from an independent label founder 
and owner: 
 
“The quantity of money that a major makes is different from the quantity of money 
that an independent label makes.  It is about making money even for independents.  
But I am an artist.  If one asked me what would you give up: ‘a record label or being 
an artist’?  The answer would be: ‘I would give up a label’.  Whereas if one went to 
the Head of Universal and asked the same question, his answer would be to give up 
being an artist because he is not an artist.  I am driven as an artist.  I can relate to my 
artists.  If I say something on an artistic level, they know I care because I am an artist 
and I know what it is like to be bossed around by a record company”.386 
 
                                                
383 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343.  For further examples of perseverance by independent labels 
see Jeff Howe, “No Suit Required,” Wired, August 25, 2006. 
384 Interview with Janine Irons, supra, n. 342. 
385 Interview with Bobby Colomby, supra, n. 297. 
386 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343. 
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As has been noted above, some of the independents work in particular niche markets,387 
where the majors do not compete so strongly, and many concentrate on innovative or 
‘alternative’ music, which sometimes leads to the establishment of a new fashion in 
musical taste that the majors are then anxious to emulate.  Once majors know what kind 
of music consumers seem to want, they supply more of the same.  Big companies need 
big sales.  However, it would be incorrect to say that majors do not care about cultural 
diversity.  Indeed, it is not always the case that independent labels are good and major 
labels are bad.  It would be wrong to dismiss all Hollywood films as bad ones just 
because they are made in Hollywood.  It seems that independents are not set out to care 
more about cultural diversity than majors; but they have more of an effect on cultural 
diversity.388  Due to the fact that majors are multi-national corporations, they operate on 
a global basis.  Even though majors sign artists performing in different genres, they are 
predominantly interested in superstars to keep their company in existence.  
Independents, on the contrary, tend to be regional.  As a result they champion the music 
they find locally and champion the local markets.  Hence, they have much more of an 
effect on cultural diversity than the majors. 
 
An independent label brings to the market something unique because the artists 
developed by independents are different from the artists developed by majors.  As 
explained before, a major does not tend to have the relationship with the artist (unless 
the artist is a superstar)389 that an independent label has.  An ‘indie’ label will normally 
bring to the market a creative talent that is not already there because a major will be too 
scared to take that risk.  There are countless examples of this, for example The Cure 
who were originally signed to Fiction, another legendary independent label at the time, 
or artists that Stiff Records signed, one of which was Elvis Costello.390  They were very 
different from the ones developed on majors’ rosters.  As was argued by Safta Jaffery 
who discovered Muse and signed them to his label: 
 
                                                
387 The problem with niches is that they mean the exclusion of other genres, thus potentially stifling 
cultural diversity.  However, the diversity in terms of this study means the diversity of the products in the 
entire sector, not within each producer’s owned sector.  Therefore, niche does not mean that there is no 
diversity.  What is more important is the diversity of producers because they have many niche products in 
the market rather than a single large producer that releases different types of music. 
388 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
389 Even superstars like Paul McCartney left majors because in his case EMI did not establish a 
relationship with him. Sabbagh, supra, n 317.  
390 Fiction Records was set up in 1991 and bought up by Polydor in 2004.  
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“If you look at my experience with Muse, when I first took them into the market, nobody 
wanted them because they were a huge risk.  Majors told me that Muse did not write 
commercial songs that will work on radio.  I knew they were not commercial but I knew 
that they were an extraordinary talent.  Had I signed Muse to a major label, they 
probably would not have been the success they are today.  The reason why they are a 
success story today is because we persevered for 6 years from the independent label 
point of view.  Now they are one of the greatest bands in the world.” 391    
 
The diversity of majors is of a different kind; it is a controlled diversity.  Major record 
companies in particular guide ‘creativity’ so that music (and videos) are recognisable 
but in a slightly different way; therefore, the industry then has a direct impact “on how 
creativity can be realised”.392  An interesting example can be illustrated with the case of 
jazz music.  Two of the interviewees pointed out that jazz was of no interest to record 
companies.  These days jazz to a major is Norah Jones, Michael Bublé, and Diana 
Krall,393 which show that majors are interested only in ‘crossover’ potential.  Another 
interviewee noted that majors have not been working with any young jazz musicians, 
and as such no new talent was coming through in the jazz scene.394  That is why an 
outlet for jazz musicians is needed in the form of an independent label.395 
 
Bearing in mind the previous discussion, it can be concluded that one of the main 
differences between majors and independents is that the former start with a market 
demand to which an artist must tailor, whilst the latter start with an artist and their 
inspiration.  Majors cater for the markets, whilst independents create the market; hence 
the latter are crucially important in terms of cultural diversity.  This is important to bear 
in mind for the future discussion about record industry consolidation. 
  
d) Culture v. Corporatism – it is also important to distinguish what drives people to 
set up their labels, and how much the notion of independence matters.  Overall the 
interviews conducted produced a predominantly similar answer on this issue: “the 
reason people set up their labels was to create their own environment, something they 
liked and enjoyed - they were trying to create community.  Independents care about the 
way they work; the work culture is very important”.396  Almost all interviewees 
                                                
391 Interview with Safta Jaffery, 21 June 2007. 
392 Negus, supra, n. 32, at p. 359. 
393 Interview with Bobby Colomby, supra, n. 297.  
394 Interview with Janine Irons, supra, n. 342. 
395 For a more detailed account see Sholto Byrnes, “Jazz: The Best New Stuff Thrives far from the 
Majors,” The Independent, February 3, 2006. 
396 Interview with Geoff Travis, supra, n. 352. 
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concurred that they wanted to create their own work environment and escape the 
politics and bureaucracy of majors.  In the opinion of Adjei Amaning:  
 
“I worked for majors and independents and I never ever felt part of the major.  I felt I was 
doing a job.  When I was working for Sanctuary it felt that I was part of something.  For 
me what was important is that I wanted to create an environment where people felt part of 
something”.397   
 
One of the other main differences in culture between majors and independents is that 
the former, particularly these days, are predominantly run by executives who have 
either little or no experience of the record industry, whereas the latter are generally run 
and staffed by passionate music lovers.398  This, in turn, leads to culture tensions within 
companies.399  In addition to that, there is also evidence of hostile relationships between 
a major company and its acquired imprint label400 (examined in depth in Chapter 4). 
 
The cachet of the label is also very important to the artists.401  Labels like Rough Trade, 
Factory Records, Motown, Domino,402 or Stiff Records have all possessed this cachet, 
and it can be argued that the artists from those labels built their careers on cultural 
capital.403  The same cannot be said about majors, with the slight exception of EMI.  
Three decades ago Warner used to be a great company in terms of their cachet when 
they had artists like Van Morrison, Joni Mitchell, Neil Young, Grateful Dead, and 
Randy Newman, but since then it has changed.  These days, after the departure of 
                                                
397 Interview with Adjei Amaning, supra, n. 347. 
398 For example, three new executives at EMI under the Terra Firma have no experience of the record 
industry.  They come from finance, chemicals company and management background.  The A&R staff 
has also been replaced by ‘suits’ at Sony and Vivendi.  See James Hall, “Terra Firma Brings EMI Down 
to Earth,” The Telegraph, September 02, 2007.  There is, of course, always an exception to the rule with 
Andy Taylor, the founder of Sanctuary Records, formerly the largest independent music company in the 
UK, who was a chartered accountant.  Jason Nisse, “The Lowdown: Sex’n’Suits and Rock’n’Roll…and 
Strokes of Genius,” The Independent, October 26, 2003.  
399 Negus, supra, n. 56, at pp. 64-82. 
400 id. 
401 Rob Sharp and Rebecca Armstrong, “Record Labels that Rocked Our World,” The Independent, 
January 17, 2008. 
402 Alastair McKay, “Record Labels: The Domino Effect,” The Independent, February 3, 2006. 
403 The term ‘cultural capital’ was invented by Pierre Bourdieu in 1973.  See Richard Jenkins, Pierre 
Bourdieu (London: Routledge, 2002), 128 – 152 and Theodore Gracyk, I Wanna Be Me (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2001), 33.  For more on the importance of cultural capital for the independent 
labels see Sarah Thorton, Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Middletown CT: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1996); Rob Young, Rough Trade: Labels Unlimited (London: Black Dog 
Publishing, 2006); The Independent, “Rough Trade: the Label that Changed Music History,” September 
08, 2006; and The Independent, “Rough Trade: Rough and Ready,” September 10, 2006.  
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Madonna,404 Warner still has REM and Red Hot Chilli Peppers on its roster, but it can 
hardly be said to have any cultural cachet any more.405 
 
The anti-corporate ethos and message of genres like rock, punk, and rap is still 
important and prevalent.  Oasis provides a salient example of how crucial the indie 
credentials and cultural capital can be in terms of anti-corporate attitude (and political 
reasons).406  Oasis was discovered by Alan McGee and was signed to his then 
independent label, Creation Records.  Although what the consumers did not know was 
that Creation had a hidden financial deal with Sony to market Oasis, since it would be 
disastrous for Oasis to be associated with Sony while promoting ‘Cool Britannia’.  The 
importance of cultural integrity can be further demonstrated by the American indie-rock 
group, Band of Horses, which had to recall the song they had licensed to Wal-Mart’s 
online campaign in 2007 after a fan backlash.407  A further example is the Smashing 
Pumpkins who sued Virgin Records for using their music in Pepsi and Amazon 
commercials claiming that Virgin’s actions threatened their reputation for artistic 
integrity.408  This shows that the symbolic notion of being associated with an 
independent label and cultural capital can be crucial, and in present times, this notion 
has gained more importance with artists like Arctic Monkeys, Kaiser Chiefs, Franz 
Ferdinand all signing to independent labels. 
 
Apart from the work culture and cultural cachet, in terms of business methods it is also 
much more difficult for a major label to change the way in which it operates.  Because 
of the majors’ inflexibility, they have missed out on a vast number of opportunities that 
could help them escape the market slides.  The business method of majors and 
independents can be described as “a big ship v. a speed boat argument”.409  For a major 
label to change, it takes so many departments, quite often in several territories, to 
approve a certain decision.  With an independent label, however, mostly it is a case of a 
                                                
404 Ray Waddell, “Madonna Confirms Deal with Live Nation,” The Billboard, October 16, 2007; and 
Brian Garrity, “WMG Downplays Madonna’s Exit,” The New York Post, October 17, 2007. 
405 Interview with Geoff Travis, supra, n. 352. 
406 For a good account of the events see David Cavanagh, The Creation Records Story: My Magpie Eyes 
Are Hungry for the Prize (London: Virgin Books, 2000). 
407 Daniel Kreps, “Band of Horses Retain Ownership of their Soul, Turn Down Wal-Mart Commercial,” 
The Rolling Stone, November 16, 2007. 
408 Owen Gibson, “Smashing Pumpkins Sue Record Label over Use of Songs in Pepsi Promotional 
Deals,” The Guardian, March 26, 2008; ABC News, “Smashing Pumpkins Sue Virgin Records,” March 
25, 2008; and Jonathan Cothen, “Smashing Pumpkins Lawsuit Latest Step in Feud,” The Reuters, March 
27, 2008.  For more on cultural credibility in music see Jeff Leeds, “Does This Latte Have a Funny 
Mainstream Taste to You?” The New York Times, March 17, 2008. 
409 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
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few people meeting at the earliest opportunity to approve and make the necessary 
changes regarding, for example, the label’s direction or an artist’s career. 
 
The biggest downside of the small-sized label is that it may be disadvantaged in terms 
of lacking the finance to market a certain record.410  The lack of knowledge of how to 
run a label and how to finance that label’s operations is by far the biggest problem for 
the independent sector.411  However, if an independent label is successful, the benefits 
of a small-sized company reflect positively on the artists.  For example, as one 
interviewee noted: “... we (Dramatico) have 1 artist and 3 marketing people.  Universal 
in London have about 100 artists, and I do not think they have 300 marketing people to 
attend to those artists”.412 
 
The lack of finance413 and over-expansion414 are closely connected with the 
controversial issue of a ‘sell-out’ by independent labels.  As the research question aims 
to answer whether competition law should provide special protection for the small 
business in cultural industries, the sell-out may be a cornerstone in justifying such 
special protection for small companies whose long-term ambitions could be to sell out 
for a substantial amount of money.  As the discussion below demonstrates, this issue is 
not a straightforward one, and it may be connected with the high level of consolidation 
in the record industry.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
410 See The Independent, “Stiff Records: If It ain’t Stiff, It ain’t Worth a Debt,” September 15, 2006. 
Likewise, Factory Records achieved a 1.5 percent singles market share in 1990, but it nevertheless was 
bankrupt by 1992.  See Hesmondhalgh, supra, n. 31, at p. 477.  For the full account of the financial 
difficulties faced by the independents see also Nicholas Wilson et al., Banking on a Hit: The Funding 
Dilemma for Britain’s Music Business (Kingston University for the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport, October 10, 2001). 
411 This lack of knowledge is being mended by numerous mentoring events organised by the Association 
of Independent Music and other trade bodies. 
412 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343.                                                                                              
413 Tim Cooper, “Pop: Finger on the Pulse,” The Sunday Times, September 03, 2006. 
414 The history of a legendary independent label, Sanctuary, showed that sometimes an independent label 
can grow too fast to face its own demise.  At the moment of writing, Sanctuary is part of Universal Music 
Group.  See Andrew Edgecliff-Johnson, “Urban Woes Have Sanctuary Singing the Blues,” The Financial 
Times, September 24, 2005; Dan Sabbagh, “Sanctuary Braced for Painful Hit,” The Times, October 31, 
2005; Cossima Marriner, “Pop Goes the Label,” The Guardian, August 24, 2005; Conal Walsh, “Heaven 
Knows British Music Bastion is Miserable Now,” The Observer, August 7, 2005, and The Guardian, 
“You Just Haven’t Earned it Yet, Baby,” August 24, 2005.   
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3.4. The Blurring of Independent Labels: The Reasons for Selling Out  
 
As has been demonstrated by the evolution of majors, they have historically grown in 
size usually as a result of mergers and acquisitions, whereas independent labels have 
grown larger by developing a successful roster of artists and achieving an international 
presence by operating in different territories or by licensing their recordings to overseas 
record companies.  There have been some huge success stories amongst independents 
like Virgin, Island, A&M, Zomba and Chrysalis.  They all started as small independents 
specialising in particular niche genres of music but were successful in developing into 
significant businesses with extensive rosters of artists covering a wide range of musical 
styles.  Their stars included U2, Bob Marley, Frankie Goes to Hollywood (Island), 
Miles Davis (Blue Note), Cream, the Bee Gees, Led Zeppelin (Atlantic), Police and 
Sting (A&M), Nirvana (Sub Pop), the Jackson 5, Diana Ross, the Supremes, Stevie 
Wonder (Motown), Boy George, Mike Oldfield, the Sex Pistols, Genesis, Culture Club 
and Simple Minds (Virgin), N*SYNC (Zomba) and Sinead O'Connor (Chrysalis).  
These companies had records suitable for global sales and achieved a prominent 
position in the market.  This is one of the reasons why they were subsequently sold to 
majors.  There is also a myriad of much smaller labels that have sold out to majors, 
which in turn makes it more difficult to argue for an ethic of independence.  Whilst it 
was illustrated earlier on in this section that traditionally the independents have their 
own ethos and stand for different values than majors, at a certain point contradiction 
arises when some independents sell out to a major.  Therefore, it is necessary to see 
what drives independents towards the sell-out.  
 
As this thesis explores the issue of the protection of cultural industries by competition 
law, a question arises as to why competition law should protect small labels, when some 
of them, deep down, wish to sell out, eventually, to a bigger company.  This is an 
important point that necessitates an explanation.  In 2006 Pete Waterman, a famous 
producer from Stock, Aitken and Waterman, wrote an article titled Sympathy for the 
Devil,415 with the devil being the independent sector.  Interestingly, the article itself did 
not provoke much response, but nevertheless it contained some interesting points 
regarding the hypocrisy of independent labels in their opposing of mergers at the EU 
level, bearing in mind that they themselves would like to grow in size (this issue is 
                                                
415 Pete Waterman, “Sympathy for the Devil?” The Wall Street Journal (Europe), November 16, 2006. 
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addressed in Chapter 4).  The article also emphasised that independent labels are as 
much in the business of making money, as are the majors.  In order to question the 
hypocrisy of independents, almost every interviewee was confronted with Pete 
Waterman’s concept.  In this respect, it is important to know why independents sell out, 
and more importantly to remember that not all independents sell out.  With a couple of 
exceptions, all the interviewees rejected the arguments of Pete Waterman.   
 
It is important to re-emphasise that the majority of the independent labels do not sell 
out.  They compete with the majors for many reasons: the reasons range from those 
wanting to be idiosyncratic and individualistic to others wanting to remain in control of 
their freedom and ideas.416  In the words of Neil Leyton:  
 
“I don’t criticise those who sell their label.  Work that goes into an indie comes from the 
heart.  But some people want to move on and again it is a very emotional thing…selling 
a life’s work.  I also know a lot of people who would never do that.  I am not saying that 
one is better than the other, it is just different people”.417  
 
However, if an artist's career develops successfully, the independent may not have the 
financial resources to fund the promotion and marketing that the artist then requires.418 
As Safta Jaffery, who sold out to Warner in 2005, explained: 
   
“In my case, the more successful we became the more problems we encountered.  To be 
successful in the music marketplace, you have got to have deep pockets.  This is where 
majors always win out because they have huge deep pockets.  If an act becomes 
successful, everything becomes more expensive: the artists get greedier, the videos 
become more expensive, the production and recording costs go up and everything goes 
up.  And if one is trying to compete to stay in the charts, his / her marketing budget goes 
through the roof on a weekly basis…one has got to spend what the majors are spending 
to compete with that”.419  
  
Therefore, business requirements may be one of the reasons for selling out.  As it will 
be discussed later, one positive outcome of the sell-out may be that the founders of 
labels who sold out to majors have enough funds to set up new labels and discover more 
talent and support new artists. 
 
                                                
416 Colin Gray, “Managing Entrepreneurial Growth: A Question of Control?” in Small Firms: 
Entrepreneurship in the Nineties, ed. David Deakins et al. (London, Paul Chapman, 1997), 23. 
417 Interview with Neil Leyton, supra, n. 346. 
418 The Guardian, “The High Cost of Selling Out,” June 29, 2007.  
419 Interview with Safta Jaffery, supra, n. 391. 
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Having shown how a wide range of differing record companies operate, it is now 
appropriate to explore why competition law should be utilised to protect producer 
diversity (thus cultural diversity). 
 
3.5. The Justification of Why Competition Law Should Protect 
Producer Diversity  
 
Chapter 1 partially explained why cultural industries overall deserve to be protected by 
competition law and it also examined the arena of product diversity.  However, there is 
also the diversity of producers to be considered because a range of various producers is 
closely linked with differentiated products.  In order to show why, if at all, competition 
law should protect producer diversity in the cultural sector, firstly some definitions and 
statistics are presented, followed by a discourse into the importance of small businesses 
in terms of competition and innovation. 
 
3.5.1. Cultural and Economic Importance of Small and Medium-Sized 
Producers in Cultural Industries 
 
In the EU small and medium-sized enterprises (hereinafter, SMEs) have received a lot 
of attention within the last two decades from both scholars and governments.420  Having 
said that, while there is an abundance of EU policy and studies aimed at increasing and 
protecting the numbers of SMEs, to date there is only a handful of published research 
that deals directly with SMEs engaged in the cultural sector.421  This raises concerns 
that governments lend their support largely for SMEs involved in manufacturing 
businesses and once again the cultural aspect is being neglected.  The UK Government 
for example, constantly emphasises the importance of cultural industries in terms of 
                                                
420 Zoltan J. Acs, Are Small Firms Important? Their Role and Impact (Boston: Kluwer, 1999), 1-4.  The 
importance of SMEs has been re-enforced at the European level once again in 2005.  See European 
Competition Commission, “EU Envoy Report on the Activities of the European Union for Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises,” February, 8, 2005, at pp. 1 – 48. 
421 See for example, Wilson et al., supra, n. 410.  Other documents are more policy-orientated, for 
example, the European Council, “First-ever European Strategy for Culture: Contributing to Economic 
Growth and Intercultural Understanding,” May 10, 2007. 
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GDP and GVA,422 but not much is being done to actually protect the innovative small 
sector. 
 
SMEs are defined as non-subsidiary, independent firms, which employ fewer than a 
given number of people: less than 250 employees in the EU, and less than 500 in the 
US.423  There are two views about the impact of small businesses on economic activity.  
On the one hand, their scale of production is too small to be perhaps optimal in their 
cost structures but on the other hand, some have argued, particularly within the past 20 
years, for the importance of small businesses to the economy and for their innovative 
contributions.424  Despite the scholastic differences regarding the significance of SMEs, 
the facts speak for themselves.  Overall, SMEs account for over 95 percent of firms and 
they play a major role in economic growth by being the source of new jobs (on average, 
they account for 60-70 percent of employment).425   
 
SMEs play an integral role in market economics renewal processes because of “their 
experimentation leading to both productivity growth and variety; they are about change 
and competition because they change the dynamics of market structure”.426  In addition, 
small businesses afford the opportunity for creative people to enter into economic 
society; they are ‘the agents of change’427 and ‘the carriers of new ideas’.428  Their 
contribution to innovation is an important feature.  Generally, the level of innovation 
depends on the type of industry.  Pursuant to the Schumpeterian view discussed in 
Chapter 1, capital intensive industries, such as chemical or car industries, larger firms 
have the innovative edge, whilst in the record industry it seems that the smaller firms 
have more freedom to innovate and more opportunities to record their music in the 
                                                
422 See supra, n. 46. 
423 In the European Union, SMEs are the enterprises with an annual turnover of less than EUR 40 million 
and/or a balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 27 million.  See Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC of May 6, 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
[2003] OJ L 124, at p. 36 and also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises: Local Strength, Global Reach,” June 2000, at p. 2. 
424 See for example, Zoltan J. Acs, The Changing Structure of the U.S. Economy: Lessons from the Steel 
Industry (New York: Praeger, 1984).  
425 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra, n. 423, at p. 2.  For the 
importance of SMEs from the employment point of view and their contribution to the economic welfare 
of the society see David J. Storey, Understanding the Small Business Sector (London: Routledge: 1994). 
426 Acs, supra, n. 420, at p. 3. 
427 David B. Audretsch, “Small Firms and Efficiency,” in Are Small Firms Important? Their Role and 
Impact, ed. Zoltan J. Acs (Boston: Kluwer, 1999), 33. 
428 Small firms are not necessarily more innovative than larger firms but new firms are often the carriers 
of new ideas.  See Bo Carlsson, “Small Business, Entrepreneurship, and Industrial Dynamics,” in Are 
Small Firms Important? Their Role and Impact, ed. Zoltan J. Acs (Boston: Kluwer, 1999), 106. 
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digital age.  As stated in Chapter 1, small firms are less bureaucratic; they are able to 
exploit innovations that are too modest or risky for larger companies.  Thus their 
contribution to the economy can be summarised as being key for innovation; a seedbed 
from which larger businesses can grow and as a complement to large firms in the wider 
structure.  
 
Small businesses are important in a number of ways.  Firstly, in terms of speed and 
flexibility small firms can react and adapt to change much quicker than large ones, 
particularly so in the record industry and secondly, in terms of dynamics small firms 
provide “the entrepreneurship and diversity required for microeconomic growth and 
stability”.429   
 
The significance of small firms is best illustrated by the fact that “the stability at the 
macroeconomic level requires a great deal of instability (or gales of creative 
destruction)430 at the microeconomic level”. 431  In other words, the fact that smaller 
firms experiment and innovate more, experience seesaw failures and successes and are 
overall less staid leads to them contributing in a very real way to a dynamic and fluid 
economy.432  In the absence of diversity, large firms tend to produce similar products 
and operate in similar ways.  To sum up, both large and small firms are important but 
their roles are different.433  Both types of firms are needed, as the more firms, the more 
innovation there is in a market. 
 
In speaking of the record industry’s concrete example, earlier sections of this thesis 
demonstrated that independent labels are generally more flexible than large integrated 
record companies.  Independent labels in the record industry sense opportunities, 
innovate, and take risks.  Sceptics would argue that the same can be said about the 
majors but as history demonstrates, the majority of new genres and artists have been 
discovered by independents and then outsourced by the majors.  Moreover, 
                                                
429 id., at p. 100. 
430 The term was introduced by Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (Cambridge 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1934). 
431 See Paul Reynolds, “Creative Destruction: Source or Symptom of Economic Growth?” in 
Entrepreneurship, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, and the Macroeconomy, ed. Zoltan J. Acs et al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97; Gunnar Elliason, “Micro Heterogeneity of Firms 
and the Stability of Industrial Growth.” Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 5 (1984): 249-
274; and Burton Klein, Dynamic Economics (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
432 Carlsson, supra, n. 428, at p. 108. 
433 id., at p. 100. 
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approximately 60 percent of SMEs are innovative according to a recent paper.434  As 
larger firms downsize and outsource more innovation, the weight of SMEs particularly 
in the record industry is increasing.  On the whole, the music industry (all branches of 
it, including the live and record industries) generates over 130,000 jobs, contributes 
£3.2 billion to the value of the UK economy, and makes around £1.3 billion through 
exports.435  These impressive figures should be contrasted with the fact that over 90 
percent of music businesses are SMEs.436  Since digital technology and globalisation 
reduce the importance of economies of scale, in the record industry in particular, the 
potential contribution of smaller firms is enhanced. 
 
The importance of SMEs in the record industry has been re-emphasised by the 
European Parliament (hereinafter, EP) in 2007 after the second approval of the 
Sony/BMG merger by the Commission437 (this is discussed below in Chapter 5 and in 
the Conclusion).  The EP expressed its concerns about the European Competition 
Commission’s tactics going against the European policy of supporting SMEs in the 
music sector.  The concerns were voiced precisely because independent labels create 
more jobs than the majors and represent 99 percent of the players in the market as well 
as 80 percent of the innovation in the sector.438  The EP once again re-emphasised the 
importance of SMEs in the cultural sector: 
 
“Like many cultural sectors, music suffers from chronic concentration.  Artists and 
cultural SMEs need to be supported as they play a key role in fostering creativity and 
innovation as well as growth and employment in Europe.  We must put cultural 
diversity at the heart of the EU policy”.439 
 
One of the biggest hurdles in arguing that record industry SMEs should be afforded 
particular protection by competition law is that small independent labels oppose majors 
merging because they themselves wish to grow in size.440  That being said, as both the 
meaning and significance of ‘independence’ vary drastically amongst independent 
                                                
434 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra, n. 423. 
435 Wilson et al., supra, n. 410, at p. 2. 
436 id. 
437 Impala, “European Parliament Interrogates Commission on the Sony/BMG Merger,” October 30, 
2007.  
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440 Waterman, supra, n. 415.  
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music labels, not all small companies are growth-oriented.441  The fact is supported by 
the reluctance of small firms to adopt the setting of business or growth targets.  Several 
studies confirmed442 that a desire for independence, rather than economic incentives, 
were the prime motivator of small firms.  Some independent labels are set up to make a 
profit; others are more preoccupied with supporting their ideology and music 
preferences, which obviously throws doubt on their economic efficiency.  Moreover, as 
numerous researches demonstrated, small, growing companies make a huge 
contribution to employment figures even if they are only a small proportion of the 
overall small firm population.443   
 
The emphasis here should be in underlining the fact that the majority of small 
enterprises do not survive and can never compete with large firms.  Since the 
independent sector of the record industry mainly consists of small companies with less 
than 10 employees, the prime task for such small firms is survival, not growth.444  Even 
in ‘ideal’ macroeconomic circumstances, the larger majority of small companies do not 
have an increase in size as their main aim.445  Some of the interviewees also confirmed 
that they would not like to grow at all:  
 
“The last thing I want to do is to become the next major because I have an advantage of 
being an independent. We have one artist (Katie Melua) on Dramatico.  If we had 4 
artists, it would be a huge expansion.  I do not want to do that”.446   
 
 
In the record industry, there is a multitude of independent labels but the majority of 
them will never achieve strong economic results and in this sense are inefficient.  As 
noted in Chapter 1, the reality of the situation is that even the smallest major is still 
                                                
441 Colin Gray, “Managing Entrepreneurial Growth: A Question of Control?” in Small Firms: 
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much bigger in terms of size and power than the largest independent.447  The above is 
backed up by the fact that large companies primarily populate the record industry, with 
only a very small number of medium-sized independents in existence.  
 
Having demonstrated the importance of small firms (independent labels) from both a 
cultural and an economic point of view, the next step is to investigate the reasons for 
mergers and acquisitions, the resulting market power of majors, and its abuse by majors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
447 Mills, supra, n. 201, at p. 8.  
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Chapter 4: The Rationale behind Mergers and Acquisitions 
and Resultant Anti-competitive Behaviour 
 
“Come Together, Right Now, Over Me”. 
                   The Beatles448 
 
“Big 5, big 4, big 3, big 2, I don’t care.  They are 
digging their own graves”. 
Robert Horsfall449 
 
“Everybody says that it is going to be the great future 
for independents, but I am yet to see it”. 
Marc Marot450 
 
Before undertaking a critical analysis of the EU merger regulation and case law in 
Chapter 5, this chapter explores the reasons why majors merge and acquire smaller 
labels as well as their patterns of anti-competitive behavior. 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, majors have long utilised the policy of vertical 
and horizontal integration.  Since vertical integration in today’s digital turmoil becomes 
less important to majors because they cannot acquire every single digital platform that is 
springing into existence, this chapter focuses on horizontal integration, i.e. when majors 
merge with each other or acquire independents; this trend has been particularly 
noticeable over the last decade.  By 1992 the European Competition Commission had 
recognised that it was already then too late to prevent an oligopolistic record industry 
concentration but it nevertheless approved the EMI/Virgin merger.451  Moreover, it is 
worth mentioning that further down the line in 1995 the Italian competition authority 
found that the market structure of the record industry was indeed oligopolistic.452  In 
spite of that finding, the Commission authorised the acquisition of PolyGram by 
Seagram in 1998,453 thus creating Universal, the largest record company in the world.  
The Commission reasoned in favour of the acquisition because Seagram was not a 
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major record company in Europe and therefore the acquisition was not deemed to affect 
the level of concentration in the European music industry.454  However, during the 
Seagram/PolyGram acquisition, the Commission noted: “the oligopolistic structure of 
the music industry might point to a situation of collective dominance”.455  The Seagram 
acquisition reduced the number of major record companies from six to five.  In 2000, 
EMI and Time Warner notified the Commission of their agreement to merge their 
respective music businesses.  The proposal was withdrawn in the face of a prohibition 
decision (explained in Chapter 5).  However, in 2002 Bertelsmann was given the green 
light to go ahead in its acquisition of the then largest independent company, Zomba 
Records,456 which does exemplify that the modus operandi of majors absorbing 
independents was intrinsically ‘institutionalised’.457  The highly criticised merger 
between Sony and BMG,458 which will be analysed in fine detail in Chapter 5, followed 
various other mergers and acquisitions.  Sony and BMG merged their music entities but 
not without a regulatory hurdle; the independent labels’ trade body, Impala,459 
successfully opposed the merger in the Court of First Instance in 2006, resulting in the 
merger being sent back to the Commission for another investigation.  In October 2007, 
the Commission unconditionally approved the merger for the second time.460  Following 
that, in 2008 the European Court of Justice threw out the CFI’s annulment and ordered 
the CFI to re-investigate the merger.461  This back and forth fiasco demonstrates how 
difficult it is for competition law (in this case merger regulation) to deal with cultural 
industries.  Despite Impala’s victory at the CFI in 2006 the wave of acquisitions did not 
stop.  2007 saw three big acquisitions by Universal, firstly that of the largest 
independent company in the world, Sanctuary Records,462 secondly the acquisition of 
another renowned label, V2463 and thirdly one of the biggest music publishing 
catalogues, BMG Publishing.464    
 
                                                
454 id., paras 25-26. 
455 id., para 29. 
456 Case No COMP/M. 2883 – Bertelsmann / Zomba, September 02, 2002. 
457 Negus, supra, n. 55, at p. 35. 
458 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315. 
459 Case T464/04 - Independent Music Publishers & Labels Association (Impala) v. Commission of the 
European Communities, July 13, 2006. 
460 Case No COMP/M.3333 - Sony/BMG, October 03, 2007. 
461The Billboard, “EU High Court Throws Out SonyBMG Annulment,” July 10, 2008. 
462 Nic Fildes, “Universal Buys Struggling Music Group Sanctuary,” The Independent, June 16, 2007. 
463 Dominic White and Josephine Moulds, “Universal Agrees to Buy V2 Music for £7m,” The Telegraph, 
11, 2007.  
464 Case No COMP/M. 4404 – Universal/BMG Music Publishing, May 22, 2007. 
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This chapter is organised as follows.  The first part investigates the conditions that drive 
forward mergers in the record industry and what effect, if any, such mergers have on 
small, medium, and large-sized independent labels, artists, consumers, and culture.  
Following that, a number of examples of anti-competitive practices exercised by the 
majors are illustrated. 
   
4.1. Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions in the Record Industry 
 
Before discussing the two crucial mergers of Time Warner with EMI and Sony with 
BMG, it is firstly necessary to analyse why record companies merge or acquire smaller 
labels, and what drives this growth ambition.  Secondly, what effect these mergers have 
on small business and music diversity must be discussed.  The arguments in this section 
demonstrate numerous reasons for merging, the prevalent one being the acquisition of 
copyrights.  Greater focus on copyright is also necessary because it is the ‘backbone’ of 
the record industry; the impact of copyright ownership and protection upon cultural 
diversity should not be under-estimated. 
 
4.1.1. Copyright’s Role in Creating the Record Industry Oligopoly 
 
The following part starts with the historical development of copyright and explores its 
role in the commodification of cultural products and creativity.  It seeks to argue that 
copyright law is not designed to stimulate creativity but is there to encourage 
commercial exploitation and protect investor interests, particularly so those of the 
majors.  Also analysed is how copyright informs cultural diversity, for example how 
copyright ownership impacts on new forms of creation such as digital sampling.465  
Moving on, the relationship between copyright and competition law is investigated, in 
particular the ‘vicious circle’ illustrates that it is copyright that gives majors the market 
power to consolidate, which in turn gives them more power to acquire more copyrights 
and stifle cultural diversity.  Finally, the last section examines the effect copyright law 
has on cultural diversity and independent labels, and whether independent labels can 
provide any answers in terms of how they use copyright and other tools to protect 
creativity. 
                                                
465 See the glossary for the definition. 
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4.1.1.A. Historical Development and Justification of Copyright  
 
An understanding of the function of copyright law in the record industry in the twenty -
first century would not be complete without a brief discourse into the legal history of 
copyright law.  Copyright - like entitlements, are rooted in Greek and Roman history.466  
However, it is the development of copyright since the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries that is of greater interest and relevance to this thesis.  Two of the 
most important developments occurred in England in the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries.  The first one was the publication of Two Treaties of Civil Government by 
John Locke467 who articulated his labour and property doctrines and the justification of 
the appropriation of property: 
 
“Whatsoever he (person) removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, 
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property… that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour 
being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what 
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for 
others” (emphasis added).468 
 
It is not clear whether Locke had intellectual rights in mind when writing the Treatise.  
Nonetheless, in his other capacities, he was enthusiastic that authors were only allowed 
copyright protection for a defined period fearing that much work could be lost due to a 
monopolistic book industry holding on to licenses indefinitely.469  
 
The second crucial development was the statutory enactment of copyright law for the 
first time in England in 1710.  The law was titled the Statute of Anne and was designed 
to be a trade regulation device for book publishers470 and not so much intended to 
protect the author’s interests.  The Statute led to stronger bargaining positions in favour 
of publishers, consequently weakening the writer’s position.  America, taking English 
law as the prototype, similarly introduced laws safeguarding copyright owners rather 
                                                
466 For a detailed history of copyright, see for example, Paul Geller, “Copyright History and the Future: 
What’s Culture Got to Do with It?”  Journal of Copyright Society of the USA 47 (2000): 209 – 263 and 
Ronald V. Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1996).   
467 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (New York: Barnes and Noble Publishing, 2004), 16 
– 30.  
468 id., Chapter V, Section 27.  
469 See Peter King, The Life and Letters of John Locke (London: Bell and Daldy, 1864), 205.  Also cited 
in Bettig, supra, n. 466, at p. 21.   
470 At the time, the book trade was far from prospering because of the failure to renew the seventeenth 
century printing licensing laws.  See Lionel Bently, “Copyright & the Death of the Author in Literature 
and Law.” Modern Law Review 57, no.6 (1994): 974.   
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than creators, consequently concerning itself more with book publishers than authors; 
the situation pretty much exists today.471  As the discussion below will outline, a similar 
situation is observed in today’s record industry. 
 
4.1.1.B. Function of Copyright and Its Clash with Cultural Diversity 
 
Copyright is the monopoly right, which gives its owners the right to exclude others 
from copying the work without permission.472  Throughout copyright law history there 
were heated academic debates about the need or otherwise of such a law.473  Some 
scholars question the case for having copyright at all,474 whilst others say it is the only 
way forward.475  That particular debate is predominantly outside the scope of this thesis, 
instead this part focuses on what copyright protection means for the record industry; 
whose interests it protects and its relationship with competition law. 
 
Copyright plays a crucial role in certain cultural industries.476  Lawmakers emphasise 
that: 
 
“Copyright…constitutes an essential element in the development process.  Experience 
has shown that the enrichment of the national cultural heritage depends directly on the 
level of protection afforded to literary and artistic works.  The higher the level, the 
greater the encouragement for authors to create, the greater the number of a country’s 
intellectual creations, the higher its renown; the greater the number of productions in 
literature and the arts, the more numerous their auxiliaries in the book, record and 
entertainment industries….” (emphasis added)477 
 
Some however argue that copyright law works in an opposite way, stultifying creative 
endeavours.478  The crucial limitation of copyright law is that it may, and often does, 
impair creativity and consequently diversity, particularly exemplified in the light of the 
                                                
471 Peter Drahos, “The Visual Artist in the Global Information Economy.” Communications Bulletin 14, 
no. 3 (1995): 1. 
472 Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, “The Economic Rationale for Copyright.” The American 
Economic Review 56, no. 1/2 (1966): 421. 
473 See Edwin Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, no.1 
(1989): 31 – 52. 
474 Stephen Breyer, “The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and 
Computer Programmes.” Harvard Law Review 84 (1970): 281 – 351; Hurt and Schuchman, supra, n. 472, 
at pp. 421 – 432. 
475 Hettinger, supra, n. 473. 
476 Not all cultural industries are dependent on copyright, for example media industry (newspapers, 
magazines). 
477 The preface to the World Intellectual Property Organisation’s Guide to the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, WIPO 1978. 
478 See for example, Fiona Macmillan, “Copyright’s Commodification of Creativity,” 17. 
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numerous and successful attempts to increase the duration of copyright (discussed 
below).  The relationship between copyright and creativity is not an easy one, but as 
was stated in Atari v. Nintendo:  
 
“the copyright holder has a property interest in preventing others from reaping the fruits 
of his labour, not in preventing the authors and thinkers of the future from making use 
of, or building upon, his advances.  The process of creation is often an incremental one, 
and advances building on past developments are far more common than radical new 
concepts”.479 
 
The next step therefore is to investigate the relationship between copyright law and 
cultural diversity.  
 
Since copyright is a monopoly right, an important feature is to protect the property 
interests of its creators and holders.  However, copyright law should not just be about 
preventing illegal users from copying original works.  It should address the promotion 
of innovation and cultural diversity (even though, as pointed out in Chapter 1, cultural 
diversity is not a stated aim of copyright law).  This position is further supported by the 
US Copyright Act which sets forth the purpose of copyright protection as the promotion 
of ‘progress of science’, 480 not the rewarding of authors. 
 
Copyright protection should not necessarily clash with the fostering of creativity and 
innovation, but unfortunately that is not always the case.  Copyright law grants 
protection to the expressions of ideas, not ideas as such.  The threshold of the originality 
requirement is low, which is of great concern in terms of increasing diversity levels.  
Protection, through copyright law is not dependent on originality or creativity; in fact 
the work itself need not be of any artistic merit.  This relatively low threshold for 
originality is one reason to argue that copyright is not supporting creativity and 
culture.481  For example, compilation albums are protected by separate copyright 
arrangements from the original material embodied in them.  Moreover, it has long been 
argued that the concentration of copyright in the hands of a small number of 
corporations does not facilitate cultural diversity, but does increase profits.482  
                                                
479 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc. 975 F.2d [1992] 832, 839. 
480 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U. S. 417 [1984], 429-30; Twentieth Century Music v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (186 USPQ 65) [1975], 156. 
481 Macmillan, supra, n. 478, at p. 2. 
482 Laurence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture 
and Control Creativity (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); and Fiona Macmillan, “Copyright and 
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Copyrights can be traded and are not inalienable in themselves but at the same time 
grant exclusive rights to the holder.483  The copyright is alienable as an author can 
assign (and often does) his copyright interest; with respect to the record industry, quite 
often the copyright (in a sound recording) belongs to a record company outright for 50 
years.  The main reason for copyright transfers to take place is the need for music to be 
exposed to more consumers.484  If a recording artist is contracted to a record company, 
the recording of the artist’s performance becomes the company’s property and can be 
sold or traded without any need for the artist’s consent or sometimes knowledge.485  
Hence, it is argued that in copyright law the concept of authorship leads to 
commodification.486  An evident example of this is the fact that previously copyright on 
recordings did not vest in artists but in producers, i.e. the latter (a record company in 
most cases) was recognised as the author of a sound recording487 (see the discussion 
below).  The above demonstrates how financial investment outweighs authorship, thus 
defining a sound recording as a commodity right from the outset.  Another couple of 
reasons that add to copyright commodification are one, copyright protection’s increased 
duration and two, restrictions of fair dealing and fair use defence (the latter being 
outside the scope of this thesis).488   
 
This commodity has become a crucial area of trade; as a consequence, there are robust 
forms of rights commodification.489  However, there exists a point of view that argues 
that without such commodification copyright law would have greater integrity.490  The 
argument may also be made that some degree of commodification is necessary to 
provide financial reward for artists.  However as shown later, at the present time 
copyrights are used more to protect the interests of record companies (commodifiers) 
rather than the artists.  
                                                
Corporate Power,” in Copyright in the Cultural Industries, ed. Ruth Towse (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2002), 99. 
483 Macmillan, supra, n. 478, at p. 3. The term ‘alienation’ originally signified ‘to sale’.  See Bently, 
supra, n. 470, at p. 979.  
484 Birgitte Andersen et al., “Rents, Rights’N’Rhythm: Conflict and Cooperation in the Music Industry,” 
9, http://www.copyright.bbk.ac.uk/contents/publications/workshops/theme2/banderson.pdf. 
485 Ruth Towse, “Copyright, Risk and the Artist.” International Journal of Cultural Policy 6, no. 1  
(2000): 98. 
486 Macmillan, supra, n. 478, at p. 5 and Garnham, supra, n. 19, at p. 141. 
487 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act ((hereinafter, CDPA) 1988 (UK), s. 9 (1) & (2) (aa).  This 
provision has been changed to ‘the person who makes the necessary arrangements’, which in most cases 
means a record company.  See also John Kay, “Lennon was Right about Music and the Man,” The 
Financial Times, 16 April 2008.   
488 Bently, supra, n. 470, at p. 979. 
489 Macmillan, supra, n. 482, at p. 106. 
490 id. 
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4.1.1.C. Copyright and Globalisation 
 
The importance of copyright to its holders becomes even more evident in this digital 
age with the globalisation of cultural industries (see the discussion in Chapter 1).  
Moreover, there are certain trends that point to the globalisation of copyright itself.  The 
exploitation of a small number of copyrights in the record industry is certainly one 
factor; the increasing legal regulation of copyright on a global scale is another.  In the 
last sixty years copyright has been successfully used as a trade instrument.  Good 
examples of this on a law-making level is the inclusion of copyrights, as well as other 
intellectual property rights, in the 1947 GATT491 and the 1994 agreement, TRIPS.492  
Some see a particular irony in the title TRIPS, as it appears to suggest that the trade 
related aspect of intellectual property is the only one.493  TRIPS brought the trade 
aspects of intellectual property into the open, but these tendencies seem to have existed 
right from copyright’s moment of creation.  As the TRIPS agreement is arguably one of 
the most important developments in international intellectual property law since the 
adoption of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,494 it 
is unfortunate that its standards for the protection of intellectual property rights set the 
general trend to strengthen IP protection, with the resulting enhancement of intellectual 
property’s value.  It is interesting to note that the US government and private 
corporations heavily influenced the drafting of the TRIPS agreement.   
 
4.1.1.D. Copyright and Market Power: A Vicious Circle 
 
Copyright law as such does not seem to have raised many issues with competition law 
in the past but it nevertheless has impacted upon competition within the record industry.  
The record industry considers copyright as an investment tool and the longer its term, 
the bigger the return on investment, 495 which in turn leads to music commodification.  
The way record companies operate demonstrate that by alienating the artist from their 
work, (by owning the copyright in their sound recordings) music becomes 
                                                
491 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947. 
492 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994. 
493 Macmillan, supra, n. 478, at p. 3. 
494 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886.  
495 The BPI Report “Five Reasons to Support British Music: One of the UK’s Most Valuable Industries,” 
May 16, 2007. 
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commodified496 and music moves from the private domain of the author to the domain 
of the record company.  Secondly, it seems that the other root of commodification lies 
in the numerous mergers and acquisitions in the record industry.  This is an inter-
dependent process, which in this work is defined as ‘the vicious circle’.  Higher 
consolidation and the resulting market clout affords major record companies acquiring 
more copyrights, which in turn gives them more market power to buy even more 
copyrights, and the circle continues.  Following on, it is possible to conclude that it is 
mainly the ownership of copyrights that led to the creation of the oligopolistic power of 
major record companies.497  On the one hand, such a vast concentration of power in four 
record companies should be of great concern to the competition authorities.  On the 
other hand, it is the competition authorities that have allowed such a vast concentration 
of copyrights to reside in a handful of record companies.  The power of the corporations 
is self-reinforcing because they can afford to acquire the copyrights or simply put the 
provisions in their record contracts that demand the assignment of the copyrights to 
themselves.498  This power is expressed by the fact that four record companies have 
about 75 percent of the market share.  At this stage it would be fair to note that market 
share in itself is not a problem.  The problem arises when majors use their power in 
anti-competitive practices (see the discussion below).  
 
The vicious circle’s existence is supported by a thorough analysis of intellectual 
property’s political economy, which in turn provides data on how much intellectual 
property is concentrated in the hands of a tiny number of corporations.499  As shown in 
Chapter 3, in discussing the growth of the record industry, power, which was gradually 
built by vertical and horizontal integration,500 led to a vast number of copyrights being 
controlled by four record companies.  In this case, there is a direct link between the 
process of music commodification, copyright and the global domination of four record 
companies in the recorded music market, resulting in lower music diversity. 
 
 
                                                
496 Stratton, supra, n. 9, at p. 148. 
497 Bettig, supra, n 466, at pp. 37-8.  For other outcomes of copyright ownership see Richard Epstein, 
Intellectual Property for the Technological Age (University of Chicago: Chicago, 2006).  
498 This is a standard clause in almost every record contract. 
499 Bettig, supra, n. 466. 
500 Alexander, supra, n. 243 at pp. 113 – 123 and supra, n. 172, at pp. 85 – 98. 
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Independents can play their important role in the de-commodification of music here.  
According to the latest data,501 even though the majors’ global market share is about 75 
percent, they are only responsible for 20 percent of new recordings released.  Most of 
this 20 percent is the same music that is heard all over the world; a result of the 
globalisation of cultural industries.  Arguably, the majors force-feed consumers with 
Top 40 hits.  The independent companies cover the remaining 80 percent of music 
released.  Having 75 percent of the market share allows majors not only to control the 
music market, but “also control the flow of human ideas, language or speech, emotion 
and expression”502 (as was argued in Chapter 1).  Majors act as gatekeepers or filters for 
people’s tastes, which allows “as much cultural diversity as a Macdonald’s menu”.503  
The figures quoted above additionally point to the fact that diversity is there, it is just 
not heard by the audience in its entirety simply because the majority of independents 
cannot break through the entry barriers for MTV, mainstream television, and radio.  
  
4.1.1.E. Copyright and Competition Law:  Finding a Balance 
 
On first inspection, it appears as though the natures of copyright law and competition 
law are diametrically opposed.  Copyright law grants monopoly to authors and 
copyright holders whereas competition law seeks to control and restrict such 
monopolies.  The conflict may be illustrated by the contradiction between the US 
Constitution that permits to “promote the progress of science and useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries”504 and the provisions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
(discussed further in Chapter 5) that seek to prevent the formation of monopolies.505  
One only needs to refer to the current headlines about the numerous attempts to merge 
the remaining major record companies and publishers to appreciate the scale of the 
debate.  For example, the acquisition of BMG Music Publishing by the Universal Music 
                                                
501 Independent sector released 80 percent of new music in 2005.  This data is based on the amalgamation 
of Nielsen Soundscan figures in 2005 (81.65 percent of total US releases were independent), and BPI 
figures in 2005 (83 percent of total UK releases were independent).  See AIM, “Independent Sector 
Creates World’s First Global Licensing Agency,” June 6, 2008. 
502 Andersen et al., supra, n. 484, at p. 16.   
503 Ann Capling, “Gimme Shelter!” Arena Magazine (February / March 1996): 21.  Also cited in 
Macmillan, supra, n. 482, at p. 109. 
504 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, clause 8.  
505 A good example demonstrating the clash between copyright and competition law in football 
broadcasting rights is provided in The Football Association Premier League Ltd v. QC Leasure & ors 
[2008] EWHC 44 (Ch), January 18, 2008. 
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Group506 allowing the biggest record company in the world to acquire even more 
copyrights in music and lyrics, was recently recognised as a possible source of 
competition law violation and hence had to go through an investigation by the 
Commission.507  Nevertheless, there is almost no academic debate about the interplay 
between copyrights, mergers, and acquisitions.508  The section below will seek to 
explain such interplay. 
 
There is an obvious inter-connection between the protection of copyrights and the 
increasing number of mergers, particularly illustrated by the fact that the new wave of 
record industry mergers has coincided with the end of copyright terms in sound 
recordings of best selling artists such as Elvis Presley and the Beatles.  However, the 
relationship between copyright and competition law is a multi-faceted one.  Both 
copyright and competition law proclaim championing innovation as one of their main 
goals,509 but they do not necessarily manage to achieve this in practice.  The resultant 
increased concentration of copyrights in the hands of the four major players diminishes 
both cultural diversity and competition in the recorded music market.  Thus, a danger of 
copyright ownership is that it can stifle creativity.  An example of this would be for 
instance, the copyright issues arising when majors use their exclusive rights to either 
grant or deny licenses for sampling.510 
 
Just how important the copyright institution is to the record industry is best illustrated 
by recent calls for the extension of copyrights in sound recordings.  The following 
section will demonstrate that it is predominantly the majors who lobby hard for 
copyright extension.  The section also investigates how the already high concentration 
of copyrights in the four players affects artists, independent labels and cultural diversity 
and what independent labels can offer in terms of reducing the power of copyright. 
 
                                                
506 Louis Hau, “Vivendi Buys BMG Publishing,” Forbes, May 9, 2006. 
507 Case No COMP/M. 4404 – Universal/BMG Music Publishing, supra, n. 464. 
508 See Charles McManis, “Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions.” University 
of Cincinnati Law Review 66 (1998): 1283.  
509 For more on the copyright’s function to foster innovation see Martin Kretschmer, “Creativity Stifled? 
A Joint Academic Statement on the Proposed Copyright Term Extension for Sound Recordings.” 
European Intellectual Property Review 30, no. 9 (2008): 342. 
510 Kembrew McLeod, “How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop.” Stay Free! 20 (Fall 2002); Greg Gillis, 
“Girl Talk: The Art of Sampling,” The Times, November 23, 2008; Grand Upright Music, Ltd v. Warner 
Bros. Records, Inc. 780 F. Supp. 182 [1991]; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569 [1994]; 
Newton v. Diamond and Others 349 F.3d 591 [2003]; Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, 
Inc. 394 F.3d 357, [2004]; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films 410 F.3d 792  [2005]. 
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4.1.1.F. Exploitation of Copyright by Majors and Independents: The Case 
of Copyrights in Sound Recordings 
 
In this part, the case of copyright in sound recordings is used as a tool to show how both 
majors and independents exploit copyrights and the resulting effect on cultural 
diversity.   
 
The life of a piece of music, as a financial asset, is dependent upon the duration of its 
copyright.  Therefore, copyright term’s duration has always been of pivotal importance 
to the record industry.  In the UK, copyright in the composition (lyrics and music) lasts 
for 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author dies.511  By contrast, 
the duration of copyright in sound recordings (master tapes512 or files) is 50 years from 
the end of the year in which the sound recording is made or first released whichever is 
the later.513  By comparison, in the USA post Sonny Bono Act514 copyright in 
composition lasts for the life of the author plus 70 years, or 95 years for a work of 
corporate authorship,515 and the duration of copyright in sound recordings is 95 years.  
It is worth noting that initially the duration of copyright protection was 14 years, 
however thanks to the heavy lobbying of big corporations in the US alone, it was 
gradually stretched to over 100 years.516 
 
A new wave of attempts to extend the copyright term began particularly since 2003 
when there was a real threat that the songs of such high profit-netting artists like Elvis 
Presley and the Beatles would come out of copyright term and enter the public 
domain.517  Another reason for the attempts to extend the copyright term is the digital 
revolution with its countless music download websites, some of them legal, but most of 
                                                
511 Section 12 of the CDPA1988. 
512 See the glossary for the definition. 
513 Section 13A (3) of the CDPA provides that a sound recording is ‘released’ when it is first published, 
played in public, broadcast, or included in a cable programme service. 
514 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 USC, October 27, 1998. 
515 Jack Bishop provided a salient example of how creativity is locked up due to constant copyright term 
extensions.  In a hypothetical scenario, a composer dies at the age of 70 in 2025.  At this point the 70 
years of protection after his death kick off until 2095.  However, as it is the corporation that holds the 
copyright (in the US), the protection is extended to another 25 years, thus totalling 95 years. Therefore, 
the corporation controls the copyright and use of the work until 2120.  See Bishop, supra, n. 236, at p. 
454.   
516 Chris Sprigman, “The Mouse that Ate the Public Domain: Disney, the Copyright Term Extension Act, 
and Eldred v. Ashcroft,” Findlaw’s Writ, March 5, 2002. 
517 Nigel Hunter and Emmanuel Legrand, “Clock Ticking on Elvis Hits: Biz Seeks Euro Copyright 
Extension,” The Billboard, July 24, 2004. 
 131 
them illegal.  As has been put by a music industry insider, “the digital revolution threw 
a panzer division into copyright”.518  Having said that, majors still consider copyright as 
their biggest asset, hence their huge amount of lobbying for copyright extension in 
sound recordings.   
 
As noted earlier, a copyright confers a monopoly right to the author and copyright-
holder.  From copyright’s moment of creation it was important that such a monopoly 
would be limited in time so as to protect the public interest in having access to the 
works.  Despite that, there has been a wave of copyright term extensions in both the UK 
and the USA.519  Interestingly, it is predominantly record and entertainment companies 
(not the artists) that have lobbied and still continue to lobby for the extension of 
copyright protection because it is such a crucial trade instrument for them:520 the longer 
the duration, the higher the asset value, and the bigger the return on investment.  The 
possible extension of copyrights in sound recordings provides the best illustration of 
just how important copyright is to the majors and how the longer copyright term impairs 
cultural diversity.   
 
The Copyright Designs and Patents Act sets out in Section 9 (1) that author, in relation 
to a work, means “the person who creates it”.  Therefore, a copyright in composition 
belongs to the lyricist and music composer unless they assign it to a record or 
publishing company.  Section 9 (2) defines the author of sound recording, as the person 
by whom “the arrangements necessary for the making of the recording are undertaken”.  
The person who makes the “necessary arrangements” for the making of recordings is 
the first author and owner of the recordings for the duration of copyright.  “Necessary 
arrangements” are generally interpreted as meaning the person who pays for the 
recording costs.  This is often a record company521 but can be a production company or 
an artist.   
 
Under a traditional recording contract the record company pays for the recording costs 
and owns the recordings for the duration of copyright (50 years) and the copyright in the 
                                                
518 Quoting Tim Clark at MusicTank seminar, “Cheques, Hugs & Rock ‘n’ Roll: The Changing Face of 
Artist Management.” 5 December 2007. 
519 In Europe the recent increase in copyright term took place in 1993. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, 
[1993] OJ L 290/9.  In the USA the last attempt to increase the copyright term culminated in the 
Copyright Term Extension Act (Sonny Bono Act) in 1998. 
520 Macmillan, supra, n 478, at p. 4. 
521 Kay, supra, n. 487.  
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recordings is never assigned to the artist.  This practice has long been the case.  If, after 
some years, the artist’s career goes through a period of low sales the record company 
will usually delete522 certain albums, as it is not profitable for them to continue to make 
them available at retail.  This is effectively keeping art from the consumers and 
diminishing the potency of the Long Tail economies.  
 
In cases when a copyright in sound recording belongs to a record company, often the 
artist will approach the record company to see if it is possible to have the sound 
recordings back (possibly by paying the record company an override percentage) or if it 
is possible to license their own recordings back from record company either for their 
own use or to license on to third parties.  This is often denied, despite the fact that the 
artists might have recouped the costs of the recordings from their royalties.  As 
exemplified by Billy Corgan of Smashing Pumpkins: 
 
“We’ve made offers to buy it (their back catalogue) all.  Look, you have no interest.  Let 
us just buy it.  But they won’t pull a number on it.  They’ve atrophied the catalogue 
down so low that they probably hope we’ll crawl back and ask for cash”.523 
 
Major companies will often hold on to copyrights just in case there is suddenly a revival 
of that particular genre or for example a request for the music to be used in a film, 
advert, or computer game.  There is no obligation or incentive for the record company 
to actively exploit the recordings.  Thus there are often situations existing where artists 
are denied an income even if their recordings are still protected by copyright law, whilst 
the consumers are denied access to the artists’ recordings.  This, in itself, represents a 
competition law issue.  Artists, in their turn, use different tactics to obtain their income 
from the sound recordings that they had assigned to majors earlier in their careers.  Re-
recording back-catalogues is a new trend in the record business which allows artists to 
keep the copyright in sound recordings to themselves.524  
 
Interestingly, a few years ago BMG (before its merger with Sony) substantially revised 
its long form recording agreement and made it more transparent.  The new BMG 
                                                
522 See the glossary for the definition. 
523 Jonathan Cohen, “Smashing Pumpkins Lawsuit Latest Step in Feud,” The Reuters, March 27, 2008.  
524 Such tactics have already been employed by artists like Twisted Sister, Pointer Sisters and Simply 
Red.  Jeff Leeds, “Remaking Old Hits to Earn New Money,” The New York Times, April 18, 2007.  
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contract contained525 no royalty deductions, instead monthly accountability clauses 
were introduced, and video costs were made non-recoupable.  In addition, the term of 
the contract was made shorter with fewer options.  One of the most important 
provisions was that the record company would own the copyright in a sound recording 
for the term of the contract plus five years after the end of the term.  Thereafter, if a 
record company still wanted to keep the sound recordings, it would have to pay a 
further advance to the artist (which would have been related to the royalty earnings in 
relation to those sound recordings).  Thus the artist could have received the sound 
recordings back if the record company was not interested in them.  The contract also 
contained a profit share arrangement of 50:50.  This was a promising contract, which 
was much discussed in music circles; however, the merger between Sony and BMG 
stifled its implementation.  Moreover, majors and some independents are introducing 
‘360-degree’ deals pursuant to which record companies have a slice of not only 
copyrights, but touring and merchandising income too.526  
 
The above discussion illustrates that copyright affects the interests of major record 
companies, independent labels, artists and the public.  The discussion below 
demonstrates how majors, independents, and artists approach copyright and its 
numerous extensions, i.e. the majors mainly lobbying for copyright term extension in 
order to preserve their profits; the same trend is observed by the larger independents and 
a selection of rich artists.  However, there is also a movement of independent labels and 
artists who do not want the copyright term extension in sound recording, mainly 
because some labels and artists see it as too restrictive, expensive for releasing their art, 
and impairing cultural diversity as a result. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
525 As described by Clive Rich at MusicTank seminar: “Entering the Age of Aquarius? A New Dawn for 
the Recording Contract.” 21 January 2004. 
526 See The Economist, “A Change of Tune,” July 5, 2007; Susan Butler, “Music Biz Lawyers Wary of 
Labels’ New Grab,” The Billboard, December 28, 2007; Paul McGuiness, a Keynote Speech at MIDEM, 
“Online Bonanza: Who Is Making the Money and Why Aren’t They Sharing It? January 28, 2008; Andrew 
Edgecliff-Johnson, “Warner Set to Change iIs Tune on Digital Links,” The Financial Times, August 8, 
2007; Clare Matheson, “Music Giants Change Their Tune,” BBC, September 13, 2007; Samantha 
Marshall, “Diddy on the Art of 360 Deals,” Crain’s New York Business, November 18, 2007; Jeff Leeds, 
“Korn Sells a Stake in Itself,” The New York Times, January 11, 2006; Michael Arrington, “360 Music 
Deals Become Mandatory as Labels Prepare for Free Music,” Techcrunch, November 8, 2008. 
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4.1.1.F.i. Artists’ Response to the Extension of Copyright Term 
 
It must be noted that, the majority of artists do not lobby for copyright extension 
because they do not benefit from it.  The scarce research527 into artists’ copyrights 
shows that a very small proportion of artists are able to make a living from their 
copyrights.  Only a very small number of artists (predominantly the highest selling 
stars) have high incomes and their copyrights in music these days do not account for the 
biggest slice of their income.528  By comparison, most artists’ incomes are lower than 
the national average.529  Ironically, the richer the artist, the more lobbying outcries are 
heard:530 only a tiny number of household names like Mick Hucknall and Cliff Richard 
gave their support on the extension of the copyright term in sound recordings stating 
that it was hugely unfair that the artists who recorded the songs would lose the 
copyright protection in 50 years time.  What has not been mentioned is that artists 
inevitably borrow from different genres and influences, amalgamate ideas, and then 
create an original work.  Therefore, the greater the copyright protection the more 
difficult it is for artists to create and release their music.  The fact that artists are not 
being allowed to cross-fertilise ideas impacts negatively on musical creativity. 
 
4.1.1.F.ii. Majors’ Response to the Extension of Copyright Term 
 
When lobbying for the copyright term extension, both major record companies and 
trade bodies reason that without it the market would stop functioning,531 because the 
legitimate artist or producer who created and paid for the work would not be able to 
protect it (and its income) from unauthorised users.  Therefore, the argument is that 
copyright does protect producers and creators by enabling them to control and 
economically exploit their rights and therefore gain back their production costs.532  It is 
also claimed that a longer copyright term allows record companies to invest more in 
                                                
527 Ben Fenton, “CDs Slip Down Songwriters’ Revenue Chart,” The Financial Times, October 22, 2008; 
Sannosuke Matsumoto, “Performers in the Digital Era: Empirical Evidence from Japan,” in Copyright in 
the Cultural Industries, ed. Ruth Towse (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), 196; Martin Kretschmer, 
“Copyright and Contracts: A Brief Introduction.” Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues 3, 
no. 1 (2006), 75; Martin Kretschmer, “Artists Earnings and Copyright: A Review of British and German 
Music Industry Data in the Context of Digital Technologies”. First Monday (2005). 
528 Kretschmer (2005), id., at p. 7. 
529 Towse, supra, n. 485, at p. 96. 
530 Andrew Orlowski, “Sir Cliff Cost Us Copyright Battle,” The Register, January 25, 2007. 
531 Towse, supra, n. 485, at p. 95. 
532 id., at p. 96. 
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discovering and releasing new artists.  This indeed is not an easy case to answer.  It 
seems that the record industries’ interests are disguised (as explained below) by the fact 
that artists do not receive an appropriate remuneration after the copyright term, in case 
of sound recordings 50 years, is over.533  On the other hand, the argument is that Elvis 
Presley is dead and can no longer benefit from the sales of his recordings, thus the only 
party that can benefit from a longer copyright term is his record company.  As regards 
the need of copyright to release more artists, the latest figures confirm that all majors 
have actually decreased their artist rosters in the digital age.534 
 
What is not being mentioned however, is that majors can and do lock down previous 
recordings in their archives.535  For example, only about one third of classical 
recordings originally released by EMI are now available.536  EMI would not reissue 
lesser-known artists like Gracie Fields or Maud Powell because the potential market is 
too small for their economies of scale.  This situation describes why classical 
independent labels such as Naxos become increasingly important.  
 
4.1.1.F.iii. Independents’ Response to the Extension of Copyright Term 
 
In the above respect, it is appropriate to see why the independents’ trade bodies (i.e. 
those who represent dance, hip-hop and jazz labels and many others, who it seems, 
should be against the longer copyright term) also joined the campaign for the copyright 
extension and championed how it could benefit small labels.  This stance is particularly 
interesting because such a study has not been carried out before; hence the analysis is 
based primarily on the data collected from the interviews.   
 
First of all, it is important to state that not all independent labels are in favour of 
copyright term extension.  Presently, the license called Creative Commons (hereinafter, 
CC) is becoming more popular among small labels.  CC signifies that the public can 
                                                
533 BBC, “Musicians Urge Copyright Change,” November 26, 2008. 
534 See the analysis of the second approval of SonyBMG below in Chapter 5. 
535 On the misuse of the copyrights see Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of 
Intellectual Property and How It Threatens Creativity (New York: NYU Press, 2001) and David Bollier, 
Brand Name Bullies: The Quest to Own and Control (San Francisco: Wiley & Sons, 2005).  For more 
arguments against copyright extension see Kretschmer, supra, n. 509, at pp. 341 – 347. 
536 Michael Church, “Sold for a Song; Small Labels Are Cashing in as the Copyright Expires on 
Recordings Owned by the Majors,” The Independent (Music supplement), November 30, 2006, at p. 13. 
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legally share, remix, and reuse the musical works.  CC is placed midway between 
copyright — all rights reserved — and public domain — no rights reserved.537 
 
CC sets free musical works for non-commercial uses, i.e. music fans can use the music 
licensed under CC for non-commercial sharing and commercial sampling of the songs, 
but the use of the material for commercial purposes, e.g. advertising, is restricted.  
Unfortunately, there is no data with regards to how many independent labels employ the 
CC concept, but their numbers should not be underestimated.  Since 2000 the CC 
movement turned into a copyleft movement and it is becoming increasingly popular 
amongst the small labels that can not break through the mainstream entry barriers and 
who have a message (most likely anti-major and ideological) they wish to broadcast, 
e.g. Skinny Dog Records, Fading Ways Records, Magnatune, Loca Records, Nine Inch 
Nails and Positron! Records.  The supporters of CC are not against the concept of 
copyright.  They are, however, against numerous copyright extensions.  Curiously, even 
independents’ trade bodies, such as AIM and Impala, disregard the diversity of labels 
they represent, with Impala, for example, including all its members into the campaign to 
unite their efforts for copyright enforcement with major record companies.  This step 
infuriated a few labels using the CC concept: “I think it is very dangerous when Impala 
got us on their members’ list; it was a public list printed in the Popkomm538 guide and it 
was at the time when they were lobbying for the Directive on enforcement of 
copyright”.539    
 
During the interview stage, those labels that are in favour of the copyright extension 
produced some very interesting answers.  The first line of responses can be classified as 
“the whole industry exists because of the artists, and therefore, the latter need to be 
                                                
537 For more details see the official Creative Commons website, http://creativecommons.org/about/; Slater 
J. Berry, Underneath the Knowledge Commons (London: Mute, 2005); Mikko Valimaki, The Rise of 
Open Source Licensing: A Challenge to the Use of Intellectual Property in the Software Industry 
(Helsinki: Turre Publishing, 2005); Simon Trask, “Creative Commons, Copyright & The Independent 
Musician.” Sound on Sound (January 2005); and Mike Sterry, “The Slip,” The New Music Express, May 
15, 2008. 
538 This is an annual music industry conference in Germany. 
539 This happened when Fading Ways Records joined AIM.  The founder of Fading Ways Records, Neil 
Leyton, specifically inquired whether AIM would be lobbying for the copyright extension, and if the 
answer would be ‘yes’, he would have not joined AIM.  The President of AIM assured him that no such 
action would take place via AIM.  However, what Neil Leyton did not know was that upon joining AIM, 
his label would automatically become a member of Impala (European Independent Music Labels 
Association) and the latter joined the majors in lobbying for the copyright enforcement Directive 2005.  
Interview with Neil Leyton, supra, n. 346. 
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protected”.540  Some emphasised the artificial differences between songwriters and 
artists, because the songwriters’ copyright term is the life of a composer / lyricist plus 
70 years after his / her death, whilst copyright for the artists’ sound recordings is for just 
50 years.541  When these interviewees were confronted with the question that the 
majority of artists cannot and do not make their living out of the copyrights, there was 
either consent or disagreement with that fact.  Others, however, had a more shrewd 
approach:  
 
“This is called the hypocrisy of human being.  When I was just an artist, I used to rage 
against the record companies because if an artist recouped his work, then under the 
copyright law, he should still be the owner of the copyright because he paid for it.  
Now I am sitting in a position of the owner of the record company and I do not want 
the artists to own the copyrights because it was me who paid for them”.542 
 
The main advantage of the extension of the copyright for independents is that they can 
do reversion deals, i.e. a label can license its artist’s recordings for a limited number of 
years, and then the rights return back to the label or artist.543  However, the above 
scheme can only benefit medium to large independent labels, and very rarely the small 
ones, which occupy the largest slice of the independent sector.  Some of the 
interviewees who are pro copyright extension believe that there should be a maximum 
term of copyright in sound recordings for which the copyright can be owned by the 
labels and then returned to the creators, 544 i.e. the performers should obtain their 
copyrights back automatically if the company has not used the song for 20 years.  It is 
in this area that some independents can and do play their role in democratising record 
industry standards.  
 
Even if some independents can benefit financially from the copyright extension, it is 
less clear whether they will benefit from the cultural viewpoint.  Something I felt the 
independents do not realise.  Although, as a general rule, any label or artist can record 
songs that have already been released (for example a label can take a released Kate 
Bush song to make a new version of it on its artist’s album), there are a few exceptions.  
As explained by one interviewee, from a label point of you it makes sense to be in 
favour of the copyright extension.  On the other hand, when independents are doing 
                                                
540 Interview with Adjei Amaning, supra, n. 347. 
541 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
542 Confidential source. 
543 Interviews with Safta Jaffery, supra, n. 391 and Geoff Travis, supra, n. 352. 
544 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
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cover versions or samples, it makes life more difficult for them: “we only have one 
band that does cover versions but this is our only expensive band,545 and if the copyright 
term is extended, the recording of their albums becomes more expensive”.546  Despite 
that, since 2005 there have been multiple calls from the record industry, including trade 
bodies for the independent sector, to extend the copyright term in sound recordings. 
 
4.1.1.F.iv. Recent Attempts to Extend the Term of Copyrights in Sound 
Recordings: Industry Response 
 
The importance of copyrights to majors in the twenty-first century shows no signs of 
weakening.  The latest desire to extend the copyright term for sound recordings in the 
UK was expressed in the consultations preceding the Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property.  The major record companies and their trade bodies, the BPI and the IFPI, 
leapt on to the idea of copyright term extension.  However, even despite heavy 
lobbying, the Gowers Review recommended not to extend the copyright term in sound 
recordings.547   
 
Post Gowers Review, the majors and their trade bodies again used all their lobbying 
powers to extend the copyright in sound recordings from 50 to 95 years.548  The 
lobbying attempts re-appeared with new vigour after the publication of the Culture 
Select Committee’s Report that recommended a copyright extension on grounds of 
fairness.549  Even David Cameron, the Tory leader, sided with the majors, although in 
his view, the term extension should be limited to 70 years.550  In justifying his desire to 
extend the copyright term, David Cameron stated that a longer term would be good for 
the artists and consumers because the majors would have enough incentive to digitise 
both older and niche repertoire which more people could enjoy at no extra cost.   
 
                                                
545 This is so because in this case the label has to pay for the copyrights in compositions.  
546 Interview with Janine Irons, supra, n. 342. 
547 Recommendation 3 in “Gowers Review of Intellectual Property” (2006).  
548 The BPI Report, supra, n. 495. 
549 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Staying Ahead: the Economic Performance of the UK’s 
Creative Industries”, 25 June 2007, para 236. 
550 David Cameron, “Call for Extension in Copyright Term,” Keynote Speech at the BPI AGM, 04 July 
2007. 
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On the one hand, lobbyists state that a longer copyright term is necessary to benefit the 
artists.  On the other hand, as stipulated in the majority of recording contracts and the 
law, the copyright in sound recordings belongs predominantly to the record companies.  
This explains why in the lobbying documents the word ‘artist’ is mentioned in very few 
instances, whereas the interests of ‘investors in sound recordings’ are mentioned in 
nearly every sentence.551  As it stands at the moment of writing, the UK Government 
rejected the proposal of the Culture Select Committee once again on the grounds that by 
extending the term the majority of artists would not benefit and such an extension 
would not encourage new musical works.552  On the European level, an independent 
report, launched by the European Commission also considered the copyright extension 
and reached the same conclusion as the Gowers Review.553  However, the lobbying 
powers of majors and their trade bodies still seek to extend the copyright term in sound 
recordings at the European level.554  Their attempts have still failed right up to the 
moment of this research’s submission.555 
 
What this section has shown is that copyright has a number of different functions.  
Whilst initially its philosophy stood for remunerating the author, in reality particularly 
in terms of competition law, copyright protects and increases the investment of the 
bigger corporations, whilst at the same time stifling diversity.  Thus, as the majors are 
becoming increasingly vulnerable in this digital age, their main efforts are focused on 
holding copyrights for as long as possible.  Appetite for copyrights was shown to be an 
important reason for merging, but it is not the only reason.  Other reasons are explained 
below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
551 See for example, the BPI Report, supra, n. 495. 
552 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, “Government Response to the Culture, Media and Sport 
Select Committee Report into New Media and the Creative Industries.” (2006). 
553 Europa, “The Recasting of Copyright and Related Rights for the Knowledge Economy,” November 
2006, Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, 83 – 136.  
554 Europa, “Music Copyright to Be Extended to 95 Years.” January 12, 2009; Patrick Foster, “Musicians 
Celebrate Victory as Go-ahead Given for Copyright to Be Extended to 95 Years,” The Times, February 
13, 2009. 
555 Andre Paine, “U.K. Biz 'Disappointed' at EU Term Extension Rejection,” The Billboard, March 27, 
2009. 
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4.1.2. Other Reasons for Mergers and Acquisitions in the Record Industry 
 
Although a substantial amount of research has been carried out investigating why 
companies prefer to merge,556 the record industry needs to be studied differently for a 
number of reasons.  For instance, most companies (outside of the music business) 
merge and by their increased market power are able to increase prices to their 
consumers.  By contrast, the record industry is unlikely to have price increases on its 
agenda because their CDs are already overpriced.557  Therefore what the record 
companies aim to achieve by merging, are not price increases but the growth of such 
non-price issues as artist acquisition, marketing and promoting.  These points should be 
borne in mind during the future discussion in this thesis concerning non-price factors.  
Another specific reason for mergers in the record industry is that it has faced a number 
of particular problems and concerns.  As previously demonstrated and detailed in the 
historical background, the record industry is, and was, cyclical.  It has experienced 
booms and declines, particularly so when new technology emerged into the 
marketplace.  Thus, in the accelerated innovations of the digital era, merger deals could 
be validly considered as responses to some of the challenges the industry currently faces 
(see Section 3.1.9).  
 
One of the reasons that companies within the cultural sector merge is to attract the 
required high levels of investment.  Investment levels have decreased with the onset of 
the digital era.  From the year 2000, the amount of CD and DVD piracy in addition to 
the general economic downfall558 produced a shock reaction amongst the majors.  
Adding to those problems, illegal file sharing (Peer to Peer or P2P websites) made it 
even easier for consumers to disregard CDs.559 As one of the interviewees put it: “why 
would anybody be paying for music if people can download this stuff free?”560  As 
                                                
556 See for example, Gregor Andrade et al., “New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 15, no. 2 (2001): 103-120; Farok Contractor and Peter Lorange, Cooperative 
Strategies in International Business (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1988) and Thomas Krattenmaker and 
Steven Salop, “Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary Rights.” American 
Economic Review 76 (1986): 109 – 113.   
557 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at paras 56 – 9. 
558 See for example, Katie Allen, “Record Labels’ Woes Deepen Warner Losses,” The Guardian, May 9, 
2008. 
559 According to the Recording Industry Association of America, free downloads outnumber legal 
downloads by 40 to 1.  Some industry figures, however, think that this is an underestimate: “If the RIAA 
says it's 40 to 1, then it's probably 100 to 1.”  See Andrew Orlowski, “Free Music Has Never Looked so 
Cheap,” The Register, April 3, 2007. 
560 Interview with Bobby Colomby, supra, n. 297. 
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discussed in Chapter 3, the majors have opted to fight illegal file-sharing websites561 
and file-sharers562 and they have succeeded in some cases.  However, they do not have 
the power to either sue every single file-sharer nor can they shut down every single 
illegal file-sharing network.563  In addition to that, record companies have compounded 
their problems by letting companies outside of the music world grab distribution power, 
e.g. supermarkets and the Apple Corporation.564  One of the interviewees too, fully 
concurred that supermarkets now have more power than record companies:565  
 
“One of the mistakes majors made was to hand over the power to the supermarkets 
that now control and bully the record companies.  If there is a big release coming 
out, sometimes majors do not even have a say in what the artwork might look like.  
This is ridiculous.  When it comes to that, independents are not even in the game.  
You cannot even get through the door if you are an independent.  They will not even 
pick up the telephone; you will not get a meeting with them.” 
 
 
Ironically due to their size, majors in many respects are archaic, particularly so when 
there are technological advances available to the consumer.  These large companies do 
not seem to be able to embrace new opportunities that come along with new 
technologies that are not under their immediate control.566  Perversely, the policy is to 
fight these innovations vehemently as was the case with the arrival of radio, TV, and 
video.  A similar reticence is now being witnessed with the arrival of, and ever 
increasing rate of innovation within digital technology  (for more details see Chapter 3).   
 
Mergers and acquisitions also allow the newly formed entity to carry out extensive cost 
saving programmes,567 most often by laying off hundreds of employees,568 and artists.569  
                                                
561 The majors have won the lawsuit against software manufacturers in 2005.  See MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd, supra, n. 315.  
562 John Lettice, “Much More to BPI’s Fileshare Suits, but Where’s the Fire?”, The Register, October 18, 
2004. 
563 In this case, the Government could undertake some actions to prohibit illegal file-sharing like it does 
in case of child pornography, for example.  See Ben Hall, “France Plans to Cut Off Internet Pirates”, The 
Financial Times, November 22, 2007.   
564 Andrew Orlowski, “Apple, Tesco ‘Most to Blame’ for Music Biz Crisis,” The Register, October 19, 
2007; Tim Arango, “Despite iTunes Accord, Music Labels Still Fret,” The New York Times, February 2, 
2009; The Los Angeles Times, “Rage Against the iMachine,” September 6, 2008. 
565 Interview with Safta Jaffery, supra, n. 391.  See also David Sinclair, “Store Wars,” Independent Music, 
November 30, 2006, 14; Music Week, “Independent Retailer Round Table,” October 2, 2005; and Jon 
Rees, “Tesco Puts Squeeze on Music Industry,” Mail on Sunday, March 30, 2008. 
566 For example, one of the main reasons why the CD was embraced by majors is because the technology 
was invented and controlled by Philips and Sony. 
567 Dominic White, “EMI Executives Face Losing Bonuses,” The Telegraph, December 07, 2007; 
Sabbagh, supra, n. 317. 
568 Christopher Walsh, “BMG, Sony, Zomba Announce Studio Closings, Staff Cuts,” The Billboard, 
December 15, 2001; Dominic Rushe and James Ashton, “2,000 Jobs on the Line at EMI,” The Sunday 
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As an example of further economies, a merged entity saves many millions in 
membership fees for record industry trade bodies such as the IFPI, the BPI and the 
RIAA.570  Hence, if mergers in the twentieth century could be considered as mainly the 
intention to grow, the desire to merge in the twenty-first century can be seen much more 
as a defensive move.  Alongside that however, there is an aggressive element to mergers 
too. 
 
As exemplified in the preceding section, one of the crucial reasons for merging is to 
facilitate the major record companies’ pursuit of consolidating a vast number of 
copyrights.  The consolidation of such rights does afford them the power to extend the 
private ownership of musical recordings with the subsequent consolidation of the 
required market power (and the market share) for promoting their products (see the 
discussion below on anti-competitive practices).  As Keith Harris explained: “Partly, it 
is the economies of scale and partly it is the market clout; the bigger the company, the 
more things you can do”.571  The rationale driving the desire to extend the majors’ 
market power is that in so doing new companies are excluded from the market; 
therefore the existing oligopolistic advantages are secured for a longer period.572  Of 
course, there are thousands of independent labels and it can be argued that the entry 
barrier into the record industry is now very low indeed, principally because the costs of 
recording a cheap album in the digital age have fallen.  Free entry is an important factor 
in competition but it does not mean that a new company can enter and immediately be 
as profitable as an established company,573 because the record industry is a sunk cost574 
industry.  It is indeed comparatively simple to set up business as a record company as 
long as the company has a repertoire source, whether it is in the form of a recording 
contract with an artist or has acquired some copyrights in recordings that have already 
been produced.  It is not necessary to own a recording studio, manufacturing facilities or 
a distribution network since all of these can be hired on the open market when required.  
Thus, the barriers to entry are low.  However, for the purposes of the future discussion 
                                                
Times, January 13, 2008; Richard Wachman, “EMI Cuts Threaten 2,000 Staff,” The Observer, January 
13, 2008; Cortney Harding, “Layoffs Continue at Island Def Jam,” The Billboard, December 03, 2007. 
569 Adam Sweeting and Juliette Garside, “Guy Hands: EMI Must Dump Artists to Survive,” The 
Telegraph, January 19, 2008. 
570 Sabbagh, supra, n. 317 and Joshua Chaffin, “EMI Threat to Music Trade Bodies,” The Financial 
Times, November 28, 2007. 
571 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
572 George J. Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger.” American Economic Review 40 (1950): 25. 
573 id., at p. 27, and specifically about the record industry, see Miranda Sawyer “It’s No Way to Make a 
Living These Days,” The Observer, February 17, 2008.  
574 As explained in Section 3.3. 
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of consolidation, differences should be drawn between the low cost threshold of setting 
up and running a label against the running of a label and making it competitive in the 
market.  In fact, some small label owners made it clear that in terms of distribution and 
marketing, there is no difference between the digital and physical ages.  In the words of 
Janine Irons,575 the CEO of an independent jazz label:  
 
“The digital thing does not really improve anything…when you go on iTunes, it is all 
Universal and Sony.  How do we get past all that?  We are on iTunes and we are also in 
the shops, but with jazz it is always in the basement or on the top floor and it is the same 
thing in the digital area - the front page is Universal and Sony.”   
 
Therefore, even in the digital age, majors seek to dominate distribution channels and 
becoming fewer in number can certainly facilitate achieving this goal.  Although it 
seems that vertical integration is not that important to majors now and their sales power 
has slipped into the hands of other companies, for example Apple, majors may still 
produce anti-competitive effects, such as foreclosure576 and others (see the discussion 
below). 
 
In addition to the increased market clout merged companies can command, mergers 
allow the companies involved to obtain overseas experience, e.g. knowledge of 
consumers’ preferences and cultural specificity.577  For example, PolyGram was a very 
successful record company in Europe but it did not share the same level of success in 
the USA.  Likewise, EMI has been a European leader for years but not so successful in 
the USA.  Similar circumstances may be noted regarding the Sony and BMG merger.   
 
However, not all mergers lead to a success story.  Often, the frenzy to increase market 
share does produce negative side effects on the merged companies, as well as on the 
smaller businesses and consumers.578  For example, the 1989 merger between Warner 
Communications and Time Inc. made Time/Warner the largest media conglomerate in 
                                                
575 Interview with Janine Irons, supra, n 342. 
576 See the glossary for the definition.  
577 Stephanie Peltier, “Mergers and Acquisitions in the Media Industries: Were Failures Really 
Unforeseeable?”Journal of Media Economics 17, no. 4 (2004): 264-5. 
578id., at pp. 261 – 278 and William Fruhan, “Pyrrhic Victories in Fights for Market Share.” Harvard 
Business Review 50, no. 5 (1972): 100-107. 
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the world.  However, due to the immense debt the company was in, plus a series of poor 
results, a number of groups including the Warner Music Group had to be sold.579   
 
4.2. Positive Effect of Mergers and Acquisitions on Independents, 
Artists and Consumers? 
 
The title to this section has a question mark because the positive effect of mergers and 
acquisitions is in doubt.  There is a general principle stating that in an oligopolistic 
market, the larger companies need not necessarily conspire and be detrimental to the 
smaller players.580  Such markets can indeed be competitive.  Recent analysis of the 
European Commission statistics proves that the majority of mergers are allowed for the 
very reason that not all mergers are harmful.581  In theory, the positive effects of 
mergers are that the newly formed entity may increase efficiency by re-structuring their 
activities, plus the majority of joined entities are competitively neutral, or even 
beneficial for competition, as well as for consumers and thus they should be allowed to 
proceed.  Also positively, merged entities may create synergies, improve, or create new 
products, and/or lower costs, consequently benefiting consumers.  Even the new 
European Competition Merger Regulation (analysed in Chapter 5) emphasises that 
“many oligopolistic markets exhibit a healthy degree of competition.”582  Given the 
above, the effects of whether or not the reduction of majors from five to four could be 
pro-competitive and the effects of mergers, particularly that of Sony and BMG, on 
independent labels, have to be explored. 
 
It can be argued that having only four companies dominating the recorded music market 
produces marginalised competition.  Competition that is challenging to the majors 
requires more than just a myriad of ‘bedroom’ independent labels.  It cannot be said that 
majors force independents to exit the market but they do make independent companies’ 
existence more disadvantaged with the latter being unable to compete as aggressively.   
 
                                                
579 id., at p. 262. AOL and Vivendi also experienced similar problems to those described.  See Enrique 
Bustamante, “Cultural Industries in the Digital Age: Some Provisional Conclusions.” Media, Culture and 
Society 26, no. 6 (2004): 813; and The Economist, “Lights! Camera! No Profits!,” January 16, 2003.   
580 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 1026.  
581 See the Commission’s statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf. 
582 Council Regulation  (EEC) No 139/2004, supra, n. 211, at para 25 of the Preamble (discussed in 
Chapter 5). 
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That perhaps explains the prevalent opinion concerning majors and independents; the 
majors are portrayed as predators, who pounce and acquire humble independents.  This 
stereotypical assumption has never really been examined and therefore it was deemed 
necessary to investigate the truth of the matter during the interview stage.  Interestingly, 
in answer to the following question: “Does the 75 percent of the market share held by 
majors worry you?”, every response was “No”.  The answer to the question of: “Have 
you felt that the situation has worsened for the independents after the Sony/BMG 
merger?”, was a unanimous “No” too.  Such indifference to the merger may be 
explained by the fact that independents consider that they operate in a different sphere.  
However, when confronted with the question of “Should Impala have opposed the 
Sony/BMG merger?”, the majority of the interviewees responded “Yes”.   
 
The interviews also provided two opposite views on the impact that mergers have on 
independents.  A series of responses could be grouped as “could not care less if they 
[majors] merge because it is not going to change anything for my label – the gap 
between majors and independents is too big already and we can not compete on the 
same terms anyway”.583  The other respondents thought that the fewer majors there 
were in the market, the more opportunities there were for independents because majors 
would concentrate on the commercial releases, whereas independents would fill in the 
diversity vacuum.584  Thus the latter line of responses conforms to Burnett and Lopes’ 
views (discussed in Chapter 1).  Whilst certain interviewees could not think of any 
impact of acquisitions, others came up with the straight reply that majors have a positive 
impact on independents by acquiring them.  This is a new approach to the problem of 
acquisitions, and therefore it deserves an explanation. 
 
Keith Harris made an interesting point in that he was of the opinion that majors actually 
do a favour to independents by acquiring them. 585  For example, after Andy McDonald 
sold his label Go! Discs to PolyGram, he had enough money to start a new and 
successful independent label, Independiente.  Similarly, Alan McGee signed a licensing 
deal with Sony in order to receive enough funds to market the band Oasis via his label, 
Creation Records (for more see Chapter 3).  The argument is that majors give 
                                                
583 Interview with Safta Jaffery, supra, n. 391. 
584 Interview with Geoff Travis, supra, n. 352. 
585 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370.  
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independents enough funding to go and set up a new label and develop more talent.  The 
argument has a certain degree of value but as always, there is another side to the coin.   
 
In most cases, what is transformed during acquisition is the culture of independents with 
the resulting diminution of roster diversity.586  Marc Marot, ex-Managing Director of 
Island Records, gave a very interesting account of the issue.587  In 1984, Island Records 
found itself in a disastrous situation with huge debts (losing about £4.5m per year) and a 
large roster of artists.  The then small major, PolyGram Records acquired Island 
Records and rescued it by introducing a new structure and intelligent management.  
With PolyGram’s funding, Island could afford to sign stellar acts and reinvent U2, 
which made the label a very profitable entity.588  Therefore, at this point the argument 
that independents actually benefit from being acquired by majors is a valid one.  
However, when the biggest major label, Universal, acquired PolyGram from Phillips, a 
different reality prevailed.  The root of the difference was that PolyGram was a 
European-centred company, whilst Universal was American-based.  Universal 
introduced radical changes to both the structure and culture of Island.  Prior to the 
acquisition, there were 67 singles released by Island run by a staff complement of 50.  
After the acquisition there were 211 singles released, with the same personnel of 50 
people because the company had to double its turnover whilst reducing costs.  On top of 
that, there was increased pressure on the label to develop American acts.  Within a few 
years, Vivendi acquired Universal and they too wanted even more cost savings; 
achieved by selling properties and recording studios.  This sequence of events had a 
deeply negative effect on the artistic community because the artists who were originally 
signed to an independent label did not necessarily fit the matrix that only required hits.  
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether mergers and majors have any positive 
effect on the small business in the record industry is not straightforward.  Quite often 
what suffer the most are musical diversity and the artists themselves.589  
                                                
586 For multiple examples of majors' artist roster diminution see David Park, Conglomerate Rock: The 
Music Industry Quest to Divide Music and Conquer Wallets (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007), 32. 
587 The data below was provided by Marc Marot at MusicTank seminar, supra, n. 323.  
588 PolyGram also saved from bankruptcy the legendary rap and hip-hop label Def Jam in 1994.  Rob 
Sharp and Rebecca Armstrong, “Record Labels that Rocked Our World,” The Independent, January 17, 
2008. 
589 For more on this see Negus, supra, n. 32, at pp. 359 – 379.  According to Negus, each unit or genre can 
be categorised according to its performance and investment requirements.  Negus cites the example of 
Capitol-EMI getting rid of its Urban division and sacking 18 staff members (mostly black).  The 
company's argument was that it could then concentrate on other areas/genres (which happened to be 
white).  There was a public outcry that the abandonment of this division within the company was racist as 
sales were relatively healthy.  Thus, Negus made the point that companies also seek to control culture. 
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It is important to bear in mind that a large market share gives majors the opportunity to 
exercise their market power in unlawful ways as can be seen below.  The next section 
will provide examples of anti-competitive behaviour by the majors and its effect on 
independent labels, artists and consumers. 
 
4.3. Anti-Competitive Practices 
 
“Dominant position is not a problem; it is the 
abuse of it which is.” 
Patrick Zelnick590 
 
This section describes anti-competitive practices in the context of what is defined as 
anti-competitive behaviour under European, UK, and US law.  The section of the 
material covering the legal dimension of anti-competitive practices is dealt with in 
Chapter 5). 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, oligopolistic markets do not always lead to anti-
competitive behaviour by the larger companies.  However, there have been and still are, 
patterns of anti-competitive behaviour throughout the existence of the record industry.  
In response to those patterns, there have been numerous investigations into the 
operation of the record companies; some of them proving anti-competitive practices, 
some of them failing due to the lack of evidence.  This section provides a number of 
examples of such behaviour591 and its repercussions on small businesses.   
 
In 1994, the then Monopolies and Mergers Commission592 carried out an investigation 
into the record industry,593 and emphasised that a number of practices exercised by the 
then five major record companies, appeared to prevent, restrict or distort competition in 
the market of recorded music.  The practices were as follows: 
 
                                                
590 Quoting Patrick Zelnick, President of Impala at Music Industry Conference “London Calling”, 28 June 
2007.   
591 Numerous sources have been written on some of the issues discussed below, particularly the recording 
contracts.  For more information about the recording contracts see: Simon Garfield, Expensive Habits: 
The Dark Side of the Music Industry (London: Faber, 1986) and Steve Greenfield and Guy Osborn, 
Contract and Control in the Entertainment Industry (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1998).    
592 Now known as the Competition Commission (UK). 
593 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, “The Supply of Recorded Music: A Report on the Supply in the 
UK of Pre-recorded Compact Discs, Vinyl Discs and Tapes Containing Music,” June 1994.  See also 
Tom Usher, “This Monopoly of Music.” Entertainment Law Review 6, no. 1 (1995): 27 – 31. 
 148 
(i) The adoption of similar pricing policies; 
 
(ii) The decline to license imports of some sound recordings; and 
 
(iii) Entering into recording contracts with artists, which include terms that restrict the 
artists’ ability to exploit their talent fully and restrict competition in the supply of 
recorded music. For example, clauses relating to the extent of copyrights acquired, 
length of contract, exclusivity, options, obligations to exploit recordings, and royalty 
rates. 
 
The following discussion will illustrate and critically analyse these and other practices. 
 
4.3.1. Minimum Advertising Price and Minimum CD Price 
 
In 2000 the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter, FTC) carried out an investigation 
in the USA into the Minimum Advertising Price (hereinafter, MAP).  Within this 
practice, majors forced retailers to keep prices artificially high by threatening to 
withhold millions in promotional money.594  Under MAP, retailers were forbidden to 
advertise CDs below an established minimum, at the risk of losing millions of 
promotional money from the record labels.  In the FTC's view, these pricing policies 
constituted antitrust violations because they represented a form of price-fixing.595  FTC 
held that MAP policies, supported by every major, violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, as 
unreasonable restraints of trade under the so-called ‘rule of reason’,596 and that the MAP 
policies were illegal “facilitating practices which increase the risk of collusion or 
interdependent conduct by the market participants”.597  The majors settled this case out 
of court.598 
 
In 2002 and 2003, there were two further related investigations in which the USA 
antitrust authorities accused both majors and retailers of collusion in setting minimum 
                                                
594 See Federal Trade Commission, “Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of Restraining Competition 
in CD Music Market.” May 10, 2000. 
595 The FTC estimates that U.S. consumers may have paid as much as $480 million more than they should 
have for CDs and other music products because of the MAP policies over 1997 - 2000. id. 
596 Discussed below in Chapter 6. 
597 Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky et al., “In the Matter of Time Warner; Sony Music 
Entertainment; Capitol Records, d.b.a. EMI Music Distribution; Universal Music & Video Distribution 
Corp. and UMG Recordings; and BMG Music, d.b.a. BMG Entertainment.” File No. 971-0070. 
598 Federal Trade Commission, supra, n. 595. 
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prices for CDs.599  Once again, both cases were settled out of court.600  An earlier case 
examining price-fixing by Warner and Universal to raise prices for the Three Tenors 
albums resulted in Warner too, settling the case, whilst Universal faced an 
administrative trial.601 
 
In the UK as well there was an investigation in 1994 into The Supply of Recorded 
Music, which found that music products were not unfairly priced.602  However, three 
years later in Italy, the then five majors were fined for taking part in concerted practices 
that fixed standard wholesale prices.603 
 
4.3.2. Price-Fixing of Downloads  
 
In 2001 all five majors at the time set up their own two online music services: Pressplay 
(Sony and Universal) and MusicNet (Warner, EMI and BMG).  These joint ventures 
caused numerous competition concerns.604  Firstly, those two services meant the then 
Big Five’s ownership of a vast amount of copyrights in music, with the resultant 
freedom of what to do with their recordings.  The majors were licensing their own 
music to their own digital distribution companies, thus controlling the pricing of music 
distribution on the Internet.  Secondly, such a duopoly meant that majors could choose 
between either acquiring their competitors, or not licensing their music, thus driving 
them out of business.  In the latter scenario, consumers were forced to subscribe to both 
services if they wanted content from all five majors, or go back to illegal downloading.  
The services also used competing audio formats and numerous restrictions.  Despite the 
above, the Department of Justice’s investigation found no evidence that MusicNet and 
Pressplay have harmed competition or consumers of digital music.605   
 
                                                
599 Sarah Coffey, “Settlement in CD-Record Club Suit: Members to Get 75 Percent Discount after 
Charges of Price-Fixing,” CBS, December 5, 2003; Joel Selvin, “CD Rebate, Anyone?” San Francisco 
Chronicle, February 23, 2003; and Maine Attorney General, “Attorneys General Win Antitrust Settlement 
in Lawsuit Alleging Pricing Conspiracy on Music CDs.” September 30, 2002. 
600 The majors settled the 2002 investigation for $143 million.  In agreeing to the settlement, the 
companies denied any wrongdoing. 
601 Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Charges Warner Music and Universal Music,” July 31, 2001.  
602 The MMC Report, supra, n. 593. 
603 Associazione Vendomusica / Case Discografiche Multinazionali, supra, n. 452. 
604 For a good analysis see Cyrus Wadia, “The Department of Justice’s Investigation into Online Music,” 
Cooper, White & Cooper, January 1, 2005. 
605 See Statement by Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate, “The Closing of the Digital Music 
Investigation.” The Department of Justice, December 23, 2003. 
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The situation has drastically changed with the arrival of Apple iTunes.  Suddenly, the 
power to set prices has slipped from the majors to Apple.606  Nevertheless, in 2006 the 
Department of Justice opened an antitrust probe into possible collusion by the majors in 
fixing prices for downloads on digital music shops such as Apple iTunes, Yahoo, Real 
Networks and Napster.607  Prior to 2009, individual tracks cost 99 cents in the USA and 
79 pence in the UK and such price setting, country by country, alerted the competition 
authorities in the EU too.608  Analysts claimed that the majors were making up to 65 
percent more revenue on digital downloads than on CDs despite an apparent reduction 
in manufacturing, distribution, and packaging costs.609  The majors argue that they are 
entitled to such a big profit share because they had invested heavily in the technology to 
make their music available online.610  Even though the prices for physical products, 
such as CDs, have dropped in the past few years, majors have been insisting that 
downloads should be priced differently depending on the popularity of the songs and 
artists.611  Finally, in 2009, Apple gave in to the majors’ demand for variable pricing of 
the songs on iTunes.612  This is likely to make the investigation into fixed prices of 
downloads redundant, but at the moment of writing, the investigation continues. 
 
4.3.3. Parallel Imports 
 
The Supply of Recorded Music613 as well as the investigation by the Office of Fair 
Trading (hereinafter, the OFT) in 2002 on the Wholesale Supply of Compact Discs also 
                                                
606 This is also confirmed by the Commission’s second approval of the SonyBMG merger in 2007 
(discussed below in Chapter 5).   See also Tim Arango, “Despite iTunes Accord, Music Labels Still Fret,” 
The New York Times, February 2, 2009. 
607 Greg Sampson, “DoJ Investigates Alleged Price-Fixing of Music Downloads,” Jurist, March 04, 2006; 
Bobbie Johnson, “US Opens Inquiry into Pricing of Music Downloads,” The Guardian, March 4, 2006. 
608 European Competition Commission, “Competition: European Commission Confirms Sending a 
Statement of Objections against Alleged Territorial Restrictions in On-Line Music Sales to Major Record 
Companies and Apple.” 03 April 2007; Johnson, id.  
609 Also cited in Dipesh Gadher and Steven Swinford, “CD Makers Hike Price of Music Downloads,” The 
Sunday Times, June 11, 2006. 
610 Majors also have to pay for downloads’ patents, different aggregators and format providers as well as 
digital rights management (copy protection to prevent the piracy).  Interview with Darrell Panethiere, 27 
June 2007. 
611 These requests made Apple’s CEO Steve Jobs remark that: "If they (majors) want to raise prices, it's 
because they're greedy.” See Johnson, supra, n. 607. 
612 Brad Stone, “Making Sense of New Prices on Apple’s iTunes,” The New York Times, April 7, 2009; 
Joe Weisenthal, “Apple Relents on iTunes Pricing, Premium Tracks for $1.29,” The Business Insider, 
January 6, 2009; Hilary Lewis, “iTunes' Variable Music Pricing Begins April 7,” The Business Insider, 
March 26, 2009. 
613 The MMC report, supra, n. 593 and Usher, supra, n. 593, at p. 28.  
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considered the issue of parallel imports.614  It found evidence of various practices being 
used by some or all of the majors to limit parallel importing of CDs into the UK from 
other EU countries.615  However, there was not enough evidence to show that majors 
were putting pressure on retailers not to import.  Having said that, because the evidence 
was borderline, the OFT reserved the right to continue future monitoring of the 
industry. 
 
4.3.4. Restrictive Contracts 
 
 
According to the report by the Mergers and Monopolies’ Commission, restrictive 
contracts could stifle and restrict competition not so much between majors and 
independents but in the supply of recorded music.  Restrictive contracts could bind an 
artist to one label for a decade, which means that an artist could not join another label.  
Therefore, restrictive contracts too have to be considered under the notion of anti-
competitive behavior. 
 
In the past and in the present, record contracts616 between a label and an artist have 
contained certain terms that have been considered unreasonable and in restraint of 
trade.617  A few examples being: too long a duration,618 insufficient exploitation 
commitments619 and exclusivity.620  It must be noted that with regards to recording 
contracts, independent labels too, often include unfair terms.621  However, there are 
independent labels that are democratic with their recording contracts, the so-called 
                                                
614 Office of Fair Trading, “The Wholesale Supply of Compact Discs.” September 2002.  For a more 
detailed discussion see Usher, id. 
615 Evidence included vertical agreements not to import, discounts, marketing and promotional support to 
retailers on the understanding that all CDs were purchased from the UK subsidiary of the major record 
company.  The OFT also found evidence that retailers who had imported CDs were punished. 
616 For a good critique of the recording contracts see the MMC Report, supra, n. 593, at pp.97 – 100 and 
Guy Osborn and Steve Greenfield, “Understanding Commercial Music Contracts: The Place of 
Contractual Theory.” Journal of Contract Law 23 (2007). 
617 See for example debate in Panayiotou and Others v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd  (the George 
Michael case) [1994] EMLR 229.  For more detailed information see also John Enser and David Zeffman, 
“The Impact of UK Competition Law on the Music Industry.” Entertainment Law Review 4, no. 3 (1993): 
67 – 72; Michael A. Smith, “Restraint of Trade in the Music Industry.” Entertainment Law Review 5, no. 
5 (1994): 182 – 187; Alan Courthard, “Panayiotou v Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd Times, June 30, 
1994 (ChD),” Journal of Business Law (1995): 414 – 422. 
618 Silvertone Records and Zomba Music Publishers v. The Stone Roses and Gareth Evans (1991) 
unreported; Silvertone Records v. Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152.  
619 Silvertone Records v. Mountfield, id. 
620 Schroeder Music Publishing Co. Limited v. Macauley, [1974] 1 ALL ER 171 (although this case dealt 
with a publishing agreement). 
621 Miranda Sawyer, “It’s No Way to Make a Living These Days,” The Observer, February 17, 2008.  
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50:50 deals, when the record label shares the income equally with the artist.  Some 
independents do not charge their artists for the album artwork, video clips, R & D 
charge,622 packaging deductions,623 and they share the recording costs 50:50 with an 
artist.  Obviously, these types of arrangements are much fairer to the artists.   
  
In the infamous George Michael case against Sony,624 the former claimed that his 
contract was restrictive on the grounds of exclusivity (leaving him unable to sign to 
another record company); duration of the contract (potentially over 20 years); no artistic 
control over his recordings; no obligation on Sony to release any of his recordings and 
restrictions on recording after termination of the contract.  This set of standard terms 
does not seem to be in neither the artist’s nor the consumer’s interests.  In the past few 
years particularly, numerous discussions and initiatives sought to amend the standard 
terms of major record contracts, the most famous attempt being the new BMG contract, 
(reviewed in relation to copyright on page 128).  However, at the moment of writing, no 
other major has stepped forward with the notion of introducing more democratic record 
agreements.       
 
Another problematic area in record contracts, which restricts competition in the supply 
of music and impacts diversity, is the claiming back of copyright in the recordings by 
the artists from the record company.  These days, the situation is slightly improved 
because record contacts often include release commitments, with the option for 
recordings to revert if these commitments are not met.  Sometimes artists can buy back 
the masters by repaying the record company advances, or by paying an override royalty.  
Quite often though, the record company chooses to delete625 the works without 
providing an artist with the option to buy the masters back.  Although the situation in 
relation to deleted works is improving in the digital age, this practice is still used by the 
majors.  The problem affects both the artists and public overall.  As a music industry 
insider working under Universal’s regime revealed: “every month a computer-generated 
                                                
622 The majors introduced Research and Development charge when the CDs first appeared on the market. 
Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343.  
623 The R&D charge then was transformed into the ‘packaging deduction’ – a major reserves the right to 
charge its artists for any breakages of the CDs.  This controversial deduction, described as a fallacy by 
Mike Batt, is applied to downloads too, even though there can be no physical breakage of a download.  
624 Panayiotou and Others v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd, supra, n. 617.  George Michael lost the 
case as he previously voluntarily entered into the re-negotiated agreement with Sony, which provided him 
with a substantial remuneration. 
625 Andrew Druckenbrod, “PSO discs see light of day again,” The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 03, 2007.  
Although the situation is slowly being rectified by the majors.  See Owen Gibson, “Long-lost Tunes Dug 
up for Jukebox of the Net,” The Guardian, January 19, 2006.   
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list would come in from Universal based purely on the lowest selling albums in the 
previous quarter, suggesting that they should be deleted.  Sometimes we had to delete 
Bob Marley and Robert Palmer records because they were not selling in large 
numbers”.626  Independents too delete their old records because they cannot afford to 
manufacture titles that do not sell well.  However, they are more willing to sell the 
copyrights back to the artist, or if the artist does not have the money to acquire the 
copyrights but would like to sell his songs on his website, an independent label may 
take a share of the sales.  Such an approach seems more democratic compared to the 
outright deletion of works by the majors. 
 
However, when the then MMC investigated the restrictive clauses in artists’ contracts, 
they were not found to be anti-competitive.  The reasoning behind such a decision was 
that record companies compete with each other to sign both new and established artists, 
which gives artists adequate bargaining ability to negotiate the terms of their 
contracts.627  The position held by the MMC seems to be poorly researched as new 
artists, with a few exceptions, do not have enough bargaining power to negotiate better 
deals with majors.  While the MMC accepted that clauses granting exclusivity to record 
companies do restrict competition, since they restrain an artist from releasing their 
material on other record companies, the MMC recognised that a certain degree of 
exclusivity was necessary for such contracts and it was noted that artists should seek 
remedies in the courts.628  Unfortunately, the MMC did not clarify what was the 
reasonable duration of ‘a certain degree of exclusivity’.  What this shows, however, is 
that competition authorities are ready to consider restrictive contracts as a potential anti-
competitive tool because they may disadvantage other labels and more importantly the 
artists as well as the consumers.   
 
4.3.5. Payola 
 
Historically, radio play has always been crucial to the record industry in terms of giving 
exposure to recordings.  This section provides examples of majors’ anti-competitive 
behaviour in obtaining airplay.   
 
                                                
626 Quoting Marc Marot at the MusicTank seminar, supra, n. 323.  
627 The MMC Report, supra, n. 593, at pp. 28-9.  See also Michael Trebilcock, The Common Law of 
Restraint of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto: Carswell. 1986). 
628 The MMC Report, id., at p. 13. 
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It is extremely difficult to obtain airplay on mainstream radio stations such as BBC 
Radio 1 and Radio 2 in the UK,629 because quite often the radio stations restrict their 
choices to between 15 – 30 songs,630 which in turn leads to a further reduction of 
diversity.  Numerous digital radio stations only partially address the issue; in terms of 
coverage, it is still important that recordings have exposure on mainstream radio.  The 
most common way to obtain airplay is to hire a radio plugger, who will help the artist 
have his/her recordings heard for a fixed (usually significant) amount of money.  There 
is, however, another way to obtain airplay.  Payola (pay for play) signifies the practice 
whereby illegal payments are made to radio stations for airplay.631  Payola in the record 
industry has existed for the past 45 years and has been well documented along with the 
fact of how deliberate opposition to pay radio stations nearly ruined the careers of 
groups such as the Pink Floyd632 in the US.  However, within the last two decades, 
bribes to radio stations have evolved into an elaborate corporate payola strategy, 
particularly in the US.  With the significant consolidation of the radio industry, e.g. 
Clear Channel and Infinity Broadcasting, major record companies can, and do, negotiate 
deals for airplay across a large number of stations.  The inducements for airplay may 
take several forms:  
 
1. Bribes in the forms of expensive holidays and gifts to radio programmers. 
2. Giveaway prizes for radio stations’ audiences. 
3. Payments covering operational expenses of the station. 
4. Payments to ensure that certain records are played under the guise of 
advertising.  
 
To conceal many of the payments to individuals and radio stations, fictitious ‘contest 
winners’ and documents are often used to make it appear as though the payments and 
gifts were going to radio listeners instead of station employees. 
 
Just how important radio stations are to the majors can be viewed from the extract 
below taken from the correspondence between Epic Records and Infinity radio station: 
                                                
629 Helienne Lindvall, “Behind the Music: The Politics of the Playlist,” The Guardian, December 4, 2008. 
630 Belifante and Johnson, supra, n. 368, at p. 19. 
631 This practice has recently become expensive even for the majors.  See Eric Boehlert, “Record 
Companies: Save Us from Ourselves!” Salon, March 13, 2002. 
632 Dannen, supra, n. 213 and Alexander, supra, n. 172, at pp. 93 – 95. 
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“Epic Records has agreed to provide a Celine Dion promotion for each 
mainstream adult Infinity radio station.  The promotion will consist of winner and 
guest from each market being flown roundtrip to Las Vegas for a Celine Dion 
performance at Caesar’s Palace.  Epic Records will provide two nights hotel stay 
and tickets to the performance.  There will be one grand prize (meet Celine, play 
Blackjack with Celine, have lunch with Celine) to be determined before the 
promotion airs.  This e-mail also confirms each of the following stations has 
agreed to report “Goodbye’s” on October 28th, 2002”.633 
Followed by, 
“OK, here is it in black and white and it’s serious: if a radio station got a flyaway 
to a Celine Dion show in Las Vegas for the ad, and they are playing the song all 
in overnights, they are not getting the flyaway.  Please fix the overnight rotations 
immediately”.634 
 
These are perhaps some of the reasons why the ex-New York District Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer initiated a payola investigation in 2005.635  This particular case was settled 
by the parties involved with Sony BMG636 paying $10 million, Warner Music637 paying 
$5 million, EMI $3.75 million,638 and Universal paying $12 million.639  These examples 
demonstrate that even though majors are fined heavily for this conduct, they still have a 
cavalier attitude to payola. 
  
4.3.6. Marketing & Advertising Power 
 
Marketing power as such does not represent anti-competitive behaviour.  It is the way 
the power is used which can exclude other participants from the market and the 
resulting diminution of diversity that is in need of examination.  The abuse of marketing 
power is included in this section because of the above concern.   
 
                                                
633 Office of the Attorney General, “Sony Settles Payola Investigation,” July 25, 2005. 
634 id. 
635 See also Arshad Mohammed, “FCC Plans Payola Investigation,” The Washington Post, August 9, 
2005.   
636 See Attorney General of the State of New York in the Matter of Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 
“Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15)”. 
637 Attorney General of the State of New York in the Matter of Warner Music, “Assurance of 
Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law § 63 (15)”. 
638 Greg Levine, “Hot Wax: Spitzer Says EMI Settles Payola Probe,” Forbes, June 15, 2006.  
639 id. 
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The economies of scale and a 75 percent market share provide majors with another 
competitive advantage, namely enormous marketing and advertising budgets.640  For 
example, in 2004, Universal single-handedly cut its CD prices in the US.  This price-cut 
was accompanied by a demand that retailers provide Universal with 32 percent of their 
shelf space.641  Slashing the prices of CDs can already harm the livelihood of 
independents, let alone the purchase of one third of the available shelf space by one 
company.  Additionally, buying up advertising space on TV, radio, in retailers and 
digital music shops, has become standard practice by the majors.642  Even hugely 
successful independent labels like Dramatico in the UK cannot compete with majors in 
the run up to Christmas,643 e.g. majors can afford to book all their Christmas television 
advertising in May.644  The big four might not even know what records they are going 
to market, but they know that they will have enough catalogues to make TV advertising 
worthwhile during the run up to Christmas.  Therefore, even if there is a successful 
record released by an independent in October, it is impossible for the company to 
provide a good marketing campaign because there are no advertising spaces left.645  For 
example, apart from the price cuts, in 2003 Universal single-handedly bought up all the 
advertising space on the French music channel TF1,646 thus blocking out not just 
independents, but other majors as well.  This behaviour excludes smaller companies 
from the recorded music market and should, therefore, be dealt with under competition 
law rules. 
 
Having shown the cultural and the economic importance of independent labels, and 
examples of anti-competitive practices exercised by the majors, it is now appropriate to 
analyse the past and existing jurisprudence per se in greater detail.  The analysis is 
carried out in conjunction with a critical analysis of merger cases and regulations in 
both the US and the EU, but with particular emphasis of those in the EU. 
 
                                                
640 John Vernon, Market Structure and Industrial Performance (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972). 
However, independents seek to change the situation.  For example, their recent attempts to create a global 
rights licensing agency, Merlin, which collects income from ad-based online portals such as MySpace and 
YouTube.  Andrew Orlowski, “Indies Unite to Challenge Big Four Digital Deals,” The Register, January 
20, 2000. 
641 Clare Matheson, “Mixing up the Music Industry,” BBC, November, 19, 2003. 
642 See Music Week, “Universal and Asda Link up on TV Sponsorship Slots,” June 6, 2005.  
643 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343. 
644 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
645 id. 
646 Matheson, supra, n. 641. As Patrick Zelnick, President of Impala, put it: “In 2001 Universal bought 85 
percent of TV advertising in France and 95 percent of TV advertising in December the same year.” Music 
Industry Conference, London Calling, June 28, 2007.   
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Chapter 5: Past and Existing Jurisprudence in Merger 
Regulation 
 
The previous chapters have looked at anti-competitive practices, the effect of mergers 
on independent labels and the importance of the diversity of producers for both 
economy and culture.  These issues help provide the backdrop to examining the 
question of how applicable competition law has dealt with regulating the competitive 
dynamics between big and small businesses, and whether that law can help protect 
cultural diversity.  This chapter will seek to demonstrate that both the application and 
interpretation of the merger regulation lack uniformity and that existing legal tests are 
not suitable for cultural industries. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Firstly, a concise overview is provided of previous 
and new merger legislation relevant to the record industry.  Past jurisdiction has to be 
considered because to date, all the record industry mergers within the EU have been 
decided by applying the old merger test.  Following the overview, there are the analyses 
of the most influential mergers in recent years which had different merger tests and 
policy applied to them.  Initially, an analysis of the Time Warner/EMI merger (EU 
approach) and the Warner/PolyGram (US approach) are provided.  Such analyses, albeit 
brief, are necessary to highlight the crucial differences in the substantive tests between 
the two regulatory frameworks as well as to demonstrate how uncertain and 
unpredictable the legal regulation of the record industry has been.  The analyses are 
followed by a detailed assessment of the merger between Sony and BMG.  This 
particular merger was chosen because it has been one of the most important and 
controversial decisions on collective dominance since the decision in Airtours (see the 
discussion below).  The analysis of the Sony/BMG merger will highlight the economic 
approach, on which both the merger test and existing jurisprudence are based and which 
were illustrated in the Commission’s and Court of First Instance’s rulings.  The detailed 
analysis of the approval of the Sony/BMG merger in 2004, its annulment ruling by the 
CFI in 2006 and the second approval of the joint venture by the Commission in 2007, 
are necessary as a foundation for the ultimate debate about whether there should be a 
different legal regime for cultural industries, whether particular attention should be 
given to the issues of non-price competition, and whether competition law has so far 
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failed in preventing a high level of concentration in the record industry; and if so, 
whether the law itself needs to be changed.   
 
The discussion contained in this chapter has largely been lacking in literature and 
practice to date.  Those researchers who have worked in this field have reported back on 
specific areas only.  This study takes the research further by showing that European 
Merger Regulation is not equipped with the tools to deal with cultural industries and 
suggestions to remedy the situation are detailed in the Conclusion. 
 
5.1. EU Merger Regulation 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the basis of competition law is that competition should be 
preserved because consumers benefit from competition through lower prices, better 
products, services and innovation.  Therefore, it is crucial for any industry to keep 
producing at competitive levels.  The task for overseeing competition matters in each 
Member State lies in the hands of the national authorities.  The European Competition 
Commission is fulfilling this task in the EU.647  As discussed in Chapter 4, not all 
mergers are harmful, but some of them might give rise to anti-competitive behaviour, 
e.g. higher/fixed prices as well as diminished diversity, thus reducing both economic 
and consumer welfare.  By definition, under joint ownership, financial interests and 
profit making of the parent companies are linked and become paramount.  The parties to 
these joint ventures have a more fluid, transparent exchange and disclosure of 
information, including price information and other key factors.  Such accessibility of 
information, therefore, is likely to reduce their incentives to compete aggressively with 
each other and if anything, increases the likelihood of collusion, which can affect their 
relevant market substantially.  The above explains why merger regulations take 
seriously any claims about potential co-ordination mechanisms.648  
 
Co-ordination between companies and their business practices may arise through an 
explicit cartel agreement,649 or via the presence of certain market characteristics that 
make the market conductive to collective dominance, the latter exampling tacit 
                                                
647 The Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission fulfil this task in the USA. 
648 See for example, Case IV/M.190 - Nestle/Perrier [1992] L 356; Case IV/M.619 - Gencor/Lonrho 
[1997] OJ L 11; and Case IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice [1999] OJ C124/10. 
649 For an explicit collusion to take place there needs to be an agreement to either fix prices or to divide 
the market.  See Jones and Sufrin, supra, n. 580, at p. 859.  
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collusion.  Tacit collusion or tacit co-ordination can be defined as a co-ordinated 
outcome that emerges from companies’ non-cooperative strategies, i.e. there is no need 
for a formal agreement between the companies, as is necessary in the case of an explicit 
cartel.  Such conduct by the companies is therefore more difficult to spot by the 
competition authorities.650 
 
In 1989 after a long history of failed proposals by the European Commission, the 
European Council adopted the European Community Merger Regulation (hereinafter, 
the ECMR) 4064/89.651  Until 2000, the Commission had a great record of case-
management with only one case being annulled by the CFI.  After 2000 however, some 
cracks started to appear in the Commission’s application of the merger regulation as the 
CFI annulled three high-profile decisions.652  The annulments triggered adverse public 
criticism to which the Commission reacted by carrying out a review of the quality of its 
decision-making followed by a Green Paper on the Reform of Merger Control,653 which 
recommended the introduction of a new merger test.  On 1 May 2004, the Commission 
adopted a new ECMR, which now regulates all mergers in the European Union.654  
Simultaneously, the Commission has also adopted Guidelines on the Assessment of 
Horizontal Mergers, which covers both single and collective dominance.655   
 
Since all previous mergers have been considered under the old ECMR, it is necessary to 
look at the old substantive test first in order to compare it to the modified test in the new 
ECMR to see what changes, if any, the new test can bring to the already highly 
concentrated record industry.  The old regime is also important because the European 
                                                
650 id. 
651 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of December 21, 1989 on the Control of Concentrations 
between Undertakings [1989] OJ L395 as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97, [1997] OJ L 
180, hereinafter the ‘Old ECMR’.  The ECMR ensures that mergers and acquisitions are investigated 
either by the European Commission or by one or more national courts but never at both the EU and 
national level.  Any transaction that exceeded thresholds defining a ‘Community dimension’ is 
investigated only by the European Commission, and not by national authorities.  Commission decisions 
can be appealed in the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice. 
652 Case T 342/99 - Airtours v. Commission [2002] ECR II-2585; Case T 310/01 -  Schneider Electric v. 
Commission [2002] ECR II-4071; and Case No COMP/M.2416 - Tetra Laval/Sidel [2004] OJ L 43 13. 
653 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, COM (2001) 745/6 of 
December 11, 2001. 
654 Council Regulation  (EC) No 139/2004 of January 20, 2004 on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings [2004] OJ L 24, hereinafter the ‘New ECMR’.  For more information on EU merger policy 
see John Vickers, “Merger Policy in Europe: Retrospect and Prospect.” European Competition Law 
Review 7 (2004): 455 – 463. 
655 Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Undertakings [2004] OJ (C31) 5. The guidelines focus on the following elements: the possible anti-
competitive effect of horizontal mergers, buyer power, barriers to entry, market shares and introduce the 
consumer welfare-price standard. 
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Competition Commission will still consider new cases based on the previous thirteen 
years of case law. 
 
5.1.1. The Old ECMR (Collective Dominance Test) 
 
Under the old ECMR, regulatory intervention in pending mergers was warranted only 
on the satisfaction of the test set out under Article 2(2), which provided that: 
 
“A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market”(emphasis 
added).   
 
As the wording suggests, dominance was the substantive test under the old ECMR.  The 
uncertainty of this test begins with the concept and definition of collective dominance.  
Some scholars argue to this date about what is meant by the words ‘collective’ and 
‘dominance’.  The case law has brought in clearer ideas on that issue.  In Continental 
Can the Commission defined ‘dominance’ as follows: 
 
“Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to behave 
independently, which puts them in a position to act without taking into account their 
competitors, purchasers or suppliers.  That is the position when, because of their share of 
the market, or of their share of the market combined with the availability of technical 
knowledge, …or capital, they have the power to determine prices or to control 
production or distribution for a significant part of the products in question.  This power 
does not necessarily have to derive from an absolute domination permitting the 
undertakings which hold it to eliminate all will on the part of their economic partners, 
but it is enough that they be strong enough as a whole to ensure to those undertakings an 
overall independence of behaviour, even if there are differences in intensity in their 
influence on the different partial markets.” 656 
 
In terms of interpreting the notion of ‘collective’, it has been seen to include the 
situation where two or more undertakings are united by such economic links that 
together they hold a dominant position vis-à-vis the other operators on the same 
market,657 or vis-à-vis their competitors, their trading partners and consumers on a 
particular market.658  
                                                
656 Case 6/72 [1973] ECR. 215, at para. 11.3. 
657 Societa Italiano Vetro SpA [1990] 4 C.M.I.R 535.  
658 Compagnie Maritime Belge NV v. Commission [2000] All.E.R 385.  For more on the definition of 
collective dominance see Russel Richardson and Clive Gordon, “Collective Dominance : The Third 
Way?” European Competition Law Review 10 (2001): 416 – 423.  
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5.1.2. Airtours Decision: Tripartite Collective Dominance Test 
 
Many assumed that the understanding and application of the collective dominance test 
would become easier after the seminal decision in Airtours v. Commission,659 which set 
a new tripartite collective dominance test and raised the standard of proof required of 
the Commission in order to block a merger.   
 
Although the Airtours case related to the travel industry, it is important to examine it in 
the context of this study, as it raises many relevant points of reference and comparison 
for the record industry.  In this case, the market for short-haul foreign package holidays 
was shared between four major short-haul travel companies and the fringe or small 
travel companies, which could be seen as being akin to major record companies and the 
independent record labels, respectively.  The main fear was that two of the major 
companies and a newly merged company would foster tacit collusion and subsequently 
create a collective dominant position in the market.  Initially, the Commission blocked 
the merger.660  However, Airtours then brought an appeal in the CFI, which reversed the 
decision of the Commission and made the test for collective dominance very difficult to 
satisfy.  The CFI ruling661 stated that, in order to establish a collective dominant 
position, the companies had to have a common understanding about the terms of co-
ordination and that the following three conditions had to be satisfied: 
 
1) Sufficient market transparency, i.e. the coordinating companies must be able to 
monitor the way in which the other company’s market conduct is evolving. 
 
2) To be sustainable over time, collusion needs a punishment mechanism that can 
deter a company from deviation, i.e. there should be some form of a retaliatory 
mechanism. 
                                                
659 Airtours v. Commission, supra, n. 652.  For more academic debate about this seminal case see for 
example, Ali Nikpay and Fred Houwen, “Tour de Force or a Little Local Turbulence? A Heretical View 
on the Airtours’ Judgment.” European Competition Law Review 24, no. 5 (2003): 193 - 202; Peder 
Christensen and Valerie Rabassa, “The Airtours Decision: Is There a New Commission Approach to 
Collective Dominance?” European Competition Law Review 22 (2001): 227 - 237; Heiko Haupt, 
“Collective Dominance under Article 82 EC and EC Merger Control in the Light of the Airtours 
Judgment.” European Competition Law Review 23 (2002): 434 - 444; Massimo Motta, “EC Merger 
Policy and the Airtours Case.” European Competition Law Review 21 (2000): 199 – 207; and Niels, 
supra, n. 105, at pp. 168 - 172.  
660 See supra, n. 648. 
661 Airtours v. Commission, supra, n. 652, at para 62, and para 195 with respect to the retaliatory 
mechanism. 
 162 
3) The reaction of both current and future competitors not participating in the co-
ordination, as well as customers, should not jeopardise the results expected from 
the co-ordination. 
 
The Court also insisted on the cumulative nature of these conditions and specified that 
the Commission must conduct a thorough market investigation and base its conclusion 
on fact rather than speculation, i.e. it is the clear evidence of this that counts, not just the 
mere theory.  This again signals that, from Airtours v. Commission and onwards, the 
Commission will be looking for a very detailed economic analysis of the market in 
merger cases, i.e. economic evidence should be the crux of every decision.  In this 
respect the question arises as to how relevant is the economic analysis for cultural 
industries?  As shown in Chapter 1, there is a strong and undeniable connection between 
culture and economics, which is expressed in the term ‘cultural industries’.  That being 
the case, the next section will highlight the difficulty of using economic tests in the 
cultural sphere and recognising the nuances of cultural industries.  This will help 
demonstrate, in the Conclusion, that assessing only economic data in terms of cultural 
industries so far has not prevented high record industry concentration, which further 
supports the argument in favour of the need for a new cultural test, also highlighted in 
the Conclusion. 
 
5.1.3. Economic Approach 
 
Following the CFI’s ruling in Airtours, a new position of Chief Competition Economist 
was created within the Directorate-General for Competition (hereinafter, DG Comp) 
along with an accompanying staff of 10 PhD industrial economists.  The intention of 
this was to provide the system with appropriate ‘checks and balances’ as well as 
ensuring access for the Commission to some form of qualified, independent opinion.662  
Overall, the aim of the increased emphasis on the economic evidence was to create 
more legal certainty and predictability.  Introducing a more economics based approach 
also put European competition legislation closer in line with the US competition 
legislation (see further the discussion below). 
 
                                                
662 Sven B. Volcker, “Mind the Gap: Unilateral Effects Analysis Arrives in EC Merger Control.” 
European Competition Law Review 7 (2004): 405 – 407. 
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Whilst playing a significant role in certain cases,663 the economic approach seems less 
relevant in certain other cases, particularly those involving cultural industries, and as the 
practice has shown, the economics-based analysis has its problems.  In current practice, 
the Chief Economist’s staff joins a case only at Phase II, so they have to rely on the data 
submitted by the parties,664 thus they are not able to fully participate in the investigation 
from the outset.665  Additionally, the high-tech economic-approach and analysis is very 
costly,666 leads to more bureaucracy at the Commission,667 and is often uncertain too.668  
Since economics is not an exact science, the economic approach has the added 
disadvantage of resulting in disagreement between economists themselves.669  As noted 
by Schmalensee: “economists cannot testify with the confidence of experts on ballistics 
or fingerprints – or at least they should not”.670  However, arguably the biggest danger 
with an economic approach is that it is built on theoretic models, namely game-theory 
models.671  Some of these theories clash with each other, thus producing different 
outcomes.  Some scholars would even argue that these theoretic economic models are 
“sensitive to the underlying assumptions.”672  It is not clear which particular model the 
DG Comp may choose for any particular case and it further raises the question as to 
how valid and relevant this particular model is for the industry being considered.  These 
matters, in turn, have important repercussions affecting the degree of predictability of 
the Commission’s practice.  Some argue673 that the more economic approach may create 
less legal certainty, while there is also debate as to the quality of the decision-making 
involved in these processes.  Thus, it can be concluded that the use of economic 
evidence does not provide an all-encompassing solution, particularly in respect of 
                                                
663 New York v. Kraft Gen Foods, Inc. 926 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
664 The discussion below of the Sony/BMG merger demonstrates how inconsistent the data collected by 
the parties can be.  
665 Volcker, supra, n. 662, at p. 406. 
666 Arndt Christiansen, “The ‘More Economic Approach’ in EU Merger Control.” Cesifo Forum 1 (2006):  
36 - 37. 
667 Pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Implementing Regulation, the merging parties must submit the official 
notification form and all documents in 35 copies as compared with 24 and 19 copies previously. 
668 Arndt Christiansen, supra, n. 666, at p.  39. 
669 Arndt Christiansen, “The Reform of EU Merger Control – Fundamental Reversal or Mere 
Refinement?” Social Science Research Network (2006): 40.  For more on the economic approach see 
Michael Utton, Market Dominance and Antitrust Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003), 3 – 27. 
670 Richard Schmalensee, “Horizontal Merger Policy: Problems and Changes.” Journal of Economic 
Perspective 1, no. 2 (1987): 42.  Also cited in Christiansen, id. 
671 Massimo Motta, Competition Policy. Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 124 – 134. 
672 Ben Dubow et al., “Unilateral Effects and Merger Simulation Models.” European Competition Law 
Review 25, no. 2 (2004): 117. 
673 Arndt Christiansen, supra, n. 666, at p. 39. 
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cultural industries, which are not purely about economics (see the detailed discussion 
below). 
 
5.1.4. The New ECMR (Significant Impediment of Effective Competition) 
 
Having considered the old merger regulation and test, it is now appropriate to examine 
the modifications carried out to arrive at the new test. 
 
Article 2 (2) of the new ECMR provides for a new substantive test, which is the 
significant impediment of effective competition (hereinafter, SIEC): 
 
“A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the 
common market or a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the common 
market” (emphasis added).674  
 
The above wording underlines a certain degree of convergence between the EU and the 
US substantive tests (see below the outline of the US test).  The need for such 
convergence was highlighted by the case of GE/Honeywell675 where the EU and the US 
authorities viewed the competitive effects in very different ways, resulting in opposite 
outcomes.  The US authorities approved the merger of GE/Honeywell, whilst the 
Commission under the old ECMR rejected the proposed transaction.  Another 
supporting factor for the introduction of the new test was the gap676 between the 
application of the old test that existed as regards single dominance and collective 
dominance situations.  Arguably, the old test, based on the concept of single dominance, 
was not equipped to deal with the gap between a single dominance and the situation 
when large companies merge without creating or strengthening a dominant position.677  
In theory, the new test closes a loophole with regards to anti-competitive mergers in 
oligopolistic markets falling below the dominance market threshold. 
 
                                                
674 For more analysis of the new test see Andreas Weitbrecht, “EU Merger Control in 2004 - an 
Overview.” European Competition Law Review 26, no. 2 (2005): 67 - 73 and Trevor Soames and Sylvie 
Maudhuit, “Changes in EU Merger Control.” European Competition Law Review 26, no. 1 (2005): 57 -
64. 
675 Case No COMP/M.2220, GE/Honeywell [2004] OJ L48, 1. 
676 Simon Baxter and Frances Dethmers, “Unilateral Effects Under the European Merger Regulation: 
How Big Is the Gap?” European Competition Law Review 26, no. 7 (2005): 380 - 389. 
677 id. 
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The new test was constructed differently from the old ECMR, which had presented a 
two-part test: “a concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a 
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded”.  The new 
ECMR, however, provides a reversal in the threshold emphasis, effectively turning the 
order of the test around.  Some scholars678 insist that the new substantive test represents 
a fundamental change in the EU merger regulation policy.  However, the prevailing 
opinion679 is that the new test is unlikely to change the Commission’s approach because 
it still preserves the dominance test.  Proving this point, the Commission has stated that 
the case law of the old ECMR would remain relevant under the new merger test:  
 
“By keeping the concept of dominance unaltered, the new test will preserve the acquis 
and, thus, the guidance that can be drawn from past decisional practice and case law.  
As a result, previous decisions and judgments could still be relied upon as precedents 
when considering whether a merger is likely or not to create or strengthen a dominant 
position”. 680 
 
The Commission too has expressed its thoughts on the new test: 
 
“Although it does not alter the Commission’s approach to the analysis of the 
competitive impact of mergers, the wording of the new test focuses unambiguously on 
the impact of a merger on competition.  At the same time, it is a truly ‘European’ 
solution, combining the best of the substantive standards in our various jurisdictions, 
and preserving existing precedent, in the form of past Commission decisions and past 
judgments of the European Courts.  Even if it can be expected that the Commission will, 
from now on, focus more on the competitive harm of a proposed transaction rather than 
on the dominance issue, its decision practice should not dramatically change, since it 
had already interpreted the dominance test in such a way that the market power issue 
was the main focus of its assessment” (emphasis added). 681  
 
Only future cases will demonstrate whether the new test is a profound change or a 
reworded version of the old test.  
 
                                                
678 Michael G.Egge et al., “The New EC Merger Regulation: A Move To Convergence.” Antitrust  (Fall 
2004): 37. 
679 See for example, Stephen Hornsby, “European Merger Control – Can Enhanced Merger Control 
Solve the Oligopoly Problem?” January 30, 2004. 
680 See Philip Lowe, “Implications of the Recent Reforms in the Antitrust Enforcement in Europe for 
National Competition Authorities.” Speech at Italian Competition/Consumers Day, Rome, December 9, 
2003.  Also cited in Baxter and Dethmers, supra, n. 676, at p. 380. 
681 Linsey McCalum and Nicola Pesaresi, “Merger Review Package in a Nutshell.” Competition Policy 
Newsletter (2004): 2. 
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5.2. US Merger Regulation Test (Substantial Lessening of 
Competition)   
 
This thesis is concerned with commentary and examination of two competition 
frameworks, namely that of the EU and the US.  As such, it is important to outline the 
US merger test in order to highlight some of the key differences between its 
interpretation and application as compared to the EU (both old and new) merger tests, 
and to also identify which test is better suited to deal with cultural industries.  
 
The antitrust law in the USA, which is relevant to the mergers in the record industry, is 
found in Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  Section 
1 of the Sherman Act outlaws all contracts, combinations and conspiracies that 
unreasonably restrain interstate trade, including price-fixing and Section 2 deals with 
monopolies.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions that are 
likely to substantially lessen competition:  
 
“No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, 
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital…of another 
person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where … the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly”. 682   
 
This wording of Section 7 has formed the basis of the US substantive merger test, in 
terms of the ‘substantial lessening of competition’ (hereinafter, SLC), which is 
successfully used as a merger test not only in the US but in other countries as well, e.g. 
Canada, Australia, UK and Ireland.  The SLC test is even more economics-oriented than 
the dominance test (the latter being more of a legal nature),683 and its meaning and 
application are likewise not entirely certain.  Throughout its existence, the SLC test 
underwent different interpretations from “an increase in the market concentration and a 
reduction in the number of competitors to a loss of opportunity for small business or a 
reduction of local control over business”.684  However the main difference between the 
                                                
682 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
683 Makan Delrahim, “Antitrust Enforcement in the Entertainment and Media Industries.”  December 18, 
2003. Speech presented at the Recording Artists’ Coalition, Los Angeles, at p. 7; Giuseppe Tesauro, “The 
Evolution of European Competition Law and the Italian Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato,” in The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose Regulation, Which Competition?, ed. 
Hanns Ullrich (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 78. 
684 Gabriele Stirati, “The Appraisal of Collective Dominance and Efficiency Gains under the Substantive 
Test of the New EU Merger Regulation.” Erasmus Law and Economics Review 1, no. 3 (2004): 280. 
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two tests is that the EU dominance test concentrates on the creation or strengthening of 
the dominant position, whereas the SLC test concentrates on how much competition is 
lost as a result of the merger. 685  
 
Initially, the Green Paper produced by the Commission recommended the adoption of 
the SLC test as it could be closer to the spirit of the economically based analysis 
undertaken in merger control and less legally rigid than the dominance test.686  This 
recommendation was also influenced by the fact that the US competition authorities 
provided a large number of consultations and commentary for the Green Paper.  
Nevertheless, the Commission opted out of adopting the SLC test, because as shown 
earlier, it would have undermined the existing body of case law built up on the 
dominance test.  Once again political pressure affected matters and a compromise had to 
be found between the Commission and the Member States.687  It is yet to be seen to 
what extent, if at all, the new ECMR resembles the SLC test in practice.    
 
Having looked, in brief outline, at the legislative framework of EU and US merger 
control, there now follows a discussion in the next section on the way in which the 
relevant competition authorities have applied existing legislation to recent mergers in 
the record industry.  
 
5.3. Mergers in the Record Industry 
 
 
The record industry has always been subject to numerous mergers and acquisitions, as 
outlined earlier in Chapter 3.  The critical analysis below will investigate how European 
merger regulation was, and is dealing with cultural issues in relation to the record 
industry.  The analysis will look at certain classic cases in the area and their different 
interpretation by different courts.  Having done that, it will then review the competition 
law in terms of the record industry, and show why the European merger test utilised in 
                                                
685 Vickers, supra, n. 654, at p. 455. 
686 Green Paper on the Review of Council Reg. 4064/89 COM (2001) 745/6. December 11, 2001, at para 
165.  Not all scholars agree, however, that the SLC test is better than the SIEC test.  Some argue that they 
are very similar, but the competition authorities in the EU and the USA have different emphasis on the 
evaluation factors, e.g. market shares, market concentration, entry barriers, countervailing power etc.  See 
Ulf Boge and Edith Muller, “From the Market Dominance Test to the SLC Test: Are There Any Reasons 
for a Change?” European Competition Law Review 10 (2002): 496. 
687 Christiansen, supra, n. 669, at p. 20.  
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these cases was inappropriate for the record industry.  For consistency and to avoid 
focussing only on the Sony/BMG merger, the analysis also considers how both the EU 
and the US competition authorities dealt with some other mergers between major record 
companies in the past.  
 
5.3.1. Time Warner 
 
The examples of two mergers involving the Warner Records group illustrate that 
competition law may have the relevant tools to prevent high concentration of the record 
industry.  Throughout its long history, Warner Records has attempted several times to 
merge with other companies, notoriously failing twice.  The Federal Trade Commission 
(hereinafter, FTC) in the USA blocked Warner’s first merger attempt with PolyGram in 
1984.688  The second merger with EMI was withdrawn from the European Commission 
in 2000 amid the parties’ fears that it would be blocked.  The analysis below 
demonstrates how both merger attempts were treated by the US and EU competition 
authorities, and how legal regulation is viewed and interpreted with uncertainty within 
the record industry.  
 
 5.3.1.A. Warner/PolyGram (US Reasoning) 
 
At the time of the first merger attempt in 1984, Warner was the second largest music 
label in the US, whilst PolyGram was the sixth largest and experiencing financial 
problems.  Unlike in the Sony/BMG merger plan, Warner/PolyGram proposed a joint 
venture to record and distribute their music.689   
 
The United States Court of Appeals noted that the factors to consider when determining 
impact on competition included “market shares of merging firms, industry trends 
towards concentration, degree of concentration within the industry, prior mergers by 
firms in question, and barriers to entry in the industry”.690  It is worth noting at this 
stage that such matters have not been considered in the Sony/BMG rulings.  The Court 
                                                
688 Federal Trade Commission v. Warner Communications 742 F. 2d [1984] 1156 - 1165. 
689 PolyGram intended to close down its distribution operations in the US, so that a new joint venture 
would distribute the records of both companies.  For circumstances surrounding the Warner/PolyGram 
merger see Qualen, supra, n. 336, at pp. 17 – 20. 
690 Federal Trade Commission v. Warner Communications, supra, n. 688, at  para 13. 
 169 
considered Section 7 of the Clayton Act as well as Section 13 (b) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, the latter of which provides that a merger will be allowed if it is in the 
public interest.  Further, it is important to note that the notion of public interest has 
never been mentioned in any of the Sony/BMG rulings.  The Court of Appeals noted 
that the main issue was “not to make a final determination on whether the proposed 
merger violates Section 7, but rather to make only a preliminary assessment of the 
merger’s impact on competition”.691  In this case the Court wanted to assess the impact 
of this potential merger on competition in the future.  This contrasts with the seemingly 
more stringent tripartite dominance test encountered in the Airtours case.  At the time of 
the Warner case, in the mid 80s, the recorded music market was moderately 
concentrated.  However the Court of Appeals already saw a trend towards increased 
concentration, noting that the proposed joint venture would present “serious, 
substantial, and difficult questions with respect to its anti-competitive effects”.692 
 
Most importantly, it was emphasised that if the merger were completed, the new 
venture’s market share would be 26 percent, whereas the total market share of the top 
four record companies was 75 percent.  At this stage, it is worth noting that the 
combined market share of Sony/BMG following the merger in 2004 was about 25 
percent.  Due attention was also given to the increased concentration amongst record 
distributors, disadvantages in obtaining airplay and substantial barriers to entry.  
Therefore, the Court of Appeals found it necessary to assess those non-price issues.  
Moreover, the judgment in the Warner/PolyGram case set out that financial weakness in 
itself did not justify a merger with another record company.693  That again is in crucial 
contrast to the parties’ reasoning for the Sony/BMG decision (as set out in the 
discussion below).  The Court of Appeals re-iterated that the antitrust laws did not 
protect competitors, even if those competitors feared that they might as a result be 
forced from the market, showing that the antitrust law protects competition, rather than 
competitors.  Finally, the Court considered public interest factors, for example 
beneficial economic effects and pro-competitive advantages for consumers.  After 
considering all the above criteria, the Court blocked the merger.  At this stage, it is 
important to bear in mind that although the US Court used broad criteria to assess the 
                                                
691 id. 
692 id., at para, 15. 
693 id., at para 16.  At the time, the American branch of PolyGram was losing $300,000 a day.  See  
Qualen, supra, n. 336, at p. 18.  
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impact of the proposed merger on competition, no mention was made about culture or 
cultural diversity.  
 
5.3.1.B. Warner/EMI (EU and US Reasoning)  
 
This particular merger provides a good illustration of how competition authorities may 
carry out a thorough market investigation (which is only partially witnessed in the 
Sony/BMG merger investigation).  In 2000, EMI and Time Warner694 notified the 
Commission of their agreement to combine their music business, including music 
publishing, on-line distribution and retail distribution.695  During the early stages of 
investigation, the Commission reached the conclusion that the transaction should be 
prohibited for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the Commission pointed out that the market 
was already highly concentrated (with the majors holding around 80 percent of the 
market share), and the merger would create a collective dominant position in the EU.  
Interestingly, when considering the Sony/BMG merger in 2004 and 2007, the 
Commission was not perturbed by the fact that the four majors together held 75 percent 
of the market share at that point.  Secondly, the merger between Warner and EMI would 
have raised a single dominance issue in the market for music publishing,696 because the 
newly formed entity would have had a resultant market share of over 30 percent and in 
some cases as high as 75 percent in almost all EU Member States.  It is unclear whether 
the Commission was disturbed by the potentially high concentration of copyrights held 
by just two players or whether there were a number of vertical issues in music 
publishing caused by the AOL/Time Warner deal,697 but nevertheless the music 
publishing was one of the most important criteria, which led to the subsequent 
withdrawal of the merger.  Another fear was that the new entity would have been 
between 2 to 5 times bigger than its next competitors (Universal, BMG or Sony).  
                                                
694 Case COMP/M. 1852 - EMI/Time Warner, aborted on October 5, 2000. 
695 See European Competition Commission, “Commission Opens Full Investigation into Time 
Warner/EMI merger”. June 14, 2000.  For more information see Soetendorp and Kretschmer, supra, n. 
167, at pp. 56 – 59; Valerie Rabassa, “Joint Ventures as a Mechanism that May Favour Co-Ordination: 
An Analysis of the Aluminium and Music Mergers.” European Competition Law Review 25, no. 12 
(2004): 771, 778, and Valerie Rabassa, “The Commission’s Review of the Media Merger Wave.” 
Competition Policy Newsletter 1 (2001): 46 – 52.   
696 Rabassa (2004), id., at p. 778. 
697 COMP/M.1845 - AOL/Time Warner Case, October 11, 2000.  Vertical issues arose because with 
control of both Time Warner and EMI music content, AOL could have been in a position to favour Time 
Warner/EMI content at the expense of other record companies.  The merger between Time Warner and 
EMI along with AOL’s existing structural links with BMG, would have given AOL control over about 
half of the EU music content available for on-line delivery. Rabassa (2004), id., at p. 778, and Molly 
Boast, “Report from the Bureau of Competition.” Federal Trade Commission, March 29, 2001. 
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In its initial investigation stage, the Commission produced a list of the following factors 
to be taken into account when considering whether the merger was likely to be anti-
competitive:  
 
a. TimeWarner was the ‘maverick’698 of the market, the removal of which would 
have significantly changed the incentive to compete effectively.  It seems that 
the Commission adopted the common view that maverick firms could be good at 
forcing competition in a given market.  Therefore, the argument is that if 
TimeWarner merged with EMI, the former would have had less incentive to 
compete in the recorded music market.699  
 
b. TimeWarner/EMI could have consolidated their structural links with the other 
majors through distribution agreements and album compilations.  That, in turn, 
could result in fewer opportunities for small labels to break into the market.700  
 
c. The majors would have had little incentive to deviate from their co-ordinated 
behaviour because of market transparency and retaliatory measures, for 
example, withdrawing a deviator from the highly profitable compilation deals.  
Thus, the Commission was already aware of the retaliatory measures in the 
record industry, and this is important to bear in mind for the following analysis 
of the Sony/BMG merger. 
 
d. The recorded music market would have become more transparent as the number 
of majors would decrease.  This is also an interesting point as in the Sony/BMG 
merger, the Commission did not find that the reduction in major labels from 5 
companies to 4 would lead to higher transparency within the market. 
 
e. Another important factor in rejecting the merger proposal was that small and 
new independent music labels as well as the consumers would not be able to 
challenge the collusion.  This is the only opinion that the Commission has not 
changed in the second approval of the Sony/BMG joint-venture (see below).   
                                                
698 See the glossary for the definition of ‘maverick’. 
699 However, this is not a clear-cut issue.  For the effect of maverick firms in merged entities see Malcolm 
B. Coate and Andrew N. Kleit, The Economics of Antitrust Process (Massachusetts: Kluwer, 1996), 49. 
700 It is not known whether the Commission had considered the impact of the proposed merger on cultural 
diversity.  There is no mention of it in the Commission’s Press Release. 
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In their desire to merge, the companies even offered to sell record labels, music 
catalogues and distribution networks to meet the Commission’s concerns, but this was 
to no avail.  Bearing in mind the above concerns of the Commission, the parties 
withdrew their merger application. 
 
In the USA, the FTC reached the same conclusion although it used different criteria.  
Firstly, the competition authorities in the US stated that the recorded music market was 
already highly concentrated.  This is also important to bear in mind when discussing the 
US reasons for allowing the Sony/BMG merger in 2004 (see below).  Secondly, a clear 
point was made about the proposed merger increasing the co-ordinated behaviour 
among the majors.  As for the structural links, it was noted that the recorded music 
market was ruled by “a tight oligopoly with a history of price co-ordination, and 
formidable impediments to entry”.701  In this respect, the FTC didn’t hesitate to provide 
examples of MAP practices and market transparency.  Similarly to the assessment of the 
proposed merger between Warner and PolyGram, the FTC took into account non-price 
matters, which are crucial in terms of the record industry; for example, entry conditions 
and expansion opportunities by independent labels (the discussion below will 
demonstrate how these non-price matters are arguably more important than price 
concerns).702  The FTC was of the view that independents operate in a different market 
segment than the majors, due to the fact that the majority of independents do not have 
established artists and catalogues, neither do they own their own distribution 
companies, or possess any marketing mechanisms (such as the in-house PR available at 
the majors).  Therefore, it was concluded that, were there to be an anti-competitive price 
increase by the majors, independents would have not been able to defeat it,703 and 
therefore could not provide strong enough competition to the majors.  Going slightly 
ahead, it should be noted that the Commission in its second ruling on the Sony/BMG 
merger (see below) also similarly expressed the view that independents would not be 
able to defeat an anti-competitive price increase, and therefore would not be able to 
compete strongly with majors.  This, in turn, points to a lack of effective competition in 
the recorded music market. 
 
                                                
701 Boast, supra, n. 697. 
702 It is not known, however, whether the FTC considered the cultural issues directly.  
703 Boast, supra, n. 697. 
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5.3.2. Sony/BMG Merger  
 
In order to understand the way the competition authorities dealt with recent mergers in 
the record industry, the Commission’s decision on SonyBMG is analysed first, followed 
by the CFI prohibition judgment then the second approval of the merger by the 
Commission.  The first two rulings are very interesting because they focus only on the 
economic analysis of the record industry, completely leaving out the in-depth analysis 
of non-price competition issues such as cultural and product diversity (this is submitted 
in the Conclusion).  The non-price issues are discussed for the first time in the EU 
reasoning in the course of the third ruling, but as the analysis below will demonstrate, 
the Commission has only given  ‘surface treatment’ to these issues.  
 
5.3.2.A.  The Commission’s Sony/BMG Clearance Decision 
 
“The Commission’s ruling in Sony/BMG 
appears to be a bit of a Friday afternoon 
job.”704 
 
This particular merger is important because it was the first big test case for the 
Commission’s application of their new economic approach.  This section provides a 
critical assessment of the Commission’s grounds for allowing the two companies to 
merge.  First, to assist the reader in understanding this complex case, the sequence of 
each ruling is provided in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
704 Quoting Mike Pullen, partner at DLA Piper.  Also cited in Tobias Buck, “Watchdog Reels at 
Sony/BMG Ruling,” The Financial Times, July 13, 2006. 
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Table 2: The Sequence of Events of the Sony/BMG Merger 
 
Sony/BMG Merger 
Date Outcome 
20 July 2004 Merger approved by the EU Commission 
(hereinafter, the decision). 
13 July 2006 Merger disallowed. The independents’ 
trade body, Impala, wins at the Court of 
First Instance against the Commission’s 
Decision in 2004 (hereinafter, the 
annulment judgment). 
03 October 2007 Merger re-approved by the Commission 
(hereinafter, the approval). 
30 November / 20 December 2007 The European Parliament questions the 
Commission as to the approval of the 
SonyBMG for the second time, and its 
affect on cultural diversity and small 
business. 
10 July 2008  The annulment judgment of the CFI was 
set aside by the European Court of Justice 
and sent back to the CFI for the re-
assessment. 
05 August 2008 Sony buys 50 percent of BMG’ stake.  
30 June 2009 The CFI held that any further action 
would be devoid of purpose and that there 
would be no more adjudication on the 
case of Sony/BMG. 
 
 
Before going into the grounds for allowing Sony and BMG to merge their record 
businesses, a brief chronology is provided to illustrate how quickly the Commission can 
change its mind.  In January 2004, Sony and Bertelsmann notified the Commission of 
 175 
the proposed merger under the old ECMR.705  In February, the Commission started its 
investigation as it was concerned that the proposed merger might create or strengthen a 
collective dominant position of the major record companies (the old EC merger test).  
On 24 May 2004, the Commission issued a statement of objections to the parties in 
which it provisionally concluded that the transaction was incompatible with ‘common 
market’.  However, at a hearing in July 2004, the Commission made a fundamental U-
turn and granted unconditional approval to the merger.  The main reason for the 
Commission’s approval was that there was insufficient evidence that the four major 
companies could tacitly coordinate their prices through a collective dominant position.  
As a result, in 2004 Sony and Bertelsmann merged their global recorded music 
businesses.  
 
The merger was highly anticipated, however, the music industry insiders never believed 
it would be allowed.706  Sony/BMG was a five to four merger (four to three in Greece).  
The combined market shares of the majors ranged in the region of 70 to 90 percent 
depending on the country.  Therefore, the main issue to discuss in this section is why 
this particular merger was allowed, whereas others that presented similar issues were 
blocked?   
 
The first main difference between the Sony/BMG merger, which was allowed, and the 
other mergers that were disallowed, is that they Sony and Bertelsmann did not merge 
their music publishing activities, manufacturing and distribution chains.  Sony and 
BMG only merged their Artist & Repertoire departments and were said to be involved 
in the subsequent marketing and sale of recorded music.707  The two companies alleged 
that those activities would not affect competition because the merger was aimed at 
concentrating on the developing of new artists and the selling of their records.   
 
The Commission, in turn, identified three relevant product markets: recorded music, 
online music, and music publishing.708  As the then five major record companies 
dominated the global music market, the investigation focussed primarily on the 
marketing of recorded music.   
                                                
705 As the joint venture was notified in January 2004, it was investigated under the old ECMR regulation. 
706 Particularly after Warner/PolyGram and EMI/Warner’s attempts to merge in the past had been 
unsuccessful.   
707 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 6.  
708 id., at paras 9 – 45.  
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5.3.2.A.i. Legal Critique of the Decision 
 
The following discussion critiques the Commission’s general approach towards the 
application of the existing law to merger cases.  This section also lays the ground for 
further debate on the Commission’s approach to mergers based on the existing ECMR, 
being largely dictated by economic considerations, as opposed to cultural diversity (see 
the Conclusion).  The argument remains that cultural industries should not be assessed 
on a pure economic basis, and also that non-price issues should be taken into account.  
This point is integral to this thesis, and makes it unique. 
 
In order to assess whether the proposed venture would create or strengthen a collective 
dominant position in the relevant product markets, the Commission referred to the 
following two economic parameters of the industry: (i) parallel wholesale pricing; and 
(ii) discounts.  To examine the current competitive dynamics in the record industry, the 
Commission carried out a price survey spanning the four years prior the merger.  It 
focused on the average net prices on a quarterly basis for the top 100 albums of each 
major in the five largest Member States of the EU and it also examined whether the 
parties could have achieved any price co-ordination on the basis of parallelism in 
average prices.  Despite the fact that there was a certain degree of parallelism in the 
markets studied, the Commission thought the evidence was not sufficient enough to 
establish co-ordinated pricing behaviour.709  Having said that, the ‘published prices per 
dealer’710 (hereinafter, PPD) were readily published in catalogues and were therefore 
transparent to the competitors, which in turn pointed to the possibility of price 
monitoring711 and price co-ordination by the majors.712  In order to see whether or not 
there was any price co-ordination, the Commission analysed whether majors’ discounts 
were aligned and sufficiently transparent so as to allow efficient monitoring of price co-
ordination as well as on the level of net prices.713  However, the analysis of discounts 
made the Commission come to the conclusion that it could not establish price co-
ordination because the discounts were found to vary from album to album.714  
Therefore, even though the Commission demonstrated that there was a certain degree of 
                                                
709 id., at paras 75, 82, 89, 96, 103. 
710 See the glossary for the definition. 
711 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para, 76. 
712 id., at paras 77, 84, 91, 98 and 105. 
713 id., at para 74. 
714 id., at paras 79-80, 85-87, 92-94, 99 – 101 and 106 – 108. 
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price co-ordination, it could not prove the existence of collective dominance in any of 
the five largest Member States.715   
 
Since the Commission analysis showed some indications of co-ordinated behaviour, it 
then had to further analyse whether the markets for recorded music were characterised 
by features facilitating collective dominance.  The features chosen were product 
homogeneity,716 transparency,717 and retaliatory measures.718 
 
1) Product Homogeneity 
 
Regarding product homogeneity, the Commission noted that heterogeneity in the 
content reduced transparency in the market and made tacit collusion more difficult.719  It 
seems that in this analysis, the Commission relied on the opinion of the parties 
themselves (Sony and BMG) that recorded music released by majors constituted a 
heterogeneous product, as each release was unique.  This opinion is, of course, highly 
debatable but the Commission did not seem to wish to investigate that discussion any 
further.  From the competition theory point of view, homogenous products may play a 
crucial role in collusive behaviour “because it is easier to monitor the prices and output 
of a single commodity product than to keep track of competitor behaviour in relation to 
hundreds of distinct items”.720  Despite the above, the Commission (and the CFI, as 
discussed below) ignored the issue of cultural diversity.  It is not clear why the 
Commission blindly took on board both Sony and BMG’s statements that their products 
were heterogeneous and why it neglected the issues of format homogeneity, particularly 
when the Commission itself stated that the CD format, its pricing, and the marketing 
strategies employed were ‘quite standardised’.721   
 
2) Transparency of the Recorded Music Market 
  
Since there was enough evidence of steady long-term relationships between majors and 
distributors, the Commission considered whether the market for recorded music was 
                                                
715 id., at para 109. 
716 id., at para 110. 
717 id., at paras 111-3. 
718 id., at paras 114-118. 
719 id., at para 110. 
720 John Boyce and Deborah Cresswell, “How Many Competitors is Enough?”. Global Legal Group. 
(2005): 11. 
721 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 110 
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transparent enough to constitute a state of collective dominance.  The weekly charts, 
together with sales data and the fairly publicly known PPDs, pointed to high 
transparency within the recorded music market.  However, it was noted that even 
though there were only very few retailers, which sold the albums released by the 
majors, the fact that some of them had different list722 prices would make it more 
difficult to monitor a tacit agreement.  Despite that, the Commission contradicted itself 
by pointing out that the situation was “conducive to the adoption of co-operative 
strategies on behalf of the majors and also facilitated the monitoring and the 
information flow”,723 for example the weekly hit charts. 
 
3) Retaliatory Measures 
 
In its final attempt to establish the existence of a collective dominant position amongst 
the majors, the Commission explored whether or not there were any indications that the 
majors had retaliated against any ‘cheating’ major in the past, particularly in respect to 
hit compilation albums.724  Sony and BMG, akin to Time Warner and EMI, participated 
in numerous compilation deals with other majors.  Compilation albums accounted for 
15 - 20 percent of the recorded music market,725 and as such excluding a ‘defector’ from 
future compilation deals or refusing to license an artists’ music for the defector’s 
compilations, could constitute an effective retaliation mechanism.  Nevertheless, the 
Commission ignored the evidence, ruling that because there was no deterrent 
mechanism ever employed there was neither tacit collusion nor collective dominance in 
the recorded music market.  
 
The above analysis prompted the Commission to conclude that: 
  
“There was not sufficient evidence to prove that the reduction of the majors from five 
to four represents a change substantial enough to result in the likely creation of 
collective dominance. In particular, the Commission has not found sufficient evidence 
that a reduction from five to four majors would facilitate transparency and retaliation 
to such extent that the creation of a collective dominant position of the remaining 
four majors has to be anticipated”. 726   
 
                                                
722 See the glossary for the definition. 
723 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 112. 
724 id., at paras 114 - 118. 
725 id., at para 115. 
726 id., at paras 154 - 157. 
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In ruling out pre-merger collective dominance, the Commission also ruled out the 
creation of post-merger collective dominance based on the same three characteristics of 
product heterogeneity, market transparency, and retaliatory mechanisms.727 
 
As a final point, the Commission considered spill-over effects from the proposed 
merged entity on the activities of Sony and BMG in the distribution of online music and 
music publishing.728  The first spill-over being the creation of a dominant position in the 
national markets for distribution of online music due to the vertical relationship between 
Sony and Sony Connect.729  Sony Connect could have provided SonyBMG with even 
more power, and for example, could have denied their competitors access to its back 
catalogue,730 or they could have chosen to promote their artists instead of their 
competitors’ artists.  The denial of access by digital operators to the SonyBMG’s back 
catalogue seems to be an important issue to the Commission as it highlighted the same 
point in the second ruling too (discussed below in relation to the second approval of 
SonyBMG).  This shows how attention is given to making sure that there is good access 
to the same content, but not, it seems, to preventing content homogeneity.731  The 
Commission found that the access was denied in the past but nevertheless it ruled out 
the creation of single dominance because in 2004 there were other players in the market, 
for example OD2.  The second concern about the spill-over effect was raised by the 
third parties732 in relation to the Bertelsmann music publishing interests.733  Even 
though the parties did not merge their publishing departments, the parties could have 
co-ordinated their behaviour in music publishing.734  However, as the administration of 
publishing rights was predominantly in the hands of the collecting societies,735 this 
claim was put aside too.  Thus, the merger was allowed.   
 
 
 
                                                
727 id., at paras 155 – 158. 
728 id., at paras 176 – 182.  
729 id., at paras 171 – 175. 
730 id., at para 171. 
731 Evangelia Psychigiopoulou, “EC Competition Law and Cultural Diversity: The Case of the Cinema, 
Music and Book Publishing Industries.” European Law Review 30, no. 6 (2005): 848. 
732 Third parties included Apple Computer, Universal Music International, European Consumers’ 
Organisation, Impala, International Music Managers Forum, EMI, Warner and Time Warner.  
733 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 177. 
734 id., at para 178. 
735 id., at para 179. 
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5.3.2.A.ii. Sony/BMG Decision: The Main Conclusions 
 
 
The approval of the merger triggered a critique not just from the independents’ trade 
bodies but the Advisory Committee of the Commission as well.  The latter reported a 
minority dissent on the approval of the merger.736   Hence, the next step is to look into 
the ‘outside’ reasons for why the merger was approved as well as some contradictions 
present in the decision. 
 
There are a number of factors that influenced both the EU and US decisions not to 
prohibit the merger.  Firstly, when the merger was being considered, the majors were 
only marginally successful at selling their music content on-line, owing, in no small 
part, to the greater internet-based piracy of music content that was prevalent at that 
time.  Secondly, prior to the Sony/BMG merger, the Commission had faced three 
defeats in front of the CFI since 2002; these defeats have been cited as another reason 
for the merger’s approval.737  Thirdly, because Sony/BMG was structured as a joint 
venture and was announced prior to recent amendments to the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 in the USA, the parties were not required to notify 
the transaction to US antitrust enforcement agencies.738  However, the most plausible 
reason for the approval of the merger by the Commission seems to be a higher burden 
of proof set by the Airtours.  The tripartite test for collective dominant position 
established in the Airtours case is very difficult to satisfy and it left the Commission 
with less freedom to block a merger, except where collective dominance could be 
proved or where a merger would lead to a single dominance, usually meaning a market 
share of 40 percent.  That explains why some refer to collective dominance test as a 
legal ‘straitjacket’, which focuses on static considerations whilst ignoring wider 
dynamic and behavioural factors.739   
 
                                                
736 Opinion of the Advisory Committee on Concentrations Concerning a Preliminary Draft Decision in 
case COMP/M.3333 - Sony/BMG. Brussels, July 9, 2004. 
737 Kenneth Logan et al., “Antitrust Developments in the Media and Entertainment Industries,” Simpson, 
Thatcher and Bartlett, September 22, 2004. 
738 Federal Trade Commission, “FTC Closes Investigation of Joint Venture between Bertelsmann AG and 
Sony Corporation of America,” July 28, 2004; Fabio Polverino, “Assessment of Co-ordinated Effects in 
Merger Control: Between Presumption and Analysis.” Social Science Research Network (2006): 35-36. 
739 This is the view of some economists.  See Mario Monti, “The Substantive Standard for Merger 
Control, and the Treatment of Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: An EU Perspective.” Fordham Annual 
Antitrust Conference, New York, October, 30-31, 2002, at p. 2. 
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According to the judgment in Airtours, it is up to the Commission to prove that the 
entry barriers for smaller companies are very high.  That, in itself, makes it extremely 
difficult to demonstrate the existence of collective dominance.  The burden of proof is 
so high that even one of the Commissioners noted that: “…the evidence available [in 
Sony/BMG] was not sufficiently strong to prove collective dominance”.740  At the same 
time, it was stated that: “the high degree of concentration in the music industry remains 
a concern and the Commission will continue to closely monitor the development of the 
music markets”.741  These contradictory statements signal the situation that the 
Commission had to clear the mergers with unclear evidence; the Sony/BMG merger is a 
prime illustration of the dilemma the Commission faced.  The merger case demonstrated 
that it is virtually impossible to provide concrete evidence in order to prove the three 
factors; and even in a best case scenario the evidence provided will not be unequivocal.  
This leads to the question of what should happen if neither anti-competitive effects, nor 
their absence could be proved in a precise way?742  The record industry provides a 
perfect example of how often such a situation may arise.  In such ambiguous cases, it 
has been suggested that every piece of evidence should be evaluated in the context of 
‘the whole set of the evidence available’,743 i.e. the evidence needs to be considered as a 
whole.  In this context, Judge Richard Posner noted in the High Fructose Corn Syrup 
case decision: 
 
“The second trap to be avoided in evaluating evidence of an antitrust conspiracy …is to 
suppose that if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally 
to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary judgment. It is true that 
zero plus zero equals zero.  But evidence can be susceptible of different interpretations, 
only one of which supports the party sponsoring it, without being wholly devoid of 
probative value for that party.  Otherwise, what need would there ever be for a trial?  The 
question for the jury in a case such as this would simply be whether, when the evidence 
was considered as a whole, it was more likely that the defendants had conspired to fix 
prices than that they had not conspired to fix prices” (emphasis added).744 
 
 And,  
“…no single piece of the evidence … is sufficient in itself to prove a price-fixing 
conspiracy.  But that is not the question.  The question is simply whether this evidence, 
                                                
740 Peter Eberl, “Following an In-depth Investigation the Commission Approved the Creation of the 
Sony/BMG Music Recording Joint Venture on 19 July 2004.” Competition Policy Newsletter 3 (2004): 
10. 
741 id. 
742 Gisela Aigner et al., “The Analysis of Coordinated Effects in EU Merger Control: Where Do We 
Stand after Sony/BMG and Impala?” Social Science Research Network (2006): 20. 
743 Polverino, supra, n. 738, at p. 38. 
744 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation 295 F.3d 651 US Court of Appeal (7th Cir. 2002), 
665-56. 
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considered as a whole and in combination with the economic evidence, is sufficient to 
defeat summary judgment.”745 
 
These statements could help support the argument that there should be a broad 
assessment of the complicated mergers with unclear evidence, as opposed to a pure 
economic analysis. 
 
Whilst assessing the possible effects of the Sony/BMG merger on the independents, the 
Commission looked at typical competition law issues, such as market shares and price.  
The overall market share in the recorded music business did not change after the 
merger.  However, it would be incorrect to consider the merger only as the 
mathematical adding up of the two companies’ market shares.  A combined market 
share equals combined market power, which allows greater ability and power to dictate 
market conditions, or to lower output and reduce the quality of content, and diversity.  
Here the Commission followed the guidelines set up in Airtours, which emphasised the 
importance of the economic analysis of a merger.  However, what the Commission 
should have concentrated on is not the amount of the economic analyses and 
methodologies applied but rather the quality, and relevance of the economic data.  For 
example, the Commission paid huge attention to price matters, as it would indeed in any 
other merger.  However, as is debated more rigorously below and in the following 
chapter, there exists the argument that, given that the record industry is a cultural 
industry, it should, therefore, be assessed on non-price competition issues as well as the 
price issues,746 including, for example, genre and artist diversity, radio and TV access, 
artist acquisition and development.  Clearly, there are more important issues in the 
record industry these days than just price increases, which, as discussed above, are not 
on the agenda in any case since the products were already overpriced in 2004.  The 
Commission simply ignored other crucially important issues, such as physical and 
online distribution, combined financial, licensing and lobbying powers of the new 
venture as well as the doubled advertising and marketing budgets that would result.    
 
The Commission itself noted that the way in which albums were priced and marketed at 
the wholesale level appeared to be standardised.747  Hence, it is not clear why the 
Commission disregarded the relationship between the record companies (sellers) and 
                                                
745 id., at p. 661. 
746 Black and Greer, supra, n. 112, at p. 13.   
747 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 110. 
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wholesale distributors (their customers) in its assessment of price-related issues in the 
record industry.  In George Stigler’s seminal work, A Theory of Oligopoly, the 
definition of ‘homogeneity’ included homogeneity both in product (sellers) and in 
purchase commitments (buyers).748  Accordingly, if the price of the product is 
determined in a standardised way,749 transactions would be regarded as uniform, the 
product deemed homogenous, irrespective of that products’ content.750  Thus, the 
uniform pricing of CD’s could be seen as helping sustain collusive behavior.751  In this 
respect, the Long Tail could be argued to provide a counterweight, but it is not clear 
whether it could at this stage defeat the price structures for the physical products.  
 
Unlike in Airtours, the Commission in its decision of Sony/BMG did not give proper 
attention to the merger’s potential effect on independents.  In Airtours, the Commission 
devoted a large part of the judgment to a thorough analysis of the challenges, which the 
small travel operators were facing.  These ‘challenges’ included the marginalisation of 
competitive force,752 lack of vertical integration,753 disadvantaged sale of seats,754 
distribution of package holidays755 and cost disadvantages of small tour operators.756  It 
was also held that the elimination of First Choice as a middle-sized competitor was 
significant because it would create a wider gap between the large and small players.757  
By contrast, in the assessment of the Sony/BMG merger there was no real emphasis on 
the independents except looking at their differences in terms of distribution, 
organisational structure, and marketing power.  Providing a list of different 
characteristics of majors and independents can hardly be considered sufficient in order 
to fully appreciate the effect of the merger on the independents, and it shows a lack of 
foresight or reluctance on the part of the Commission, to wish to understand the 
challenges faced by small businesses in the recorded music market and the relevance of 
this to the issue at hand.  However, the Commission did admit that independents were 
experiencing serious barriers to expansion: “for (international) distribution the 
                                                
748 George J. Stigler, “A Theory of Oligopoly.” The Journal of Political Economy 72, no. 1. (1964): 44. 
749 Record industry is not the only industry where heterogeneous products have mainly uniform prices, for 
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752 Case No IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice, supra, n. 648, at para 84. 
753 id., at para 78. 
754 id., at para 79. 
755 id., at para 81. 
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independents often depend on the distribution networks of the majors.  Even those 
independent record companies, which have their own distribution facilities on a national 
basis, rely on the majors’ or other independents’ international distribution facilities”.758  
Unfortunately, it did not elaborate on these concerns.  None of the problems relating to 
the practical aspects of radio play, advertising time, A&R, shelf space, manufacturing, 
promotion, and licensing were even touched upon, even though these are crucial 
parameters for the record industry, and are arguably more important than price co-
ordination and transparency in the market (see more on the importance of non-price 
issues in Section 5.3.2.C.ii. and Conclusion). 
 
Having examined the Sony/BMG and Warner/PolyGram decisions, a number of crucial 
differences can be identified.  Firstly, the tests themselves, collective dominance and 
SLC, are similar in that they are both economic-based tests but at the same time, they 
are dissimilar in their application.  The Warner/PolyGram merger illustrates that the 
SLC test is less legally rigid than the dominant position test.759  Therefore, it gives the 
FTC more room for manoeuvre.  Secondly, the factors which the US court took into 
account in Warner/PolyGram are totally different from the ones considered in the 
Sony/BMG case: the US Court of Appeals considered the level of concentration in the 
music market, the tendency for increasing it and entry barriers.  The Commission as 
regards Sony/BMG seems to have shut its eyes to those factors.  Had the Court of 
Appeals’ reasoning and the SLC test been applied to the Sony/BMG merger request, it 
is unlikely to have been allowed. 
 
Nevertheless, the approval of the Sony/BMG merger demonstrates once again the point 
of legal uncertainty in relation to mergers in the record industry; it was surprising that 
the FTC in the USA also approved the Sony/BMG merger without a more thorough 
investigation.  However, in a statement by Commissioner Thompson about the 
investigation closure into the Sony/BMG merger by the FTC, he noted: 
 
“…my decision was a difficult one, in part because I am particularly concerned about the 
impact of media mergers on the prices and quantity of media, as well as the diversity of 
content, available to consumers.  The industry is highly concentrated among record 
labels, and the proposed joint venture will only enhance this concentration.  
Additionally, the history of parallel Minimum Advertised Price policies in particular 
                                                
758 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 54. 
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indicates a propensity for independent behaviour among the major labels” (emphasis 
added).760 
 
The Commission too noted that there was a conduciveness to collective dominance761 
but there was not enough evidence to establish a collective dominant position.  That is a 
pivotal statement.  Unfortunately, the Commission did not elaborate on it.  Moreover, 
no conditions have been imposed on the merged company, which means that in future 
they could radically change their behaviour and not be penalised for that.  By contrast, 
in Airtours, it was ruled that sufficient deterrents should exist to ensure that tacit 
collusion would not be sustainable.  
 
5.3.2.B.  The CFI’s Prohibition Judgment 
 
This section analyses the CFI’s heavy criticism of the Commission’s approach to the 
application of the existing law, but it additionally demonstrates that the CFI too used the 
economic-based approach in annulling the Commission’s decision.  These two rulings 
open up the debate in the thesis’ final chapter for the need to take the diversity of 
cultural products and producers into account when considering mergers in the cultural 
sector.  
 
On 13 July 2006, the European Court of First Instance unexpectedly annulled the 
Sony/BMG merger.762  The judgment came after Impala appealed to the CFI against the 
merger.  Impala is a European trade body for independents, set up by the Association of 
Independent Music, which to date represents about 3,000 independent labels.  ‘Shock’, 
‘surprise’, and ‘unexpected blow’ are just some of the words used to describe the 
reaction to the CFI’s ruling.763  Independent music labels were euphoric, whilst majors 
were at a loss.   
 
                                                
760 Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, “Sony Corporation of America/Bertelsmann 
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Before going into the discussion of the judgment in greater detail, some background and 
a summary of the parties’ arguments are first provided for a better understanding of the 
CFI’s ruling. 
 
a) Impala’s Arguments  
 
Initially, Impala publicly criticised the Commission’s decision because of the disregard 
of the foreclosure of the independents from retail and radio stations, resulting in the 
diminished choice and diversity in terms of new genres and artists: 
 
“Diversity is not a philosophy.  It is a necessity.  The Sony/BMG decision goes against 
the Commission’s own assessment of the market, not only in Sony/BMG but also in 
2000 in the attempted EMI/Warner merger. The EU is legally obliged to ensure the 
defense of cultural diversity across all policy areas.  The decision to authorise the 
merger is a legal, economic, political and cultural mistake.  This is a sentiment Jan 
Figel, the new EU Commissioner for Culture, clearly underscored when he reminded 
the European Parliament that European integration is more than just an economic or 
geographical challenge, it is also a question of values, civilisation and cultural 
heritage”.764 
 
 
Perhaps recognising the difficulty in succeeding on diversity as a legal argument, in 
front of the CFI, Impala decided to put the cultural diversity argument aside, which 
would seem advisable, given that the old merger test did not provide for a cultural 
argument.  Instead Impala chose to present five legally grounded arguments, two of 
which were that the Commission (i) infringed Article 253 EC and (ii) wrongly asserted 
that there was no collective dominant position765 on the market for recorded music prior 
to the proposed merger.  The Court concentrated only on those two pleas (the fact that 
the CFI chose to concentrate only on two pleas out of five later led to the annulment of 
this judgment by the ECJ in 2008).766  
 
Impala’s claim was based on the following arguments: 
 
• The record industry was highly conducive and co-ordination did take place; 
• The record industry had a stable customer base; 
• Sony and BMG were monitoring the retail market on a weekly basis; 
                                                
764 Quoting Patrick Zelnik, President of Impala.  See Impala, “European Independents Appeal Sony/BMG 
Merger.” November 3, 2004. 
765 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 53, 56, 148, 110, 112 and 113. 
766 For more on the annulment by the ECJ see the Conclusion.  
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• The majors had a high market share; 
• The majors had significant financial strength; 
• High prices of the products and homogeneity of product in its format (not 
the content); 
• Parallelism of the net prices as well as the public knowledge of public 
selling prices;  
• Oligopolistic structure of the record industry; 
• The Commission relied on the information provided by Sony and BMG on 
discounts rather than on the information on the parallelism between PPDs 
and the net prices for all of the majors; 
• A high level of transfer of senior executives between the record companies; 
• Sony and BMG produced weekly reports monitoring the retail market, which 
included information on their competitors; and, 
• Weekly charts and retail prices made it very easy to detect how much a 
major is charging for hit albums.  That is because majors only needed to 
monitor a limited number of best-selling albums to account for most sales. 
 
Impala contended that these factors meant that, even if it was not possible to predict the 
price of each individual release charged to each individual retailer at every point in 
time, it would still be possible to know net prices and that this in turn provided the 
transparency necessary to establish the existence of collective dominance.  
 
Impala also claimed that in order to establish whether or not a concentration would 
strengthen a collective dominant position, the Commission must carry out a prospective 
analysis, and not a retrospective analysis, as was done in the Sony/BMG decision. 
 
b) The Commission’s Arguments 
 
The Commission objected to Impala’s claims by stating that there was indeed a degree 
of stability in the customer base and that certain monitoring took place but it did not 
find that such monitoring was sufficient to overcome the lack of transparency of 
discounts, in particular campaign discounts.  It argued that the majors could co-ordinate 
their prices but only if they monitored 400 albums of their competitors.  The 
Commission stressed that it would require not just increased monitoring but also efforts 
to identify discounting practices, which would be very resource-intensive for any major. 
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c) Sony/BMG’s Arguments 
 
In the words of the interveners, Sony and BMG, the merger represented a pro-
competitive response to the decline (a 20 percent fall in CD prices in three years, 
increased illegal downloading of music and increased competition from alternative 
products such as films on DVD) and continuing change in the music industry.  They 
omitted to mention other contributing factors, such as the general economic downturn, 
the still high cost of CDs to the consumer,767 as well as a broader failure to meet 
consumers’ tastes and an absence of quality content and innovative music.   
 
5.3.2.B.i. Findings of the Court of First Instance 
 
1) Critique of the Decision 
 
Before going into the collective dominance test it should be stated that the CFI criticised 
the Commission’s ‘extremely succinct’768 analysis as “superficial, indeed purely formal, 
particularly in the case of a concentration that raises serious problems”.769 
 
Since the Sony/BMG case was considered under the old ECMR,770 the CFI also applied 
the old merger test.  Collective dominance formed the core of the judgment.  It also 
reinforced the three conditions set out in Airtours771 in order for collective dominance to 
be established, and upheld Impala’s claim, in that the Commission was obliged to 
assess, using a prospective analysis, whether or not the concentration would lead to a 
situation in which effective competition in the relevant market would be significantly 
impeded.  The CFI also emphasised the importance of the Airtours test adding that the 
Commission must provide ‘solid evidence’ 772 in its decisions. 
 
On the whole, the CFI heavily criticised and admonished the Commission.  As stated 
earlier, in order to analyse whether the majors had pursued a co-ordinated price policy, 
the Commission first looked into the average net prices of each major in the five largest 
                                                
767 Interestingly, in the original decision, the Commission made it clear that the decline in the demand for 
CDs was due, among other things, to the fact that the CDs were overpriced. Case No COMP/M.3333 – 
Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at paras 56-9. 
768 Case T464/04 - Impala v. Commission, supra, n. 459, at para 525.  
769 id., at para 528. 
770 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, supra, n. 651. 
771 Airtours v Commission (2002), supra, n. 652. 
772 Case T464/04 - Impala v. Commission, supra, n. 459, at para 248. 
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Member States from 2000 - 2004.773  The Commission also examined whether the 
different majors’ discounts were aligned and transparent.  The CFI concluded that in 
doing so, the Commission paid too much attention to campaign discounts without even 
assessing their relevance and giving any explanation as to why they were chosen in 
preference to file discounts.774  However, in the decision the Commission asserted: “...in 
all countries, the most important discounts are file discounts”.775  Nor was there any 
definition of what campaign, file, and invoice discounts were.  Placing too much weight 
on discounts, and in particular campaign discounts was held to be incorrect, thus 
upholding another one of Impala’s claims.  The CFI also demonstrated that the 
Commission was selective in the data it relied on, as well as the extent to which the 
merging parties managed to persuade the Commission in their own interpretation of 
their data, e.g. the heterogeneity of content.  Indeed, how could the Commission come 
to the conclusion as to the heterogeneous nature of the musical content when in 
paragraph 58 of its decision it stated that “part of the decline of the records’ sales could 
be explained by the record companies’ failure to meet the consumers’ tastes, the 
absence of quality content and of innovative artists” (see more on this in the 
Conclusion).  In the view of the CFI, the Commission did not even attempt to challenge 
or to check the submission by the parties as to the heterogeneous nature of their content. 
 
2) Transparency of the Recorded Music Market 
 
Transparency constituted the crucial part of the CFI’s criticism of the decision.  For 
example, in the Statement of Objections, the Commission set out that the proposed 
merger was incompatible with the common market because of the existing collective 
dominant position.  It also stated that the market for recorded music was transparent 
and particularly conducive to co-ordination.  Throughout the investigation lasting five 
months, the Commission’s view did not change.  Such a U-turn in the eventual decision 
surprised the CFI.776  It was only in the wake of the arguments presenting at hearings on 
15th and 16th June 2004 that, without carrying out any fresh market investigations, it 
adopted the opposite position and allowed the parties to go ahead with the merger. 
                                                
773 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 69. 
774 See the glossary for the definition of ‘campaign, file and invoice discounts’. 
775 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 150.  In paragraph 78, the Commission 
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776 The CFI stated that Commission had to justify the reasons for such a U-turn between the Statement of 
Objections and the final decision.  However, in an earlier case, T-210/01 - General Electric v. 
Commission, 14 December 2005 (unreported), at para 513, the CFI stated that Commission was under no 
obligation to explain U-turns from previous decisions from the same market.  
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The section on transparency in the original decision contained only three paragraphs, 
although according to the position defended by the Commission in its written 
submissions to the Court “in the present case transparency is the essential, and indeed 
the only, ground for the assertion that there is no collective dominant position in the 
market for recorded music”.777  It was not even concluded that the market was not 
transparent, or even that it was not sufficiently transparent to allow tacit collusion.  At 
the very most, the Commission stated that the monitoring of campaign discounts at 
album level “... could reduce transparency in the market and may make tacit collusion 
more difficult”.778  Arguably, such a vague assertion could not support the finding that 
the market was not sufficiently transparent to allow a collective dominant position, and 
details were lacking as regards the nature and operation of campaign discounts, their 
degree of opacity, their size and impact on price transparency.  Another inconsistency 
included the Commission itself noting that examining the way discounts were aligned 
was not a completely valid test to measure market transparency and saying that “even 
the alignment of discounts cannot demonstrate such transparency”.779 
 
Moreover, it was held by the Commission that the public nature of gross prices and the 
limited number of albums to be monitored were all capable of giving rise to a high level 
of transparency of prices.  The Commission went further to state that: “there are further 
devices in the market which increase transparency and could facilitate the monitoring 
of an agreement”,780 for example, hit charts and established relationships between 
retailers and majors.  It also acknowledged that Sony and BMG had set up a system of 
weekly reports, which included information on competitors.  It is these inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies that beg the question as to how the Commission reached their initial 
decision in the first place. 
 
In its assessment of the competitive dynamics in the recorded music market the 
Commission drew evidence from various countries and perhaps the example of how the 
questionnaires have been dealt with in Italy illustrates best how poor the Commission’s 
assessment was.  In the words of the CFI: “it is scarcely possible to understand how the 
Commission was able to consider that ‘a majority’ of the customers’ responses revealed 
that the majors had only ‘some knowledge’ of their competitors’ discounts, when 
                                                
777 Case T464/04 - Impala v. Commission, supra, n. 459, at para 289. 
778 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 111. 
779 Case T464/04 - Impala v. Commission, supra, n. 459, at para 306. 
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footnote 55 to the decision states that ‘five out of five of the Italian retailers which 
replied to the question said that majors are aware of each other’s PPDs and 
discounts”.781  Likewise, in the questionnaire used in France, footnote 49 states that 
“three out of four retailers said that majors were aware of each other’s PPDs and 
discounts”.782  In the view of the CFI: “all factors…far from demonstrating the opacity 
of the market, show on the contrary, that the market was transparent”.783 
 
It seems that the Commission made a valid point in front of the CFI in that price 
alignments, even of a considerable degree, may be quite common in the competitive 
structure of the market and thus do not necessarily constitute co-ordinated behaviour.784  
However, the Court set out:  
 
“... close alignment of prices over a long period, especially if they are above a 
competitive level, together with other factors typical of a collective dominant position, 
might, in the absence of an alternative reasonable explanation, suffice to demonstrate the 
existence of a collective dominant position, even where there is no firm direct evidence of 
strong market transparency, as such transparency may be presumed in such 
circumstances”.785   
 
Overall, the CFI gave the impression that the empirical evidence, which the 
Commission had at its disposal, was sufficient to establish past co-ordinated 
behaviour.786  This falling out between the Commission and the CFI over the 
importance of price alignments once again exemplifies how uncertain legal regulation 
is, particularly when there is no concrete evidence. 
 
3) Retaliatory Measures 
 
The CFI also pointed out that the Commission made a mistake in relying on the absence 
of evidence regarding retaliatory measures having been used in the past, whereas 
according to the case law, the mere existence of effective deterrent mechanisms is 
sufficient, since when the companies comply with the common policy there is no need 
to have recourse to sanctions.787  There was a real possibility of sanctioning a 
‘deviating’ major, as explained earlier, through excluding it from compilations and that 
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fact alone would have been sufficient in order to establish an effective deterrent 
mechanism.788  Interestingly, one of the reasons why the TimeWarner/EMI merger was 
withdrawn was that the Commission had highlighted the possibility of retaliatory 
measures in the recorded music market, such as exclusion from the compilations.  In 
2004 however, the Commission was unable to indicate ‘the slightest step’ it may have 
taken to assess if retaliation had occurred in the past.789  Since the CFI did not require 
the Commission to show instances of actual punishment of deviators in the past, it 
clearly lowered the threshold in proving collective dominance in this respect.  As 
indicated earlier, the collective dominance test in Airtours is very difficult to satisfy, 
particularly if the evidence is ambiguous; therefore, some lowering of the threshold 
seems to be a move in the right direction.   
 
As both the transparency issue and retaliatory measures constituted the essential 
grounds on which the Commission concluded that there was no collective dominant 
position, the CFI found that each of those errors would in itself constitute sufficient 
reason to annul the decision. 
 
4) Manifest Error of Assessment 
 
For the purpose of making a thorough judgment, the CFI also considered another of 
Impala’s claims, i.e. the manifest error of assessment.  As mentioned above, the 
Commission surprised the CFI at the U-turn between the Statement of Objections and 
the final ruling.  The CFI observed that even though the Statement of Objections was a 
preparatory document, it did not mean that the document was without merit or wholly 
irrelevant.  It stressed that the Commission should have at least explained its reasons for 
such a U-turn in the decision before the Court.   
 
The Commission was also reprimanded for having relied on the data presented by the 
parties’ economists based on their chosen methodology.  Moreover, the data prepared 
by those economic advisers to Sony and BMG was said to be unclear and unreliable. 
The CFI went on to discover even more contradictions in the decision.  This section 
provides just a few of them.  The Commission stated that a large number of albums 
priced at different list prices could complicate the monitoring of a tacit agreement.  
                                                
788 id., at paras 463-474. 
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However, it noted at a later stage that majors only needed to monitor the prices of a 
limited number of best selling albums to account for most of the sales: “data provided 
by Sony and BMG show that the top 20 titles each year account for at least the yearly 
sales for BMG in all countries except Germany”.790 
 
Even more faults were found in the questionnaires sent out to retailers during the 
Commission’s investigation.  For example, the questionnaire asked the following 
question: “according to the experience of your purchasing department, are record 
companies aware of their competitors’ PPDs and discounts?”  Only a tiny number of 
UK respondents gave the full answer, such as PPDs – yes, Discounts – no.  Most of the 
respondents replied simply: of course, absolutely, certainly, thus blurring the issue as to 
whether these responses were referring to PPDs or discounts.791  In the light of all those 
contradictions, it is not surprising that the CFI concluded that the evidence in the 
decision did not support the conclusions drawn from it,792 thus establishing that the case 
was vitiated by a manifest error of assessment. 
 
5.3.2.B.ii.  Impala Judgment: The Main Conclusions 
 
The Sony/BMG decision is the latest in a long line of overturned rulings.  It is 
extremely rare, however, for the CFI to overturn approved mergers.793  Normally, the 
CFI overturns prohibition decisions.794  Apart from creating even more legal 
uncertainty, this particular judgment is very interesting for the following reasons: 
 
1. An already joined company was facing a de-merger forced by law. 
2. The differences in approaches between EU and US merger tests. 
3. The grounds on which the CFI based its judgment. 
4. The effect this ruling will have on the record industry. 
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Firstly, the judgment broke new ground by potentially dismantling a joint venture that 
has been operating for two years, thus creating a spectrum of increased intervention and 
uncertainty after closed mergers and acquisitions.  Secondly, the judgment also 
demonstrates the potential difference in merger tests between EU and USA akin to the 
GE/Honeywell scenario, because the US authorities approved the Sony/BMG venture 
without the issuance of a Second Request.795  It is also interesting that the CFI ignored 
the fact that the Sony/BMG joint venture had received the regulatory approval in the US 
by the FTC. 
 
There are a number of positive points about the CFI’s ruling, for example, without 
Impala, the ‘poor’ ruling on the Sony/BMG merger would not have been opposed.  The 
judgment arguably represented the most significant development in the concept of 
collective dominance since Airtours.  Importantly, in its judgment, the CFI showed that 
it was not imposing too a high standard of proof for the Commission, and the latter was 
perfectly able to meet such standard.796  Overall, this ruling created good dynamics 
between majors and independents.  The CFI made an important point in rejecting the 
premise that a significant fall in demand for recorded music on CDs was a reason for a 
merger.  This goes in line with the US reasoning in Warner/PolyGram in that financial 
weakness of the parties could not justify a merger.  Thus, in the future, majors will not 
(or should not) be able to justify their mergers on grounds of financial difficulties.  
 
Another positive outcome of the CFI’s ruling is that in future the Commission is likely 
to demand more evidence from the merging companies, and take third party objections 
more seriously.  Having said that, third parties often, being the competitors, seek to 
improve their own market position in an anti-competitive way.797  In Impala’s case, it 
does not look as if they opposed the Sony/BMG merger to create legal uncertainty, and 
consequently it cannot be argued that Impala sought to improve its market position in an 
anti-competitive way.  It could be argued that there is a fine line between being a 
competitor opposing a merger and being an impartial party doing so in the interests of 
                                                
795 See the glossary for the definition of ‘Second Request’.   
796 Van Rompuy Ben and Pauwels Caroline, “Is the Standard of Proof Imposed by the Community Courts 
Undermining the Efficiency of EC Merger Control? The Sony BMG Joint Venture Case in Perspective.” 
EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, May 17 – 19, 2007, at pp. 1 – 33. 
797 Preston McAfee and Nicholas Vakkur, “The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws.” Journal of 
Strategic Management Education 2 (2005): 3 - 21.  Often firms use the competition policy to defend their 
profit-maximising interests.  See William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, “Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition.” Journal of Law & Economics 28 (1985): 247 – 266.  
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competition.798  This distinction is something that would need to be taken into 
consideration by the Commission in the future.  
 
Regarding the future of the record industry and what this CFI’s ruling may mean to both 
majors and independents, the judgment seems to have had little effect on the overall 
trend towards more concentration in the record industry.  In the words of Patrick 
Zelnick, the Impala v. Commission was “a watershed in European Affairs, a landmark 
judgment for music.  There is no doubt that it will block any further mergers and will 
transform how music and other creative sectors are treated”.799  But will it indeed do so?  
As will be demonstrated in the following section, the Commission has given the second 
approval to the Sony/BMG merger.800  In a hypothetical but nevertheless common 
scenario where a major is acquiring a small, medium or even large-sized independent 
label, would that major record company be required to clear the acquisition with the 
Commission?  It seems unlikely.  Nevertheless, such acquisitions happen on an almost 
daily basis without the need of the Commission’s involvement.  Ironically, one year on 
after the CFI judgment, Universal, the biggest major record company in the world, in 
addition to acquiring the BMG publishing catalogue (with regulatory clearance), also 
acquired eight independent record labels801 including Sanctuary Records802 and V2803 in 
the UK, two iconic independent labels, without any regulatory procedures applying.  
The year of 2008 saw another acquisition of an independent label, 679 by Warner 
                                                
798 As mentioned earlier, the basic premise of competition law is to protect competition, not competitors.  
See Eleanor M. Fox, “We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors.” World Competition 26, no. 2 
(2003): 149; Sven Volcker and Cormac O’Daly, “The Court of First Instance's Impala Judgment: A 
Judicial Counter-Reformation in EU Merger Control?” European Competition Law Review 11 (2006): 
589 – 596.  Soon after its victory at the CFI, Impala challenged Universal’s acquisition of the BMG’s 
music publishing catalogue, albeit unsuccessfully.  See Impala, “Impala Launches Consultation on 
Universal BMG Music Publishing Merger Concerns.” November 13, 2006; Impala, “Impala Welcomes 
Second Stage Investigation into Universal BMG Music Publishing Merger.” December 8, 2006; Impala, 
“Impala Statement on EC Approval of Universal BMG.” May 22, 2007; and Impala, “Impala Challenges 
Universal’s Creeping Dominance and Asks EC to Examine Sale of Publishing Assets.” October 8, 2007. 
799 Impala, “European Court Annuls Sony/BMG Merger. Independents Win Landmark Judgment.” July 
13, 2006.   
800 European Competition Commission, “Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval of Recorded Music 
Joint Venture between Sony and Bertelsmann after Re-assessment Subsequent to Court Decision.” 
October 03, 2007. 
801 The labels are Vale Music in Spain, ARS in Belgium, Magic in Poland, Lionheart in Sweden, Rounder 
Records in the UK.  See also Impala (October 8, 2007), supra, n. 798. 
802 Lars Brandle, “UMG Seals Sanctuary Buyout Deal,” The Billboard, August 02, 2007.  This acquisition 
was followed by an immediate closure of Sanctuary’s UK record business.  Instead, Universal 
concentrated on the management of artists and merchandising activities.  See Richard Wray, “Record 
Breaker UK Label Closes,” The Guardian, September 6, 2007; Clare Matheson, “Music Giants Change 
Their Tune,” BBC, September 13, 2007. 
803 Ed Christman, “UMG to Acquire V2 from Morgan Stanley,” The Billboard, August 10, 2007. 
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Music804 and the acquisition of Spanish label Univision by Universal without any 
regulatory consent.805  Therefore, it seems that there is no stopping Universal’s and 
other majors’ appetite for growth.  There are other variations to the above scenario that 
entail expansion and growth that do not involve direct acquisition of independent labels.  
A major can instead sign numerous financing, licensing and distribution agreements 
with independents, which blur the idea of what an independent label is these days (as 
discussed in Chapter 3; some independents eagerly sign such deals, whereas others 
simply do not have a choice).  That explains why even in the digital era the market 
share of the independents decreases, while the market share of the majors is on the rise.  
Thus, so far competition law has clearly not provided a solution for independents as it 
has failed to prevent high record industry concentration. 
 
5.3.2.C.  The Commission’s Second Approval of Sony/BMG 
 
Following the CFI’s annulment of the Commission’s decision, it was sent back to the 
Commission for re-assessment of the merger under the market conditions for 2007.  In 
October 2007, the Commission confirmed clearance under the ECMR for the creation of 
SonyBMG.806 
 
5.3.2.C.i. Legal Critique of the Approval 
 
It must be stated that this time around it seems that the Commission did indeed 
undertake a complex analysis of the merger, which is reflected in the length of the 
ruling, some 339 pages, compared to the 54 pages of the original decision.  The 
Commission took on board the remarks and criticism made in the CFI’s judgment in 
considering whether the alleged collective dominant position was supported by any 
factual evidence.  In this respect, Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes, noted: “this 
investigation represents one of the most thorough analyses of complex information ever 
                                                
804 The Record of the Day, “Warner Music UK Acquires 679 Recordings.” January 21, 2008. 
805 Michele Gershberg and Gerald McCormick, “Universal Music Buys Univision’s Music Unit,” 
Reuters, February 28, 2008. 
806 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460.  See also European Competition Commission, 
“Mergers: Commission Confirms Approval of Recorded Music Joint Venture between Sony and 
Bertelsmann after Re-assessment Subsequent to Court Decision.” October 03, 2007; Nic Fildes, “Outcry 
as EC Greenlights SonyBMG Merger,” The Independent, October 4, 2007; and Katie Allen, “SonyBMG 
Merger Cleared by Brussels,” The Guardian, October 3, 2007. 
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undertaken by the Commission in a merger procedure”.807  The complex information 
included the vast numbers of econometric data analysing all net prices, discounts and 
wholesale prices for all CD chart albums sold by all major record companies in the EU 
between 2002 and 2006.  Thus, in order to investigate whether the merger might 
significantly impede effective competition in the recorded music market, the 
Commission used the same, albeit very complex, economics-based analysis.   
  
What is important in terms of the argument of this thesis is that in its approval ruling, 
the Commission decided that the economics-based approach was not enough and took 
into account non-price co-ordination in relation to such matters as “access to airplay, 
chart rules, release dates, and alleged negative impact on cultural diversity”.808  Having 
said that, the Commission was still reluctant to even use the term cultural diversity, and 
in fact it was used only four times in the approval (see the discussion of such a position 
below).   
 
Naturally, in the second investigation, more attention was given to recorded music in 
digital formats and its on-line licensing.  In 2007 the digital market was still an 
emerging market as it amounted to between 2 percent and 6 percent of all music sales in 
the 15 EU Member States.809  However, the Commission emphasised that the digital 
market has evolved significantly since the year of 2004 and represented a ‘dynamic 
market’.810  Hence, in the opinion of the Commission, problems that existed in 2004 
were not so relevant in 2007, e.g. the majors’ restrictive licensing behaviour in 2001 and 
associated with it US antitrust investigation (see more in Chapter 4).  The Commission 
noted that, as of 2003, the majors started to license their digital content to third 
parties.811  The word ‘their’ is crucial because similarly to the first decision, the 
Commission focussed on the ease of access to the majors’ content by third parties.  It 
did not go into the discussion of access to different content by different labels, i.e. 
preventing content uniformity. 
 
                                                
807 European Competition Commission, id. 
808 id. 
809 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at para 43. 
810 id., at para 79. 
811 id., at para 47. 
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Similarly to the first decision, the Commission stated that the content accessed in a 
digital format was highly heterogeneous as every release was unique.812  It seems that 
when assessing whether the nature of the majors’ content was diverse, the Commission 
again blindly took on board the information submitted by the parties.813  Unfortunately, 
very few comments can be made on the issue of content diversity, as the data on 
SonyBMG’s new releases in 2006 was confidential.814  Having said that, the 
Commission stated that 90 percent of chart material originated from the majors815 and 
that the supply of digital content by majors in the EU was 85 percent, whilst 
independents accounted for 15 percent.816  It is strange, to say the least, that the number 
of chart hits (rather than diversity) was the main yardstick for the Commission.  By 
contrast, as mentioned before, there were only four mentions of ‘cultural diversity’ in 
the approval compared to countless mentions of ‘hits’. 
 
However, in contrast to the first decision, in the approval, the Commission paid far 
greater attention to independent labels.  For example, it found that the digital sector 
created growth opportunities for the independents too.817  It is possible to agree that the 
digital sector creates more opportunities for independents, but they are unlikely to be 
described as growth opportunities.  There is no doubt that the Internet represents a more 
level playing field between the majors and independents, but in the Commission’s own 
words “promotion activities, signing up of new artists, vertical integration and 
international presence imply that majors will be more able to exploit a given record”.818  
Obviously, the independents can upload their music on iTunes via a rights aggregator, 
but there are about 10 million songs in the iTunes store819 and unless there is a good and 
costly PR, TV and radio marketing campaign, it is very difficult to be noticed by the 
consumers.  Thus, it seems that the Commission has over-simplified the increasing role 
of the Internet, and it did not come as a surprise when the Commission found no co-
ordinated effects amongst the majors.  It is not to say that the Commission acted 
                                                
812 id., at para 50. 
813 id., at para 117. 
814 id., at para 507, table 14. 
815 id., at para 54. 
816 id., at para 82. 
817 id., at para 55. 
818 id., at para 91. 
819 id., at para, para 427.  The Commission stated the figure of 6 million songs for 2007.  The data for 
2009 informs that there are now about 10 million songs on iTunes.  See Bobbie Johnson, “Apple Drops 
DRM Copy Protection from Millions of iTunes Songs,” The Guardian, January 6, 2009.  
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unlawfully, but rather its analysis lacked the necessary depth into the problem of online 
sales.   
 
The next step was to assess whether the merger has led to a creation or strengthening of 
a collective dominance on the wholesale market for licensing of music to digital music 
providers.  In order to carry out the assessment, the Commission’s market investigation 
examined to what extent the majors had aligned price levels in their contracts with 
digital music providers, and if such alignment had taken place, then was it because of 
the co-ordination between the majors or was it more to do with the high bargaining 
power of Apple (in relation to iTunes)?  Here, once again the Commission has 
employed the tripartite Airtours test.   
 
1) Transparency of Prices in Digital Markets 
 
What worried the Commission the most were the uniform prices in digital markets.  
However, as the market investigation showed, it was the Apple corporation that was in 
control of setting the prices at 0.99 Euro, and therefore, it was outside of the majors’ 
control.820  Secondly, the Commission found that the rapidity of new entrants and string 
of changing business models resulted in a lot of uncertainty in the digital market,821 and 
as such price-fixing was not an issue.822 
 
2) Retaliatory Measures 
 
The Commission could not find an example of how retaliation could take place in the 
digital world given the nascent stage of the digital market,823 but for the sake of 
completeness it turned to examining the physical formats.  It was held that with respect 
to compilation releases, their success depended on the popularity of the songs included 
in them, and therefore excluding “a major from a compilation could potentially hurt the 
retaliating majors more than the deviating major”.824  The Commission also cited 
another reason in support for deeming compilations relatively unimportant was that in 
the digital world, the customers preferred to create their own compilations.825  That 
                                                
820 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at paras 51, 70, 71. 
821 id., at paras 56 – 58. 
822 id., at para 132. 
823 id., at para 139. 
824 id., at para 140. 
825 id., at para 456. 
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seems logical and correct, but in the same ruling the Commission noted that the CD 
market still accounted for about 82 percent of global music sales,826 and therefore 
compilations still constituted an important part in the record business.  To support its 
conclusion as to the lack of retaliation mechanism, the Commission used an example of 
Universal unilaterally reducing the prices of 1500 albums in 2006 without any 
retaliation by the remaining majors.827 
 
3) Countervailing Abilities 
 
In the previous sections, the Commission stated that owing to the Internet, independents 
had a more level playing field.  However, when the Commission got down to assessing 
the countervailing abilities, it noted, “independents exert only limited competitive 
pressure on the majors, in particular as they produce a relatively small number of chart 
hits which are very important for digital music services”.828  Seemingly, independent 
labels offered little challenge to any potential co-ordination.  With regards to the 
countervailing power of customers, it was rightly noted that Apple however, had a 
certain market power to react to potential co-ordination amongst the majors.829 
 
Based on the above analysis, the Commission has ruled out the creation or 
strengthening of a collective dominance in the market for digital distribution of music. 
 
For the sake of the fullness of the market investigation, the Commission also analysed 
price developments for the period from 2004 - 2007 on the basis of data received from 
the majors and the market share calculated by the IFPI.  The investigation into the retail 
prices for downloads showed that they were fairly standardised830 due to the strong 
bargaining power of Apple.  
 
Investigating recorded music in the physical format the Commission also noticed that 
the majors’ market shares have been relatively stable in the EU countries from 2000 – 
2006,831 however there was an unclear trend in terms of the digital age when in the 
majority of the EU countries, independents have lost their market shares (for more see 
                                                
826 id., at para 443. 
827 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at para 142. 
828 id., at para 145. 
829 id., at para 146. 
830 id., at para 166. 
831 id., at para  411. 
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above on page 82).  The Commission noted that the combined strength of independents 
varied from 42 percent in Portugal to 10 percent in Ireland.832  The country-by-country 
analysis also showed that independents in the majority of the EU Member States 
continued to lose their market share,833 as is now also happening in the digital age.  
Therefore, the Commission overlooked the paradox that in the digital age, the market 
share of the independents has actually diminished.  This should be seen in direct 
contrast to the Commission’s findings that the Internet provides a more level playing 
field for the independents. 
 
Importantly in terms of this thesis, the Commission for the first time considered the 
impact of the merger on artists and subsequently, cultural diversity.834  In doing so, the 
Commission examined the way in which majors handle and limit their catalogues and 
national repertoire, as well as focusing on promoting a tiny number of Anglo-American 
superstars through increasingly narrow retail channels, all of which affect consumer 
choice.835  It was revealed that SonyBMG did significantly reduce their artist rosters,836 
but so did the other majors due to the decline in demand for a physical format.  It was 
also noted that major record companies often sought to sign successful artists away 
from the independents they were contracted to because “majors are generally able to 
offer them better financial conditions”.837  The Commission also noted that several 
artists have managed to become very successful through the Internet without the support 
of record companies, citing the examples of Sandi Thom, Lily Allen and the Arctic 
Monkeys.838   However, what the Commission’s market investigation did not show was 
the well-documented fact that Sandi Thom was not a self-made Internet star, as had 
been publicised.  In fact she had a £1million contract with RCA and cleverly used 
media stunts masterminded by her PR company.839  Similarly, Lily Allen had a deal 
with Parlophone first, and then used a PR company to create a buzz about her success 
                                                
832 id., at para  414. 
833 For the countries where the market share of independents has diminished see id., at para 662 - the UK; 
para 799 - France; para 933 - Spain; para 997 - Austria; para 1054 - Belgium; para 1170 - Greece; para 
1223 – Ireland; para 1443 – Finland; para 1497 – Sweden.  However, in some countries, the 
independents’ market share was on the increase: para 733 - Germany; para 1117 - Denmark; para 1277 - 
The Netherlands; para 1333 – Norway; para 1388 – Portugal.   
834 id., at para 415. 
835 id. 
836 id., at para 416.  The numbers are confidential. 
837 id., at para 420. 
838 id., at para  422. 
839 Owen Gibson, “An Internet Superstar or Just Another Rock’n’Roll Swindle?” The Guardian, May 31, 
2006; Daniel Melia, “Sandi Thom Revealed as a PR Stunt?” Entertainment Wise, May 30, 2006. 
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on MySpace.840  The same sort of background applies to the popular success of the 
Arctic Monkeys.  These stories show how difficult it is for artists to break into the 
market and compete with highly promoted stars without the support of the record 
company.  They also show that in some instances the Commission’s investigation has 
not gone far enough and in some instances it could be said to be superfluous.  
 
Nevertheless, based on its findings, the Commission concluded that the merger would 
not affect negatively cultural diversity at the level of music creation.841  It is possible to 
agree that the merger would not have any impact on music creation; rather it is the 
diversity of the content delivered to the consumers that would be impacted upon.  
Moreover, it was noted that the merger had no negative impact on cultural diversity at 
the level of retail and distribution, as iTunes in Europe alone had about 10 million 
songs.842  Once again, as explained earlier, it is relatively easy to upload content on to 
iTunes, what is difficult is spreading the word about it.  In this sense, the digital world is 
not necessarily that much easier for the independents than the physical world. 
 
Moving to the analysis of CD prices, the Commission noted that, “the PPDs of each 
album change several times within the life cycle of an album, leading to great 
difficulties for competitors to monitor this evolution of price”.843  It was also shown that 
the PPDs were no longer published along sales charts in the majority of the EU Member 
States.844  However, 84 percent of the independent respondents in the market 
investigation thought that the PPDs were transparent as they still could be accessed via 
catalogues sent and the weekly updates that the majors e-mail out to retailers with 
information about new releases.845  About 61 percent of the respondents stated that 
majors were aware of each other’s PPDs.846  The Commission validly pointed out that 
standard pricing was not unusual and that in fact many industries display a similarity in 
pricing for similar products, which has been seen in practice to be the case.  It does, 
however, highlight the need to consider the importance of non-price issues in terms of 
the record industry (see the discussion below).   
 
                                                
840 Gibson, id. 
841 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at para 426. 
842 id., at para 427. 
843 id., at para 462. 
844 id., at para 463. 
845 id., at para 466. Each e-mail contained information about the PPD. 
846 id., at para 467. 
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Furthermore, the Commission then moved to investigating the transparency of the 
discounts in the physical market.  This time it was stated that file, campaign, and 
retrospective discounts were the most important discounts.847  However, unlike in the 
original decision, there was no mention of any invoice discounts.  Nor was there any 
explanation as to why invoice discounts were no longer considered important.  Upon 
investigation of the discount policies, the Commission concluded that there was no 
discount transparency.848  
 
Having carried out a country-by-country analysis, the Commission held that the joint 
venture of Sony/BMG was compatible with the common market.  Similarly to the first 
ruling, the merger was cleared unconditionally.849 
 
5.3.2.C.ii.  The SonyBMG Re-Approval: The Main Conclusions Regarding 
Cultural Diversity and the Importance of Non-Price Factors 
 
This part focuses on the most important issue in terms of this study, which finally 
received some acknowledgement in the Commission’s assessment, i.e. the non-price 
considerations. 
 
In order to examine the market for recorded music, the Commission also carried out an 
in-depth market investigation, contacting customers and competitors in the 15 EU 
Member Sates.850  Part of the investigation included scrutiny of co-ordination at the 
level of non-price issues.851  The point deserves special attention in this work being the 
first time that the Commission paid attention to non-price factors in the mergers 
between record companies, namely limiting independents’ access to retailers and 
foreclosing independent competitors from access to airplay.   
 
With respect to retailer access, the market investigation showed that any shelf space 
allocation was the decision of the retailers and was based “... on the perception of 
                                                
847 id., at para 477. 
848 id., at para 486. 
849 In the past, the Commission approved a number of mergers based on certain conditions that the newly 
created entity was obliged to follow.  See for example, Case NoIV/M.2050 - Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram 
[2000] OJ C 311/3 and Case No COMP/M.1845 - AOL / Time Warner [2001] OJ L268/28. 
850 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at paras 525-6. 
851 id., at para 532. 
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potential sales of each album.  Record companies can have an influence by promoting 
albums and proposing high rebates, like in any industry, although the final decision 
remains within the staff of the retailer”.852  The Commission seems to have rightly 
found no co-ordination in such an approach.  The market investigation also showed the 
same conditions for both majors and independents to access the shelf space: 
“independents do not have more difficulties than major record companies in gaining 
access to shelf space and promotion space”.853  The paradox of this is that, on the one 
hand, it was stated that independents have the same chances of obtaining the shelf space 
as majors, but at the same time it is the retailer who makes the decision on the 
perception of potential sales.  In the majority of cases, the potential sales will be higher 
with a major record company, as not every independent label can afford to pay huge 
amounts of money for the display, TV, and radio advertising etc.  In fact, the 
Commission itself confirmed this by stating that, “it is logical from their [the retailers’] 
perspective to grant major record companies better access to shelf space, as they 
produce more hits selling large volumes”.854  It may be equally possible to access retail 
space for independents but it certainly is more expensive, and in most cases 
independents are unlikely to guarantee vast sales. 
 
The problem of potential sales is also present in obtaining airplay.  At the interview 
stage of this study, there were a couple of open questions about the positive and 
negative impacts of high concentration within the record industry.  Interestingly, a 
number of respondents came up with similar answers, particularly on the subject of how 
difficult it is for the independents to obtain airplay.  Two respondents provided nearly 
the same examples with BBC Radio 1: “when a record company goes to Radio 1, it is 
being asked how big is the budget for a particular song, how much does the video cost 
etc?”855  In the words of Keith Harris: “All that Radio 1 needs to ask itself is whether 
the song is good?  What has a budget got to do with a good song?”856 
 
The Commission’s market research rightly showed that most successful radio stations 
broadcast music on the basis of a playlist: 
 
                                                
852 id., at para 606. 
853 id., at para 607. 
854 id., at para 610. 
855 Interview with Janine Irons, supra, n. 342. 
856 Interview with Keith Harris, supra, n. 370. 
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“As for the access to retail space, majors have a privileged access to radio play, 
reflecting the number of hits they release every year.  It has also been submitted by one 
competitor that radio programmers prefer to work with the majors as they propose hits 
regularly, as opposed to the independents who propose one or two hits a year.  
Similarly one competitor submitted that majors have the financial capacity to advertise 
hits on TV or on radio, therefore increasing the demand for advertised titles and 
ultimately the likelihood that radio programmers put these titles on their play lists”857 
(emphasis added). 858   
 
Following that, the Commission set out that the combined airplay for independents 
increased in 10 out of the 15 EU Member States: in some countries the airplay increased 
by 1 percent (Italy and Norway), in others by a maximum of 7 percent (Denmark and 
Sweden).859  Having considered such an important non-price issue as access to radio 
plays in just three paragraphs, the Commission concluded that there was no co-
ordinated approach from major record companies with regard to airplay access.860  It 
seems that there is indeed no co-ordination among the majors in this respect, but the 
reason of why they manage to obtain easier access to airplay lies in their market power, 
i.e. their high concentration.  Therefore, the Sony/BMG merger gave the parties a 
doubling of power to obtain both airplay and increased shelf space.  It is unfortunate 
that the Commission did not look into that. 
 
Thus, what seemed to be a promising start in the competition law development, turned 
out to be mere ‘surface treatment’ and an under-researched investigation into crucially 
important factors for the record industry.  The Sony/BMG saga illustrated just how 
inadequate the merger regulation is in terms of preserving the competitive dynamics in 
the record industry.  As this thesis focuses on competition law generally, the next 
chapter examines whether SMEs in cultural industries can seek redress under Articles 
81 & 82 of the EC Treaty and from national trade offices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
857 Case No COMP/M.3333-Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at para 612. 
858 id., at para 611 
859 id., at para 613, footnote 191. 
860 id., at para 614. 
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Chapter 6: Articles 81 & 82 of the EC Treaty and Other Legal 
Tools Accommodating the Diversity of Products and 
Producers 
 
The previous discussion identified that the EU merger regulation is orientated towards 
economic rather than cultural elements, with the main outcome being that both merger 
regulation and competition authorities have failed in preventing high concentration 
within cultural industries.  Since the thesis is concerned with competition law overall, 
and not only merger regulation, this chapter will concentrate on other legal paths that 
could potentially protect producer and cultural diversity at the EU level, for example, 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.  To date, Article 81 has had only marginal 
application in terms of the record industry.  Therefore another cultural industry, namely 
the book publishing industry, was taken as an example to demonstrate the potential 
hurdles in protecting cultural diversity.  For example, what would happen if a number of 
independent labels enter into a restrictive agreement in a certain territory?  Could 
cultural needs be an exemption under Article 81(3) (discussed below)?  The chapter will 
also consider the avenue of filing complaints to Member States’ national trading bodies.  
 
At present, as described above there is ‘structure-related’ merger analysis under the 
ECMR which looks at the future position (a forecast), but there is also the conduct-
related analysis of anti-competitive agreements, i.e. Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 
(previously Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty) which looks at the position already 
created (a retrospective analysis).  The latter, retrospective test is a possible legal tool 
that could accommodate the issues concerning the diversity of musical products and 
producers.  
 
One of the original principles and aims of the EU was the protection of undistorted 
competition throughout its territory.  Recently, however, additional objectives have 
been introduced into the EC Treaty including Community policies that are not directly 
connected with the protection of competition, but are nevertheless considered crucial for 
the Community.  These include policies regarding consumer and culture protection (see 
further below).  It is, therefore, appropriate to analyse how Article 81 is placed to deal 
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with such consumer and culture protection and whether it could provide some redress 
where cultural issues are involved.   
 
6.1. Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
 
This section begins with a discussion of the provisions of Article 81 followed by a case 
study of book price-fixing to demonstrate the tension that exists between competition 
law and non-economic considerations such as culture and cultural diversity.   
 
Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty prohibits the following, as being incompatible with the 
common market: 
“all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market”.861   
 
Article 81(2) states that any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to Article 81(1) 
shall be automatically void.  However, if an agreement falls within Article 81(1), it may 
not be void if it can satisfy certain conditions as set out in Article 81(3), which provides 
exemption on the basis that: 
i) an agreement contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, 
ii) while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
iii) does not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and 
iv) does not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
 
Thus, competition authorities may exempt a potentially restrictive agreement if it 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical and economic progress and enabling consumers to benefit from it.  These first 
two hurdles in particular open the door to public interest considerations (discussed 
below in this section).  The provision relating to the imposition of restrictions signifies 
                                                
861 The Treaty establishing the European Community, 25 March 1957. 
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that an agreement should not contain any restrictions that are not indispensable, which 
could, for example, be price-fixing.  Importantly, all four conditions must be satisfied 
for an agreement to be exempted from prohibition.862  In addition, the resulting benefit 
should be something that manifests across the whole of the European Union, not just the 
parties involved in the agreement.863   
 
Similarly to the reasons for the introduction of the new ECMR, having faced much 
criticism on its application of Article 81, the Commission adopted a White Paper on 
Modernisation of Articles 81 and 82.864  The White Paper suggested the decentralisation 
of power enabling national authorities to grant exemptions to potentially anti-
competitive agreements under Article 81(3).  Another important feature of the White 
Paper was that non-economic political considerations could not be assessed under 
Article 81(3) (see the discussion below).  In addition to the White Paper, in 2004 the 
Commission adopted the Article 81(3) Guidelines,865 which re-emphasised the 
importance of economic analysis.  However, the guidelines also mentioned an 
assessment by the Commission of the “likely impact of agreements on price, output, 
innovation, the variety or quality of goods and services”.866 
 
What is important to note here is that there is no explicit mention in the text of Article 
81(3) of any non-economic concerns, such as culture, variety, innovation but the 
Commission’s own clarifications and explanations on Article 81’s application suggest 
the need to consider these wider non-economic considerations.  These issues have, 
understandably, created some tension in the interpreting and applying of Article 
81(3).867   
 
It is therefore difficult to asses what ‘benefit’ under Article 81(3) can exempt a 
restriction of competition under Article 81(1).  This question is not an easy one as a 
balancing act is required between the objectives of competition law with that of the 
                                                
862 See joined cases T-528/93 - Metropole Television SA v. Commission [1996] 5 CMLR 386, at para 93. 
863 Richard Whish, Competition Law (London: Butterworths, 2001), 125 and Cases 56/64 and 58/64 
Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] CMLR 418, at p. 478; and BT Astra SA [1994] 5 CMLR 226, 
at para 22. 
864 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 81 and 82, [1999] 5 CMLR 208. 
865 Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/97. 
866 See para 24 of the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  For more details see Jonathan Faull and Ali Nikpay, The 
EC Law of Competition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 265. 
867 See for example, Okeoghene Odudu, “A New Economic Approach to Article 81(1)?” European Law 
Review 27, no. 1 (2002): 100 – 105.  
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other goals of the Community (which, in principle, are unrelated to the protection of 
competition, as such).  The debate also involves another important issue as to whether it 
should be the Commission or the national competition authorities who decide on these 
other goals of the Community?868 
 
With respect to Article 81, the test in ascertaining whether or not an agreement is anti-
competitive, is one of economic efficiency.869  However, economic efficiency is not the 
only objective that is taken into account by the Commission.  Occasionally, the 
Commission has taken on board other goals of the Community, e.g. the protection of 
small and medium-sized enterprises and cultural diversity.870  Such ‘dilution’ of Article 
81 arose primarily when the Treaty of Maastricht (1991) added to the EC Treaty a 
number of crucial non-economic considerations into the EU constitutional tasks, for 
example, environmental protection (Articles 6, 174 – 176), industrial policy (Article 
157), social policy and cohesion (Articles 158 – 162), employment (Article 127(2)) and 
culture (Article 151(4)) amongst them, the latter being noteworthy here.  Thus, the 
controversial Treaty of Maastricht not only had a political angle but also added a 
cultural dimension to EU competition law.871   
 
Article 151(4) provides that “the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in 
its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to 
promote the diversity of its cultures”.  It would therefore follow that Article 151(4) 
should be considered when interpreting the assessment of potential anti-competitive 
agreements under Article 81.  Article 151(4) makes it clear that the competition law 
decision makers ought to take cultural issues on board, but the problem is that it does 
not state exactly how or to what extent.  One could also ask whether or not competition 
law could accommodate a cultural exception at all?  The legal profession, namely the 
lawyers trying to follow a narrower interpretation of the legislation, may find it difficult 
to balance the competition goals of Article 81 with the non-economic goals of the 
                                                
868 For more see Whish, supra, n. 863, at p. 125 and Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy.” 
Common Market Law Review 39, no 5 (2002): 1057. 
869 Economic efficiency and welfare are implicitly recognised in Article 81(3), which states that 
potentially restrictive agreements may be exempted if ‘they improve the production and distribution of 
goods or promote technical or economic progress’.  See also Motta, supra, n. 671, at p. 45. 
870 id., at pp. 16 - 17. 
871 Christoph Schmid, “Diagonal Competence Conflicts between European Competition Law and 
National Regulation – A Conflict of Laws Reconstruction of the Dispute on Book Price Fixing.” 
European Review of Private Law 1 (2000): 156 -7. 
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EU.872  The reasons provided below explain why the supporters of the narrow 
interpretation of Article 81(1) have every right to defend their position. 
 
6.1.1. Proponents of ‘Pure’ Competition Law or Its Narrow Interpretation  
 
The narrow and legalistic view of reading Article 81(3) involves an assessment of the 
improvements of economic efficiency in a given agreement.  In doing so the 
Commission, of course, aims to protect public interests too, but to what extent?  Some 
scholars and practitioners insist that there is no room for exercising discretion under 
Article 81(3), i.e. non-competition considerations should play no role in the protection 
of competition between Member States.  The others opine that although non-
competition issues should not be imported into Article 81(3), they should be dealt with 
‘at arm’s length’.873  The purists insist that the inclusion of other Community goals into 
Article 81(3) would weaken both its direct effect874 and ‘justiciability’;875 it is also 
argued that non-competition concerns alone would not be able to “redeem an agreement 
as anti-competitive”.876  Moreover, it is contended that had non-competition concerns 
been taken on board under Article 81(3), those third parties that pursue their own 
interests from time to time, would be able to jeopardise the impartiality of competition 
law.  Finally, another sound argument for a narrow definition is that it offers better legal 
and commercial certainty because competition law impacts very much on the economy, 
and markets would rather see stability and predictability.  These are all valid concerns 
and arguments.  However, firstly, the EU competition law has not provided a definition 
of what ‘economical efficiency’ is;877 therefore this test, akin to the ECMR, is also 
uncertain in its application.  Secondly, there is always a danger for the Commission to 
be influenced by pressure from third parties, even under the economic efficiency test.  
Nevertheless, presently, the Commission insists on a narrow interpretation of Article 
81(3):  
                                                
872 id., at p. 165. 
873 Assimakis P. Komninos, “Non-Competition Concerns: Resolution of Conflicts in the Integrated 
Article 81 EC.” The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper, (L) 
08/2005. 
874 Direct effect signifies that any court or tribunal can apply the law.  
875 See Ulrich Immenga, “Coherence: A Sacrifice of Decentralisation?” in European Competition Law 
Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy, ed. Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 355. 
876 Komninos, supra, n. 873, at p. 8. 
877 Damien Geradin, “Efficiency Claims in EC Competition Law and Sector-Specific Regulation.” The 
Social Science Research Network  (2004): 4.   
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“…the structure of Article 81 is such as to prevent greater use being made of this 
approach [the need to ensure consistency between competition policy and other 
Community policies]: if more systematic use were made under Article 81(1) of an 
analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive aspects of a restrictive agreement, Article 81(3) 
would be cast aside, whereas any such change could be made only through revision of 
the Treaty. It would at the very least be paradoxical to cast aside Article 81(3) when that 
provision in fact contains all the elements of a ‘rule of reason’.  It would moreover be 
dangerous if modernisation of the competition rules were to be based on developments 
in decision-making practice, subject to such developments being upheld by the 
Community Courts.  Any such approach would mean that modernisation was contingent 
upon the cases submitted to the Commission and could take many years.  Lastly, this 
option would run the risk of diverting Article 81(3) from its purpose, which is to provide 
a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow 
application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations” 
(emphasis added). 878 
 
This passage confirms that the Commission is prepared to consider some balancing 
between the pro- and anti-competitive economic aspects of an agreement under Article 
81(1).  However, it clearly states that the agreements should be assessed only under 
Article 81(3) exemptions.879  As such it would follow that non-economic considerations 
should not be the primary factor in deciding how to carry out an assessment under 
Article 81 (3), although such considerations do not seem to be precluded from being 
taken into account.880 
 
Similarly, in its Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81, the Commission noted 
that: “the four conditions of Article 81(3) are…exhaustive….  Goals pursued by other 
Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed 
under the four conditions of Article 81(3)”.881   
 
6.1.2. Proponents of the Wider Reading of Article 81(3) 
 
Despite the Commission’s desire to read the provisions of Article 81(3) narrowly, there 
are supporters of a wider application882 the Article.  The proponents of the broader 
                                                
878 See the White Paper, supra, n. 864, at para 57. 
879 Claus Dieter Ehlermann, “The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: A Legal and Cultural 
Revolution.” Common Market Law Review 37 (2000): 549. 
880 id. 
881 Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 
[2001] OJ C 3/2, at para 42.  See also Lars Kjolbye, “The New Commission Guidelines on the 
Application of Article 81(3): An Economic Approach to Article 81.” European Competition Law Review 
9 (2004): 571. 
882 For example, Jonathan Faull noted that social policy could ‘reasonably credibly’ be brought within 
Article 81 (3).  Also cited in Whish, supra, n. 863, at p. 125, footnote 6.  For more details see Rein 
Wesseling, “The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Unspoken 
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interpretation of Article 81(3) insist that the latter should be more than just about the 
assessment of economic efficiency and it could take into account other goals of the 
Community.  Their basis for defending such a position can be found in Article 151(4), 
which states that: “the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action 
under other provisions of this Treaty”.  Therefore, Article 81 could be interpreted as 
other provisions of the EC Treaty.  
 
These other goals of the EC Treaty clearly have far reaching consequences, and have 
been argued as being as important, if not more important, than the improvement of 
economic efficiency.883  Going back to the issues raised in Chapter 1, the inclusion of 
culture into the EC Treaty is characterised through balancing the principles of economic 
efficiency and that of preserving cultural diversity.884  For example, as shown in 
Chapter 3, record labels have economic strength in terms of the revenue they contribute 
to the economies of Member States.  However, as demonstrated in Chapter 1, the 
products of those record labels are also important from the cultural point of view 
because they are intellectual, artistic works, which also happen to require financial 
investment.  The mixture of an intellectual and a financial investment makes it more 
difficult to draw a line between economy and culture, let alone describing how the law 
should accommodate and protect them.  Arguably, Article 151(4) has not resolved this 
tension, but as the analysis of book price-fixing below will show, it has only 
complicated the matter by giving culture more weight under the EC Treaty without 
specifying how cultural diversity should be protected when it collides with other 
compelling goals of the Community.885   
 
The dualism of Community aspirations is illustrated by the fact that on the one hand, 
there is the desire to achieve a single market and economic efficiency for music 
                                                
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options.”  European Competition Law Review 
20, no. 8 (1999): 420 – 433; Ben Van Houtte, “A Standard of Reason in EEC Antitrust Law: Some 
Comments on the Application of Parts 1 and 3 of Article 85.” Northwestern Journal of International Law 
and Business 4 (1982): 510; Mario Siragusa, “Rethinking Article 85: Problems and Challenges in the 
Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules,” in International Antitrust Law and Policy 1997, 
Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, ed. Barry Hawk (New York, Juris 
Publishing, 1998), 285; and Giorgio Monti, “New Directions in EC Competition Law,” in European 
Union for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, ed. Takis Tridimas and Paolisa 
Nebbia (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), 188 – 190. 
883 Whish, supra, n. 863, at p. 126. 
884 See also Anna Herold, “EU Film Policy: Between Art and Commerce.” European Diversity and 
Autonomy Papers – EDAP 3 (2004), 1 - 21. 
885 Bruno de Witte, “The Cultural Dimension of Community Law,” in Collected Courses of the Academy 
of European Law, EUI Florence Vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), 272.  Also cited 
id., at p. 8. 
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products; on the other hand, there exists the Community ambition to promote and 
protect cultural diversity.  Thus the first goal is of an economic nature that involves 
economies of scale, industrialisation of the recording process and standardisation of 
cultural products.  These factors all contribute to a uniformity of cultural output,886 
whereas the second goal poised by the Community is of the qualitative nature aimed at 
the production of diverse products.887  The diversity of recorded music output clearly 
has a cultural impact although the ability to ensure this diversity comes from more 
separated business practices and production by different labels would not necessarily 
result in economic efficiency.  Hence it is difficult to see how the economies of scale 
can co-exist with heterogeneous products.  Some even argue that those two goals of the 
Community cannot co-exist with each other.888  Not surprisingly, the introduction of the 
new non-economic concerns has triggered numerous conflicts and debates about how 
far the law can and should go to protect such concerns.889 
 
More importantly, it is not just the academics that have debated over the broader 
reading of Article 81(3).  The Commission itself has considered some of those non-
economic issues (in most of those cases, the non-economic outcome could have been 
measured).  For example, the Commission recently has ruled on cases when 
environmental protection was also considered890 demonstrating that where “a cleaner 
environment can be the basis for an exemption: the interests of the citizen may trump 
those of the consumer”.891  In previous years, the Commission also considered industrial 
                                                
886 id., at p. 10. 
887 id., at p. 9. 
888 id., at p. 12; Psychigiopoulou, supra, n. 731, at p. 838. 
889 The White Paper fuelled the ongoing debate as to whether the Commission should adopt the US’ ‘rule 
of reason’.  Under the relevant US antitrust law, namely the Sherman Act, a restraint of trade is 
prohibited, although it is accepted that certain restraints can and do promote competition.  As such the US 
antitrust authorities look to the overall effects on competition of an agreement, with the agreement being 
cleared if certain pro-competitive effects result from it.  Article 81 is designed differently as it first 
prohibits ‘all agreements which restrain competition’ and then provides the four exemptions to that 
prohibition in Article 81(3). Article 81’s construction has caused much debate amongst scholars and 
practitioners, as regards whether non-economic considerations should defeat the prohibited agreement  
(akin to the US ‘rule of reason’); however the ‘rule of reason’ debate is outside the scope of this study.  
For more details see Wesseling, supra, n. 882, at p. 422. 
890 KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT 91/38/EEC [1991] OJ L19/25, at para 27; Assurpol, 92/96 [1992] OJ L37/16, 
at para 38; EACEM No IV/C-3/36.494 [1998] OJ C 12/2, at paras 11 - 12; DSD 2001/837/EC [2001] OJ L 
319/1, at paras 142 - 146.  It must be stressed that in all those cases, the Commission exempted the 
agreements because they fell into the caveat of either consumer benefit or technical and economic 
progress.  However, the Commission considered the environmental goals of the Community in respect of 
benefiting present and future generations, for example CECED [2000] OJ L 187/47; Philips – Osram 
[1994] OJ L378/44), at para 27; Asahi/Saint-Gobain [1994]  OJ L1994/94, at paras 24-6 and Exxon/Shell 
[1994] OJ L 144/36, at para 68. 
891 Monti, supra, n. 882, at p. 189 
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policy concerns,892 employment policy,893 and crucially in terms of this thesis, cultural 
policy as well.  For example, in United International Pictures,894 the Commission took 
into account cultural policy and exempted an agreement that could potentially 
jeopardise European film industry on the condition that UIP would invest in production 
of European films.895  In the Eurovision case,896 the Commission applied an exemption 
to an agreement made between public broadcasters, which enabled smaller broadcasters 
to show sports programmes with an educational angle.897 
 
Moreover, the Commission itself argued that it was possible to take into account goals 
and policies other than those expressly stated in Article 81(3).898  Another example of 
the Commission going beyond the pure assessment of economic efficiency is its 
recognition of the need and importance to promote diverse sporting activities 
throughout the Community.899  Interestingly, the ECJ too has stated that, “the practice 
of sport is subject to Community law insofar as it constitutes an economic activity”.900  
However, it has also been argued that the application of competition rules should take 
on board the special character of sport901 because “sport is not only an economic 
activity, it is also a social activity practised by millions of amateurs and one which plays 
a positive role in society: improvement of health, recreation, bringing people together 
and also training for the young, notably in difficult social areas”.902  Therefore, it is 
argued that when considering the criteria for possible exemption, the particular 
characteristics of sport should be taken into consideration. 
 
                                                
892 Case IV/M.315 - Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva [1994] OJ L 102/15; KEWA [1976] OJ L51/15; G.E.C.- 
Weir Sodium Circulators [1977] OJ L327, 26; and Carbon Gas [1983] OJ L 376/19. 
893 Case 26/76 - Metro SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Commission, [1977] ECR 1875; and Synthetic 
Fibers, [1984] OJ L207, 17. 
894 [1989] OJ L 226/25. 
895 Although according to some scholars, the Commission failed to protect cultural diversity in the UIP 
case.  See Psychigiopoulou, supra, n. 731, at p. 849. 
896 EBU/Eurovision System [1993] OJ L 179/23.  The case was later annulled by the Court of First 
Instance but on different grounds (Cases T-528, 542, 543 &546/93 Metropole Television SA v. 
Commission [1996] ECR II- 649).  
897 For more details see Rein Wesseling, The Modernisation of EC Anti-Trust Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000), 95 - 96. 
898 In that particular case, the Commission argued for the importance of ‘maintenance of employment’.  
See Case T-17/93 - Matra Hachette v. Commission [1994] ECR II-595, at para 96. 
899 EBU/Screensport [1991] OJ L63/32 and Case No. IV/36.33 - KNVB/SPORT, 7. 
900 Case 36/74 - Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405. 
901 Jean-Francois Pons, “Sports and European Competition Policy.” Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 
(1999), 17. 
902 id., at p. 6.  
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In the past, the Commission also took on board various social reasons when considering 
an exemption under Article 81(3).  One of the best examples of the Commission 
considering social policy as outweighing economic efficiency is Ford / Volkswagen 
case.  In this case the Commission exempted a joint venture entered into between Ford 
and Volkswagen to manufacture a mini-van.  Although, the joint venture should have 
failed on competition grounds, it was exempted on social grounds: 
 
“…the project constitutes the largest ever single foreign investment in Portugal.  It is 
estimated to lead, inter alia, to the creation of about 5,000 jobs and indirectly create up to 
10,000 jobs, as well as attracting other investment in the supply industry.  It therefore 
contributes to the promotion of the harmonious development of the Community and the 
reduction of regional disparities, which is one of the basic aims of the Treaty.  It also 
furthers European market integration by linking Portugal more closely to the Community 
through one of its important industries”.903 
 
Moreover, the CFI also on occasion backed up the Commission’s broader interpretation 
of Article 81(3): “the Commission is entitled to base itself on considerations connected 
with the pursuit of the public interest”.904  
 
Therefore, without a clear mention of cultural issues in the body of Article 81, the 
assessment of non-economic matters is definitely not a clear-cut issue.  As to date, 
Article 81 has been invoked once in terms of the record industry, namely in the George 
Michael case.  In the Panayiotou case, George Michael alleged that his recording 
contract with Sony was void on the basis that it infringed Article 81(1).  The judge held 
that Article 81 was not infringed, as the recording contract did not have a sufficiently 
significant effect on inter-member state trade.  This conclusion was debatable, but the 
case was then settled in advance of any further appeal.905  A salient example on the 
                                                
903 Case IV/33.814 - Ford/Volkswagen [1993] OJ L 20/14, at para 36. 
904 T-528/93 - Metropole Television SA v. Commission [1996] ECR II-649, at para 118. 
905 See Panayiotou and Others v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Limited, supra, n. 617.  For more 
details on the case see Alan Coulthard, “Panayiotou v. Sony Music Entertainment (UK) Ltd Times, June 
30, 1994 (Ch D).” Journal of Business Law (1995): 414 – 422; Jeremy Dickerson, “The Article 85 
Implications of the George Michael Judgment.” European Intellectual Property Review 16, no. 10 (1994): 
445 – 448; Michael A. Smith, “Restraint of Trade in the Music Industry.” Entertainment Law Review 5, 
no. 5 (1994): 182 – 187; European Competition Commission, supra, n. 608.  Additionally, a number of 
cases showed how an interpretation of Article 81 could extend to consider the territorial restrictions and 
price-fixing in terms of record industry.  These cases, although worth noting as regards the application of 
Article 81 to the record industry, did not explore the issue of cultural diversity.  (i) The case of MTV 
Europe v. BMG Records [1997] 1 CMLR 867 involved a price-fixing agreement that was alleged to 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position under Article 81. The case was first notified to the 
Commission, and then secondly to the UK High Court in order to ascertain damages in favour of MTV. 
However, the High Court judge put the UK proceedings on hold until the Commission could first reach 
its decision under Article 81. (ii) In 2007, the European Commission has sent a Statement of Objections 
(to the companies concerned) alleging that the existence of certain agreements between major record 
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tension between competition law and non-economic considerations can be seen from the 
resale price maintenance of books.  This example is of interest for a number of reasons: 
(i) the clash between the protection of competition (price-fixing) and the protection of 
culture (diversity and quality of books); (ii) books, being cultural products like music 
records, have a dual nature: they embody both cultural as well as economic values; (iii) 
the analysis of book price-fixing will also help draw parallels as to what extent Article 
81(1) and (3) can regulate competition concerns in the record industry.  For that reason, 
the next part provides an outline of the conflicts and issues faced in this example. 
 
6.1.3. Case Study on Resale Price Maintenance in Book Selling 
 
As mentioned above, books are akin to music records: they are both economic and 
cultural products and they do not have close substitutes.  This case study will 
demonstrate that on the one hand book price-fixing protects the publishers and retailers 
and allows them to invest in a diverse range of books (innovation), but on the other 
hand it restricts competition.  This dichotomy creates the tension within competition 
law, i.e. how and if at all law should resolve the cultural dilemma? 
 
Resale price maintenance (price-fixing) occurs when “a distributor of a specific product 
enters into an agreement not to sell that product at a price less than assigned by the 
manufacturer”.906  Thus with respect to book price-fixing, the bookseller agrees not to 
sell the books below a certain price specified by the publisher.  There are two types of 
book price-fixing: the one imposed by the state and the one enforced by the market 
participants.  Both types of price-fixing have been used by Member States in the past as 
well as being used still in the present.  In EU competition law the price-fixing 
agreements are per se prohibited under Article 81(1).  However, as already stated, 
Article 81(3) can provide an exemption of the basis of its four conditions being 
satisfied.  
 
 
                                                
companies and Apple violate the EC Treaty's rules prohibiting restrictive business practices (i.e. Article 
81).  These agreements limit consumers to only be able to buy music from the iTunes on-line store in 
their own country of residence, thus limiting them as to where to buy music, what music they can buy and 
the price applied. See supra, n. 608. 
906 Mikheil Gogeshvili, “Resale Price Maintenance – A Dilemma in EU Competition Law.” Georgian 
Law Review 5 (2002): 281. 
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1) Publishers’ and Booksellers’ Arguments 
 
 
The main rationale for allowing book price-fixing is “to guarantee a diversified, equable 
and country-wide supply of the cultural good, the book”.907  The publishers justify 
price-fixing on the grounds that it helps promote the diversity of both titles and 
booksellers, with publishers being able to invest in the publication of the less 
commercially attractive titles along with bestsellers, i.e. without price-fixing publishers 
would not be able to cross-subsidise less popular books by their bestselling books.  
Publishers claimed that without such subsidisation, both the diversity of titles and the 
opportunity for new writers to publish their works would reduce.  For the booksellers, 
price-fixing was viewed as necessary in order to allow a broad range of titles to exist on 
the market, through the ‘bestsellers’ subsidising the slower selling books.908  These 
arguments emphasise the importance of book price-fixing from a cultural point of view.  
Apart from the cultural arguments, publishers also put forward economic justification 
for price-fixing, arguing that other players in the market, such as supermarkets and big 
book chains who were in a position to charge less for the same books, could and would 
therefore reduce the opportunities of other booksellers, who could not match them.  
Akin to the record industry majors, supermarkets operate on the economy of scale, 
which affords them selling bestsellers at very low prices.  The main fear from the 
economic point of view was that the removal of resale price maintenance would lead to 
higher concentration in both publishing and bookselling.  Supporters of price-fixing 
feared that small booksellers would disappear with the arrival of big chain bookstores 
(this is what is already happening in the US, see above page 37).  Thus, this economic 
argument was intertwined with the cultural argument, i.e. that the preservation of small 
and local booksellers with a wide range of titles would benefit both consumers and 
culture.  This should be seen in contrast to the supermarkets, which display only a dozen 
bestselling books, thus limiting the consumers’ choice as well as the dissemination of 
culture.  Overall, book price-fixing was claimed to be necessary for the protection of 
cultural diversity.909   
 
 
                                                
907 Schmid, supra, n. 871, at p. 158.  For more on price-fixing in books see Christine Zandvliet, “Note: 
Fixed Book Prices in the Netherlands and the European Union: A Challenge for Community Competition 
Law.” Columbia Journal of European Law 3, no. 3 (1997-98): 413 - 453.  
908 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Resale Price Maintenance.” (1997): 110. 
909 id. 
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2) The Position of the Commission towards the Arguments for Book Price-Fixing 
 
The Commission analysed book price-fixing from a different angle though.  Firstly, it 
was of the opinion that the situation with booksellers was more to do with market 
access, the cultural issue being cleverly tied into the market access argument.  Secondly, 
the legal angle was that cross-subsidies910 could actually diminish the incentives for 
publishers to innovate.911  Thirdly, and more importantly, from the economic and legal 
perspective, resale price maintenance excluded price competition between 
booksellers.912  Additionally, there are always a number of publishers and booksellers 
who do not release ‘high quality’ titles at all.  Thus, demonstrating why the book 
industry should have benefited from fixed price protection was a big hurdle. 
 
All of these arguments have been raised in one of the landmark cases in book price-
fixing, VBVB & VBBB,913 where both Flemish and Dutch publishers failed to justify an 
agreement, under which the booksellers in one country had to comply with the prices 
fixed by the publishers in the other country.  The final decision made in this case was 
that resale price maintenance had the effect of depriving consumers of choice and 
prevented them from seeking lower priced books.  The Commission reasoned that the 
majority of publishers in any case concentrated on bestsellers, which in turn should 
enable them to invest in less commercial titles.  As such the publishers and booksellers 
needed to prove that without price-fixing they would not be able to sell as much 
‘commercially unattractive’ titles as they would under a price-fixing regime.  The 
Commission was of the opinion that, in VBVB & VBBB, that had not been proved.  In 
this case, the Commission rejected considering cultural policy issues in whether or not 
to grant an exemption.  
 
Nevertheless, in 1998 the Commission launched an investigation into resale price 
maintenance in bookselling.  The then Commissioner Karel van Miert took a categorical 
anti price-fixing stance for the simple reason that it restricted competition and the 
publishers had not provided sufficient evidence that book price-fixing benefited 
consumers (which would then potentially give grounds for an exemption under Article 
                                                
910 Cross-subsudies mean the finance of the losses on unsuccessful books by bestselling books. 
911 Marja Appelman, “Fixed Book Price,” in A Handbook of Cultural Economics, ed. Ruth Towse 
(Cheltenham: Elgar, 2003), 238. 
912 id., at p. 239 and supra, n. 908, at p. 110. 
913 VBVB/VBBB [1982] OJ L54 36, which was later upheld by the ECJ in VBVB v. Commission [1984] 
ECR 19, see particularly para 56. 
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81 (3)).914  The Commission championed the argument that cheaper books (sold for 
example in supermarkets) would benefit the consumers because more people would be 
able to afford them and therefore access them more easily.  However, a contra-argument 
can be advanced as to the narrow choice of titles sold (at cheap prices) in the 
supermarkets.  Nevertheless, in 2000 the EU prohibited resale price maintenance in 
bookselling, which only affected the trade between Member States.915  However, many 
Member States have kept the practice of resale price maintenance within their 
territories.916 
 
As shown in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Report, the 
evidence as to the effectiveness of resale price maintenance is indeed inconclusive.917  
In certain Member States, it was found that where there was an absence of any resale 
price maintenance agreements, there was a wider range of book titles than in the other 
Member States, which allowed the price-fixing agreements.  For example, in Finland, 
price-fixing was abolished in 1971.  Despite that, the number of book titles published in 
Finland rose from 3,350 in 1970 to 12,400 in 1994.918  In France, however, price-fixing 
was abolished in 1979 but then re-introduced in 1992 because supermarkets started 
publishing their own paperbacks at a cheaper price, thus disadvantaging other 
publishers and booksellers.919 
 
The case of book price-fixing demonstrates the roots of the clash between law and 
culture because it shows that “any assessment of the economic and cultural 
consequences…. is highly uncertain”.920  The problem is that Article 151(4) only 
provides the competition authorities with minor competence to take cultural issues on 
board; it does not provide “a cultural exception to competition law”.921  The example of 
resale price maintenance in book selling has illustrated that Article 151(4) does not give 
the Commission a complete legislative competence; culture and cultural diversity seem 
to be of limited consequence in the context of wider competition considerations because 
                                                
914 Quoting Karel van Miert.  Also cited in Schmid, supra, n. 871, at p. 159.  See also the EU Council, 
“Resolution on Fixed Book Prices in Homogenous Cross-Border Linguistic Areas.” [1999 ] OJ C 42/3. 
915 The resale price maintenance is considered to be a hardcore restriction under the Block Exemption 
Regulation.  See Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000 ] OJ C 291. 
916 For example, in Germany and Netherlands the book prices are fixed by private agreements, whereas in 
France they are fixed by law. 
917 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, supra, n. 908, at pp. 112 – 114. 
918 id., at pp. 112 – 113. 
919 id. 
920 Schmid, supra, n. 871, at p. 171. 
921 id., at p. 161. 
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even though the EU is encouraged to promote the cultural diversity of its Member 
States, it does not have a specific legal instrument to do so. 
 
Primarily, the above section demonstrated that potentially Article 81 could, in some 
cases, also protect individual interests (independent labels), not only the wider, public 
interest.922  Therefore, in principle there is nothing to stop independent music labels to 
seek redress under Article 81 (for more details see the Conclusion). 
 
6.2. Article 82 of the EC Treaty  
 
Article 82 bans “any abuse by one or more undertaking of a dominant position…in so 
far as it may affect trade between Member States…”.  Due to the fact that Article 82 
uses a dominance test, it is of less importance at present, as the new collective 
dominance test has arguably replaced Article 82.  Therefore, it is outside the scope of 
this research.923 
6.3. Complaints to the National Trading Authorities 
 
If independent labels have concerns with respect to a certain joint venture and they 
cannot obtain all the evidence in order to file action under the EU competition regime, 
then it is possible to file a complaint about a particular merger or acquisition to the 
national trading authorities, such as the OFT in the UK.  For example, the Association 
of Independent Music raised its concerns with the OFT in 2007 regarding the 
acquisition by Universal of Sanctuary and V2.924 
 
This chapter has shown how Article 81 of the EC Treaty as it currently stands, may not 
provide adequate protection to cultural industries.  Independent labels and their trade 
                                                
922 William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, “Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition.” Journal of Law 
and Economics 28 (1985), 262. 
923 For the analysis of collective dominant position under Article 82 see Heiko Haupt, “Collective 
Dominance under Article 82 EC and EC Merger Control in the Light of the Airtours Judgment.” 
European Competition Law Review 23, no. 9 (2002): 438-9; Mark Jephcott and Chris Withers, “Where to 
Go Now for EC Oligopoly Control?” European Competition Law Review 22, no. 8 (2001): 303; Lorna 
McGregor, “The Future for the Control of Oligopolies Following Compagnie Maritime Belge.” European 
Competition Law Review 22, no. 10 (2001): 437.  
924 See BBC, “Indie Labels Attack Record Merger,” October 1, 2007; Office of Fair Trading, “Completed 
Acquisition by Centenary Music Holdings Limited of V2 Music Group Limited , No. ME/3280/07.” 
November 13, 2007; AIM, “AIM Responds to the OFT about the Universal’s Acquisition of V2 and 
Sanctuary.” October 1, 2007. 
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bodies could seek redress under Article 81, but without the specific mention of cultural 
interests, the competition law authorities can do little to protect cultural diversity. 
 
It leaves me to re-iterate the importance of non-price competition and non-economic 
considerations in terms of competition law assessment.  Therefore, the Conclusion of 
this study re-emphasises once more why the record industry should not be assessed only 
on price merits, and should contain other measures that could be used by competition 
law to re-instate competitive dynamics in the record industry.  
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Conclusion 
 
“A hundred years ago, the public demanded 
antitrust legislation to protect it against the 
monopoly practices of railroads, grain millers, 
and the big banks.  A different type of 
regulation may be required today, but the need 
to safeguard thought and consciousness against 
private monopoly is just as urgent”.  
 
Herbert I. Schiller925 
 
The Relationship between Cultural Diversity and Independent Music 
Labels 
 
This study sought to investigate and reveal whether or not competition law has managed 
to protect cultural diversity, and has shown that in most cases, the law fails in 
preventing high concentration within the record industry and such concentration is 
inversely connected with diversity levels.  
 
The research has demonstrated the importance of cultural diversity in terms of the 
development of intellect and values and is thus crucially important for society overall.  
The significance of cultural diversity can be drawn, not only from the opinions of 
numerous scholars but also from international treaties such as UNESCO’s Convention 
on Cultural Expressions and Article 154 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty.  As exemplified in 
Chapter 1, numerous researches looking into the relationship between music diversity 
and concentration levels in the record industry have shown an inverse connection 
between them.  Interestingly from this thesis’ point of view, the same inverse 
relationship was found within other types of cultural industries, for example within both 
the film and bookselling industries.  These examples underline the fact that the 
protection of cultural diversity is of legitimate concern.  As argued in Chapter 1, 
regulation of the record industry (as well as other types of cultural industries) by 
competition law seems to be the most efficient way to balance competitive dynamics in 
the market place.  However, the thesis also highlighted the fact that the protection of 
cultural diversity is not a stated aim of competition legislation.   
 
                                                
925 Schiller, supra, n. 137, at p. 171. 
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Alongside the prevalent notion of cultural diversity, this study has shown that the 
independent record sector as a cultural industry deserves special protection through 
competition law.  Both the historical analysis and the interviews with record industry 
insiders demonstrated the importance of small businesses in terms of delivering cultural 
diversity to consumers, and the importance of small businesses for the overall economy 
(see Chapters 1 and 3).  However, this research also emphasised that the protection of 
cultural diversity should not be dependent upon the economic parameters and profit 
making of cultural industries.  Cultural products carry a broader context than a 
traditional economic transaction.  Hence, cultural industries deserve protection because 
of their cultural input (which is often difficult to measure) rather than their economic 
potential (which is easier to measure).  
  
The study has highlighted a relationship between cultural diversity and SMEs: the 
protection and the availability of cultural diversity (diversity of products) is directly 
connected with the protection and number of small independent labels (diversity of 
producers).  It was also argued that even if there were one major company releasing all 
genres of music, the music market would still be not as diverse as having a myriad of 
small labels specialising in their own genre and music.  Both the historical analysis and 
the interviews have shown that small labels were crucial agents in discovering and 
delivering diverse music to consumers.  The interviews have also exposed the 
organisational and behavioural differences between majors and independents, which 
also lead to increased cultural diversity.  For example, no need for the economy of 
scale, risk taking in terms of new genres and the speed of decision-making are 
hallmarks of independents.  Therefore, SMEs in the cultural sector need supporting by 
governments and legislators, which in turn will lead to more diverse products presented 
to consumers.  As far as legislation, this study looked into whether or not cultural 
industries, in this particular instance, independent music labels, deserved special 
treatment by competition law and it found that small businesses in cultural industries 
should indeed have such special consideration.  The problematic issue that arises in this 
respect is that lawmakers often do not like to deal with difficult-to-measure concepts 
like cultural diversity.  However, not taking cultural issues into account resulted in the 
fact that competition law (merger regulation in particular) has failed to protect cultural 
diversity so far.  The concluding remarks at the end of this work will provide some 
concrete suggestions as to how this difficulty can be overcome.  The findings of the 
SonyBMG wrangling below will also prove that the economical parameters of the 
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record industry are important, but the decision makers should not neglect the 
importance and protection of cultural diversity, as specified in Chapters 1 and 3. 
 
Developing and New Jurisprudence: A New Cultural Test   
 
The analysis of a number of mergers in the record industry exposed the decision making 
process’ unpredictability.  Both the interpretation and the application of competition 
law, in terms of cultural industries, need to become more consistent and coherent.   
 
The Sony/BMG merger case study identified that in the course of protecting the 
independents, competition law should also consider and protect cultural diversity, thus 
ultimately protecting consumers.  As stated in Chapter 1, one of the chief objectives of 
competition law, along with the balancing of competitive dynamics in a given market, is 
the protection of consumer interests.  Therefore, the considerations do not just concern 
themselves with the balance of power between majors and independents, but also about 
the interests of a third party - the consumers.  The same analysis can be drawn from the 
case study of resale price maintenance in book publishing and selling, i.e. that 
competition law should not only be about the protection of publishers and distributors 
of books, but also about the protection of consumer interests.  Chapter 5 describes that 
when Warner and Polygram attempted to merge their entities, the US Court of Appeals 
used the public interest argument in disallowing the joint venture; however, this 
argument was not utilised in any other cases involving the record industry.926  Going 
back to the main objective of competition law - the protection of competition, not the 
competitors - the question has to be asked as to how a market share ratio of 3:1 can be 
considered a good competitive balance?  Bearing in mind the huge gap between the 
bargaining and financial powers of the two types of record companies, can independents 
offer effective competition in the marketplace?  It should be remembered that both the 
US and European competition authorities set out in their rulings that independents could 
exert only a limited pressure on the majors.927  Therefore, the competition authorities 
themselves acknowledged the lack of competition in the recorded music market.  This 
research has demonstrated that using only economic data analyses to investigate and 
consider mergers was not enough to prevent high record industry concentration.  
                                                
926 The Commission also mentioned ‘consumer choice’ in the EMI/Time Warner attempt to merge in 
2000.  However, as stated in Chapter 5, the parties withdrew their merger proposal. 
927 Case No COMP/M.3333 - Sony/BMG, supra, n. 460, at para 145 and Case COMP/M. 1852 - 
EMI/Time Warner, supra, n. 694. 
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Consequently, the principal conclusion of this study is that there should be new 
jurisprudence in relation to mergers and acquisitions in cultural industries, and this is 
dealt with below. 
 
Chapter 1 indicates that despite constant emphasis by national governments, the EU and 
UNESCO of the importance of cultural industries and cultural diversity, the latter is not 
a stated aim of the existing competition legislation.  In contrast, however, there has been 
a glimmer of hope in the second approval by the Commission of the Sony/BMG merger 
when it, for the first time in the European merging history of the record industry, 
considered the ever-crucial non-price issues (discussed in Chapter 5).  However, the 
legal position is still unsatisfactory because the existing law, including the new ECMR 
and Article 81 of the EC Treaty, makes no references to cultural issues.  Therefore, the 
mention of cultural matters in the approval of the Sony/BMG merger is the extension of 
principle without the law actually saying that it would take cultural issues into 
consideration.  
 
This part finalises the argument as to why the law should provide a different regime for 
cultural industries.  To begin with, the important issue of non-price or non-economics 
competition has to be re-emphasised in order to see why this form of competition is so 
important.  The issue is followed by suggestions to modify the existing competition law 
to take diversity of products and producers into account.    
 
Price Competition, Non-Price Competition, and Cultural Diversity 
 
Having considered all three rulings on Sony/BMG in Chapter 5, the section concludes 
that the EU competition authorities should consider culture and cultural issues.  Before 
highlighting the importance of non-price competition, it should be re-iterated that the 
previous chapters criticised the Commission’s approach to the application of the law as 
it stands.  The following part exemplifies why the existing merger test should be 
modified in order to take cultural issues into account.    
 
The study demonstrated, particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, that competition takes 
place on many levels with price being only one of the competitive factors.  Stigler 
reached the same conclusion in A Theory of Oligopoly, which emphasised that ‘price’ 
alone should not be the only issue considered when looking at collusion between large 
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companies.928  Other forms of competition include quality, output, and diversity929 (in 
this chapter, the meaning of diversity is the same as that given in Chapter 1, namely the 
diversity of producers and products).  The backdrop of the price factor in record 
industry competition is that it certainly affects the cost of both the CDs and downloads 
and these price issues have to be investigated.  However, as mentioned in previous 
chapters, there are other important aspects of the record industry which are non-price or 
non-economics related, e.g. shelf  space at retailers, radio play, TV broadcasts, etc.930   
 
As argued in Chapter 1, culture is a qualitative concept, and it should be protected for 
its cultural merits.  Therefore, this study has argued that with respect to the record 
industry it is the diversity of products and producers that should be considered as, if not 
the main, then an additional important form of competition.  In order to show the need 
for change, the analysis below summarises how, if at all, competition authorities have 
treated diversity in the three Sony/BMG merger rulings, and how or whether the law 
can be changed to accommodate cultural diversity.  
 
Chapter 3, in covering the historical growth and competition patterns of the record 
industry, showed how independent music labels have predominantly been responsible 
for discovering new genres and artists.  The majors primarily focus on ‘superstars’; 
hence they have less incentive to invest in the discovery and development of innovative 
or non-mainstream music and artists.  In parallel, Chapter 1 provided that the majority 
of empirical studies showed an inverse relationship between the level of concentration 
and diversity in the record industry.931  Bearing in mind that the four majors are now 
responsible for about 75 percent of the recorded music market share and those four 
companies increasingly cut their rosters, both the Commission and the CFI could have 
looked into that particular area, e.g. if an artist is rejected by the four majors, he or she 
would be very likely at an impasse as far as their career development.  In this respect 
independents do play a crucial role because they give artists the opportunity to set up 
their own label or release their music on another independent label.  Such a course of 
                                                
928 Stigler, supra, n. 748, at p. 44. 
929 Boyce and Creswell, supra, n. 720, at 10.  
930 On the importance of non-price competition in the record industry see Black and Greer, supra, n. 112; 
Peter Alexander, “Product Variety and Market Structure: A New Measure and a Simple Test.”  Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organisation 32 (1997): 207 – 214; Alan Baker, “A Model of Competition and 
Monopoly in the Record Industry.”  Journal of Cultural Economics 15 (1991): 29 – 54; Gander and 
Rieple, supra, n. 121, at pp. 248 – 254; and Belinfante and Johnson, supra, n. 368, at pp. 11 – 24.   
931 See Rothenbuhler and Dimmick, supra, n. 119 and Peterson and Berger, supra, n. 104. 
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action also highlights the importance of independents from both the cultural diversity 
and public interest points of view.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the legal outcomes have always been uncertain but it is 
unclear why the Commission decided in 2000 that the EMI/Warner attempt to merge 
their entities would lead to homogenous products,932 whilst in 2004 and 2007 in the 
Sony/BMG merger, the Commission highlighted the heterogeneous nature of the 
products at issue.  Both the Commission and the CFI overlooked the diversity of 
products analysis, and instead concentrated on discounts and prices analyses.  
 
Just how economics can be out of touch with cultural industries can be demonstrated by 
looking into the diversity of competition.  The clash between economics and cultural 
industries happens because the economists tend to regard “... differentiation within a 
product as a variant of price, when in fact price may not be a criterion that determines 
purchase”.933  In fact, price is definitely not a reason for purchasing music.  Music is 
bought because of an emotional and intellectual desire to listen to a particular piece or 
artist.  Price is a unique competitive concept and it should be solely applied when the 
products can be substituted.  As noted in Chapter 6, cultural products, e.g. music or 
books, are not direct substitutes; therefore, price often is simply “... an implicit average 
of varying idiosyncratic values across varied purchasers”.934  Another reason for the 
non-importance of the price increase in relation to the record industry is because there is 
a tendency for records to be sold at a standard price.935  Even the Commission itself 
admitted that the prices in the record industry were standardised.936  Moreover, looking 
at price history within the industry, prices remained at more or less the same level, or 
even dropped, under both competitive and monopolistic regimes.937  For example, 
prices dropped at the start of the 1980s at a time when industry concentration was 
high.938  At the moment of writing, a similar situation exists.  Thus, what is apparent is 
that high and increasing concentration has had little influence on prices but has 
impacted tremendously on non-price issues because the emphasis has been “... less 
                                                
932 Boyce and Creswell, supra, n. 720, at 11. 
933 Peter Johnson, Astute Competition: The Economics of Strategic Diversity (Oxford: Elsevier, 2007), 10. 
934 id. 
935 Baker, supra, n. 930, at p. 29 and Eric Strobl and Clive Tucker, “The Dynamics of Chart Success in 
the UK Pre-Recorded Popular Music Industry.” Journal of Cultural Economics 24 (2000): 116. 
936 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 110. 
937 Baker, supra, n. 930, at p. 49. 
938 Belinfante and Johnson, supra, n. 368, at p.23. 
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price-oriented and more product differentiation oriented”.939  If, as shown in Chapters 3 
and 4, such non-price or non-economics issues such as A&R activities, radio, TV and 
physical retailers are crucially important for the record industry, they should also be 
taken on board in merger and acquisition investigations by the Commission and other 
competition authorities.940 
 
The Commission’s reasoning in Sony/BMG, focusing only on price competition, was 
even more surprising in the light of its own comment in the ThornEMI/Virgin 
acquisition, which showed that diversity is the most crucial factor that should have been 
taken into account: 
 
“The main parameters for competition in the market(s) for record music are the 
promotion of records and the provision of a wide variety of artists and types of music.  
Because of the special nature of the products in this market(s), the scope for price 
competition seems to be limited.  Other parameters have, therefore, become important 
such as promotion through advertising, radio airplay, exposure in the media, concert 
tours and other promotional items.  In addition, record companies can compete for 
access to window space and point-of-sale advertising in retail outlets.  The most 
significant parameter of competition in the market for recorded music is the need to 
meet the demand for constant changes in music tastes and fashion, through new 
releases and signing up new artists” (emphasis added). 941   
 
Moreover, in the Statement of Objections in the EMI/Time Warner case, the 
Commission talked about the impact the merger would have on “... consumer choice as 
well as the marginalisation of independents and overall impact on the diversity of music 
being offered to the public”.942  It is unclear why the Commission did not pay more 
attention to its own words in the ThornEMI/Virgin case when considering other cases, 
including the Sony/BMG merger. 
 
The fact that the first Sony/BMG decision was annulled just on economic evidence and 
administrative mistakes is of huge importance.  In this particular case economic 
evidence, which was used instead of any other criteria, was enough to annul the 
Commission’s decision but as some would argue the CFI’s ruling was “... one-sided 
without a comparable treatment of the cultural issues”. 943  The Competition Department 
                                                
939 id. 
940 id., at p. 12 and Gander and Rieple, supra, n. 121, at p. 250. 
941 Case No IV/M.202 – Thorn EMI / Virgin Music, supra, n. 451, at para 38. 
942 European Competition Commission, “Commission Opens Full Investigation into Time Warner/EMI 
Merger.” June 14, 2000. 
943 Aigner et al., supra, n. 742, at p. 26. 
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within the Directorate General at the Commission used 6 economists to produce over 
100,000 pages of economic findings with respect to the original Sony/BMG merger 
investigation.944  The aforesaid shows that taking into account economic data only, in 
terms of cultural industries, does not suffice and thus lends credence to the fact that the 
competition authorities, in addition to detailed economic analysis, should also use the 
sophisticated analysis of non-price competition issues. 
 
Such attention being focussed on economic data seems even more bizarre as there is 
recognition that “product diversity is a key performance measure, as greater diversity is 
enhancing consumer welfare by increasing the likelihood that products meet 
heterogeneous preferences”.945  In other words, consumer interests were diminished due 
to cultural products being more homogenous as a direct result of higher record industry 
consolidation.  It is worth re-iterating that the Commission, in both the first decision and 
its subsequent re-approval, simply relied on the submissions of Sony and BMG that 
their content was heterogeneous, even though acknowledging in the same decision, that 
the lack of innovative products and artists were one of the reasons for declining demand 
in the record industry.946  The Commission in the first decision did not even attempt to 
carry out an economic analysis of the effects of the merger on non-price competition.  
Whilst the CFI has made the right decision to annul the merger, the fact that there was 
no mention of the importance of independents and only two mentions of cultural 
diversity, is an obvious drawback.  In its appeal to the Sony/BMG decision, Impala 
claimed that the Commission had not even enquired whether the proposed concentration 
would reduce supply in terms of numbers of new titles or in terms of originality of new 
releases, or whether it would impoverish creativity, quality and diversity in music 
choice.947  However, as explained in Chapter 5, perhaps due to the difficulty in 
succeeding on diversity as a legal argument, Impala did not emphasise the importance 
of content heterogeneity. 
 
The CFI touched only briefly upon product homogeneity948 by highlighting the 
contradiction between the heterogeneity of content and the uniformity of pricing.  
However, the CFI did not go any further into considering this contradiction.  The 
                                                
944 Michael G. Egg et al., “The New Merger Regulation: Recipe for Profound Change or More of the 
Same?” IBA 8 Annual Competition Conference (Fiesole: 17 – 18 September 2004), at p. 20, footnote 66. 
945 Aigner et al., supra, n. 742, at p. 26. 
946 Case No COMP/M.3333 – Sony/BMG, supra, n. 315, at para 58. 
947 Case T464/04 - Impala v. Commission, supra, n. 459, at para 107. 
948 id., at paras 460-462. 
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Commission undoubtedly made a number of gross blunders, which have been picked up 
by the CFI and the merger decision failed on those grounds.  However, the first two 
rulings barely touched upon the notion of cultural diversity.  Eventually, the 
Commission re-investigated the merger in 2007 by carrying out a complex analysis of 
the record industry, including reference to cultural issues and non-price items but 
nonetheless it was working from the current merger regulation (using the old merger 
test because the merger was announced before 1 May 2004), which does not provide for 
cultural matters at all.  Moreover, the extent and the depth of the investigation into the 
non-price factors are disappointing.  Since the law has not changed, it raises the 
question as to how and why the Commission extended the old substantive test and 
decided to look into cultural matters in the second approval of the Sony/BMG merger.  
The Sony/BMG saga has exposed firstly, how unpredictable the interpretation of the 
existing law can be, and secondly, that arguably neither the test in Airtours, nor the new 
ECMR are equipped to deal with the record industry (suggestions as to how to re-focus 
the merger test are detailed below). 
 
A New Cultural Test 
 
The arguments above illustrate that the current competition law cannot adequately 
regulate the record industry (as part of cultural industries) nor protect cultural diversity.  
That is not to say that law is the wrong mechanism, but it does need re-focusing.  It 
seems that current competition legislation is fit to regulate the aerospace, commodities’, 
and oil industries, but arguably, one cannot apply the same rules to regulating both 
manufacturing and cultural industries.  Even the introduction of the new ECMR (which 
is yet to be applied in record industry mergers) seems unlikely to change the current 
state of affairs in the music business. 
 
It is possible to assess hypothetically whether the substantive test of the new ECMR, 
which does not necessarily require the creation or strengthening of a collective 
dominant position but merely that competition is significantly impeded by the merger, 
is likely to deal more effectively with the oligopoly problem in the record industry.  
Firstly, post Airtours it will be very difficult for the Commission to establish that non-
collusive coordination will be likely after the merger when it was not likely before.  
Secondly, and more importantly, as has been demonstrated in Chapter 5, significant 
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impeding of any effective competition can be achieved by much smaller acquisitions 
that do not require any notification to the Commission.949  Thirdly, it is debatable how 
any new test, notwithstanding any future mergers being disallowed, will dilute the high 
concentration of the record industry.950  Whilst technological advances and new players 
coming from outside the record industry, such as telecom and mobile companies, may 
erode the majors’ high concentration, erosion of the majors’ power is yet to be seen.  
Re-wording the old ECMR test into a new one alone is unlikely to solve the record 
industry’s concentration problem.  Fourthly, the pre and post analysis that the CFI set 
out in Airtours will still have to be carried out.951  The new test will require that 
impediment to competition is increased by a merger, and that the impediment was 
unlikely to take place before.  This is not going to be an easy task.  In addition, the 
interpretation of the new test will depend on the Commission’s interpretation and as 
seen in Chapter 5, it may be quite wide and ambiguous.  
 
Post CFI ruling, Sony/BMG appealed to the ECJ against the judgment of the CFI on 
points of law, followed by a virtually simultaneous interrogation of the Commissioner 
by the European Parliament as to the impact of the Sony/BMG merger on SMEs and 
cultural diversity. 
  
In December 2007, the ECJ released the lengthy opinion of the Advocate General, 
Juliane Kokott, who stated that the merger should be disallowed on the points of law.952  
No cultural issues were ever discussed in her decision, but she clearly confirmed that 
the CFI was correct in its legal assessment.  Although the opinion of the Advocate 
General is not binding for the ECJ, according to the statistics, the ECJ follows his or her 
opinion in the majority of cases.953  The Sony/BMG case turned out to be a rare 
exception as on the 10 July 2008, the ECJ annulled the CFI’s judgment stating that the 
CFI assessed only two out of the five Impala pleas, therefore the CFI was ordered to re-
assess its judgment.954  However, there was another unexpected development in that on 
5 August 2008 (right at the end of this research) BMG sold back 50 percent of its stake 
                                                
949 Hornsby, supra, n.  679. 
950 id. 
951 id. 
952 European Court of Justice, “Opinion of Advocate General Kokott on Bertelsmann AG and Sony 
Corporation of America.” December 13, 2007.  See also Lars Brandle, “SonyBMG Ruling Scrutinised in 
EU Court Opinion,” The Billboard, December 13, 2007. 
953 Frances Murphy and Gillian Sproul, “SonyBMG Joint Venture Saga – ECJ Hits CFI One More Time.” 
Mayer Brown, July 14 2008. 
954 C-413/06 P - Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v. Impala, [2008] OJ C223/7. 
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in SonyBMG to Sony for £900 million (although BMG will retain music rights 
management for its top 200 artists).955  The Commission considered the acquisition 
under the new Merger Regulation (Council Regulation No 139/2004),956 however it did 
not apply the new SIEC test.  It is safe to say that having approved the Sony/BMG 
merger in 2007, the Commission would approve the acquisition by Sony of BMG 
because “... a change from joint to sole control only has a limited impact on the 
competitive structure.... as the acquiring undertaking already exercised control”.957  The 
CEO of Sony, Howard Stringer, noted that the transaction would provide “... a deeper 
integration between the music company and Sony’s consumer electronics products”.958  
Curiously, there was no mention of cultural diversity.  This time the Commission had 
no problem clearing the acquisition in the light of the vertical integration between 
Sony’s hardware and music businesses.959  The final ‘cap’ on the SonyBMG saga was 
put by the CFI itself in 2009, when it held that there was no need to adjudicate any 
further on this merger case and that any future action would be devoid of purpose.960 
 
Back to 2007, in parallel with the ECJ’s investigation, the European Parliament, 
launched an enquiry as to how the Commission could clear the merger when the record 
industry was already so concentrated, and what impact that merger could have on the 
SMEs in the cultural sector and cultural diversity overall (for more on this see Chapter 
4).  Therefore, the EP re-confirmed that non-economics based issues should be taken 
into account.  As expressed by Guy Bono: 
 
                                                
955 Case No COMP/M.5272 - Sony/SonyBMG [2008] OJ C 259; Ron Grover, “Sony Buys the Rest of 
Ailing SonyBMG,” The Business Week, August 05, 2008; Andre Paine, “Bertelsmann Exits Sony BMG,” 
The Billboard, August 05, 2008; Gerrit Wiesmann and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, “Sony Agrees to Buy 
Out Bertelsmann,” The Financial Times, August  05, 2008. 
956 In approving the deal, the Commission made a following proviso: “the present decision is based on the 
premise that the Sony/BMG merger has been authorised; should the pending litigations lead to a different 
outcome which would require to dissolve the Sony/BMG concentration or take other restorative 
measures, the present decision cannot be read as an obstacle to full compliance with such an obligation.”  
Case No COMP/M.5272-Sony/SonyBMG, supra, n. 955, at footnote 3. 
957 The acquisition was said not to have any negative impact on consumers and cultural diversity. id., at 
paras 49, 100, 101, 108. 
958 Grover, supra, n. 955. 
959 Paine, supra, n. 955. 
960 Order of the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) 30 June 2009.  Para 30 of the Order provides the 
following reasons as to why Impala decided to stop any further proceedings: “In that regard, the applicant 
[Impala] states that it did not bring proceedings to challenge the third decision [the acquisition by Sony of 
BMG], because the Court would have been required to adjudicate on the present case and on Case T-
229/08 before examining the third decision.  By the time those actions had been decided, Bertelsmann 
would have been absent from the market for recorded music for many years.  Furthermore, even if the 
three actions had been successful, Bertelsmann could not have been compelled to return to the market, so 
as to restore the competitive situation prevailing prior to the contested decision, that is to say, the 
presence of five major record companies”. 
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“The Commission once again has side stepped the issue.  There is a paradox existing 
between the policy of support for SMEs and the second Commission approval of the 
Sony/BMG merger.  As underlined in my report, concentration in the sector of cultural 
industries constitutes a risk for the diversity and the offer of cultural goods to 
consumers.  There is a need for further support for SMEs and micro businesses who 
contribute hugely to creating wealth in an economy whose growth does not necessarily 
require the existence of large-scale organisations....”961 
 
In particular, the EP’s main criticism of the approval of the Sony/BMG merger was 
based on the grounds that the Commission disregarded:962 
 
1. The European Council’s paper as of the 8 May 2007, which confirmed “the 
importance of SMEs in the cultural sector in view of their role as drivers of 
growth, job creation, and innovation”. 
 
2. The UNESCO Convention that emphasised that “cultural diversity is manifested 
through the varied ways of artistic creation and production”. 
 
3. The Commission’s communication on a European agenda for culture in a 
globalised world. 
 
4. Previous cases in which the European Commission “re-iterated the necessity of 
introducing remedies to re-establish a competitive recorded music market, e.g. 
the EMI/Warner attempted merger in 2000, and the Universal/BMG decision in 
2007”.  
 
The EP’s criticism seems correct, but it also can be considered unfair to the 
Commission because the latter does not have a merger test that could take cultural 
issues into account.  The merger test, as shown above, is silent on the issue of cultural 
matters and this situation has to be remedied.  Perhaps this is why in another enquiry 
into the SonyBMG merger in 2008, the EP asked the Commission whether it would 
                                                
961 Quoting Guy Bono in Impala, “European Parliament Challenges Commissioner Kroes Again on 
SonyBMG.” December 20, 2007.  See also Lars Brandle, “European MP Questions SonyBMG Merger,” 
The Billboard, October 30, 2007. 
962 These grounds are also cited in Impala, id. 
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consider adopting specific new competition law rules and guidelines which afforded 
taking cultural concerns into account.963 
 
One of the main conclusions of this thesis is that competition authorities have failed to 
prevent high record industry concentration.  Although the EU policy makers often use 
the expression ‘cultural diversity’, not much has been done in reality to protect and 
promote the notion of cultural diversity: “in fact, this general ‘amnesia’ appears to be a 
permanent feature of the Commission’s approach to the audiovisual market”.964  
Arguably, it happened because neither the past nor existing test contain any provisions 
to take into account the issue of cultural diversity.  The main issue that arises in this 
respect is that competition law influences cultural industries, but it contains no legal 
tool to regulate them.  Since there has been an increased wave of mergers and 
acquisitions in cultural industries, particularly recently, it would make more sense for 
the Commission to consider the impact of such mergers on cultural diversity. 
 
The new wave of opposition965 to using only econometric analysis is a ray of light in the 
current legal system, but ultimately, the old or new ECMR tests do not contain a 
requirement to take culture and cultural diversity on board when investigating mergers 
and acquisitions in the record industry.  That explains why neither the Commission in 
its first decision, nor the CFI in its judgment ventured into the area of cultural diversity, 
and it is not clear on which basis the Commission did so in the second approval.  Thus 
representing the dilemma threaded throughout this study; that on the one hand both the 
EU and national authorities emphasise the importance of culture and SMEs, but on the 
other hand they make no provision for either in the current competition legislation.  This 
begs the ultimate question of how can competition law protect the heterogeneity of both 
products and producers in cultural industries?  The answer depends on whether or not 
culture and cultural diversity represent a competition concern.  Using culture as a non-
competition concern would be easier for the lawyers.  Therefore, the law has to 
accommodate culture via the inclusion of non-price competition and specifically 
mentioning culture.  The latter is bound to produce a debate among scholars and 
                                                
963 Impala, “European Parliament Challenges the Commission Again about Competition in the Music 
Market and the SonyBMG Merger, as Independents’ Appeal Continues without New Action over Sony 
Buy Out.” December 19, 2008. 
964 Herold, supra, n. 884, at p. 11. 
965 See for example, Monica Arino, “Competition Law and Pluralism in European Digital  
Broadcasting: Addressing the Gaps.” Communications & Strategies 54 (2004): 97 – 128. 
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practitioners, but without this reference, lawyers will still have no adequate tool to 
assess the competitive dynamics in cultural industries.  
 
This study suggests two solutions in relation to the new jurisprudence: 
 
1) Changing the new ECMR to include specific reference to non-price competition and 
culture.  This test could be applicable to any economic activity to which the ECMR 
applies, if it has a cultural dimension.  The inclusion of non-price issues would make it 
easier for lawyers to apply this test.  Such an approach should position the Commission 
to be free to draw from cultural concerns.  Another advantage of such modification is 
that it would be easier to exercise a balancing act between the economic and non-price 
data analyses, and therefore, easier to apply this test in practice. 
 
2) Displacing the new ECMR in order to create a new regime and a new system for 
cultural issues.  The main problem with this approach would be providing legal 
definitions of cultural issues, e.g. culture and diversity.  Whilst Chapter 1 illustrated that 
it is possible to define both culture and diversity, e.g. strip down the definition of 
cultural industries to bare basics, such as the record and book industries, it is one thing 
to provide a definition by a scholar, and quite another thing to make these categories 
measurable and definable by law.  The lawmakers may find it difficult to apply such a 
test, and it would be as uncertain as the current econometric analysis.  
 
Thus, the advantages of the first proposition make it more appealing, and this represents 
the main finding of this study.   
 
New competition rules to recognise the specificity of culture have already been 
suggested by the Impala in its Action Plan,966 appearing to be a timely step forward.  
However, even Impala realises that cultural diversity being introduced into competition 
regulation is a difficult task, perhaps explaining why Impala also introduced a new term, 
‘economic diversity in music’.  Meaning that the independents produce about 80 percent 
of all music released in Europe, thus creating vast employment opportunities.  The 
introduction of economic diversity to a certain extent blurs the importance of cultural 
diversity on its own, but the upside of it is that the economic potential of culture maybe 
                                                
966 Impala, “Action Plan for Music in Europe: Boosting the European Cultural Economy by Reinforcing 
SME Actors in Music.” March 13, 2008. 
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easier assessed by the regulators.  In the end of 2008, Impala also opened another 
dialogue with Jan Figel, European Commissioner for Culture, which subsequently 
launched a Green Paper on Cultural Industries.967  The paper will examine the anti-
competitive practices experienced by independents in the digital age, e.g. entry barriers 
to mobile and online markets. 
 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
 
Additionally to the ECMR, the analysis of Article 81 of the EC Treaty in Chapter 6 
illustrated that the Commission is not equipped with any actual instrument to promote 
cultural diversity under Article 81.  Also, similarly to the ECMR, the introduction of the 
economic analysis to Article 81 disregards the non-competition matters, which are 
nevertheless important for culture and the consumers.   
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the EC Treaty contains somewhat of a contradiction 
between the aims of the European Union to protect competition under Article 2 of the 
EC Treaty, and to preserve culture under Article 151(4).  Both are the constitutional 
tasks of the EC Treaty.  The conflict between the constitutional objectives, i.e. to protect 
competition and to protect other goals of the Community is indeed not an easy one to 
solve.  As shown in Chapter 1, there are profound tensions between art and commerce, 
which are projected into the EU goals to protect competition and culture at the same 
time.  These tensions represent the main dilemma.  On the one hand, the economic 
approach that the Commission takes, disregards non-economic factors thus avoiding 
any national government’s political influences.  On the other hand, the Treaty contains 
an express obligation to take other goals of the Community into account; therefore, a 
political interpretation of competition policy is indeed imposed.968  Apart from not 
providing the Commission with any concrete instruments and guidelines as to how the 
law should preserve culture, there is no hierarchy between the two objectives.969  
However, that is not to say that competitiveness of the record industry cannot be 
improved while taking into account its cultural dimension. 
 
                                                
967 At the moment of submission, the Green Paper is not yet published.  Impala, “Impala Meets EC 
Commissioner Figel in Cannes – Discrimination of Independents to be Examined in EC’s Cultural 
Industries’ Green Paper.” January 19, 2003.  
968 Monti, supra, n. 868, at p. 189. 
969 Herold, supra, n. 884, at p. 14. 
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As exemplified in Chapter 6, the Commission has on occasion exercised a margin of 
discretion as to other goals when applying Article 81(3).  Additionally, the ECJ has 
upheld some of the Commission’s decisions, which involved the assessment of non-
competition issues.970  Having said that, such sporadic decision-making, without a 
specific legal tool, is not enough to preserve the interests of culture. 
 
The clash between competition law provisions under Article 81 and culture needs to be 
resolved now as according to the White Paper, the national competition authorities and 
courts in future will decide on the cases under Article 81(3).971  Importantly, as 
indicated in Chapter 6, the White Paper suggested a narrower and more legalistic 
interpretation of Article 81(3).972  Enabling national courts and authorities to grant 
exemptions under Article 81(3) has the potential to open a Pandora’s box for all kinds 
of conflicts.  Firstly, introducing non-competition issues into the EC Treaty means that 
they should be taken note of only when considering Community goals, not national 
ones.973  This is clearly stated in Article 151(4) which refers to the other Community 
policies and activities.  Thus, it seems that even though national courts will be able to 
decide on the exemptions under Article 81(3), they would not be able to protect 
diversity on their own territories.  Secondly, national courts may not wish to limit 
themselves to a narrow reading of Article 81(3) and this scenario has to be borne in 
mind because it may cause a vertical conflict, a conflict between national and 
Community competition law, as well as a diagonal conflict meaning an unease between 
EU competition law and Member States’ other laws. 974  The latter can be exemplified 
by Germany asking the Commission to take cultural policy into account when deciding 
whether to remove price-fixing for German language books.975  Moreover, national 
authorities may not be in a position to “balance the restriction of competition that an 
agreement might entail against a broad range of Community policies”.976  This, in turn, 
might result in a narrow interpretation of the Article 81(3). 
 
In the past, the ECJ noted that it was not itself capable of assessing the economic facts 
in terms of considering exemptions under Article 81(3).  Instead, the ECJ commented 
                                                
970 For more details see Wesseling, supra, n. 882, at p. 424. 
971 The White Paper on Modernisation, supra, n. 864, at paras 58 – 62. 
972 id., at para 57. 
973 Prior to the creation of the EU, national courts dealt with these issues.  After the creation of the EU, 
competition law held sway over national law.  See also Komninos, supra, n. 873, at p. 6. 
974 For more details see Wesseling, supra, n. 882, at p. 425. 
975 See the example in Whish, supra, n. 863, at p. 129, footnote 13. 
976 id., at p. 128. 
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that the Commission was the appropriate body to exercise the balancing act between the 
protection of competition and other goals.977  This raises another concern as to the 
consistency in the application of the European competition law by different Member 
States,978 i.e. it is not clear how the numerous national courts with different legal 
regimes will interpret and apply the provisions of Article 81(3).  The Commission will 
provide guidelines but it will necessarily leave the final interpretation to national 
courts.979  Bearing in mind that the ECJ said of itself that it was not equipped to carry 
out complex economic analyses, national authorities too would have an even more 
difficult task balancing competition protection with other Community aspirations.980  
Therefore, the measures suggested by the White Paper are unlikely to resolve the 
conflict between competition law and non-economic considerations.  
 
Before listing suggestions as to how to incorporate cultural issues into Article 81, it is 
worth highlighting differences between the ECMR and Article 81.  The ECMR 
represents a more holistic approach, whereas Article 81 (3) is about positive (hard) law 
because it has only four exceptions and all of them require solid evidence.  In terms of 
pragmatics, it is much easier for a decision-maker when deciding on the validity of a 
merger or an acquisition to take cultural issues on board.  In addition to the above 
suggestions as to how to amend current ECMR, the judges can always look into cultural 
diversity under Article 151 and it could be dealt with as a rule of reason type of 
approach, i.e. looking at the merger holistically, including both economic and non-
economic factors.  The cultural issue can also be placed in the ECMR amongst other 
economic factors or pari passu, i.e. both price and non-price factors could be treated 
equally.  Thus, the ECMR could give the decision-makers liberties, which hard law 
cannot provide, because it is a holistic test and it fits into the argument of this thesis.  
On the contrary, Article 81 was drawn in a positive way; it is interpreted stringently, 
and because of that there maybe a problem of how to incorporate the cultural diversity 
issue into Article 81.  In terms of pragmatics, it is much harder to produce evidence to 
show that there could be more cultural diversity, had a certain practice been allowed to 
go on.  The biggest problem in this respect is that cultural diversity is not a measurable 
goal.  However, that is not to say that cultural diversity is not a worthwhile objective.  
The cultural diversity exemption could be brought up under Article 81(3), however this 
                                                
977 See for example, Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 341. 
978 For more details see Wesseling, supra, n. 882, at p 424. 
979 Schmid, supra, n. 871, at p. 169. 
980 Wesseling, supra, n. 882, at pp. 424-5. 
 239 
thesis recognises that it will cause some problems (discussed below) and they will not 
be easily solved.  
 
Unfortunately, to date there is no jurisprudence in terms of protecting diversity of music 
under Article 81 (3).  The case study of book price-fixing has demonstrated the tension 
between the law and culture and highlighted the fact that the Commission was not ready 
to give priority to cultural values over competition law.  The book price-fixing case 
study affords drawing the following analogies and lessons in terms of the record 
industry.  By making the analogy with book publishers and booksellers, it could be 
argued that the protection of independent music labels leads to cultural diversity, with 
resulting benefits to consumers and society.  The latter was one of the arguments in the 
book price-fixing debate.  Therefore, it seems that Article 81(3) could potentially be 
used to protect cultural diversity in the record industry but only via the prism of 
consumer interest protection.  The aforementioned begs the question of what could be 
done to improve this situation? 
 
Scholars provided various suggestions as to the location of cultural exception in Article 
81.  These suggestions can be classified into two groups: hard law and soft law.   
 
The first group is self-explanatory in that it accumulates the opinions that non-economic 
concerns should be outside the scope of Article 81 (3).  Chapter 6 summarised the 
rationales for the hard law approach, i.e. that the incorporation of hard-to-measure 
cultural issues would make the analysis more difficult.  
 
However, this study has shown that cultural diversity could or should be admitted into 
the analysis under Article 81(3).  Therefore, begging the soft law approach, meaning 
that law should consider cultural diversity.  The question that arises in this respect is 
how cultural diversity should be treated under Article 81?  The answer once again 
depends on whether one treats cultural diversity as a competition concern or a non-
competition concern?  Akin to the ECMR, treating cultural diversity as a competition 
concern is possible but more problematic.  Treating cultural diversity as a non-
competition concern is less debatable and easier to apply in practice.   
 
Starting from the latter option, there are a number of alternatives within it.  The first 
approach would be the introduction of achieving a balance between both the pro and 
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anti-competitive constituents of the economic issues of the agreements under Article 
81(1).  This is argued to enable Article 81(3) to take on board other goals of the 
Community.981  According to this approach, if the pro-competitive aspects prevail, the 
agreement does not fall under Article 81(1); therefore, there is no need to consider the 
exemptions under Article 81(3).  Thus, only if anti-competitive effects outstripped pro 
competitive effects would recourse to Article 81(3) be required.  Such an approach 
however, would re-introduce the debate about the rule of reason.982 
 
Some scholars insist that the Commission could legitimately consider non-economic 
considerations under Article 81(3), in particular cultural issues, had there been a 
teleological (when an action is morally justified by the outcome, or the ends do justify 
the means) interpretation of the EC Treaty competition provisions.983  In other words: 
“... competition can be sacrificed when the social costs of it might be too high”.984  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 6, such reading of the Treaty competition rules has already 
taken place in a number of rulings by the Commission and the ECJ. 
 
However, it seems that the best option suggested with respect to Article 81(3) could be 
to balance the provisions of Article 81(3), as a whole, against the other constitutional 
goals of the Community without including them in the substance of Article 81(3).985  
The rationale for this approach is that the priority still lies with Article 81(3), however, 
the Commission would have to be aware of the non-economic issues but not to the 
extent that they should drive though the decision-making process.  Thus, non-economic 
concerns would only form a backdrop in decision making.  Such an alternative 
considers non-economic issues only as a matter of conciseness, or at arm’s length.  This 
solution seems to be less controversial as well as the easiest one to implement, as it does 
not change the wording of Article 81(3).  The unease that I have with this solution is 
that it seems incomplete to take culture into account only “as a further positive element 
among other economic efficiency elements of a restrictive agreement”.986  This is not to 
                                                
981 id., at pp. 422-3; and Ehlermann, id., n. 879, at p. 548. 
982 Wesseling, id. 
983 Mario Siragusa, “Comment” in European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives of 
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986 id., at p. 6. 
 241 
say that the approach is poor, but it still leaves the Commission with no specific legal 
tool to protect culture and therefore, in a way, goes against one of the main findings of 
this thesis, i.e. that culture is a legitimate (and constitutional) value that needs to be 
taken into account when balancing competition in, for example, the record industry.  
That perhaps explains why some voices went as far as suggesting re-writing Article 
81(3) to specifically include and emphasise non-competition considerations.987 
 
Therefore, another solution is to treat cultural diversity as a non-competition concern, 
but to include it within Article 81(3).  In that case cultural diversity would clearly be 
taken into account under the assessment of competition law.  The aforementioned 
suggestion would be bound to produce a huge debate amongst competition lawyers, but 
without the express legal tool in the EC Treaty, perhaps a special exemption based on 
cultural values,988 Article 81 is unlikely to be able to protect both culture and cultural 
diversity.  Therefore, what is needed is an explicit definition of competencies of the 
Commission in terms of how to protect diversity in cultural industries under Article 
81(3).  It does not mean that Article 151(4) should take precedence over other EC 
Treaty objectives, e.g. protection of competition, but one could argue that “... the goals 
identified under the various EU policy headings must be attained in the most-culturally 
friendly way”.989 
 
The above demonstrates that the incorporation of a cultural diversity clause into Article 
81 is by no means a straightforward issue.  There would be a certain number of 
stumbling blocks.  Firstly, all current provisions of Article 81(3) are outcome-based 
because they are easy to measure.  That is not to say that cultural diversity cannot be a 
factor in a decision-making process, but the problematic point is that once it is 
translated as a defence, it requires defendants (e.g. independent labels) to produce 
outcomes.  Another important practical point is that with Article 81(3) the burden will 
lie on the independents to prove that a particular agreement will benefit cultural 
diversity.  As indicated in Chapter 3, independents are likely to have a small turnover, 
and as a result, limited financial resources to defend their action.  Therefore, even 
though they may have defence under Article 81(3), it could prove to be on paper only.  
                                                
987 Christian Kirchner, “Comment,” in European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives of 
Competition Policy, ed. Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine Laudati (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), 
515, 517. 
988 Schmid, supra, n. 871, at p. 167. 
989 Psychigiopoulou, supra, n. 731, at p. 838. 
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The above may be only teething problems that could be overcome as the jurisprudence 
develops, but they have to be acknowledged in this research. 
 
Finally, a completely different (and easier) solution to the problem is to incorporate 
cultural diversity into Article 81(3) as a rhetorical service or a formalistic recognition of 
cultural diversity as a laudable outcome.  In this sense the law recognises the role it has 
with regard to cultural diversity and its protection.  For example, free trade agreements 
between countries often have a clause which ensures fair competition.  However, such 
agreements contain no definition, no enforcement procedures or dispute resolution 
procedures if the clause is breached.  Thus, in a way such a clause does not do anything, 
but it serves well in international relations; it creates opinio juris, i.e. an action is taken 
because it is a legal obligation.  With time, it may crystallise into something more 
concrete.  In this case, the onus will lay with the European Commission (not the 
independents) to come up with a test of what the protection of cultural diversity under 
Article 81(3) is. 
 
Additional Factors to Be Considered by Competition Law Authorities 
when Dealing with Cultural Diversity in the Record Industry 
 
This research demonstrated that the existing legal mechanisms that were used to protect 
the record industry from consolidation have proved inadequate.  The embrace by the 
Commission of empirical analysis of price effects, ignoring the diversity of competition 
in cultural industries, does not seem to offer much of a decent prospect.  However, as 
demonstrated above, there is a glimmer of hope in the second approval and the 
challenge of the Sony/BMG merger by the European Parliament.  This study has sought 
to illustrate that the economic analysis undertaken in the context of merger and 
acquisition investigations should take diversity into account, as some of the most 
important competitive factors in the record industry are indeed innovation and diversity.  
The fact that diversity levels are inversely connected with concentration levels in the 
record industry (discussed in Chapter 1) indicates that competition law should support 
cultural diversity.  However, in order to do so, lawyers need an operational definition of 
‘cultural diversity’ in relation to cultural industries as opposed to the wide definition 
provided by UNESCO.  The research considered in Chapter 1 showed that diversity 
could be measured, but it seems too simplistic and incorrect to measure diversity based 
 243 
on the top 100 hits from Billboard or similar charts; diversity means more than that.  
For example, the charts contain up to 100 albums, but they do not necessarily 
demonstrate the diversity of musical genres.  Besides, the questions arise as to how one 
measures diversity in a digital market and what happens when independent labels have 
numerous deals with majors?  This study suggested that diversity should incorporate 
two categories: diversity of products and diversity of producers.  But more precise 
formulae of how to measure the diversity of producers and products are needed.  All 
these arguments demonstrate the need for a thorough definition of diversity that could 
be used by lawyers in the digital age, and it could well be the subject matter of another 
thesis.   
 
Additionally, when assessing a proposed merger, the Commission should take on board 
the distribution aspects as well.  Traditionally, it was the production of cultural 
products, in this case records, that was of crucial importance.  However, in the digital 
age, there is a shift in importance from production to distribution.  Presently, it is the 
majors who own not only their distribution channels, but the majority of independent 
distributors as well.  The fact that Rupert Murdoch owns the biggest platform for 
independent musicians, MySpace, speaks for itself.990  In this respect the creation of 
MySpace Music service991 between MySpace and the four majors rings an alarm bell as 
the new service is jointly owned by the News Corporation and the majors, leaving no 
stake for the independent sector, which contributes so much to the Long Tail.  
Therefore, it is the distribution of music to which the competition authorities should pay 
more attention, instead of price increase issues.   
 
Additionally, as stated above, digital technology may aid in diminishing the market 
power of majors.  Advanced technology has already provided smaller labels with 
numerous opportunities to record and release new music.   However, digital technology 
does not yet provide effective competition between majors and independents as one of 
the biggest keys to success in the record industry lies in extensive (and expensive) 
marketing.  Moreover, in terms of the relationship between law and cultural diversity, 
technological advances also raise a number of questions: for instance, how will 
competition law grasp digital technology?  Another is how will competition law deal 
                                                
990 BBC, “News Corp in $580m Internet Buy.” July 19, 2005. 
991 Andrew Orlowski, “MySpace Music Leaves Creators Cold,” The Register, April 4, 2008; Austine 
Modine, “MySpace Trumpets Music Service,” The Register, April 3, 2008.  
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with cultural diversity in the twenty-first century when music is being sold, and in some 
cases owned by players, other than record companies, e.g. mobile phone companies and 
telecoms?  Therefore, these issues need to be taken in to account when investigating 
mergers and acquisitions.  
 
The evident conclusion of this research is that competition law has failed to prevent 
high consolidation within the record industry, and consequently, to protect cultural 
diversity.  However, it would be extreme to say that competition law should be made 
redundant, in fact, quite the opposite.  There is a need for competition law to regulate 
cultural industries, as they cannot be left to self-regulation (see Chapter 1).  Cultural 
diversity needs to be protected and the competition authorities should have specific 
legal rules.  A crucial point of this study argues that it is important to keep competition 
law and theory, because particularly in horizontal merger analysis, evidence-based tests 
would be vital in determining possible anti-competitive effects.992  Additionally, 
economic theory, backed up by empirical data, is vital for analysing possible damage to 
both competition and consumers.993  However, the most important feature of this 
research shows that competition authorities should pay more attention to cultural 
matters when considering mergers and acquisitions in cultural industries.  The 
incorporation of the analysis of cultural matters into the investigation process would 
make merger analysis flexible and forward-looking.  In other words, merger regulation 
in the twenty-first century should reflect this century’s cultural industries’ needs.994 
 
Taking a futuristic approach, even if the majors become fragmented and the power 
shifts into the hands of telecoms and mobile phone companies, the independents (along 
with cultural diversity) will be in a much weaker position because they are unlikely to 
be able to compete at all with those powerful players.  If mobile phone operators and 
telecoms are dwarfing the majors now, what is there to say about the independents?  
The effect of mobile phone operators and telecom giants using music as a loss leader 
must not be under-estimated.  Will these conglomerates want to have eclectic or non-
mainstream music or will they prefer to feature superstars on their portals and devices?  
One look at the front pages of the biggest Internet portals will point to the latter.  Thus, 
                                                
992 Adrian Majumdar, “Whither Dominance.” European Competition Law Review 27, no. 4 (2006): 161. 
993 id., at p. 162. 
994 BBC, supra, n. 140.  The importance of flexibility when dealing with cultural industries was also 
emphasised by DiMaggio, supra, n. 26, at p. 68. 
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the dilemma between law and culture, high concentration and cultural diversity should 
be dealt with now. 
 
This research argued for the importance of cultural industries and cultural diversity to 
be recognised and for their special treatment by competition law.  However, as specified 
in Section 1.10, the limitation of this study is that it has used only the record industry as 
a tool to prove the thesis.  There are, of course, other types of cultural industries, and 
some of them have been mentioned throughout the study.  It would be ideal to have 
similar research carried out into these other types of cultural industries.  However, at 
this point it can be concluded that the findings of this research are relevant to those 
other types of cultural industries and therefore could be applied to other areas of cultural 
industries.  For example, the film industry has a similar concentration issue exemplified 
by a small number of US film producers dominating screens around the world.  At the 
same time, low and even high budget movies produced elsewhere do not normally even 
get to the big screens outside their territories.  This result impairs cultural diversity, and 
as such should be dealt with under competition law as a non-competition concern.  The 
book publishing and book selling industries experience similar problems, which have 
been touched upon in Chapters 1 and 6, namely that independent book sellers struggle 
to compete with big chains.  In this case, price is of importance more so than in case 
with the record industry but such a non-price issue as cultural diversity should also be 
taken into account in future mergers and acquisitions by the big chains.  Therefore, the 
modification of the existing ECMR seems to be able to bring better decision making in 
these other types of cultural industries, but more research is needed in this direction. 
 
The conflict between law and culture is yet to be reconciled and perhaps future works 
could contribute to this dilemma.  Contemporary competition is going to become even 
more complicated with mergers becoming more and more of transnational nature, which 
in turn involves the complexities of different legal regimes.  Moreover, in future the 
record industry will become increasingly inter-connected with numerous digital 
channels, broadcasters, and ISPs, which in turn will make sustainable competition 
patterns more difficult to identify.  Nevertheless, this conflict needs to be resolved, and 
it is the hope of this author that this and future studies will contribute to solving this 
issue. 
 
 246 
Concluding Remarks: Other Ways to Diminish Concentration in the 
Record Industry 
 
Apart from the ECMR this study highlighted other potential avenues for protecting 
cultural diversity, e.g. Article 81 of the EC Treaty (not yet exercised in relation to the 
record industry) and complaints to national trading authorities.  Other ways to diminish 
the oligopolistic structure of the record industry could include further actions by 
competition law, e.g. forcing the sale of parts of conglomerates, and providing state 
support for new and innovative companies.  When a proposed merger requires an in-
depth analysis, the introduction of an independent appraiser might be another way 
forward; this already exists in the British system in the Office of Fair Trading.  The 
American example of merger cases being dealt with in court is also worthy of 
consideration.  However, private litigation is expensive and very few independents 
could afford an action against a major.995 
 
There are of course other ways to reduce concentration levels, and to prevent further 
consolidation.  Copyright law is the most important of them all.  The interesting thing 
about copyrights is that there are no anti-competitive effects of copyrights as such.996  
However, the fact that there is such a high concentration of copyrights held by relatively 
few companies does allow the majors to abuse and increase their market power and 
somewhat control diversity.997  Therefore, another way to prevent even further 
consolidation in the record industry would be by not extending the copyright term in 
sound recordings.  As argued in Chapter 4, competition and copyright law have 
divergent effects because the former seeks to prevent a monopoly, whilst the latter 
grants monopoly rights.  But it could also be argued that the objectives of the copyright 
and competition laws are essentially the same.  Both sets of rules should seek to 
promote innovation and investment to the benefit of consumers.  As Advocate General, 
Gulmann, stated in Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission: “It must not be 
forgotten…copyright law - like other intellectual property rights - also serves to 
                                                
995 Quoting Oliver Bretz, a competition lawyer of Clifford Chance in The Economist, “Let’s Try That 
Again,” July 22, 2006, at pp. 68-69.  Clifford Jones, “Foundations of Competition Policy in the EU and 
USA: Conflict, Convergence and Beyond,” in The Evolution of European Competition Law: Whose 
Regulation, Which Competition?, ed. Hanns Ullrich (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), 34. 
996 Some argue that parallel imports constitute an anti-competitive effect of the copyright.  See Out-Law, 
“CD WOW! Loses Six-year Parallel Import Battle with Music Industry.” March, 20, 2007. 
997 Bishop, supra, n. 236, at pp. 443 – 471. 
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promote competition”.998  However, as shown in Chapter 4, the acquisition of 
copyrights was, and still is, one of the main reasons for consolidation in the record 
industry, with the direct consequence of cultural diversity diminution.  That is why the 
competition authorities should consider how the consolidation of copyrights in the 
hands of a few majors affects cultural diversity.  
 
As stated in Chapter 4, since 2004 there has been a trend to extend the term of copyright 
protection in sound recordings, which could result in reducing cultural diversity.  
Thankfully, the recommendation of the Gowers Review for term not to be extended in 
sound recordings999 shows some positive signs.  However, the general reluctance of the 
UK government has to be counter-balanced with several attempts this time by the EU 
itself to increase the term of copyright protection in sound recordings from 50 to 95 
years.1000  Once again the Commission chose to ignore that copyright monopolies can 
stifle innovation and progression, for instance the re-release of old recordings and new 
music based on sampling, whilst providing a steady income stream to the majors, 
precisely why the record industry has spent so much time and money in lobbying 
governments for the extension. 1001  Time will show whether national governments will 
resist the EU pressure.  To the moment of writing, the UK government was not 
convinced as to an economic case for extending the copyright term for performers: “we 
would need to be convinced of real benefits, particularly that it is truly the performers 
who will benefit rather than the record labels”.1002 
 
One of the reasons why major record companies grew to their size was the advantage of 
copyright ownership and by having considerable market power, they are able to acquire 
more copyrights, which are both their most valuable asset and their largest investment at 
the same time.  The phenomenon creates a vicious circle, discussed in greater detail in 
                                                
998 Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann in joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P - Radio Telefis 
Eireann and Independent Television Publications Limited v. Commission [1995] ECR I - 00743, at 
footnote 10. 
999 Andrew Gowers actually considered shortening the copyright term in sound recordings to less than 50 
years but thought it was “politically prudent” to do so.  See Out-Law, “Gowers Considered Cutting Music 
Copyright to under 50 Years.” April 26, 2007. 
1000 Europa, “Performing Artists – No Longer Be the Poor Cousins of the Music Business – Charlie 
McCreevy.” February 14, 2008; Nikki Tait, “EU Push to Extend Copyright of Musical Performers,” The 
Financial Times, February 15, 2008; Karen Attwood, “EU Wants Standard 95-Year Copyright for 
Music,” The Independent, February 15, 2008; David Gow, “Extend Performers’ Copyright to 95 Years, 
Says EU Commissioner,” The Guardian, February 15, 2008; David Charter, “Sir Cliff Richard Pins 
Hopes on Law that Will Keep Cash Rolling in until He’s 113,” The Independent, July 17, 2008.  
1001 Martin Kretschmer, “Copyright Extension Will Benefit Few,” The Financial Times, February 18, 
2008. 
1002 id.  
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Chapter 4 and has produced many repercussions on diversity, creativity, entry barriers 
to the market, and viability of the music market overall.  Such behaviour leads to a 
situation where small business is not sustained on a larger scale.  Moreover, instead of 
providing an adequate form of protection to artists, copyright law quite often has had 
the opposite effect, with artists having to “...bargain with more powerful firms than they 
would have to, were copyrights weaker and of shorter duration”.1003  Thus, if an artist is 
rejected by four majors or does not want to accept their ‘take it or leave it’ contracts, the 
only way out is in the independent labels.1004  
 
The resulting majors’ market power gives rise to the anomaly that independents release 
80 percent of music available whilst the 20 percent released by the majors account for 
most of the sales and profits in the record industry.  The high concentration of 
copyrights in the record industry is a fact but there are steps that can be made to reduce 
the power of the majors.  Independents can and should play their part in minimising the 
problem of the described vicious circle.  It is unfortunate that their trade bodies cannot 
see that, and instead support copyright extension.  It can be argued that reversal of the 
copyright after an exploitative fixed term back to the artists1005 could diminish the 
vicious circle problem.  In this respect a ‘use it or lose it’ approach has been suggested, 
e.g. if copyright holders do not make a work available for public access for a period of 2 
years, the rights would revert to the artists. 1006  This change would enhance competition 
and cultural diversity and bring greater benefits to creators, artists, and consumers.  
Another solution to diminish the effect of the described vicious circle would be to grant 
the copyright in sound recordings to those artists who have recouped the costs involved 
in those recordings from their royalties.  In this case, those artists could license the 
sound recordings back to the record company for an additional amount of money.  Such 
a move is, however, unlikely to be implemented in the near future, as both major and 
independent labels would probably resist it. 
 
Competition law regulators too have a role to play in diminishing such high copyrights 
concentration in the hands of the four majors, as it was competition law that has allowed 
such power to be wielded by this handful of companies in the first place.  Consolidation 
                                                
1003 Towse, supra, n. 485, at p. 99. 
1004 Interview with Mike Batt, supra, n. 343. 
1005 Record of the Day, “FAC Backs EU Preliminary Decision not to Extend Copyright on Sound 
Recordings.” March 31, 2009. 
1006 Music Managers Forum, “Music Managers Forum Submission to the Gowers Review of Intellectual 
Property.” 
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is not a problem in its own right, how the majors behave in the market is what does 
matter, and as Chapter 4 illustrated, majors do take advantage of the market power they 
wield.  As opposed to the arts, which seek direct government support through subsidies, 
record companies seek indirect support through copyright law and its proposed 
extension.  Competition law is the only way to stop the ever-increasing desire to merge 
and grow exponentially.  Striking the right balance between the encouragement of 
competition and monopoly rights granted by copyrights is extremely difficult, but steps 
in this direction should be made.  Some scholars, particularly cultural optimists, argue 
that “the freer the market, the better”.1007  However, as illustrated in Chapter 4, a more 
open market structure may lead to the abuse of the situation.1008 
 
The present study has demonstrated the need for further empirical contributions to be 
made.  The ever-changing nature of the record industry, particularly in the digital age, 
will necessitate relevant changes in the law.  It is the hope of this author that future 
research improves on the measures between diversity and concentration and adds 
further insights to both the research of cultural industries and the necessary changes in 
competition law to take the cultural issues on board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1007 Towse, supra, n. 54, at p. 122.  See also Cowen, supra, n. 57; and Keith Acheson and Christopher 
Maule, “Understanding Hollywood’s Organisation and Continuing Success.” Journal of Cultural 
Economics 18, no. 4 (1994/95): 271 – 300. 
1008 Towse, ib. 
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Glossary 
 
Advance - is an up-front amount of money paid to an artist to deliver a recording that is 
later recouped from the artist’s royalty.  The advance is a form of loan from the record 
company. 
 
A&R - is an acronym for Artist & Repertoire, akin to Research & Development in 
technological industries.  A&R departments are the key feature of the industry because 
they search for new talent and genres, marry the desired content with the artist, and are 
responsible for the development of the artists on their roster.  
 
Campaign Price / Discount - is a discount that a record company applies to a certain 
sales’ campaign in retail. 
 
Compilation - is a record that contains songs by different artists. 
 
Concentration - is a term used in economics to describe market structure.  A high level 
of concentration signifies that the market is controlled by a small number of participants 
or gatekeepers.  In this case, the market is described as oligopolistic, i.e. the situation 
where firms are in the position to control the output and prices in order to maximise 
their profits. 
 
Cover Record - is a new version of a previously released song by a different artist. 
 
Deletion (Deleted Works) - is a record industry term referring to the removal of a 
record from a label's official catalogue.  Deletion usually happens as a result of a 
decline in sales because distributing the record becomes no longer profitable. 
 
Horizontal Integration - involves the same stages of production process, e.g. mergers 
between the existing firms and acquisitions of smaller competitors.  It allows firms to 
increase their market share, and consequently their profits and market power.   
 
File Discount - is a general discount negotiated annually and which impacts all albums 
sold to a particular customer. 
 
 251 
Foreclosure - is the practice exercised by the dominant company that denies or limits 
proper access to the market, the aim of which is to extend the company’s market power. 
 
Invoice Price / Discount - is the record company's initial charge to the dealer.  
Therefore, an invoice discount is the deduction from the face amount of an invoice, 
made in advance of its payment.  
 
Licensed-in Product - is a product (album) that was licensed to a record company 
(normally major) by another record company (normally independent label) for 
marketing and distribution. 
 
List Price / Discount - is the record company’s price, but very few buyers actually pay 
this price.  The list price puts a ceiling on the retail price that can be charged and its 
main role is to define product categories for albums.  
 
Maverick Firm - is a powerful firm that can drive competition in the market. 
 
Publisher - is a company that acquires rights to music and its exploitation. 
 
Published Price per Dealer (PPD) - is the amount the retailer buys the CD for. 
 
Retrospective Discount - is an end-of-year bonus, where rebates are negotiated with 
customers on the basis of the turnover in the preceding year. 
 
Roster - is the number of artists signed to a label. 
 
Sampling (digital) - is the process of taking a part, or sample, of a song and reusing it 
in a different song.  This process can be very expensive, as quite often two clearances 
have to be obtained by the sampler, i.e. copyright clearance in the sound recording 
(normally obtained from a record company) as well as copyright clearance in a musical 
composition (normally obtained from a publisher). 
 
Second Request - is a process by which US competition authorities (the FTC and 
Antitrust Division) request more information and data about a proposed merger or 
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acquisition, if they believe that the new entity will impede competition in a given 
market. 
 
Soundtrack - is a recording of the musical composition for a film. 
 
Sound / Master Recording - is an original recording, from which copies are made. 
 
Sunk Cost Industry - is an industry where costs are incurred and cannot be reversed, 
i.e. sunk costs are unrecoverable past expenditures. 
 
Vertical Integration - allows firms to improve their supply chain efficiency, it involves 
different stages of production process, and e.g. when a major record company acquires 
CD manufacturing, distribution, and marketing facilities.   
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List of Abbreviations 
 
A&R – Artist & Repertoire 
BPI – British Phonographic Industry 
CC – Creative Commons 
CD – Compact Disc 
CDPA – Copyrights, Design and Patent Act 
CFI – Court of First Instance 
ECJ – European Court of Justice 
ECMR – European Community Merger Regulation 
EP – European Parliament 
FTC – Federal Trade Commission 
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product  
GVA - Gross Value Added  
IFPI – International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
ISP – Internet Software Provider 
LP – Long Playing Record 
MCPS-PRS – Mechanical Copyright Protection Society and Performing Right Society 
RIAA – Recording Industry Association of America 
OFT – Office of Fair Trading 
SME – Small & Medium Enterprises 
SIEC – Significant Impediment of Effective Competition 
SLC – Substantial Lessening of Competition 
TRIPS – Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Questionnaire 
 
1. What is an independent label? 
 
2. What was your motivation for setting up an independent label? 
 
3. Do you think there are differences between majors and independents?  
 
4. Do you think that the romantic version of an independent label is being eroded 
these days, and is it all about profit-making even for independents?  
 
5. Do you think that independents care about cultural diversity more than majors? 
 
6. Are independents eroding the monopoly of majors? 
 
7. What is your attitude towards the term extension of copyright in sound 
recordings?  Who will benefit from this: labels or artists?  And why do 
independent labels support the extension?  
 
8. Are there any aspects of majors’ behaviour that impact negatively on 
independents?  
 
9. Are there any aspects of majors’ behaviour that impact positively on 
independents?   
 
10. What do you think was the main reason for the merger between Sony and BMG? 
 
11.  Should Impala have opposed the SonyBMG merger?  
 
12.  Do you think that the recent victory of Impala in the Court of First Instance will 
change anything for the independents? 
 
13. Do you feel the record industry has to be regulated (if so, by whom)?  
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